



STATE THEORY
AND
ANDEAN POLITICS

NEW APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RULE

Edited by
Christopher Krupa and David Nugent

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PENN

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Chapter 1

**Off-Centered States: Rethinking State Theory
Through an Andean Lens**

Christopher Krupa and David Nugent

The Andean region has become a site of unprecedented global concern and curiosity in recent years. Governments that represent diverse and often unorthodox followings, and that claim variously to lead or constrain a continent-wide anti-neoliberal vanguard, have made the Andean region a powerful signifier of hope and fear for political observers around the world. Indeed, constituencies located at multiple sites and scales—local, regional, and transnational—have looked to the states of the Andean region to implement deeply held and often conflicting ideas about social justice, economic prosperity, and individual well-being. One need only compare the self-righteous (and exceptionally violent) efforts of the U.S. government to eradicate coca production in the Andean region with the celebrations surrounding the election of former cocalero Evo Morales to the Bolivian presidency to appreciate the radically different hopes and fears associated with the politics and political actors of the region.

In part, these diverse and contradictory expectations have emerged out of a specific historical conjuncture. The last several decades have been witness to major restructuring initiatives that have generated contradictory waves of governmental contraction and expansion in the Andes. These initiatives have been associated with shifting and often violently induced redistributions of political, economic, and social tasks within and between public and private sectors, and have been accompanied by widespread debate over the meaning

of political participation. Among the most important consequences of these experiments in restructuring has been a loss of certainty about how political life is to be organized, and who is to be entrusted with the task of organizing it. This in turn has produced not only ambiguity but also great anxiety about what the state is, where it is located, and what it means to be a part of political life.

These conditions of widespread restructuring, and the conflicting hopes and fears to which they have helped give rise, form the point of departure for the present volume. In this book we draw on contemporary and historical examples of political process in the Andes to raise broadly relevant questions about the dynamics of state formation.¹ Ours is not a volume that seeks to identify regional patterns or regularities in state-related processes that are specific to the Andean region. We do not seek to position ourselves above the Andes, as it were, and gaze down on the region. Rather, we train our analytical gaze from this region of the world toward questions about the culture and politics of rule.

We begin with a series of questions that are suggested by the current conjuncture in the Andes, but are by no means unique to it. First, it is certainly striking that so many people attribute to the states of the Andes the ability to right historical wrongs, realize long-cherished hopes and dreams, protect against dangerous and destructive foes, and anticipate the unforeseen problems of an uncertain future. But what exactly is it that people attribute this ability to? In other words, when people use the term “state,” what is the *referent* of that term?

The answer to this question may seem self-evident, but we submit that this is far from the case. Indeed, it is the seeming obviousness of what the state is—the fact that it has come to be seen as a normal, unremarkable part of the social landscape (Corrigan and Sayer 1985)—that should give us pause. For as the chapters in the volume show, in practice it proves exceptionally difficult to determine what people mean by the term state. To a considerable degree, this is because scholars and lay people alike use the term in multiple and often contradictory ways. State, we suggest, is best understood as a folk term, but one that masquerades as an analytic category. Indeed, it is in part the ability of this term to assimilate so many different meanings at the same time that makes it such a powerful (and contentious) signifier for so many different constituencies. One of our goals in this volume is to map the terrain of meanings associated with the term state, so that we might better understand the political and cultural work that the notion performs.

This first question—about what the state is—suggests a second. Why do so many people have such high expectations of the state (cf. Nuijten 2003)? Why do diverse constituencies, within government and beyond it, have so much emotion invested in the ability of states to resolve the most basic dilemmas of their lives—to accomplish tasks that can only be regarded as miraculous? The endless evaluations of the state that take place in everyday life across the Andean region are rarely if ever cold or dispassionate. Rather, these ongoing assessments of what the state has done, hasn’t done, should have done, should never have done, and so on, are almost always accompanied by a powerful surfeit of emotion. What accounts for this pattern of affective overinvestment in the behavior of the state? What might we conclude about the state from the fact that so many people expect so much of it—and that they continue to do so, despite having (inevitably) been let down by it time after time after time?

These questions about the “what and the why” of the state in turn suggest additional concerns. When people look to the state to do the impossible, or bemoan its failure to do so, where do the groups concerned imagine the state to be located (socially as well as geographically), and where do they place themselves in relation to it (cf. Ferguson 2004; Ferguson and Gupta 2002)? Furthermore, what qualities do they attribute to the state in the course of establishing its location? Do they regard the state as present or absent, as too proximate or distant, as overly centralized or not centralized enough? Is the state seen as a site of corruption or virtue, as a domain that wields force in an arbitrary manner, or as an institution that protects the rights of citizens? What might we learn from the fact that what people intend to be descriptions of the state are almost always far more—that they are at once moral evaluations and imaginative projections that attribute to the state a history, a geography, an essence, a character?

Asking questions about the “what and the why” of the state raises related concerns about who, and also how and when. While a great many people across the Andes do indeed look to the state with everything from hope to fear to loathing, it is not the case that everyone does. To the contrary: much of the population—those who occupy positions in government as well as those who do not—is for much of the time indifferent to the “affairs” of the state. Nor could it be said that those who have such high hopes for or fears of the state choose to articulate or act on their concerns in all circumstances. This in turn suggests a series of unresolved questions. Who does and does not invoke the state? What motivates them to do so, and what ends do they seek in the pro-

cess? In what social contexts does the state become salient, and for which groups? When people invoke the state, to whom do they seek to convey their state-related concerns?

The contributions to this volume seek to engage these questions. They do so by focusing on the everyday, extra-official, and frequently invisible or partially concealed permutations of rule in the lives of Andean people. The chapters in the book draw on and extend into Andean studies the work of various theorists who question the idea of the state as a coercive institution (Tilly 1985), as well as those who view it as a cultural construction (Steinmetz 1999a). The inspiration for the present work derives from scholars who have sought to understand the state in relation to conflicting *claims* on legitimate domination (Scott 1985, 1990), and who have investigated the assemblages of social relations that variously compose, disassemble, and recompose around such claims (Krupa 2010). Meaning and violence are both centrally involved in this process of making claims. Indeed, state formation, we suggest, is usefully understood as a cultural process, rooted in violence, that seeks to normalize and legitimize the organized political subjection of large-scale societies (Nugent 2010).

This approach pushes us beyond the limits of the state as conventionally understood to consider how formally “nonstate” acts of governance may intersect with official institutions of government, but never be entirely determined by them or bound to their authorizing agendas. It also compels us to examine the multiple and often-contradictory logics of rule embedded in (and masked by) official expressions and acts of state (Pandey 1990). As such, our work with concrete cases aims to understand the more privatized, localized, and internalized manifestations of governance as something other than simply an add-on to the politically “real”—the sanctioned and bureaucratic institutions of power that bear the seal of state. Indeed, our cases call into question the very *notion* of the politically real—understood as a uniform, internally homogeneous enactment of state power. Instead, we focus on multiple and conflicting claims to the right to rule, within government institutions, beyond them, and between what is generally considered to be inside and outside of the state (cf. Mitchell 1991, 1999).

As the chapters in this volume show, we are especially concerned with *materially grounded* political imaginaries. We are equally concerned with their attendant assertions of the proper relation between the ruled and the rulers (sometimes characterized as “citizen-state” relations), as these are enacted in specific contexts. We posit the simultaneous existence of competing

projects of rule, which operate at multiple geographic and social scales, each of which seeks to normalize particular sets of social relations. We explore the processes by which elements of these competing political projects may (or may not) become assimilated into a coherent notion of state. We also examine the forms of inequality and oppression that are masked in the process (cf. Pandey 2006).

A prime example of this process of masking, we suggest, are national-territorial models of state formation, be they conceptualized in terms of core/periphery morphologies, centralization/decentralization tensions, or relations between bureaucratic centers and their margins. We argue that such models obscure our understanding of the multiplicity of ways in which assertions of legitimate rule are insinuated into the fabric of everyday life in the Andes. National-territorial models of the state, we suggest, are best understood as official geographies of rule that seek to naturalize the power of national regimes.

As the chapters in the volume show, the institutions associated with the national territorial state can act as powerful legitimating devices that serve to conceal vested interests and to silence subaltern and unofficial voices. The contributors to this volume adopt a critical attitude with respect to such official geographies. We prefer to view states both *as* off-centered political fields and *from* off-centered locations of analysis. To off-center the state is to denaturalize it as the transcendental core of political life and the master symbol of political practice. It is to dis-locate our inquiries from the gravitational pull of state and to expose the concrete work and outright violence involved in positing the state as the center of political life. This means tracking the ways vernacular invocations of state seek to legitimate claims to rule, grand and mundane. It means asking which kinds of actors have sought to carry out political projects under the umbrella of “state” and which have pursued non-state political projects. It means exploring the processes that have variously enabled or disabled the efforts of these actors to coordinate (or at least reconcile) their interests and concerns, between localities and across scales. It also means asking how these attempts are legitimated (if at all), and what challenges or forms of competition arise from them (Scott 1985, 1990).

By off-centering the state we also seek to draw attention to the processes that generate different kinds of political subjects, and different kinds of political subjection. We are interested in particular in the forms of citizenship and participation associated with distinct projects of rule. As the foregoing suggests, we view citizenship as a powerful process of normative claims-

making—one that is central to the formation and legitimation of states. A key dimension of citizenship, we suggest, involves struggles over which kinds of political subjects and which forms of political participation will be recognized, authorized, and embraced as valid. As such, citizenship necessarily masks and also legitimates enduring forms of inequality that are structured along lines that are not officially recognized and embraced as worthy of consideration within the parameters of particular political projects (Guerrero 2012; M. C. Ramírez 2011).

The contributions to this volume approach citizenship not as an actual status but as a legitimating political and cultural field—one that is continually restructured through the dialectic between official promise and popular claim (Krupa 2011). Our chapters also focus on the shifting frontiers of citizenship—on distinctions between normative and incomplete or deviant citizens, for example, and whether these distinctions are made according to race, language, gender, class, or other criteria. The contributors are equally concerned with the forces that give rise to these changes in the topography of citizenship-based inclusion and exclusion.²

Routes of Inquiry for Off-Centering the State

In the chapters that follow we open up discussion about four main areas of investigation.

First, we seek to encourage the development of what might be called a *critical phenomenology of rule*. Our aim here is to attend closely to the social space of lived governmental and nongovernmental encounters and to ask about the conditions that (may) make the state appear present in everyday social relations. We are equally interested not only in if but also how the state is apprehended—how it is granted objective, known status, is “seen” and experienced as such—by governed and governing populations. As the cases in the volume bring out in rich detail, the elements of everyday experience that people seize on to form an image of the state—to make claims on it, and to reach conclusions about it—vary enormously. How, we ask, do people make these choices? How do they navigate and reconcile the often-ambiguous distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate rule, within government institutions and beyond them, to reach particular conclusions about the state? This becomes an especially complex process as state projects get enacted through vernacular political systems, and as authorized and unauthorized agents alike

appropriate the lexicon of state to advance their own political and economic projects. The process by which people draw selectively on the experiences of everyday life to form an image of the state may be more complex still in zones of “graded” or “fragmented” sovereignty (such as indigenous communities, haciendas, capitalist production sites, private clinics, and so on), where unofficial logics and processes of rule figure so prominently.³

Second, we seek to focus attention on broad *morphologies* of statecraft by mapping governing structures and processes in ways that extend beyond simply tracking the centrifugal tentacles of bureaucratic reach, or that posit “limits” to a reified state. How might we trace out, instead, the geography of competing claims to political legitimacy and conditions of subjection at multiple geographic and sociopolitical scales? Which of these claims come to be assimilated into or associated with different projects of rule, by whom, and why? What dynamics obtain in overlapping zones of official and unofficial governmental practice? What efforts are made by the conflicting parties to resolve their conflicts in zones of difference, and to represent these conflicts to the populations they seek to govern? Finally, how do the contradictions inherent to all projects of rule impact domains that are generally regarded as beyond the limits of the state—the private, the domestic, the affective?

Third, we seek to open up an investigation into the role of *fantasy*, *imagination*, and *delusion* in processes of state formation—not only in generating the idea of the state, but also in forming the very categories and procedures on which state representatives base their activities. Regarding the state as idea: by means of which sets of practices—material, discursive, ritual, and performative—do people come to accept (or not) states as real and enduring parts of the social landscape? What everyday objects and encounters do people seize on as embodying the state, and how are these objects and relations produced, assembled, circulated, and consumed? What claims do people make on the state in the course of constructing it, and how do they position themselves with respect to the state? Which conditions of economy, society, and politics enable the reproduction of state-generating practices, and in which conditions does the “magic” of the state dissipate (Coronil 1997; Taussig 1997, 1999)? How does that magic come to inhabit alternative sets of practices, alternative claims to the right to govern (Nugent 2010)?

A related set of issues we explore concerns the role of fantasy and delusion in informing the institutional structures and everyday activities of the state. Here, we are concerned with what might be called the masking of the remarkable by the routine (cf. Pandey 1990, 2006). As a number of the contributions

to the volume show, fantasy and fear, anxiety and delusion, have permeated virtually every aspect of state formation in the Andes. The states of the region have been heavily invested, however, in attempting to disguise this fact. Indeed, based on the practices and procedures followed by government functionaries, the forms of representation they employ, even the categories they use to classify and administer the population, one would never know that such volatile and irrational forces have played any role whatsoever in the production of rule. We suggest that the exaggerated claims to neutrality and rationality that are part and parcel of the state's presentation of self are not to be taken at face value. We further suggest that what is important about these efforts to expunge any and all traces of affect and imagination from the entire domain of state activity is not only what these efforts conceal but also *that* they conceal. We seek to probe beneath the state's carefully crafted exterior by bringing to light what official government practice is so determined to obscure—the role of the remarkable, the delusional, in the routine activities of state.

Our fourth area of inquiry attempts to cut across national-territorial models of state power by focusing on *cross-border* processes of statecraft in regional and international context. Here, we attend to the role of transnational and subnational powers and processes that undergird as well as undermine the national state. We have in mind here forces as varied as the historically contingent dynamics of global capital, continent-wide security operations, and trans-border insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. We have in mind as well institutions of governance and assistance that work within and between multiple nation-states, as well as the transnational languages of political legitimacy that they and other political actors employ. Here, we enquire into the complex field of political-economic and sociocultural relations in which national state structures are embedded, and from which they seek to distinguish themselves.

These areas of investigation call for a different sort of methodology from that conventionally found in ethnographic and historical studies of the state. The following section outlines the approach developed by this book's authors, which we characterize as nonrealist.

Spectral Objectivity: A Nonrealist Approach to Understanding the State

What ties these routes of inquiry together is a suspicion of any approach that affords to the state the status of an objective, empirical fact. The contributors to this volume do not take the state as a given. Instead, they subject to careful, critical scrutiny what might otherwise be taken as evidence of the reality of the state—people's unending appeals to the state to afford them their rights, their protests to the state about official abuses (or neglect) of power, their attempts to understand the logic behind state actions, and their efforts to be privy to the state's secrets. The chapters in the present book assert that while these various invocations of the state do not point to its concrete existence, they are nonetheless of crucial importance. They point to how the state is conjured into being in the context of the minutiae of everyday life.

The warning against tendencies to reify the state is by now well established in the critical literature, and none so memorable as Philip Abrams's (1988: 15) admonition that we stop treating it as an "object akin to a human ear" or "even an object akin to a human marriage" (Taussig 1997). But such invectives have not provoked the crisis of representation or conceptualization they demand. Much writing in the social sciences and humanities continues to narrate the state with naturalistic certainty, as something one can stand in measurable degrees of proximity to, fall in or out of earshot of, act on or be acted on by, or grab hold of and "thereby smash, seize, or destroy" (Joseph and Nugent 1994: 19). Such habits of narration and such patterns of understanding match those found in empiricist novels or art, those José Ortega y Gasset famously derided by noting that "So coarse a reasoning lies at the bottom of what is currently called 'realism'" (Ortega y Gasset 1948: 102). It is with similar caution that we seek to understand that genre we call state realism.

We wish to understand state realism as a genre in the full sense of the term, that is, as a model for consciousness and experience, grounded in conventions mediating our interactions with the phenomenal world (Bakhtin 1994: 174–80). Realism, in this sense, posits a fully representable world, a world in which transcription acts as a mirror of reality and reality emerges as that which can be mirrored in transcription (Grant 1970). State realism is the proposition that the state assumes phenomenological form and can be apprehended as such. It posits the state as ultimately locatable, if not always in the foreground of experience then in a distant elsewhere, and found within the people and things that bear its official seal. The state arrives when these

people and things arrive and disappears when they do. It is, we maintain, on such ontological reifications of state that much of contemporary political subjection depends.

One of the most enduring conventions of state realism is a centrifugal imaginary. That is, state power is regarded as something that is concentrated in various bureaucratic-administrative centers, from which it radiates outward across national-territorial space. State extension may be traced through a variety of means—the installation of departmental offices, the movement of money, the implementation of laws, the activities of security officers, the implementation of governmental policies, projects, demands, and so forth. Underlying this approach is a somewhat hydraulic assumption that as one moves farther away from the wellspring of the state at its center to its margins or peripheries, so is the power of the state progressively reduced to a trickle or gets corrupted and transformed as it diffuses into “local” (as opposed to “national”) arenas, where it is overcome by forms of personalistic (i.e., “nonstate”) power, be they those of warlord, caudillo, or drug baron.

The studies in this volume start their investigations from a different premise. Our contributions do not presume that the state has an objective existence, and then seek to trace “its” intrusions and dissipations into social fields beyond the state. Instead, they take as a central problem to be solved the very production of realness and the aura of objectivity that may surround the state. In rejecting the notion that the state has a real, empirical existence—as well as the notion that it can be represented as such—the volume seeks to raise questions about the kind of existence the state does have. And it explores the consequences of the realist insistence that the state can be fully represented, that it is a discrete entity.

As the foregoing suggests, we posit the art of representation as a key technology of state power, evident in material acts of presenting parts *as if* they stood for wholes, objects *as if* they indexed entities, and the linkages of force and meaning that announce how such representations are to be read. On the one hand, the chapters that follow trace the ways that specific objects, relations, acts, and performances—some of which carry the mark of the state—are marshaled as if they stand for state and give material evidence of its existence and power. Our contributions are equally concerned with the ways in which these objects, relations, and performances may be used to question the existence of the state, or the legitimacy of its actions. In other words, representation as a technology of state rule is a highly contested process. A central question that we explore in the volume is how such representational

struggles are waged, and at times won, in concrete moments of governance. We also investigate the outcomes of these battles, and the conditions under which they might or might not condition “so coarse a reasoning” as state realism among the governed.

It was precisely these concerns with effectual political representation that animated Antonio Gramsci’s fascination with what he called “organic centralism”—that moment in the “relation between the governors and the governed” in which “an identification [is formed] between the individual and the whole, the whole (whatever organism it is) being represented by its leaders” (Gramsci 2000: 244). What most interested Gramsci in this relationship was how, in its elaboration into an abstraction of collective will, the figure marking the center “no longer exists in reality, but becomes a phantasm of the intellect, a fetish.” This figure comes to be approached, he noted, as a “sort of autonomous divinity,” one whose very power to act and reason is itself infused with, and no more than a product of, the forms of consent and identification it generates among members of the collectivity (243). The state and its agents must “express” (in a Hegelian sense) the interests of the whole they claim to represent and the mystical center that claims to organize it. This is a center, however, that can never in fact be located, indeed cannot exist, apart from the fetish of life bestowed on it in these immediate encounters. To follow Gramsci’s method here means that we can never actually study the state, for such a thing, except in the form of a phantasm, has no material existence. What we can study, however, are the practices through which bonds of identification and consent are solicited and bestowed (or not) on the agents of state. We can study the ways their demands are made to seem expressive of a popular will, and how, ultimately, the fetish of the state may come to take on a life of its own, as an actor seemingly playing back the desires and aspirations of its creators.

Focusing on concrete practices of governance, the authors in this volume start by asking how such practices do or do not come to be seen as embodying the state. They ask what conditions allow certain acts, relations, personages, and objects to travel under the sign of the state while others do not. Our contributors also explore how people choose from among a great many possible acts, relations, and so on, to select those that they will use to represent the state, and to pass judgment on the legitimacy of rule, in particular circumstances.

The antirealist approach developed in this book draws considerable influence from Abrams’s definition of the state as above all else “a bid to elicit

support for or tolerance of the insupportable and intolerable by presenting them as something other than themselves, namely, legitimate, disinterested domination" (1988: 76). Abrams's view of the state as a bid or claim to the right to rule rather than a thing that implements rule (see also Corrigan and Sayer 1985) compels a major rethinking of the state—one that helps open a window on the processes that are the subject of the present volume. In addition to its conceptual innovation, Abrams's argument also has important methodological implications. Indeed, it calls for a method of studying state-related processes that is very different from that employed in the state realist literature. Abrams continues: "The study of the state, seen thus, would begin with the cardinal activity involved in the serious presentation of the latter: the legitimating of the illegitimate" (76). The chapters in this volume seek to take up Abrams's methodological call. Drawing on specific cases, they explore how efforts are made to elicit support for the insupportable—not once and for all but over and over again, as a fundamental part of the process of social reproduction and of the experience of membership in modern political society. As the contributions to the present work show, relationships that involve extraction, exploitation, and domination are among the most important that are cloaked behind the mask of the state. How, the authors ask, do state-sanctioned processes seek to ensure obedience from state subjects? How do these processes attempt to guarantee a flow of surplus from those who generate it? How do officially endorsed practices of rule seek to justify the subordination and exclusion of large numbers of people? What sorts of struggle, doubt, competition, and outright rejection accompany these practices? In sum, is the illegitimate legitimated? And if so, by whom, according to whom, and by what means?

In addressing these questions, the chapters below build on Bourdieu's lead in understanding state legitimation as a type of ground-level political work, often linked less to spectacular displays of state power and benevolence than to the routine tasks undertaken daily by petty bureaucrats and minor functionaries. For Bourdieu (1999: 72), what makes political routine significant is the "obligatory reference" state agents express through their work "to the values of neutrality and disinterested loyalty to the public good." These values are not organic to the state form itself, as a priori conditions automatically legitimating the work conducted in its name. Rather, it is through such routine transactional encounters with the public that "the official representation of the state as the site of universality and of service of the general interest is invented and imposed." These assertions of universality and disinterest, Bourdieu sug-

gests, are not to be taken as merely expressions of how a fully formed and independently operating entity like the state acts in moments of encounter with something other than itself. Rather, they are better understood as moments in which the entification of the state happens. They are productive sites where *the state itself* is "invented and imposed," by means of reference to these (and other) values, as the force enabling the "illegitimate" or otherwise blatantly coercive to occur.

As studies in this book show, there is no guarantee that such representational strategies will have the intended "effect" (cf. Abrams 1988); instead, as projects, not achievements, they may produce intense debate among the governed over the terms of their subjection or expose the very illegitimacy of a state that fails to make good on its own promises. To extend Bourdieu's insights further, we need to understand better the local idioms into which abstract notions of universality, disinterest, and the like may be translated and to what effect, the conditions under which certain state-related projects adopt or refuse such "obligatory references" to such values, as well as the local competitions for political power that get codified as "particularist" or "interested" as a result. The point we wish to stress, however, is the way legitimation-work relies on and in turn supports the sort of realist ontology of state identified above. If state realism seeks to naturalize certain indexical relationships between objects (badges, seals, buildings, people) and their referent (state), thereby attributing concrete form to that referent, it likewise attempts to naturalize the meaning inherent in those objects. It strives to turn them into representational devices expressing certain values (such as universality and disinterest), as if organic to them, that legitimize the work they are meant to do.

One of the ways scholars have sought to understand the process by which the illegitimate comes to be accepted as legitimate is with recourse to the notion of the state effect—the illusion that the state is an institutional structure that is independent of economy and society (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991, 1999; Trouillot 2001). Despite the importance of this concept, and the frequency with which it is invoked in the academic literature, there has been surprisingly little ethnographic or historical exploration of the concrete dynamics of the state effect. Scholars have had little to say about how this apparition is conjured into being, by whom and toward what ends. Nor have they commented on the raw materials out of which it is fashioned, or on the characteristics of the imagined state once it has been fashioned. They have had little to say about the depth or breadth of the imagined state, or about the geography or the history attributed to it.

Working with the methodology sketched above, the chapters in this volume sketch out parameters of the state effect that have thus far received little attention from the scholarly community. Our chapters explore new ways of studying practices of governance that depart from the typical “encounter” archetype common in ethnographic and historical monographs, in which state and society are portrayed as two autonomous and fully formed entities bumping up against one another on a political trajectory framed by either coercive absorption or outright resistance (Clastres 2010). We begin with a focus on the affective life of the state, particularly the ways desire, hope, and fear may simultaneously invest us in projects of state and seem to conjure the state, as if the natural object of these emotions, into being. We go on to discuss the role of aggregation and projection in bringing the imagined state into being.

State Effect/State Affect

Like all totalities that cannot be directly seen, states must be imagined—by piecing them together on the basis of evidence derived from everyday life. How people select what will come to represent the state in any given set of circumstances, why they select what they do, and what conclusions they reach about the state in the process of so constructing it, are among our central concerns. So too, however, is the nature of the bond that holds these pieces of evidence together, and that binds people to the (idea of the) state. The contributions to the volume seek to map the affective terrain of this bond of obligation.

Indeed, a primary aim of this book is to explore the complex and contradictory process of affective attachment associated with the “state effect”—the illusion that the state is an “an inert structure that somehow stands apart from individuals and precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives” (Mitchell 1991: 4; see also Abrams 1989). We are especially interested in the emotional investments people make into what Lauren Berlant (2010) calls the “cluster of promises” that seem to adhere to the state as an object of desire—a form of attachment we refer to as *state affect*.

As a number of our chapters show, affect commonly becomes effect in the form of an assemblage of needs and hopes, desires and expectations that imply *obligation* on the part of the state to its constituents (Nuijten 2003). We assert that the unquestioned faith on the part of large numbers of people, from all walks of life, that the state has obligations to them with respect to the most

important issues in their lives is a key mechanism by which the state is brought to life in the Andean region. The contributors seek to map the affective terrain of this bond of obligation. That is, they seek to explore how hope and fear, promise and expectation, disillusion and alienation, bind people to the enduring objectification that is the state. “To phrase ‘the object of desire’ as a cluster of promises” Berlant (2010: 93) notes, helps explain “our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises.” Our endurance *in* the object, of course, implies an endurance *of* the object itself, a centralization of the subject’s desire in the reproduction of the thing-as-such, as Gramsci, as Marx, very well understood in their writings on the fetish. With respect to this dimension of state formation, there can be no effect without affect, as it were.

What is curious about the affective relationship that so many people maintain with the state, we suggest, is the degree to which it is structured around frustration and disappointment— affective responses born of promises so rarely kept by those who speak in the state’s name. As the rampant discourses of corruption and cooptation surrounding political activity so clearly attest, as well as the speed with which newly minted leaders are ousted by the very constituencies that brought them to power, disappointment in the state is in many ways anticipated, is known in advance. Indeed, for many people, disappointment and frustration seem to be built into the existential condition of living in the realm of the modern state. So too, however, is hope and expectation—that somehow this time, under this leader and this state, things will turn out differently. This cycle of hope and despair, we argue, is a fundamental part of state affect, and also of the state effect, in the Andes. In other words, the process of organizing a complex affective field, and of acting as the focal point for a range of contradictory needs and desires, is essential to the realist ontology by which the state appears to us as an independent power that has significant consequences in people’s lives.

Working with this notion of a cycle of hope and despair, the chapters here seek to shed light on the ways in which affect may expand into an enduring yet contradictory mode of sentimental engagement with the state—even when the seemingly more material and “real” powers of state are entirely absent or marginal to everyday life. As the contributors to the book show, the ways in which people may regard the state as obligated to them may concern anything from lower taxes to better health care, from greater equity to more transparency. But it is the existence of the affective bond—the perceived obligation—that helps breathe life into the state.

Aggregation and Projection

As the foregoing suggests, what we have called state affect may play a central role in state formation, acting as the bond that connects people and their everyday experiences to the idea of the state. But there are additional aspects to the process by which people conjure the state into being to which we would also like to draw attention. We refer to these as aggregation and projection.

As noted above, precisely because they cannot be seen, states must be imagined—must be constructed out of everyday encounters with objects, rituals, persons, and activities that have no inherent relation to one another or to the totality that is commonly referred to as the state. While some of these bear the mark of the state, others do not. In each of these encounters, we suggest, people seize on what is immediately available to them and on the basis of what this encounter suggests, they make several kinds of imaginative leaps and magical connections. One of these is *aggregation*. This term refers to the process by which we connect qualitatively distinct individual encounters, objects, and so on, that have nothing in common with one another and convince ourselves that they are varieties of a single, unifying experience. This names, we suggest, our relationship with the state.

In other words, as a component of state formation, aggregation depends on a process not unlike the kind that Marx referred to in volume one of *Capital*, in his analysis of the commodity form, and the transformation from use value to exchange value. Aggregation makes it possible to overcome the incommensurability of our many individual encounters with objects and activities, personages and places, and to construe all as variations on a single theme. Rather than being based on exchange value, however, aggregation is more usefully understood as being based on “fetish value.”

We employ this term toward two ends. The first is to draw attention to commensurability itself as a phenomenon that is at the very core of the process of imagining states. The second is to highlight the conditions that variously enable or disable the ability of any given object, event, and so on, to act as a fetish—to be regarded as an embodiment of state power. Complicating the process of aggregation is the fact that there is not one but many “currencies” of state. There are many networks of objects and experiences that we may draw on to form the image of a coherent institutional domain that stands outside of us and acts on us. One of our goals in the present volume is to begin a conversation about regularities in the process of aggregation—to determine whether or not particular sets of experiences, encounters, objects, places, and

personages are consistently grouped together as people construct the state out of their everyday experiences. We are equally concerned with the ends toward which these recurrent aggregations are directed.

The second kind of magical connection at work in state formation to which we seek to draw attention is *projection*.⁴ Like aggregation, projection is based on everyday encounters with objects, individuals, ritual processes, and so forth. Unlike aggregation, however, projection does not consist simply of connecting unrelated encounters. Rather, it refers to the process by which we seize on what is immediately available to us in any given encounter, and on the basis of what this encounter suggests (rather than shows) to us we project into being an entire domain of power, morality, organization, order, and discipline (or the lack thereof) that lies somewhere *beyond* that encounter. We also locate ourselves (and others) spatially, temporally, socially, and affectively as proximate to or distant from this projected domain of state, depending on a process of moral, ethical, and practical judgment about the adequacy and legitimacy of the state we project and the social world we inhabit.

The chapters in this volume seek to explore patterns in the process of projection. They attempt to focus scholarly attention on the main variations in power, morality, and so on that people conjure into being in the course of conjuring the state. The chapters also explore regularities in the circumstances that generate distinctive patterns of projection. As a first approximation, we note that among the most common of these folk models attributed to the modern state are (1) a coercive character, based on its monopoly on the use of force; (2) an emancipatory character, based on its ability (and duty) to enforce the citizenship rights associated with popular sovereignty; (3) an exploitative character, based on its role in reproducing class inequality; and (4) a mystifying or naturalizing character, based on its ability to define appropriate forms of social activity and individual and collective identity. As shown by the work of numerous scholars from multiple disciplines, it is fanciful at the very least to assert that an autonomous institutional domain referred to as the state could do any of the above. What is interesting and important, we suggest, is the recurrent view that the state can (or alternatively should) despite the fact that it never does.

The process of imagining the state involves more, however, than simply projecting its characteristics on the basis of everyday encounters. An additional dimension to projection is germane here. In general parlance the word “projection” implies that whatever we project we do so onto some spatial/temporal plane other than the one we inhabit. This is an apt description of the

process by which we imagine the state, because this by-product of our imaginative faculties is necessarily removed from our direct encounters with the objects, people, ritual spaces, and so on, that carry the mark of the state.

Realist representations suggest that encounters with official objects, acts, and personages reveal the essential features of the state. We suggest, however, that it is just the opposite. Instead of these encounters exposing to us the reality of the state, they conceal the imagined state from view even as they construct it as an apparently real entity. Because it is created through imaginative projection, the state necessarily remains shrouded, at a distance from what we can see or feel through direct experience. We can never really *know* the state, at least not directly. Because we can and must imagine it, the state is a repository into which we may project our hopes, fears, disappointments, expectations, and so forth.

As the chapters in the volume suggest, how groups aggregate unconnected events, experiences, and objects, and on this basis project a single, unified structure of rule may rest on more than state affect. While affective bonds of perceived obligation may play a crucial role in this process, so too may ethical/moral considerations. The idea of the state is always an assertion about how the social world should be organized rather than a description of how it is organized—even though the two are so consistently conflated and confused.

It is also important to note, however, that aggregation and projection commonly occur in the complete absence of affect. People call on the state for a great variety of reasons. The simple fact that they invoke this master metaphor of legitimacy, however, signifies neither belief nor affective investment in the claims made in its name. While these may be involved, it would be a mistake to assume so on the basis of the claims themselves. It is an interesting fact that assertions about the right to rule tend to be highly stylized. This is because specific languages of legitimacy (whether they concern democracy, development, divine right, human rights, etc.) come to dominate most social settings. Although the terms of these communicative systems are often contested, the use of some such language tends toward the compulsory. This in turn means that people are not at liberty to choose any type of claim that they wish. Rather, they find themselves compelled to use specific terms regardless of their personal beliefs. As a result, the use of a language of state can mask any number of different motivations and emotions.

Outline of the Book

Parts I–IV (Chapters 2–11) present empirical studies of political processes from across the Andes that focus on efforts to normalize and legitimize organized political subjection. It is our hope that these studies will open up new ways of thinking about state formation. Part V (Chapters 12 and 13) offers a series of theoretical interventions that explore the broader significance of the empirical studies. These conceptual chapters have been written by scholars whose intellectual formation allows them to view the Andes from an “off-centered” perspective. It is our hope that the theoretical contributions will help bring out the relevance of the case-specific studies for a more general scholarly audience.

Parts I–IV address the major themes introduced above. The chapters also address the broader set of issues discussed earlier in this chapter: the materially grounded nature of political imaginaries, affect as a crucial raw material out of which state effects have been fashioned; citizenship as a normative process of claims-making; and aggregation and projection as mechanisms by which the state as totality is imagined.

The contributions to Part I inquire into the conditions that (may) make the national-territorial state appear present as an ordinary, unremarkable feature of social life. They focus on how this state form is granted objective, known status, how it comes to be experienced as real, by governed and governing populations alike. They also explore the ways the reality of the state is experienced in vernacular political systems and zones of fragmented sovereignty, in which people draw selectively on the experiences of everyday life to navigate and reconcile the often ambiguous distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate rule.

The contributions by María Clemencia Ramírez and Nicole Fabricant (Chapters 2 and 3) offer critical phenomenologies of the national-territorial state. They analyze the ways official geographies based on center-periphery relations obscure what are in reality quite arbitrary and interested projects of rule. Ramírez brings this out by analyzing processes that seek to construct and expand state structures in Colombia. Fabricant approaches the issue through an analysis of efforts to deconstruct the (territorial) state in Bolivia.

Ramírez provides a fascinating discussion of the role of frontier regions in the construction of a conventional geography of rule in Colombia. Focusing on the Putumayo region, she shows that such regions are consistently represented in terms of what they are not. They are characterized in terms of

absence—zones of (national) exception that lack the key institutions and orientations that characterize the state as a whole. These peripheries are said to be witness to abuses of the most egregious kind—abuses that demand the extension of state protections and controls. Only in this way can conditions in the periphery be brought into line with those of the center. And only in this way can the state of exception represented by such frontiers be brought to an end.

The author examines discourses of a number of different kinds, each of which shares this view of the Colombian periphery, and in the process implicitly or explicitly calls for intervention or assistance. Among the most interesting aspects of Ramírez's chapter is its demonstration of the broad range of constituencies who partake of this state imaginary—from academics to politicians, from paramilitaries to guerrillas. It is revealing that such disparate groups, which disagree about virtually everything else, appear to agree on this one point.

As the author shows, what such constructions fail to acknowledge is that nowhere in Colombia (or anywhere else, we might add) can one find the idealized state that elites claim is absent in the frontier. Indeed, the neutrality and disinterest that ruling groups insist must be established in the peripheries of the nation is lacking even in the supposedly most state-saturated regions of the country (i.e., the national capital). Even in the center, Ramírez shows, state and nonstate actors alike employ violence on an extensive scale and in the most arbitrary of manners to achieve their particularistic ends. They also appropriate public institutions and national resources in the most blatant of ways to advance their own private agendas.

If the lawlessness of the center was somehow concealed from view, then elites' representation of the frontier as a zone of exception might make some sense. In fact, however, the highly "irregular" conditions of the center are common knowledge—to such an extent that they are the subject of frequent lament by elites themselves. However, this fact does not prevent elite groups from insisting that a "state of absence" is unique to frontier regions or from calling for measures that would establish new institutions in the "lawless jungles" of the Putumayo. The impartial state that so many different constituencies agree has yet to arrive in frontier regions is thus shown to be an imaginative projection rather than an actually existing institution—in the center as well as the periphery. Furthermore, it is shown to be a projection that seeks to naturalize a particular national project of rule.

Fabricant explores the naturalizing effects of official state geographies by examining events in a different national periphery—the Santa Cruz region of

Bolivia. This case provides an especially interesting contrast with Ramírez's discussion of the frontier regions of Colombia. In Bolivia, established interests do not call for the expansion of an absent state into a region where it has not yet arrived. Rather, vested interests in this section of the Bolivian periphery call for the expulsion of what they characterize as an overly present state from a domain where it is said not truly to belong.

Fabricant provides us with a fascinating discussion of the efforts of the elites of the Santa Cruz region to secede from Bolivia—to turn a periphery into a center. Cruceños have been compelled to resort to these extreme measures, she suggests, because of the unusual circumstances they face vis-à-vis the national regime of Evo Morales. The elites of Santa Cruz find themselves confronted with a popular indigenous movement that has managed to influence important aspects of government policy and seems to have "captured" the state. The Cruceños have responded by seeking to create an entirely new polity—one that would banish from their domain any and all traces of the redistributive policies of Morales, and would also be a safeguard to their own agro-industrial interests. Borrowing and inverting their adversaries' tactics and strategies, secessionist elites in Santa Cruz claim that they seek to decolonize the state and establish freedom of enterprise as well as broad conditions of social justice. Toward this end, Cruceño elites espouse a neoliberal model of government and the national-territorial model of state in which authority over land, labor, and natural resources would be recentered in what has traditionally been a backwater. Furthermore, these peripheral elites seek to make themselves central in the name of freedom and democracy.

Lesley Gill's critical phenomenology (Chapter 4) of the Colombian state analyzes the ways official state projects are enacted in vernacularized political domains. In an off-centered reading of Weber-inspired understandings of the state, she identifies a series of nonstate forms of territorial control, each of which possesses the ability to dictate the terms of everyday social life and that operate alongside, with, or against official institutions. "The state," Gill shows, has always, necessarily, forged alliances with such groups to accomplish the twin goals of maintaining social order and facilitating capital accumulation. These relationships have frequently blurred, if not inverted, the distinctions between public and private, legal and illegal, state and nonstate, making the limits of official power difficult to determine.

Gill focuses on the changing nature of these relationships in the oil-refining center of Barrancabermeja, in Colombia's Middle Magdalena region. She examines the complex mix of transnational, national, and subnational

forces that combined to produce distinctive forms of territorially based sovereignty through three successive periods during the twentieth century. Among the most interesting aspects of Gill's chapter is its emphasis on the contradictions between capitalist accumulation practices and working class mobilization in defining the specific form of territorial control that has consolidated in each of these periods.

Gill is particularly interested in the political actions and imaginaries of Barrancabermeja's working population. She documents with great insight and sensitivity the challenges the region's laboring groups have faced in sustaining their own forms and visions of democracy and popular citizenship. Ironically, it is the government and its allies that have represented the most serious threat to these efforts on the part of the working class. For in their determination to secure a compliant labor force, and to undermine popular organizations and cultural forms that seek to advance working class aspirations, official and unofficial powers have systematically violated the rights guaranteed to all Colombians. What emerges from Gill's analysis of the historically evolving nature of territorial power in Barrancabermeja is a view of state formation as an unstable process of conflicting claims, each of which seeks to normalize what are in reality quite arbitrary and interested forms of social life.

The contributions to Part II also seek to denaturalize national-territorial models of the state. They do so by drawing attention to the limitations of conventional geographies of rule by mapping governing structures and processes in ways that extend beyond tracking the expanding reach of a bureaucratic apparatus, or that posit limits to a reified state. They explore a more complex political, symbolic, and affective geography, consisting of competing claims to legitimacy, at multiple geographic and sociopolitical scales. They also investigate the process by which some of these claims come to be assimilated into state projects while others are ignored, marginalized, or made invisible.

Christopher Krupa (Chapter 5) takes up these concerns by examining the ways rural property regulation agendas were deployed in the Andes to build state capacity in areas deemed off its grid. Focusing on the region of Cayambe in northern Ecuador, Krupa shows how technologies of state expansion such as cadastral maps, land registry forms, and taxation charts were presented to landowners as thoroughly realist devices, themselves charged with indexing the new presence and power of the state in the rural highlands. Because the municipal state entrusted with cadastral renovation was then ruled by the pro-indigenous Pachakutik party, the success of this internationally funded

initiative lay in the capacity of government representatives to connect this project to the broader set of aspirations they saw as defining indigenous life in the countryside. To this end, land maps, property registration slips, and, especially, the surplus surrendered in the form of taxes, were portrayed not simply as evidence of state power. Rather, they were presented as evidence of a particular kind of state, a state embodying the popular will, that would lead the historic struggle of indigenous communities against land-based domination and racial inequality in the region. When thousands of indigenous Ecuadorians were called on by Cayambe's mayor to defend these historical objectives against elite and urban opposition, the local media puzzled over the strange form of state realism structuring the protest, telling the nation that "indigenous people support taxes"—an especially fetishistic confirmation, Krupa shows, of the tenuous connection state representatives sought with their indigenous bases.

Running through Krupa's chapter is a critique of state decentralization initiatives undertaken in the Andes during the past two decades. These initiatives have capitalized on a set of desires and promises of total inclusivity. In Ecuador, as throughout the Andes, these initiatives have generated new (though not always compatible) modes of hope and investment in the state across the entire social spectrum, even among truly marginalized groups. The appeal of these restructuring projects stems in part from their promise to extend to new social groups the benefits of liberal democratic citizenship—benefits that could be measured in geospatial terms by one's proximity to that state's centers of political power. Actually existing political centers became increasingly codified as exclusionary, myopic, and power-hoarding sites (contradicting the basic principles of universality, generalized beneficence, and public welfare that mark the state's purpose). As this occurred, proximity to these sites, paradoxically, became construed as inherently democratic, egalitarian, and beneficial. These sites became the imaginary space where the "state idea" still held great purchase (Abrams 1988 [1977]). The logic of decentralization initiatives, thus, was that all so-called margins could become centers—that every space in the national-territorial landscape and every person living within it could, in fact, become centrally located with respect to the state. This was an ideology as misrepresentative of its own logic as that which maintains that everyone can be wealthy in a capitalist society if they only work hard enough. In Krupa's chapter this promise appears in the response by a local councilman to indigenous concerns about the higher taxes to come from cadastral renovation, that "for us to be citizens, we have to comply with various requisites, one of which

is to pay taxes." Krupa interprets this intervention as an especially insidious form of "ethical doubling" that comes with presenting the state as a "cluster of promises" or an object of desire to marginalized populations—that the desire for social equity is realizable only through subjection to the state and that inequality is simply an expression of distance from it.

As Krupa maintains, the critical question about the era of decentralization is not how a more proper and successful distribution of political resources could be achieved (a question that replays to the state the story it tells of itself). Instead, the real question concerns how it is that the ability to realize commonly held desires for such things as democracy, justice, betterment, and progress comes to be framed in terms of people's proximity to the state. Implicit in such a framing is the claim that the state naturally monopolizes the capacity to dispense these conditions—a claim that in turn shapes what comes to count as "state" in people's lives.

A. Kim Clark (Chapter 6) also provides a critical morphology of national-territorial models of the state. Clark frames her chapter conceptually by drawing on the influential formulations of Timothy Mitchell (1991, 1999) and Philip Abrams (1988). These scholars, she suggests, call on us to question the seeming unity and autonomy of the state—to ask how states come to be regarded as coherent entities separate from the social order. Clark is particularly interested in what might be thought of as the stratigraphy of the state (cf. Ferguson and Gupta 2002)—in how the state comes to be regarded as standing above everyday social life. Clark is equally interested in the spatiality of the state—in the ways that state projects come to be construed as forms of outreach, emanating from a center, to act on areas where the state had previously not established a presence. These processes, she suggests, are integral to understanding how the intolerable becomes tolerated—how the illegitimate becomes legitimated.

Clark examines these questions by analyzing two projects carried out by the Servicio de Sanidad (Public Health Service) in the highlands of Ecuador in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The first was a campaign to eradicate bubonic plague in a rural province. The second was a maternal-infant health program that was established in provincial capitals and county seats. Clark provides us with a fascinating account of the process by which certain kinds of health problems came to be constituted as "public," and therefore as suitable for "state" intervention. She provides us with an equally insightful and interesting discussion of the activities of the individuals who helped carry out these programs. Clark is especially attentive to the role of

state actors in projecting the image of a disinterested state. Public health officials, she shows, were quite conscious of the impression that they created, through their own actions, as well as by means of the practices of those they supervised.

While the generation of a state idea, Clark suggests, was critically dependent on the actions of these individuals, far more was involved in making the intolerable become tolerated. State projects became persuasive and attractive when they brought together at least some of the aspirations of their recipients with the goals of state actors and institutions. Through a process of mutual co-constitution, she argues, the social relations of everyday life came to invade and orient state programs, even as state actors actively constructed the image of a beneficent state acting on society.

Mercedes Prieto (Chapter 7) also explores the limitations of conventional center-periphery models of state, but through the lens of emergent forms of gendered citizenship. Prieto examines this issue by analyzing government-sponsored social welfare and development projects (in particular, the *Misión Andina*) in highland Ecuador during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Among the most interesting aspects of Prieto's analysis is her discussion of these programs as "state events." By using this term, Prieto draws attention to the periodic, intermittent nature of the encounters between those responsible for the government programs and indigenous communities. The goal of these efforts at social engineering, she suggests, was to establish novel forms of interdependence that would help improve the living conditions in indigenous communities, a task made more difficult by the fact that responsibility for the everyday administration of indigenous people was in the hands of nonstate elites (hacienda owners and Catholic church officials). Prieto argues that government programs organized as state events helped generate "partial state subjects"—subjects who recognized the existence of the state, but who were nonetheless able at certain moments to resist state subjection, and at other times used state programs strategically to further their own agendas.

As Prieto shows, the forms of indigenous personhood that government programs sought to construct were highly gendered. They were also intended to shore up the particular form of family that government elites believed dominated the countryside. This was the traditional nuclear family, which the government regarded as patriarchal, moral, and self-regulating. By reaching out in gender-specific ways to empower communities, those responsible for government programs sought to establish a *modus vivendi*, of a principally polit-

ical character, in which administration was based on neither a fully developed bureaucratic edifice nor a drive toward complete hegemony.

The contributions to Part III seek to open up an investigation into the role of fantasy, imagination, and delusion in processes of state formation—not only in generating the idea of the state, but also in forming the very categories and procedures on which state representatives base their activities. Here, we are interested in the physical objects, the social categories, and the cultural encounters that people seize on in forming a coherent (if illusory) notion of the state. We are equally concerned with the conditions that undermine these processes of aggregation and projection, such that the magic of the state dissipates.

Irene Silverblatt (Chapter 8) provides a fascinating account of the role of fear, fantasy, and delusion in Andean state formation, by focusing on the “great conspiracy” and the Inquisition of 1639. In the *Gran Auto de Fe* that was the culmination of the conspiracy, Crown officials sought to deal with a crisis of major proportions—one they believed represented a dire threat to the entire colonial order. The threat stemmed, they believed, from alarming developments in society that undermined the integrity of the racial hierarchy that Crown officials viewed as the basis of colonial rule.

During the half-century leading up to the “great conspiracy,” Silverblatt shows, the Crown had established a bureaucratic order intended to administer a population classified by rigid categories of race (Indian, Negro, White). These categories were wholly imaginary. They sought to impose unity on groups that had little in common, and in the process obscured deep divisions internal to each “race.” Even so, being a (white) Spaniard was intended to define a unifying experience for all colonizers, just as being an Indian or a Negro was meant to articulate a common experience of being colonized. It was the common (if imaginary) experience of being one thing or another that had been called into question, officials feared, by the extensive blurring between these categories.

By the time of the “conspiracy,” it had become clear to Crown officials that the racial boundaries they had labored so hard to construct and maintain had been extensively crossed—to such an extent that the social order was highly degraded. To address this problem, officials focused their energies on groups whose tainted blood reflected the colony’s degraded condition, and whose behavior was regarded as threatening to the status quo.

Silverblatt provides us with a fascinating if chilling account of the Inquisition of 1639, and the racial logics that informed it. She documents with great

skill the paranoia that seized Crown officials, who came to fear that a vast movement of dangerous others sought to mobilize to threaten the Crown’s precarious hold over a degraded colony. As Silverblatt shows, not just the racial categories of the colonial order were imaginary. So was the idea of the colonial state itself. Dramatic public performances such as the *Gran Auto de Fe* allowed Crown officials to distance themselves from the social order, and to position themselves and the colonial state above it—a vantage point from which they could safeguard the integrity of the imaginary social categories they themselves had created. State and social order mutually constructed one another.

David Nugent (Chapter 9) explores the role of fantasy and delusion in informing the institutional structures and everyday activities of the state. He is concerned, in particular, with what might be called the masking of the remarkable by the routine. He engages this problem by analyzing the efforts of successive national regimes in Peru to modernize the Chachapoyas highlands during the first half of the twentieth century. Government officials sought to implement a broad range of development projects, all of which relied on the forced labor of the peasantry. The scale of the labor demands associated with these projects was truly remarkable—a fact that officials sought to conceal behind a mask of routine bureaucratic rules and procedures.

Government officials took these extreme steps, Nugent shows, due to their belief that Peru had come to lag behind the other nation-states of the globe. The elite planners who oversaw the modernization of Peru’s vast mountainous interior sought to use state offices to accelerate a temporal process they believed had been stalled in the highlands due to the lingering influence of the sierra’s premodern attitudes and institutions. In the process, progressive elites sought to produce something they regarded as sorely lacking—a truly *national* economy, society, and culture. At stake in government attempts to remake the highlands was nothing less than the formation of a modern nation-state.

Having given themselves a delusional charge—that of increasing the velocity of history in order to make present an absent nation-state—government officials went a step farther. In the Chachapoyas region, they also imagined into being the labor force necessary to realize their grand schemes. The fact that this imagined labor force was considerably larger in size than the actual population made it impossible to carry out government development projects. As a result, official efforts to modernize Chachapoyas were by-and-large a failure.

It was the official response to failure, Nugent shows, that was the basis of state formation. Being unaware that they had conjured into being an imaginary labor force, government officials were baffled by their inability to locate it. Drawing selectively on the cultural resources available to them, they came to attribute their frustrations to a range of dangerous others—childlike Indians, political subversives, and corrupt government functionaries—who were as imaginary as the government's fictive labor force. It was *these* groups that were said to be interfering with the all-important process of national integration. As time passed, state representatives became increasingly obsessed with these groups, and increasingly paranoid about their inability to control them. As they did so, the fantasy and delusion that had always been latent within the seemingly mundane activities of everyday government administration came to the surface, generating a crisis of rule.

The contributions to Part IV call into question national-territorial models of state power by focusing on cross-border processes of statecraft. Here, we attend to the role of transnational and subnational processes that undergird as well as undermine the national state. In so doing, we enquire into the complex field of political-economic and sociocultural relations in which national state structures are embedded, and from which they seek to distinguish themselves.

Karen Spalding offers a fascinating account of cross-border processes of statecraft by focusing on debates about justice and just rule during the first half-century of the Spanish colonial period. Spalding is very adept at tracing out the process by which a trans-Atlantic corpus of rights and obligations concerning just rule emerges out of the factional disputes among elites in Spain and Peru. She is equally insightful in showing that what was at stake in these debates was the ability of the elites of both societies to assert (or retain) their dominance over the majority of the population—and in this way ensure the continued appropriation of the surplus generated by that majority. Among the central contributions of her chapter is its discussion of the highly contested nature of claims regarding just rule, in the Old World and the New.

Spalding documents the emergence of a transnational system of justice that was truly hybrid—that drew on and recognized the legitimacy of select principles and relationships that derived from both societies. Spalding is equally insightful in showing that the monarchy in Spain and the colonial system in the Andes developed at the same time, with events on each side of the Atlantic influencing the other. Her argument makes it very difficult to sustain the idea that the Spanish state had a center in Spain and a periphery

in the New World. Indeed, as the author shows, what would conventionally be understood as the periphery is in one very important sense better understood as the core. The experiment in rule attempted by Toledo in Peru after 1570, which did much to bring the period of hybridity to an end, may well be “ground zero” in terms of the articulation of a form of legitimacy based on the absolute authority of the Crown—an assertion of legitimacy that appears to have been innovated at the “margins” and then exported to and adopted by the “center.”

Winifred Tate's analysis of the Putumayo region of Colombia (Chapter 11), in which international, transnational, national, and subnational forces all vie for supremacy, provides a very insightful exploration of cross-border processes of statecraft. Her contribution brings out with startling clarity what may transpire when contradictory claims to rule are *not* resolved. How, she asks, do people come to imagine the state when these competing political projects arrive at an impasse, when there is no resolution about which forms of citizenship and which kinds of political participation will be recognized as valid?

Tate addresses these questions through an analysis of the Putumayo that focuses on marginalized groups and silenced voices. As she shows, there is much disagreement about how to understand conditions in the Putumayo. Colombian state officials and their U.S. government allies depict the region in much the same terms as do the elites Ramirez analyzes with such insight. The Putumayo, they assert, is a zone of chaos and lawlessness where the state is absent—a zone in which it is essential to intervene, to stabilize. Tate, however, reveals to us a very different perspective—one whose off-centeredness complements that of Ramirez.

When viewed through a non-national optic, Tate shows, the Putumayo frontier may be usefully understood in terms *opposite* those used to characterize its national and transnational elites. Rather than being a zone of absence, where the state has yet to establish itself, it is a domain in which state processes are hyperpresent. The problem in the Putumayo is not that there is no state, but rather competing projects of state formation—each with radically different plans for the people and the resources of the region. Because none of those who seek to establish dominion over the Putumayo have been able to prevail over their rivals, the more humble inhabitants of the region have been subject to all at the same time. This has left them with a destabilizing, inconsistent, and highly fragmented experience of governance.

Tate's analysis is particularly interesting in documenting how the inhabi-

tants of the Putumayo have responded to finding themselves caught between multiple, contradictory projects of rule. They have done so, she shows, by articulating their own form of legitimate order, based on their own understanding of citizenship. Tate uses the term “aspirational state” to refer to this process. She brings to light an important subterranean history, in which subaltern groups seek to forge alliances with regional, national, and supranational organizations, governmental and non, that would help them realize their aspirations. By bringing us this view from the margins, Tate is able to draw attention to how a non-national-territorial state may be imagined in conditions of political impasse.

Part V addresses theoretical concerns. This final section consists of chapters by Akhil Gupta and Gyanendra Pandey, who are not Andeanists, but whose highly influential writings have done much to shape contemporary discussion and debate about the state. Both contributors explore the book’s theoretical contributions to studies of state formation and political struggle around the world. Both highlight the way this book’s reconceptualization of state power beyond its official manifestations opens up new directions for research into the often taken-for-granted expressions of political domination in post-colonial societies. Both discuss as well how the book’s methodological insights will help researchers everywhere better grasp the role of affect, imagination, and fantasy in state formation and identify the competing projects of rule that operate under the banner of state.

In sum, this volume proposes an antirealist approach that rejects the notion that the state can be granted the status of empirical reality. We propose that the state be understood not as an objective fact but as a material and cultural process of a very specific sort—one that seeks to render natural, or taken for granted, quite arbitrary and interested forms of rule. The chapters that follow show state formation to be inherently unstable because it seeks to silence, conceal, or delegitimize alternative understandings of how social life should be lived. These alternative understandings are based on their own moral and ethical principles, their own affective engagements. They express material and cultural logics that are many and varied and that can animate both alternative claims to rule and struggles for release from it. Collectively, they produce a field of power and meaning that is as conflictual and contradictory as the stratified sociopolitical contexts from which these logics emerge. Among our central concerns in this volume are the processes that seek to create order and consensus out of the disorder and discord that inevitably characterize unequal social contexts. We are concerned with what is

hidden in the process of asserting order and consensus. We are interested in how assemblages of disparate judgments and claims come to aggregate into broad patterns that aspire to the status of transcendental reality. In other words, we are concerned with what might be called contingent entification—with the sites and circumstances in which the state is asserted as the inevitable and inescapable center of an all-encompassing political and moral universe and with the categories and optics that assign us our appropriate place in it.

PART I

**CRITICAL
PHENOMENOLOGIES
OF RULE**

Chapter 2

The Idea of the State in Colombia: An Analysis from the Periphery

María Clemencia Ramírez

This chapter offers a critical phenomenology of the national territorial state in contemporary Colombia. The focus is on the ways in which the construction of a conventional geography of rule based on center-periphery relations helps construct the idea of a neutral and disinterested state (Abrams 1988: 77–79), even as it obscures what are in reality arbitrary and interested projects of rule. The chapter is concerned in particular with the role of frontier regions in the construction of state imaginaries. Focusing on Putumayo, it shows that frontier regions are consistently represented in terms of what they are not. They are characterized in terms of absence—as zones of (national) exception that are lacking in the key institutions and orientations that are said to characterize the state as a whole. Because they are zones of exception, these peripheries are said to be witness to abuses of the most egregious kind—abuses that demand the extension of state protections and controls. Only in this way can conditions in the periphery be brought into line with those of the center. And only in this way can the state of exception represented by such frontiers be brought to an end.

The chapter examines discourses of a number of different kinds, each of which shares this view of the Colombian periphery, and in the process implicitly or explicitly calls for intervention or assistance. One of my concerns is to document the broad range of constituencies that partake of this state imaginary—from academics to politicians, from paramilitaries to guerrillas. It

is revealing that such disparate groups, which disagree about virtually everything else, appear to agree on this one point (cf. Roseberry 1994).

What such constructions fail to acknowledge, I show, is that nowhere in Colombia can one find the idealized state that elites claim is absent in the frontier. Indeed, the neutrality and disinterestedness that ruling groups insist must be established in the peripheries of the nation is lacking even in the supposedly most state-saturated regions of the country (the national capital). Even in the center, state and nonstate actors alike employ violence on an extensive scale and in the most arbitrary of manners to achieve their particularistic ends. They also appropriate public institutions and national resources in the most blatant of ways to advance their own private agendas (López 2010).

If the lawlessness of the center was somehow concealed from view, then elites' representation of the frontier as a zone of exception might make some sense. In fact, however, the highly "irregular" conditions of the center are common knowledge—to such an extent that they are the subject of frequent lament by elites themselves. This fact, however, does not prevent elite groups from insisting that a "state of absence" is unique to frontier regions. Nor does it prevent elite groups from calling for measures that would establish new institutions in the "lawless jungles" of the Putumayo. The impartial state that so many different constituencies agree has yet to arrive in frontier regions is thus shown to be an imaginative projection (see Chapter 1) rather than an actually existing institution—in the center, as well as in the periphery. Furthermore, it is shown to be a projection that seeks to naturalize a particular national project of rule.

In developing this argument, I first discuss how Colombia has come to be identified as an "unintegrated" country, a country of regions, an identity that is seen as "a narrative central to its nationhood" (Serje 2005). Second, I discuss violence as a predominant factor in academic discussions over why it has been impossible to consolidate a modern state in Colombia that exercises direct control over its territory. This leads to a discussion of the guerrillas' and paramilitaries' relationship to the state and to politics.¹ Some academics argue that the inability of the state to govern without relying on the *de facto* power exercised by the Liberal and Conservative party-aligned political class represents a form of indirect state rule. In response, I discuss some characteristics of this political class at the national level and in Putumayo. Finally, I discuss corruption and political practice in Putumayo in order to question the dichotomy between the central and subnational expressions of the state.

Characterizations of the Colombian State

The imaginary of the Colombian nation-state is as an unintegrated national territory made up of areas that can be divided into two geocultural regions (Roldán 1998): the civilized Andean center where the state apparatus is present, versus the rain forest and other areas of the tropical periphery. These latter areas have been represented as uncivilized since colonial times due to their unforgiving geography and unhealthy climate. They resisted conquest and were inhabited first by "barbarous aborigines" or "savage rebels." Later, they came to be populated by *colonos*, settlers from the center of the country that have included people displaced by political violence in the 1950s, *campesinos* seeking land since the 1960s, and the unemployed attracted by resource booms such as petroleum and coca since the 1970s. Academics have described the Colombian nation as comprising "central spaces effectively integrated into the political and economic dynamics of the nation and diffuse, discontinuous, peripheral spaces distinguished by exclusion or fragmentary inclusion" (González et al. 2002: 264). But Aretxaga has questioned the center-periphery duality implicit in such framings and has warned against reifying the condition of peripheral and marginal territories, which should instead be understood as intrinsic components of the nation-state (see also Chapter 1 of this volume). In a nutshell, "those who are excluded are included by virtue of their exclusion" (2003: 407). This questioning of the center-periphery duality constitutes one of the key elements of the project that led to the current volume and is central for the analysis developed in this chapter.

The peripheral regions of Colombia that are said to be less integrated into the nation-state are seen as frontier zones, characterized by Serje (2005: 115) as "territories that have historically eluded the national integration project," and have above all been considered, "reserve areas with the potential to produce great wealth" (225). The representation of these regions as "savage" legitimizes their exploitation through extractive and enclave economies where productive and distributive practices such as "usurpation, slavery, servitude, and manipulation through indebtedness . . . have always required the use of violence and physical coercion" (225). To Serje, these territories constitute "the other side of the nation." That is to say, they form an integral part of the national territory with a particular social, economic, and political function historically assigned to them by the nation-state. To Domínguez (2005: 279) these regions of the "extreme periphery" are where "primitive capital accumulation" takes place and "national and international capital seek to extract max-

imum returns." He also calls into question their nonintegration to the central state and highlights their ties to the international system.

Nonetheless, the idea of a division between civilized and savage regions and a fragmented vision of the nation dominate representations of the nation-state in Colombia. These perspectives are notable in the public statements and narratives promoted by state officials both in the department of Putumayo and in the national capital. They are salient in academic analyses of the Colombian state to the extent that they constitute a "common discursive framework" (Roseberry 1994: 364) that must be taken into account.

Colombia's Western Amazon, including the department of Putumayo, is still considered a frontier region. Its colonization began in the late nineteenth century and has continued ever since, mainly by inhabitants of the Andean highlands fleeing social, political, and economic upheavals in their places of origin. Remembering that Weber's prerequisites for effective state formation include a high level of territorial control and the exercise of a monopoly on violence, Bolívar (2003: 40) holds that this population inflow "impedes the imposition of state control since . . . neither the hierarchies nor the forms of social cohesion necessary to such control can be consolidated" in the region.

This characteristic of the region must be taken into account to understand the conformation of the state effect (Mitchell 1999) in Putumayo. The hegemonic belief is that this and other "savage" territories must be conquered, colonized, and exploited, but above all penetrated in order to incorporate them into the nation-state. As Nugent (1999: 69) has indicated, even the ideas of "penetrate" (*intervenir*) and "absorb" (*incorporar*) used to characterize state formation "reflect what is assumed to be the oppositional nature of state and society." In this chapter I will discuss and problematize this opposition that has been set up as a defining characteristic of the state, following the proposals of Abrams (1988) and Mitchell (1991, 1999).

I write from the perspective of Putumayo, an off-centered location defined by its inhabitants as "abandoned by the state," and "a forgotten region," which can be considered part of "the other side of the nation" (Serje 2005), in order to explore how the imaginary of the central state as a cohesive and autonomous entity is produced. As several anthropologists have pointed out (Aretxaga 2003; Das and Poole 2004; Tsing 1993, 1994), the ambiguous relationship between state and society is particularly evident in peripheral and marginal regions where the process is more easily seen as incomplete in the face of "savagery" and a weak or absent rule of law. Indeed, the population of these

areas is said to live somewhere between inclusion and exclusion, between legality and illegality.

The dominant meta-narrative in political and even academic discourse on the nature of the state speaks to a series of consistent issues. These include the importance of controlling international boundaries, and of integrating the nation in social and territorial terms. They include as well the need to establish sovereignty over the state's external frontier areas (zones of ongoing settlement or "colonization" in the south and east) as well as its internal frontiers (areas of colonization located among other areas with more consolidated structures). Several authors characterize the state by virtue of its absence from these areas and the existence of regions not directly under its control: some have posited "the partial collapse of the State" (Oquist 1978) and a few propose that the state has "collapsed" in peripheral regions (E. Pizarro 2004); others refer to spaces that the state has left "devoid of its presence" (Pécaut 1988) or to the state's weakness (*precariedad*), since it does not exercise authority in wide swaths of the national territory (González 1999; Pécaut 2003). Other authors point to the "uneven and asymmetrical presence of state bodies and institutions" (González et al. 2002). These and many other characterizations of the Colombian state allude in some way to the historical and ongoing paradox of its simultaneous presence and absence, and above all, to its "historical inability to integrate the national territory and to establish a legitimate monopoly on regulating society and employing force" (Orjuela 2010: 31).

The existence in peripheral territories of nonstate armed groups including guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug trafficking mafias that establish ambiguous relationships with the hegemonic order is seen as a further challenge to central control. State regulation and legitimate coercion are so lacking in these less than fully integrated territories that the central state is said not to enjoy the position expected of a modern capitalist state. To González, Bolívar, and Vásquez, "both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries operate in a context dominated by intermediary networks in the sense that political distinctions like state vs. opposition are not meaningful in a context where state and society seem to be perfectly blended" (2002: 231-32). This recognition of the conflation of state and society confirms Mitchell's argument that the state is penetrated on all sides by societal elements "and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to determine" (1991: 88). Nevertheless, it is said, this situation applies only in the peripheral regions and should be addressed by separating state and society, thus guaranteeing that the state has a monopoly on violence and exercises direct control over the population.

However, it is important to highlight that in the Andean center of the country the state lacks the very autonomy that is said to be absent in the periphery. The characteristics that differentiate the center from the periphery are thus far less clear than we are led to believe.

Violence and State Formation

Political violence in modern Colombia began as a confrontation between the traditional Liberal and Conservative political parties, each of which was attempting to maintain control of the state apparatus. The period of interparty strife known as the Violence lasted from 1946 to 1958 when the two parties signed an accord known as the National Front and agreed to alternate in government until 1974. Nonetheless, political violence has continued in other forms, making glaringly obvious the lack of a state monopoly on the use of force. Various authors (Pécaut 1987; Leal and Dávila 1990; González 1997; LeGrand 1997) agree that one of the causes of violence has been the Liberal and Conservative elites' refusal to delegate enough real power to the state to strengthen it, and their refusal to permit the political expression of social conflicts, leading to a disconnect between social movements and political representation, as well as to the limitation of the state capacity to mediate in those social conflicts. Violence has flared when social conflicts had no means of institutional expression. Moreover, the Liberal and Conservative parties have promoted violence and the exclusion of other political forces to the extent that Colombia's violent conflicts have been fought over a redefinition of the right to engage in politics (LeGrand 1997), making the political practices of these hegemonic parties central to the idea of the state.

In addition to political parties as nonstate authorities that threaten the autonomy of the state, it has been pointed out that tensions between local, regional, and national party leaders can translate into struggles between different levels of power (Roldán 1998; Bolívar 2003; M. C. Ramírez et al. 2010; Torres 2011; González 1997). Bolívar (2003: 149) stresses that nonstate armed actors are present and violence erupts in those areas where "institutions of social control and regulation are insufficiently articulated by party structures." On the other hand, these are the very areas where the army is called on to contain violence and ends up playing an important role in the regions' integration into the central order, in some cases becoming the predominant state authority in the area.

The above arguments recall Abrams's (1988: 79) proposition that "the *idea* of the state as an ideological power" conceals "the actual disunity of political power . . . a profound disunity within the political." It can be argued that party-defined and party-driven politics are the face of the Colombian state in the popular imagination of its subjects. Before discussing political practices in Putumayo, two points should be emphasized, both of which underscore the absence of state autonomy in the very center of the nation-state: the presence of nonstate armed actors, which illustrates the state's failure to hold a monopoly on the use of force, and the role of nonstate party elites, without whom state officials cannot implement central decisions.

Challenges to the State Monopoly on Violence

Bloodshed is so ubiquitous in Colombia that Pécaut (2003: 18) refers to it as "generalized"—a condition that has prevailed since the time of the Violence (1946–1958), and became even more salient in 1980 with the rapid growth of drug trafficking. In a context of generalized violence, conflicts seem to be resolved according to their own logic, outside the sphere of the state, while daily violence is routinely accepted as a form of interpersonal and intergroup relations. Furthermore, illegal armed groups control certain parts of the country and these *de facto* powers exercise "private forms of indirect government" (Mbembe 2001: 67). More specifically, Ramírez Tobón (2005: 171) differentiates between "counter-state" territories where guerrillas dominate and "para-state" areas of paramilitary control, contrasting the ideological positions of these actors and emphasizing the paramilitaries' alliance with the official armed forces. As Tate argues in this volume, the support of state representatives for paramilitaries is an inversion of the state's expected role.

In this context, the monopoly on the use of force proposed by Weber as one of the defining characteristics of state power is tenuous at best in Colombia to the extent that the armed forces are seen by the population in some areas as simply one more armed actor in the conflict. While the central state sees its military presence in peripheral regions where nonstate armed actors operate as evidence of state presence, an exclusively military presence militarizes and distorts the state's social and other policies.

While the actions of guerrillas and paramilitaries are mediated by the needs of drug trafficking, these groups exercise authority and establish *de facto* laws to which local populations are subject. In the Colombian conflict,

“local power is a form of booty, indeed a military goal in its own right” (Ramírez Tobón 2005: 180). Rather than establishing alternatives to the central order, armed actors compete to exercise local and regional power by developing negotiating and other relationships with state representatives, illustrating that there is “a substantial liminal area where state institutions and de facto power centers converge” (Escalante 2008: 305). Armed actors receive payments out of state revenues and to some extent they co-govern. One might say that rather than opposing the state they act in its stead, as its “proxies,” while their struggle presupposes and is defined by its existence (Krupa 2010). The ambiguous relationship of armed actors with local and regional state bodies and representatives leads one to concur with the conclusion expressed by Nugent in the case of illegal political networks in Peru, that “they display the same organization, and may demonstrate the same intentions as the formal state apparatus” (1999: 69). Both FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the paramilitaries perform government functions and impose discipline on the civilian population.²

In Putumayo, the population refers indiscriminately to legal and illegal armed groups in the area as imposing “the law.” Different groups may compete with each other or one group may dominate a locality at a particular time and place. A campesino talked about the arrival of police in his town: “What I remember is that institutional law was imposed. Now the police are . . . the law of the state. I think that people here were used to there being no law, or if there was it was the insurgents’ law” (interview with a campesino in El Placer, August 4, 2011). This brings up the question of government and ways to regulate the conduct of the population as described by Foucault, for whom the concept of governmentality “does not stem from the unity of the state but rather from a multiplicity of practices with particular approaches to governing” (Castro-Gómez 2010: 45). It is these objectified practices that give life to the state, but in these peripheral territories the state as an autonomous entity is diluted by the existence of other “laws” that interact and affect the exercise of local power in different ways. I concur with Nugent (2007) that these governing practices allow us to deconstruct the general category of “the state.”

FARC Guerrillas

Although at one time FARC’s stated goal was to overthrow the capitalist state, in practice they have sought its “transformation into a sociopolitical regime

that would broaden the space for participation and representation of the lower and middle classes” (Ramírez Tobón 2005: 171). This is attested to by the correspondence of peasant self-defense (and future FARC) commanders with the government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953–1958) and later with National Front presidents Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958–1962) and Guillermo León Valencia (1962–1966) asking for the full social inclusion of demobilized peasant self-defense units. Only after being attacked by the armed forces did these units again take up arms and evolve into what came to be known as FARC (E. Pizarro 1991). In addition, Ramírez Tobón (2005: 174) reports that everyday social conflicts in regions where the guerrillas were present, “began to be processed through a new ‘legal’ order that with time and with the strengthening of the armed groups produced guerrilla jurisdictions that satisfied the desire of the population for a local form of organization that the state had effectively denied them, due either to the absence of legal institutions or its own aggressive acts.” Gutiérrez (2010: 16) calls attention to how insurgent groups “began to distinguish between bad politicians and officials and others who were not so bad which, cognitively speaking, is just one step away from trying to establish alliances within the system.”

Political scientists have analyzed the contradictions described above as reflecting a certain tension in FARC’s approach between establishing an alternative state and its actual interaction with the existing state apparatus. In his historical analysis of the organization and its relationship with the state in areas of campesino colonization, Ávila (2010: 178) points out that, beginning in 1982, “the political project of the FARC consisted of forming an alternative state,” but only “during the [1993] expansion of the organization did this take the form of a proto-state.” He analyzes the FARC proposal for a new government as a concrete expression of that political project.

Although FARC imposes laws and procedures for resolving conflicts and local inhabitants adhere to them, I maintain that the exercise of authority and government does not necessarily constitute a counter-state, a proto-state, or a state-in-the-making (Bejarano and Pizarro 2004). What’s more, FARC is recognized by the inhabitants of the region not as a state but as one authority among others. I argue that what we see is “a government within the government” as described by FARC Commander Manuel Marulanda (interview in *Semana*, see *Revista Samana* 1999). For example, Ferro (2004: 431) reports that during the peace negotiations between the government and the FARC between January 1999 and February 2002, representatives of the state believed that the FARC would be able to oversee a gradual but disciplined elimination

of illicit crops by coca producers and to guarantee the compliance of producers starting in areas like Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá).³

FARC never fails to recognize and interact with local and regional governments. In the southwest of the country, it has supervised mayors and governors and supported administrative decentralization and the direct election of mayors when this became law. FARC has also supported civic strikes when residents were demanding that the central state fulfill its obligation to provide public services and infrastructure and when residents of peripheral regions demanded that their voices be heard in the formulation of public policies that would affect them (M. C. Ramírez 2011). Vásquez (2009: 153) has described the guerrillas as open to the state's role in providing for the economic welfare of the population, "but deeply opposed to any presence of those state bodies with which they have fought, such as the army, or those that compete with or challenge the guerrillas' monopoly on the administration of justice in these regions." Furthermore, FARC's authority is both accepted and resisted by the population with no implication that it supplants the existing state authority. It should be noted that people in these peripheral regions draw a strong distinction between the local and the central government. Mayors and governors frequently support the demands that Putumayo's inhabitants make on the central government, speaking out not in their capacity as officials but rather as citizens of Colombia and specifically as citizens of Putumayo (M. C. Ramírez 2011). The national government and central state apparatus is represented as both absent and exclusive, with unfilled obligations to the areas of recent and ongoing colonization that aspire to be incorporated into the nation-state to gain access to services such as education, health, and potable water and to receive development assistance in the form of road construction and productive projects. It is believed that the route to full inclusion in the central order is for the state to increase the services available until reaching the level found in the central part of the country, and this is the constant demand.

The Paramilitaries

The paramilitaries sought to "replace the state in regions where the guerrillas had thoroughly undermined institutional legitimacy" (Ramírez Tobón 2005: 152), which translated into the co-optation of local power "with a promise that authority would be handed back to the state when it recovered its rightful control of the region" (173). Carlos Castaño, founder and commander of the paramilitary United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas

de Colombia—AUC) always presented himself as a defender of the "legitimate" state and justified his actions as a patriotic act seeking to reestablish state presence in areas under guerrilla control. The state, on the other hand, "willingly ceded its monopoly on the use of force and the administration of justice in return for the narco-paramilitaries' taking the offensive in the counterinsurgency" (Ávila 2010: 117–18). Accordingly, the army utilized paramilitaries "as a rearguard to consolidate a counterinsurgency program" (Gutiérrez and Barón 2006: 281) in areas where these forces had taken control, thus preventing the return of the highly mobile FARC. As such, para-militarism can be characterized as the most recent expression of a long-term state policy that has sought to delegate military functions to citizens, just as during the period known as the Violence. These policies are justified by the metanarrative of the state's weakness and absence in certain peripheral regions and, thus, its need to be strengthened.

While FARC confronts the army, paramilitaries have acted in alliance with it. Massacres of unarmed civilians committed by the paramilitaries are justified by their characterization of the population in peripheral areas as "guerrilla auxiliaries," whose physical elimination accords with the paramilitary objective of isolating the guerrillas by annihilating what they call their "bases of support" (M. C. Ramírez 2009).

When Álvaro Uribe came to power in August 2002, Castaño declared in an interview that the Autodefensas should demobilize, since their political platform coincided entirely with that of the new president. This lends credence to the idea that the paramilitaries would perform state functions only until that time when the state assumed its responsibilities in areas where its presence had theretofore been lacking:

If you read the defense and democratic security program of the current government, it's a perfect self-defense plan under the color of Colombian law, of international law. It's the society, the government, the armed forces, all united as one. That's set in stone. . . . This government's policy has been clear since the campaign. It was going to bring about the re-institutionalization of the state. (Carlos Castaño, interview on Caracol Television, July 22, 2003)

From the moment of his inauguration, Uribe declared all-out war on the FARC but initiated negotiations with Castaño and the AUC leadership for its demobilization, a process that led to the July 15, 2003, signing of the Santa Fe

de Ralito Agreement to Contribute to Peace in Colombia. The disarmament of the various AUC fronts was initiated in keeping with the provisions of this agreement and lasted until April 2006.

Armed Actors and Politics

If it is political parties holding power that produces the state effect in Colombia, what relationship do the armed actors have with party politics? Ávila (2010: 168) maintains that the FARC “are not interested in winning political representation as a means to take national power,” because they have always considered participation in electoral politics to be an “endorsement of the political and economic elites,” of the “oligarchy” that it was their role to overthrow. Unlike the paramilitaries, FARC has worked through the Community Action Committees (Juntas de Acción Comunal; JAC) and other grassroots social organizations, which Ávila considers a strategy to capture sociopolitical space from below. They have not interacted politically with members of the local elites, a group with whom the paramilitaries have less problematic relations (Gutiérrez 2010: 17) due to the origins of the latter armed group in social sectors “with greater social capital, with aspirations for regional and national power and with established connections with those who hold it” (Ávila 2010: 167). These circumstances would subsequently lead to the matrix of interwoven interests and ambitions shared by regionally based politicians and paramilitaries known in Colombia as para-politics (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris 2007; López 2010).

Nevertheless, the Community Action Committees are established by the Ministry of the Interior, and Gutiérrez (2010: 16) notes that the fact that the guerrillas work through them and through other state agencies dedicated to improving the social conditions of campesinos means that “the building blocks with which the insurgency constructed its social influence were provided by the state,” confirming the permanent interaction of FARC with state institutions that I mentioned above. Community Action Committees often send requests to the guerrillas for support in different struggles or for their help in resolving community conflicts. The Committees have served as the organizational base for civic movements and marches in the region to demand public services and infrastructural improvements from the central state, movements supported by FARC, illustrating the ambivalence of the guerrillas toward the role of the state in their own areas of influence (M. C. Ramírez 2011).

The FARC approach to local officials has changed over the course of the conflict as officials have either been “supervised” as individuals involved in local governance or been threatened as representatives of the state. The latter approach has been particularly salient during electoral campaigns and especially after 1997, when armed paramilitaries moved into the southwest of the country both to ally with the armed forces in attacking the guerrillas and to contest control over areas of coca production. It was at this time that the territory was divided up and different areas came to be dominated by one armed group or another. The Southern Front commanded by the Castaño brothers moved into Putumayo in 1997 and by 2000 had established control in the municipalities of lower Putumayo.⁴ In 2002 the Southern Front was integrated into the AUC’s Central Bolívar Bloc under the command of “Macaco,” nom de guerre of Carlos Mario Jiménez.

As a response to the government’s tacit support for the paramilitaries, FARC has sabotaged elections to create a vacuum of power, and has increased their kidnapping of public authorities, forcing many local officials to flee the area (Ávila 2010: 179). They have not succeeded in preventing local elections, but voter participation has diminished significantly (M. C. Ramírez et al. 2010).

There is ample documentation of paramilitary alliances with the army (Human Rights Watch 2000; Ramírez Tobón 2005; Ávila 2010) and with political figures (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris 2007; Ramírez Tobón 2005: 149; López 2010; Ávila 2010) who depended on the paramilitaries to consolidate power in their regions. The paramilitaries’ goal was to control the state through these alliances and thereby influence legislation coming out of the national congress (López 2010). In his work on the capture of the state by armed actors, Ávila (2010: 85) concludes that “the paramilitaries . . . have used electoral, political, and government institutions in achieving their goals, capturing political representation and imposing quotas for their participation in local, departmental, and national bureaucracies.” Nonetheless, paramilitaries in Putumayo under the leadership of Macaco prioritized drug trafficking over political participation, unlike the Northern Bloc of paramilitaries on the Caribbean coast under a commander known as “Jorge 40.” This bloc put a higher priority on influencing congressional elections. Once again, the behavior of the “same” armed actors toward the state varied by region.

I maintain that the critical difference between paramilitaries and guerrillas has been that the paramilitaries defined themselves as supplanting the central state in regions where its presence was weak; while, rather than opposing

the state in a practical sense, FARC “supervises” it, attempting to ensure that it fulfills its duty to provide for the needs of the population. However, both armed groups pressure mayors and municipal bureaucracies for access to public revenues in the context of the increased fiscal and administrative decentralization promulgated in the 1991 Constitution, each of them in attempts to further its own goals. Gutiérrez (2010: 16) calls this a demand “invented by the insurgents that was adopted and perfected by the paramilitaries.”⁵

Finally, it can be argued that these actors depend on the existence of the state apparatus for their own self-definition because it is in relation to the state that they legitimize their own activities. In this sense they constitute a fundamental aspect of the idea of the state in Colombia.⁶

Local Elites, Power, and Politics

The local political elites known as the “political class” have overwhelmingly been members of the traditional and hegemonic Liberal and Conservative parties. Their identity has been defined by “efforts to reproduce themselves as would a caste” in order to maintain their privileges (Leal 2010: 9). Although power is delegated to these local and regional political elites by the state, they have been understood to exercise control somewhat autonomously from state regulation as they mediate the presence of the central state in the regions, making state power indirect through their clientelist networks. These connections to clientelist circles of the Liberal or Conservative party have led some analysts to speak of “two counterposed political subcultures” (González 1997: 38; Pécaut 1997: 16) and to sustain that it is these traditional political parties, rather than the state, that have “defined the forms of collective identity and belonging.” As a result, they have imposed “a division of the social body and social actors have continued to be guided by the political parties” (Pécaut 1997: 16).

Their de facto power is recognized to the extent that “the autonomy of the central state is still very restricted with respect to political parties. In effect, the state adapts to the hegemony of one of them . . . or to their cohabitation in government” (González 1997: 39; Pécaut 1997). Furthermore, as García Villegas (2009: 32) notes, the incapacity of the state to control violence is a function of the hyperpartisanship of political debates, which results in the violent expression of conflicts and the state’s lack of autonomy from politics: “the political parties occupy the state almost entirely, so much so that almost

everything is approached with the *with us or against us* style characteristic of interparty debates.” For their part, the political parties establish national networks that, unlike the state, do integrate the regions into the political center.

In the above arguments, the state is seen as insufficiently autonomous from politics, while political elites are portrayed as relatively autonomous from the state, confirming my argument that the state effect is produced when political parties rise to power, a phenomenon that is particularly notable in territories such as Putumayo. But what is this state that is embodied? To the political parties, the state means the availability of government jobs and resources that can be used “to carry out the clientelist practices that are the central feature of state mediation” (Leal 2010: 6). In fact, González, Bolívar, and Vásquez (2002) deny that there is bureaucratic power independent of party politics, questioning the existence of a state bureaucracy “essentially indifferent to the interests and values defended by the political regime” (Lefort 1986: 98) as would be expected in a modern state.

According to Leal, this decades-long control of state administration by the two parties has led to the naturalization of the indiscriminate use of state resources and to the emergence of what has been called the “clientelist political system,” since “without state protection, clientelism’s capacity to reproduce itself would disappear and the system would have to be restructured” (Leal 2010: 7). This perception of the state as a prize available to the winner of elections is fundamental in the conformation of the idea of the state in Colombia, where political actors are motivated to participate in politics in order to get a piece of the pie. Bayart (1993: 90) writes in a similar vein about Africa: “The apparatus of the state is in itself a slot of the ‘national cake’ . . . so that any actor worthy of the name tries to get a good mouthful . . . [state] institutions are in themselves providers of riches and wealth and the struggle to control them is only one of the aspects which we call in the west, ‘the class struggle.’” This is true in Putumayo, where regional elites continue to affiliate with the still hegemonic Liberal and Conservative parties.

Political Practices and the State Effect in Putumayo

There is an underlying class tension in Putumayo.⁷ On the one hand are the families and groups that make up the traditional clientelist political elite formed by political bosses known as caciques. These are Liberals and Conservatives who have held power since the 1940s, when the territory was being

settled, and they are primarily associated with Mocoa, the capital of the department. Mocoa, located in upper Putumayo, is the seat of departmental government and administration. In practice, only members of this political elite are elected to the House of Representatives and participate in the decisions of the central government that affect the region (Torres 2011). It cannot be said that they use their access to the central government to benefit the majority of the department's inhabitants. On the other hand, and in contrast to this political class, are the inhabitants of lower Putumayo, a forested region where coca is grown and nonstate armed actors are a "normal" part of daily life. The residents of lower Putumayo resent their abandonment by both the central government (M. C. Ramírez 2011) and the regional administration:

the governor is practically a second mayor in the department. He wants to be the leader of the department capital and maybe some nearby areas but he ignores the regions farther away from the center of the department. In this case the center is Mocoa and the governor ignores San Miguel and the border region. (Forum in La Dorada [San Miguel], September 2, 2008)

These differences within the department also play a determinative role with respect to the perception of the state in the region, as a Putumayo-born journalist explains:

Putumayo doesn't have a very large population and that's why it's more visible here. Five or ten families that have risen very quickly, and they're very visible. Lower Putumayo has always looked to the people in Mocoa because all the interests are managed from here, taxes are collected and they don't come back in the form of services so there's a conflict between upper and lower Putumayo. (Interview with Hugo Zambrano, January 2010)

A municipal councilor in La Dorada (San Miguel) comments on the same topic:

lower Putumayo says let's vote against Mocoa because the power, the thieving, and everything else is centralized there. So the aspiration is to make ourselves feel that we too can be an option, that they should recognize us, those kinds of motivations. Traditionally they've said

that the mistakes in Putumayo, what's been done badly is the fault of the Mocoans. This is another understanding of things and it comes up as an alternative to the usual explanations. (Forum in La Dorada, September 2, 2008)

The regional state was equated with the political class of Mocoa but some political actors from lower Putumayo took it as their primary mission to open up access to the departmental government and to the House of Representatives. The governor who took office in 2007 took this approach:

this state government used to belong to three or four families. I came into office with the mission of opening up political space for new faces. That was the reason for all the problems [referring to investigations of himself carried out by the Inspector General (*Procuraduría*)]. Listen, in 2007, members of a single family held all four of the most important positions in the department: the Secretary of Finance, of Education, of Health, and the manager of the Putumayo Energy Agency. . . . No one can say this is right. (Interview with Felipe Guzmán by Edilberto Piragauta, September 2009)

This class conflict at the local level translates nationally to the manipulation of Colombian legislation intended to broaden the social base of those with institutional access to participation in governance, a process inevitably linked to political parties. Bureaucratic positions and their associated economic benefits are objects of desire for people from excluded sectors of society, and anything goes in the struggle to obtain them. According to a popular saying in Putumayo, political participation is "a question of the stomach," what Bayart (1993) calls "the politics of the belly"

Administrative decentralization plays a central role here. Transfers of resources from the center to the regions, along with the relative autonomy of regional governments, allows for greater access to public resources by local governments. This is one reason why they seek to integrate themselves into the central order and thereby participate in the national system of resource distribution, a process that is mediated by party politics. Nevertheless, there is a constant tension between being more regulated or controlled by the central government or seeking greater autonomy and relative power.

When Putumayo became a department under the new Constitution of 1991, its inhabitants were seen to be "coming of legal age." This was an out-

come that Putumayo had struggled for, but now it is common to hear people say that they were not prepared for “independence” and that the central government should have done more to teach them to manage their own affairs. It is also said that centralized government was preferable because decentralization has increased corruption due to the relative autonomy with which local governments now manage their resources. Some even express the wish to go back to central rule. This tension reveals a strong relationship between the center and the periphery, casting doubt on the definitive nature of the dichotomy.

Local governments are subject to national laws, decrees, and regulations issued to oversee the official activities of municipal and departmental governments, which I argue produce and incarnate the state effect (Mitchell 1999). The goal of these laws, decrees, and regulations is to rationalize state activities and promote good governance, the characteristics of which are effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Corruption is considered the antithesis of good governance, so the meanings attributed to corruption at the local level are seen in relation to central government laws that promote good government. These laws are referenced by local members of political parties to defend their colleagues when they hold office and to criticize their rivals when the tables are turned.

Six governors of Putumayo have been elected by popular vote under the 1991 Constitution, and all of them have been investigated by the Office of the Inspector General (Procuraduría) for improper contracting procedures. Five of them have been prohibited from holding public office or signing contracts with the state for different periods of time. When the implicated ex-officials are asked about these events, their responses always include two points. First, they do not believe that they engaged in illegal practices with respect to the management of public funds. As a result, one has to question the divergent conceptions they and others in the region hold about what is or is not a corrupt practice, and how much latitude officials have in their administration of the public trust. Evidence indicates that the concept of corruption is polysemic and amorphous (Haller and Shore 2005). Second, they all state in the strongest terms that they were subjected to political persecution, as the investigations against them were initiated after their political rivals denounced them to oversight institutions such as the Controller (Contraloría) and the Office of the Inspector General. In a June 1, 2009, address to the first session of the new departmental assembly, governor Felipe Guzman remarked:

I would like to announce to you as colleagues that we're going to make some decisions; we're going to forewarn our political opponents that from now on we're going to defend ourselves; we're going to describe for the benefit of public opinion many of the things that have happened in this department and in some municipalities, that people here shouldn't just listen to the opinions of some people who want only to talk about scandals, to expose scandals, but we'll also try to expose the interests that manipulate some people, interests that want to generate chaos and destabilize the present government more than they want to promote the public interest.

In this speech the governor minimized the importance of the administrative corruption that he has been accused of, calling the accusations “debates over scandals in the search for transparency.” Rather than challenge the accusations against him he emphasizes political persecution. This attitude is similar to that of the previous governor, who served from 2003 to 2007 and is now in prison:

unfortunately I made some administrative mistakes . . . [but] my conscience is clear because I didn't steal any education money or children's health money. They said a lot of very ugly things about me, that I had stolen a lot of money, but people can see that I don't have a luxury car; I don't have any of the riches they said I took, buildings or things. The most important thing to me—because I'm a man of faith—is that my conscience is clear. I have nothing to be ashamed of; I'm at peace with God. (Author Interview with 2003–2007 governor, August 2009)

According to the former governor, his commission of administrative errors was not the same as stealing. He swears his innocence before divine authority, which is superior to the earthly variety, and goes on to say that his mistakes were the result of receiving poor advice:

the governor's enemies are right there in the departmental government. . . . They're the ones who do bad things and then they go public with it after they get the governor to make a mistake. . . . It's common for them to sell information to whoever will pay them. . . . It's all a matter of money; it's an established way of doing things, it's a mafia.

To the ex-governor it's a question of what he calls "covert methods of managing the people in power," adding:

Those of us who are in power or who've been in power have come to realize that we're puppets of groups that just administer power for their own benefit, just a few groups and a few families. This has been very frustrating for me personally when I think about what politics is.

He reiterates that the state system belongs to the traditional political class and that wresting power from this class should be a central goal for anyone who throws his hat into the political ring. In addition, the traditional political parties are in the hands of local elites, a situation that has led to internal divisions and factions within the parties and to the appearance of alternative parties. Since 2002, this has affected the hegemony wielded by the traditional parties (Gutiérrez 2007). Accusing political opponents of corruption and seeing them punished is an important political weapon used to hold onto power or to topple others who hold it (Jordan 2007: 227). The main goal is not to guarantee the responsible management of state resources but to appropriate the state apparatus in order to distribute the spoils to one's clients. This is often accomplished by distorting the financing of services associated with the paternal protector state in order to reap votes in subsequent elections, including investment in schools, waterlines, sewers, and small scale development projects. As Sharma and Gupta (2006: 16) stress, interbureaucratic conflicts, corruption, and inconsistencies "are central to institutional organization and the reproduction of states."

Conclusions

In this chapter I have examined the discourses and practices that objectify the state and produce what has been called the state effect (Mitchell 1999) in the midst of armed conflict. This reified state embodied by politicians is a point of reference used to legitimize the existence and activities of armed actors.

I have shown through an analysis of several practices and forms of discourse that in Colombia the divide between state and party politics precedes the divide between state and society, since party politics is synonymous with the state in the way that corruption is synonymous with the state in Nigeria (Jordan 2007: 14). In the national imaginary, there is a wish to see a state that

is independent from politics, but in practice politics is dominant, and it is the political parties and their activities that produce the state effect. Taking these factors into consideration, one can say that the state in Colombia is not autonomous from party politics and does not reflect independent technocratic bureaucratization in the ways expected of a modern state.

I have also demonstrated the existence of a discursive framework that seeks to locate the state in time, space, and affect (see Chapter 1 of this volume)—that refers to the state as incomplete, deformed, or in the process of formation. These inconsistencies demonstrate the social and cultural construction of the state in the context of "generalized violence" and the armed conflict. This vague and arbitrary idea of what it is thought the state should be is even further diluted when we examine the local state in relation to the central state. Legislation that emanates from the center to regulate public administration is accepted as a reference point, and this does produce a state effect, but it also demonstrates the unclear barriers between state and society. The former is appropriated and manipulated by politicians to constrain or punish officeholders and to provide their own clients with services within the framework of the paternal protector state. In addition, the presence of the armed forces is equated by some with the presence of the central state, but perceived by the population as one more armed actor to be feared.

In order to deconstruct the general idea of the state, there should be a focus on nonstate armed groups that exercise *de facto* authority and how they interrelate among themselves, given that their presence alongside the armed forces and other state representatives complicates the idea of the Colombian state.

Finally it is important to indicate that the permeable boundaries between state and party politics cast further doubt on the dichotomy of the center and the periphery. Political networks compromise the autonomy of the state at both national and local levels.

Chapter 3

Respatializing the State from the Margins: Reflections on the Camba Autonomy Movement in Santa Cruz, Bolivia

Nicole Fabricant

Recent anthropological writing has shown the various ways that neoliberal globalization has undermined states' claims to centralizing political power in any national-territorial domain. The state's autonomy appears to be increasingly compromised and its reach diminished as private entities have come to define state-making within a competitive market logic and to promote smaller, more locally oriented, governmental structures. Some anthropologists view this trend as having contributed to the fracturing of the nation-state's large bureaucratic apparatus and, in turn, its capacity to govern at a distance (Sawyer 2004; Ferguson 2005, 2006; Gupta and Sharma 2006). In this context of the diminished state, nongovernmental organizations—not only NGOs, but also schools and independent communities—are increasingly carrying out responsibilities that were formerly considered those of a centralized state authority.

This chapter is concerned with the question of how these fractioned parts might at once challenge *and* reproduce the state's natural claim to political centrism and inherent right to rule. It asks about the modes, mechanisms, and methods whereby groups who see themselves as occupying the state's margins might use new nodes of economic production and power to encourage a return to centrism, albeit in a smaller, regional form. In doing so, it aims to advance inquiry into a paradox noted by the editors in Chapter 1, namely,

how people might actually intensify their expectations of the (ideal) state amid periods of deep disappointment and violent conflict with the (actual) state they are governed by.

I focus on the country of Bolivia because it presents a particularly interesting example of how social movements might redefine the state as a pluricultural and plurinational one, incorporating native populations into it and, in turn, undoing longstanding and oppressive colonial legacies. This reported cultural, economic, and social transformation has been particularly troubling to *mestizo* (mixed-race) elites in the lowland regions of the nation, who have essentially instrumentalized the state as a means to both pacify and control such native populations. In years past, they had used the state as a means to secure and grow their wealth through governmental concessions and tax breaks. Increasingly, however, Bolivian elites are losing their grip on state power, as progressive social movements claim power and introduce redistributive reforms to undo a history of unequal political and social relations and uneven economic access to the means of production. I am interested in what happens when the center, or those who historically comprised the center, become part of the margins. More specifically, what happens when those who have considered themselves *conquistadores*, and thus, owners of land, suddenly become marginalized in their own national territory? How and in what ways do they reimagine a state from new critical, regional nodes of economic production?¹ In what ways do these elite populations mobilize everyday cultural practices and performances to justify their continuing right to rule? Simultaneously, how does these elites' practice of state-making by taking matters into their own hands further weaken, disempower, and delegitimize the existent governing body by respatializing power, authority, and control to the margins?

Historically, Bolivian citizenship rights have been exclusionary, defined by rotating regimes of landed elites. These elites' pedigree of power stretches back to the colonial era, when European colonists first centered on turning Indians into subjects of law, and later into citizens of liberal or rational bureaucracies (Larson 2004; Postero 2007). *Mestizo* elites obsessed over the question of how the Indian fit into a rational state and sought various methods of control, from the initial transformation of Indians into individual property owners in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Platt 1982; Barragán 1999; Larson 2004; Langer 2009), to the implementation of assimilationist practices that targeted homes, communal spaces, bodies, and educational systems in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as spaces of improvement and regulation (Canessa

2005). In the mid-1990s, the neoliberal state implemented a top-down form of multiculturalism, recognizing indigenous peoples as actors in development schemes (Postero 2007). While these policies and practices actively sought to transform Indians into “citizens” of the modern and rational nation-state, the substance of that citizenship left much to be desired. Indigenous peoples held formal citizenship but continued to be excluded from political and economic participation (Postero 2007). More recently, Bolivia has become a critical space for evolving an indigenous politics, which focuses on how to overturn these assimilationist and inherently racist histories. Native peoples have begun to organize politically, particularly around resources and national sovereignty (Fabricant and Postero 2013).

Evo Morales and his political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), came to power in 2005 after a series of resource-based movements calling for an end to the privatization of water and natural gas and pushing for the creation of a constituent assembly. A few of the critical questions that surfaced during these mobilizations focused on how a state should be organized, how and in what ways marginalized groups could be incorporated into the state, and how a state could reflect the values, beliefs, and traditions of its majority native population (Fabricant and Postero 2013). Morales—who came out of a history of union organizing and grassroots politicking around the militarization and eradication of coca production in the Chapare region—promised to decolonize the state, bringing an end to its colonial and racist legacies. This has been paired with the overtly anti-neoliberal stance, undoing the thirty-plus-year legacy by nationalizing key industries and reinserting the state into the center of economic development, especially through hydrocarbon exploitation and the redistribution of resource rents as cash transfers to the poor. The process of decolonizing the state has taken many forms, integrating indigenous peoples into state-making, organizing a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution of the country, and redefining environmental policies through indigenous values of *buen vivir*, or “living well.”

However, an organized reaction to this indigenous and explicitly anti-neoliberal government has been growing in the East. Prior to the election of Evo Morales in 2005, Bolivian lowland elites began to fear a transformation of the state they had controlled. They especially feared the possibility of a centralized, more actively redistributive state with the power to reclaim land and resources from them. As a result, these dominant political and economic interests began to organize for a more decentralized state, one that would cede natural resource wealth and administrative power to regional rather than na-

tional control. This reform was expected to sustain a private and neoliberal model of agro-industrial development. Most concretely, elites advanced a discourse of departmental autonomy (Gustafson 2006). As Kent Eaton (2007) argues, departmental autonomy is generally understood to mean: (1) regional control over natural resources (land, timber, gas, and oil); (2) the right to retain control over two-thirds of all tax revenues generated in the department; and (3) authority to set all policies other than defense, currency, tariffs, and foreign relations. This regionalist project percolated in urban centers where elites constructed their notions of statehood.³ As noted, regions were the economic pivot centers of economic production and prosperity, and native or indigenous rights proved purely symbolic.⁴ This model stood in direct opposition to the all-inclusive, participatory, and redistributive Bolivian indigenous social movement project, which reached an electoral climax with the election of Morales in 2005.

This chapter focuses on the backlash to a redistributive and Andean state, the defiance to the advances of indigenous peoples, and the response to threats to dominant groups’ economic and political interests. Santa Cruz represents the agro-industrial capital of Bolivia and has thrived as a result of growth in transnational investment and the consequent expansion of export-oriented production since the middle of the twentieth century. Many of the leaders of the autonomy movement are economically and politically invested in this form of large-scale, export-oriented agriculture. Clearly, new forms of statehood might undermine these production and distribution networks, which have handsomely benefited the growing industrial and agricultural elite. The Santa Cruz autonomy movement became an especially threatening political formation in 2006, as Morales proposed to pass a radical agrarian reform bill to reclaim *latifundio* (large-scale landowners) lands in the East and redistribute large *haciendas* (plantations) to *campesinos* (peasants). Landed elites perceived this legislation as an attack upon their natural rights to land, space, and even *la patria* (homeland, nation). In response, elites in Santa Cruz quickly organized a broad-based movement in opposition to Morales’s redistributive proposals.

This fueled the campaign to make independent and regional governing bodies the most powerful pivot for state decision-making. The elites’ proposal struck at the heart of their state adversaries’ power. While they often spoke about dismantling centralized power, undermining the Morales government was their primary objective. Most importantly, they were principally concerned with revalidating the state’s historically conservative political equilib-

rium and expanding their inherent right to rule from the “Media Luna,” the crescent-shaped lowland region of Bolivia. It is no coincidence that the Media Luna comprises most of the resource-rich departments of Bolivia: Santa Cruz, which accounts for more than 42 percent of the nation’s agricultural output, Tarija, which accounts for 80 percent of the natural gas, and Beni and Pando, which remain centers of cattle ranching and agro-industrial development. Regionalists in Santa Cruz propose that the scale and boundaries of the state that administers these resources be “respatialized”—in other words, shrunk to a smaller scale, making the new state more proximate to the spaces being governed, easily controlled by local elites, and distanced from the centralized redistributive politics of the Morales administration.

“We Have Built This City”: Santa Cruz as Regional Economic Powerhouse

Elites leading the autonomy movement frame their regional history around a “pull yourself up by the bootstrap” discourse, arguing that they advanced and progressed without the help of the central government.”⁵ As the president of Camara Agropecuaria del Oreinte (CAO) stated:⁶

This region of Santa Cruz . . . when I was born, this city unfortunately had about 50,000 people. Today, we have one million. We used to only have about 50,000 hectares of production, and today, we have two million hectares of production. How have we grown? We have done this ourselves. We have done this, *los Cruceños*, with our own forces. We have built the highways, we have installed the electrical facilities and portable water. Everything we have done ourselves, us . . . *los Cruceños* . . . never once did the government, the central government help us to grow or develop.⁷ (Author’s Interview, July 15, 2007)

This discourse of regional independence has become a critical part of the autonomist campaign intended to diminish the reach and authority of the Morales administration.

Equally important, redistributive state policies are described as an extension of this historic state neglect. From representatives of CAO to the Civic Committee (a de facto institutional and regional governing body comprised of agribusiness elites), this theme that associated state centralism, no matter

its form, with regional neglect was a featured part of the discourse. As Rubén Darío Méndez (head of publicity for the Civic Committee) stated:

We have lived through 184 years of centralism. We have suffered the consequences of this, and even more, our region has suffered the consequences of this. In Tarija, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz, there was always hydrocarbon wealth, and in other words, the centralism of the *altiplano* [highland region of Bolivia]. This was a long history of discrimination against Santa Cruz. The governments came and usurped our mineral wealth. (Author’s Interview, June 10, 2010)

A cross-section of scholars has developed an alternate narrative of the historic role of the central state in relationship to local and national dominant economic interests. Critically, they posit that the central state always had resource-based interests in the lowlands and often provided government land concessions and tax breaks to large-scale landowners in order to develop critical industries. As Lesley Gill (1987) notes in her ethnography of the frontier development in lowland Bolivia, the barons of the short-lived rubber boom and the German import-export houses controlled the first commercial activity in Santa Cruz, and these businessmen often received large government land concessions, which helped them control important rubber reserves in the provinces of Velasco and Beni. When rubber collapsed on the global market, the import-export houses transformed their activities into agriculture, and in the middle of the twentieth century, agriculturalists in the eastern lowland region were helped by the state, working in collaboration with international and transnational banks, who invested in the region as a critical space of agricultural development. In the 1950s, the United States provided millions of dollars in aid to stimulate large-scale agro-industrial development in the region, creating a new class of capitalist farmers. As a result of this expansion of large-scale agriculture in the East, small-scale farming was destabilized and campesinos were dislocated. Equally important, the expanding production capacity of the increasing sites of agro-business demanded a great number of laborers. Thus, the central government established colonization programs, which directed poor Andean farmers to migrate to the lowland to serve as laboring forces. Over time, surplus laborers were also directed to urban areas.

Some Cruceños resented the influx of highlanders migrating to Santa Cruz, as the majority of them were poor and worked as seasonal agricultural laborers. By and large, however, these laboring Indians were not perceived as

a direct threat to Cruceños' economic interests. Eventually, however, racialized tensions flared around the presence of middle-class Collas, who came to Santa Cruz and invested in business and commerce. Elite Cruceños were concerned that highlanders might come to control critical markets (Gill 1987), and so they increasingly framed regional and resource-based struggles as part of an anti-Colla resistance. On this basis, they invested in creating political formations to advance their interests and produce a rhetoric of undermining growing Colla economic power and political influence. Elites formed groups such as the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, founded in 1950, to protect their economic investments, consolidate business interests, and create a political powerhouse in the region. Their first battle and first victory, in 1957, placed significant pressure on the centralized government to earmark a larger portion of oil revenues generated in the department for local expenditure. Due to the location of key resources, like gas, elites managed to claim a certain amount for their region, denying the highlands of critical funds necessary for the centralized state. Many taxi-drivers and working-class Paceños (people from La Paz) I bumped into on the streets talked about the autonomy movement as an elite-led movement and always referred to the fact that when the backbone of the mining industry fueled the national economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, highlanders never denied the lowlands funds/expenditures from resource wealth to develop regions. And elites in Santa Cruz never once complained about "centralization" in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. However, now that the tables are turned and resources are unevenly distributed in the lowlands, elites demand independence and blame a centralized state for their problems.

Critically, despite elites' rhetoric of state disinvestment in the region, these snapshots of state-based investment in agriculture and colonization programs illuminates the role the state has had in developing the region by providing economic and political support to large-scale agriculturalists. The scale and uninterrupted nature of this support was sustained until Morales was elected president.⁸

The Evolution of a Lowland Export, Agribusiness Model of Production and Distribution

In the 1970s, as Santa Cruz made the country self-sufficient in sugar, followed by rice and beef, foreign lending institutions and the Bolivian government in-

creased the level of financing to further develop this export-oriented sector. This economic support was almost entirely directed to large-scale agriculturalists—a policy Gill (1987) argues was economically flawed. She further suggests that political favoritism and state corruption were important factors in directing large sums to particular capitalist farmers. First, the repayment record of large agriculturalists was worse than that of peasants, who had an especially low delinquency rate. Yet, the centralized state, working in collaboration with private banks, continued its unjust policy of directing its resources to elites. Second, banks continued to finance export crops even as yields dropped. Military regimes, such as that of Hugo Banzer, a brutal dictator of the 1970s who had vested interests in the lowland region, did not pressure growers to repay credit; instead, a decree extended the repayment period for cotton and soybean loans from the state bank an additional eight to twelve years. Banzer went a step further. As part of the centralized state apparatus, he purchased credit portfolios of Citibank, where over 80 percent of the loans were overdue, and transferred the debt to the national bank to prevent international and national pressure on delinquent borrowers. This, in turn, was the basis for enormous income transfers to the most privileged groups of producers. This evidence is but a partial illustration of how the state did, in fact, favor and protect the rights of historically privileged populations. The ideological justification for granting such large extensions of land under the designation of cattle or agricultural enterprise was consistent with the government's import-substitution policy, which stated that large holdings offered a greater productive potential than small-scale holdings.

With the introduction of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s under Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, Cruceño elites again benefited from the liberalization of markets, opening of borders, and expansion of export-oriented production. Over the years, these latifundio elites had consolidated their interests and expanded connections with international and transnational agribusiness. Many shifted production from sugarcane to soy, the new hope for regional and national development. Santa Cruz became an important regional center in the expansion of soy production, helping to feed the global appetite for this crop. The Bolivian state, working in conjunction with transnational and private capital, provided a range of subsidies and tax breaks for large-scale soy producers, creating a favorable environment for shifting production to meet the anticipated demands of this emergent market.

Clearly, the vital interplay between regional politics and large-scale economic and agricultural investment in export-oriented industries is not new. However, this locus for decision-making has grown in importance. This has

gradually occurred as emergent neoliberal policies further emboldened elites to consolidate their control of economic policy through regional, as opposed to centralized, governmental structures. Due to the fact that elites really are not reliant upon the centralized state for critical funding, but rather have ties to transnational corporations, they have managed to effectively cut relations and embolden efforts from the space of regional nodes of economic production. These transnational agribusinesses have also provided funding directly for their right-wing movement-building efforts.

As many social scientists have noted, transnational agribusinesses like ADM, Cargill, and Monsanto work in collaboration with regional elites to create an open and friendly agribusiness environment in Santa Cruz. These companies were also actively involved in delegitimizing any power the central government had over this particular region. As Sawyer (2004) and others have noted, it is in the interest of transnational corporations to work independent of the state creating those variegated layers of power and control. When indigenous social movements resisted the privatization of natural resources in the early 2000s, elites realized that their alliances with transnational corporations had to be consolidated. This control and delegitimation was directly threatened by Morales and the "indigenous state."

A primary task, then, for Santa Cruz autonomists was to convince people, in an era of indigenous rights, plurinationalism, and new forms of statehood, that the communitarian state was not going to advance the interests of this agro-industrial center of production, or this region of the country. As noted earlier, part of their platform centered on convincing people that elites and Cruceños had always had to build this region independent of the centralized state. What distinguished this moment, however, was elites' mobilization of a racialized discourse of their natural rights to land, space, and the nation-state. Elites, in some respect, imagined MAS and its efforts to decolonize the state as an Andean invasion of their natural space.

As elites struggled to hold on to their region as a space of control and state-making, they created clear boundaries of who did and did not belong to these emergent centers of capitalist production, marking city spaces with highly politicized graffiti reading, *Collas necesitan pasaporte para entrar a Santa Cruz* (Collas need passports to enter Santa Cruz). Highland migrants are now imagined as *avasalladores* (invaders), a threat to the logic of the modern agribusiness city. Some urban Cruceños believe that the informal Colla vendors clutter and dirty the streets, and should be pushed to the margins of the city, while in rural areas (Fabricant and Gustafson 2011), Collas are de-

scribed as "a flood, a hemorrhage, and the *Indiada*, or Indian hordes" (Gustafson 2006) that steal land and productive resources from native Cambas. In both instances, Cambas imagine highland indigenous migrants as out of place, a threat to agribusiness development in rural areas, and a disruption to the orderly functioning of the modern city, which will come to represent their modern regional-nation-state.

Natural Rights to Land, Space, and Nation-State

Cambas have created a complex regional mythology, emphasizing the region's comparatively whiter colonial heritage and enlarging the idea that the lowland ruling classes were the original conquistadores, which made them rulers of the land and the region. As Bolivian sociologist Ximena Soruco (2011) notes, this idea of the pure race descendants of lines of females and males of the Spanish concubines and soldiers who founded Santa Cruz is not new. Rather, it has been picked up and mobilized by regionalists, who have found inspiration in late nineteenth-century writers like Gabriel René Moreno, who argued that the force of law and progress would make both these floods disappear, as both races could not coexist with modern civilization and would inevitably vanish. Progress, then, was contingent upon the conquest of the Oriente (term used to describe the lowland region of Bolivia). This, of course, was a colonizer's racist, social Darwinist interpretation of the world: "The famous repugnance of three centuries, repugnance at ever mixing their blood with that of nearby Guarani or Quechua" (Moreno 1989 [1885]: 137).

The Cruceño identity, as Soruco (2011) notes, was built around the image of economic activity and productivity (specifically, the private extraction of raw materials), was ostensibly opposed to any kind of state intervention, and was strongly linked to the international market. The rubber, chestnut, and wood *barracas* (workman's hut or small farmhouse) coexisted with sugarcane, cotton, soy, and cattle plantations as symbols of civilization, progress, and the territorial expansion of the Oriente. This is very much still the case, as elite Cruceños continue to imagine their right to rule as deeply embedded in this idea of productivity. Their relatively fixed intention is to rule a resource-rich nation and maximize its possibility for international trade and commerce. Thus, their historic rights to this domain have become linked to ideas about how to control, develop, and expand commercial or economic activity.

To more deeply understand elite discourse that connects race, space, and natural rights to the state and ultimately the region, I visited Giselle Bruun, who received much attention as a leading figure of the Cruceña Civic Battles in the late 1950s to secure 11 percent of the petroleum royalties. When I visited her in her home, a block from the center of Santa Cruz, she jumped up from her reclined position to talk about her European descent. “My mother, Doña Miertte Sciarioni, was born in Santa Cruz, but she was Italian. My father was French. We lived well during that period,” she told me. They owned the famous Hacienda de Cuatro Ojos, which was her maternal grandfather’s property. She described it as follows:

It was a place that was flowery and glorious and that registered the history of Santa Cruz. This was the gigantic colonial mansion. One would enter the house of my grandparents, and it was an environment that was completely European, in terms of the decorations and the customs, but also the old continent. *One would breathe in order and cleanliness, there was total organization.* (Author’s Interview, June 2010; emphasis added)

She then transitioned quickly from colonialist ideas of order, progress, and cleanliness to the total disorganization of Andean migration to Santa Cruz:

Oh, Santa Cruz was a little sensible town . . . and then all these people came and we received all of them so that they could work and bring Santa Cruz *adelante* (forward). Santa Cruz received all these people with her arms open . . . but these people who have come from the interior, they just want to squat wherever they want, and it’s very difficult to work with them. What this *pueblo* needs is order, cleanliness, and love for the *pueblo*, a town that is giving them food. But they only are about the economic part, that’s it. (Author’s Interview, June 2010)

In part, Bruun’s discourse paralleled earlier discourses of nationhood as including certain groups and excluding others. For example, according to Postero (2007: 34–35), liberalism worked by “determining acceptable boundaries between who is included and who is not.” Other sociologists have explained that elite assumptions about indigenous peoples’ barbarous way of life and primitive communal practices justified their exclusionary policies. These themes are feathered into present discourse used to mobilize for Cruceños’

historic rights to land in the Oriente. These kinds of discourses, translated into critical regional and city policies, reinforce the historic standing of the liberal and exclusionary state: Those who do not fit into their imaginary of regional-national identity, in which order, cleanliness, and economic productivity are critical to their project, shall remain on the margins.⁹

My conversation with Bruun, illustrative of many themes of the contemporary autonomy movement, characterizes a particular kind of Indian—the Colla migrant who represents a political and economic threat to the regionalist project built upon neoliberal practices and ideals and who must be subjugated. Deeply embedded in her language of Andean migrations of chaos, disorder, and uncleanness are also ideas about regional productivity—large-scale agrarian capitalism and a globalized food system that promotes a modern identity. Autonomists conceptualize their Colla counterpart as disrupting this model of “productive” citizenship based upon their “illegality”: squatting, seizing lands, and implementing a possibly more communitarian or redistributive model. Due in part to this anti-Colla sentiment, many autonomists argue that the centralized state is not, in fact, representative of their interests in the Oriente, and Cambas feel a new governance center should emerge in their region.

Territorial Remappings of Statehood: Resources, Rights, and Nation

This racialized discourse, combined with the idea that the centralized state has never provided assistance to this region, emboldens campaigns to remap the boundaries of nationhood as excluding the altiplano and only including the Media Luna. At the forefront of remapping campaigns lies the Nación Camba, a right-wing extremist regional group in Santa Cruz whose members envision their homeland or nation to be the crescent-shaped lowland region. In their vision, the highlands, no longer part of Bolivia, would revert to their colonial title of “Alto Peru.” In part, Nación Camba’s justification for a Camba nation has to do with a kind of culturalist discourse in which Cambas are different than their Colla counterparts. Beyond this political-cultural ideology, however, is an agenda to create a state space in relation to resource wealth—an area ripe for economic expansion if the state does not interfere with the intensification of exploitation or the scale and purposes of production.

As in other parts of the world, the contest for terrain in Bolivia is fought by transnational corporate interests, sovereign states, and indigenous or native communities over natural resources. For example, James Ferguson (2005) suggests that oil companies, as agents of transnational capital, transcend and traverse sovereign states, and bypass them altogether to establish private enclaves tied to resource extraction. Setting up their own forms of governance and violence firms territorial orders delinking them from wider national space and society (Ferguson 2005). These privatized territorial enclaves generate conditions called “graduated” or “variegated” sovereignties (Ong 2006), subnational spaces that allow distinct groups to enter and control resource politics. As Tomas Perreault (2011) has noted, in the case of Bolivia, Nación Camba can be thought of as one of these graduated or variegated sovereignties, whereby conservative political groups could have the power to remap the bounds of governance and collection of rents on resource wealth. Remapping the bounds of governance provided a concrete way of reimagining the nation-state at the regional level. Further, as Morales promoted an indigenous and redistributive state through use of resource rents for social programming, Cruceños had to creatively map the bounds of the Media Luna and their resource wealth to legitimize mestizo citizenship rights and a neoliberal development model.

I attended several meetings at the Nación Camba headquarters in 2006 and 2007, listening to speeches about the importance of protecting natural resources in the region. The discourse focused strongly on replicating a model of private property like that in the United States or Europe. As one Nación Camba representative told me, “If there is oil under my house, it belongs to me. It should not belong to the state to be redistributed to everyone” (author’s interview, February 1, 2006). To learn more about this organization, I traveled to the house of its founder, Sergio Antelo, a man in his mid- to late fifties who has been the intellectual force of the separatist movement Nación Camba. Antelo has provided much of the theoretical framing that has powered the movement.

On the day I was to meet Antelo, I wandered around the Equipetrol neighborhood, searching for his house.¹⁰ When I asked him to describe Nación Camba, he explained:

“Nación Camba” in reality is a name that we took on after a long process of gestation. We thought that it was critical to unify, reunify some sectors—especially intellectual sectors—some sectors that wrote about

regional, national, and international themes... and out of this emerged the idea to form a movement, an informal movement. Inside this political debate exist three intellectual/ideological currents: One is a tendency (*bolivianista nacional*), and another is autonomist (“I was Bolivian”), and the third tendency is separatist. After much debate, we decided to put out a name that would be easy to identify. We decided on “Nación” because a nation represented a group of people with similar features or traits, and “Camba” because it is a characteristic of our cultural-regional differences from the Altiplano.¹¹ (Author’s Interview, February 2006)

As Perreault (2011) and other geographers have pointed out, these “imagined realities” of Nación Camba represent new spatial imaginaries of regional statehood in which elites have complete control over resource wealth and rents. Following a long tradition of anthropologists and geographers who have looked at resource extraction and its relationship to nation-state building (see Coronil 1997; Watts 2001, 2004; Valdivia 2008; Bebbington and Bebbington 2010; Gustafson 2009), I am also interested in resources as a filter through which we can most clearly view regional development and its potential as well as historic role in remapping spatial and authoritarian bounds. Perreault (2011) looks at something he calls “resource nationalism,” whereby understanding the relationship between nature and nation involves understanding the place-based histories of resource government regimes and the ways that resource governance and social struggles are territorialized within national space. He identifies natural gas as a critical site or terrain of struggle over collective identities and national belonging. These resource claims and, over time, wars have become a political and economic pivot for class and racial struggle. This has occurred as extraction and production practices endangering indigenous groups and communities have become the basis for politicizing racial identity as part of a discourse of rights to resources and redistribution. More concretely, these groups have used indigeneity as a language, discussing the “original peoples” of the land or nation and linking ideas about land, territory, and natural resources. In reaction, elites have invented a discourse of resource exploitation and productivity as critical to regional development. They creatively link their history of neglect in relationship to the centralized state and their right as conquistadores to govern the resources of the region and the direction of its development.

In this political environment, Santa Cruz has formed critical alliances with



Figure 1. Remapping of natural space.

other resource-rich neighboring states like Tarija, which accounts for much of Bolivia's natural gas. While Nación Camba does not publicly acknowledge its intention to control all natural resources in the region, this is the basic tenet of the movement and its rationale for remapping the bounds of statehood. Camba mapping is a political tool and has been used to visually and publicly etch zones of resource wealth and new transnational connections or nodes through extractive routes.

As Eduardo Galeano (1973) reminds us, however, maps can be deceiving. In the most commonly used maps, two-thirds of the world appears to be the North and one-third the South. Europe is shown as larger than Latin America, even though Latin America is actually twice the size of Europe. He states, "The map lies. It steals space just as the imperial economy steals wealth, official history steals memory and formal culture steals the world" (Galeano 1973: 49). Those who see the world in such deformed arrangements are challenged by Galeano to reconsider what it would mean to see the world differently. Cambas certainly see their world through a political filter of economic gain

and historic filter of political dominance, and thus, they see Bolivia *differently*. Consequently, they have magisterially remapped the bounds to create a spatialized national identity of the Media Luna that has particular economic, social, and political implications. Figure 1 illustrates Cambas' physical and visual remapping of national space and territory. The darkest tone represents the Media Luna. Critically, Cambas imagine this remapping of territorial bounds as critical to their political vision of independence.

This map, along with Nación Camba's Media Luna image, has traveled across borders and bounds. For example, the outline of the Media Luna with the word, "Independencia," marked the city walls of Santa Cruz and government buildings during the heat of the autonomy campaigns in 2006 and 2007 (see Figure 2).

Outlines of the Media Luna and similar images of autonomy have also traveled across the Internet and through social networking websites like Facebook. Images that circulated on Facebook in 2007 and 2008 represent one way in which the outline of the Media Luna is reshaped in both form and meaning



Figure 2. Independence with Media Luna etched on the walls.
Author's photo.

as young Cambas living in the United States comment on their understandings of autonomy.

As one such Camba states, "We are Cambas Carajo [God Damn It!] We are the productive engine of the country and we want nothing to do with Collas. That's why we are calling for independence. And even though we live in the United States, we support autonomy" (author's interview, November 2010). The image of the Media Luna inside a globe and the quote "Este es mi país" (This is my country) indicates the power of images to reconstruct reality and retell history. Yet, this symbol, when feathered into the discussions on Facebook groups such as *Autonomía y Pasaporte para los Collas* (Autonomy and Passports for Collas), produces a powerful arc of redefinition of nationhood and spatialized mapping of identity:

We are six regions of the country that have won the *Si* for Autonomy and not because we are children of *macacos* [ugly people] and others who do not produce and who are parasites sucking the blood from our city, who come and live off of the city, our beautiful and beloved Santa Cruz where everyone was always welcomed . . . but now we have to stop this and detain those countrymen who come and want to take away our land and dirty our city. . . Enough! Autonomy for Santa Cruz and passports for Collas.¹²

Thus, through social media, citizenship rights move beyond the limits of city bounds and provide a kind of transnational or international discourse of statehood from the margins.

This physical and visual map of Bolivia in regional form illustrates a spectacular and performative resketching of power from the central state to new regional spaces of control. This reappropriation project first claims and later reproduces all the conventional definitions of "the state." This project of discourse and identity conversion ultimately creates new forms of sovereignty, devolving from a historic national state to a region. Indeed, this conventionality and mimesis is very much at the heart of this separatist project. It could be argued that such critiques of current centralism accomplish little more than propose new sites of centralization. Critically, in the Media Luna, elites creatively manipulate and mobilize images, metaphors, and symbols, and, in the process, have made "culture" itself into a powerful signifier of development and progress against an evil, backward, and centralized state.¹³ In this way, regional elites have mobilized historic forms of racism against their Colla

counterparts. In a time of economic crisis and heightened migration, such racialized constructions of distinction have come to hold greater power as the backbone of their movement for independent statehood.¹⁴

Such projects reterritorialize (or recentralize) state power from La Paz to new regional nodes of economic production. The autonomy movement has brought its ideas regarding regional control over natural resources, the right to retain control over two-thirds of all tax revenues generated in the department, and the authority to set all policies other than defense, currency, tariffs, and foreign relation to a larger audience through spectacular performances and new embodied forms of democracy and citizenship practices. These performances, on the one hand, are constructed to validate a naturally conservative political equilibrium for the state, while on the other hand, paradoxically, they reinforce its inherent right to rule.¹⁵ For instance, in December 2006, regionalist elites who were frustrated that the national government was not taking their calls for autonomy seriously decided to take matters into their own hands in order to ratify in a *de facto* fashion their statutes, through what they referred to as "direct democracy:"

The Cabildo: Building the Legitimacy of a Popular Movement for Autonomy

When I asked a Civic Committee member about the significance of *cabildos* (public town meetings), he replied, "Cabildos are about direct democracy." In order to ratify their autonomy statutes in 2006, regional elites hosted what was referred to as the *cabildo del millón* (meeting of a million people), a public forum that promoted a popular perception of the movement's commitment to democratic practices. Ruben Costa, governor of Santa Cruz, ended this *cabildo* for autonomy with the following proclamation:

Costa: If the Constituent Assembly approves a political constitution of the state that violates the *ley de convocatoria* regarding the two-thirds majority vote and the referendum for autonomy, do you stand against such an illegal constitution?

Crowd: Yes!

Costa: Do you give full and total power to the governor of Santa Cruz to implement a decentralized regime that allows for a social democratic state of rights?

Crowd: Yes!

This spectacular event placed Santa Cruz's autonomy movement on the national agenda. Over 500,000 people attended, and the gathering lasted an entire day. Attendees were called upon to collectively resist the body of national laws created by a group of indigenous organizers, NGOs, and other left-wing intellectuals. The intense connection between this mass of people and the political agenda of the landed elite was expressed repeatedly through chants, such as the rhythmic language of call and response. This discursive sing-along climaxed with a frenzy of popular votes, which ultimately resulted in the transfer of power to the governor and civic committees. During the course of this frenzy of votes, these officials were presented with a popular mandate to construct and implement a new constitution. These regional leaders were directed by the assembly to advance the movement's goal of building an autonomous nation, severed from the western highlands.

While this version of the constitution was never formally passed by the central state's constituent assembly, the autonomist movement managed to place enough pressure upon the government to insert their demands for regional autonomy into the new constitution. Importantly, the *cabildos* and public performances of "embodied democracy," such as hunger strikes and protest marches, bolstered the legitimacy of their political claims to the formation of a democratic mass movement, and, in turn, their agenda for autonomy and independence. Imagining a new regional-national identity through images, songs, and narratives has a certain power, but far more powerful is the creative involvement of *Cruceños* in regional, spectacular events of democracy. The latter lends an important degree of authority to the pageantry.

The *cabildos* are political shows that animate static ideas and sentiments into the dramatic clarity of mass action. More concretely, these public rituals, replete with songs glorifying the beautiful and productive city of Santa Cruz, stories of the historic marginalization of the region, and new staged productions of democracy, serve to embody otherwise abstract concepts such as justice (Conquergood 2002). Like marginal communities in the highlands that take matters into their own hands to protect themselves from thieves across the class divide (Goldstein 2004), these regional elites take matters into their own hands to protect their land from landless peasants or to enact their form of justice. To paraphrase Victor Turner (1969), justice lives only in performance and exists only insofar as its rituals promote ongoing concerns. Protesters come away from these spectacular events feeling as though concerns about justice have radiated through and beyond the event. In turn, that heat solders many of the participants to the politics of the autonomy move-

ment. The rituals expressed through the medium of spectacular events such as the *cabildo* effectively link cultural differences, historic reclamation, and contemporary resource battles to systems and structures of democracy and justice.¹⁶

While *cabildos* were especially popular in the early days of the autonomy battles, more recent performative events advocating statehood include democratic campaigns challenging the human rights record of Evo Morales's administration. This campaign was developed by Civic Committee members during the summer months of 2010. Luis Núñez, president of the Civic Committee, presented a petition at a climactic moment in the campaign to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C., in December 2010. Months before the official presentation of this petition, Sarita Muñoz (niece of Giselle Bruun) explained:

Citizens of Santa Cruz must petition the United Nations to intervene. Why? We are signing these booklets because we want to contribute from the perspective of civil society. This action defines a public politics related to two big problems. First, we believe that democracy is the best system, even though there are daily challenges. Second, we believe that tolerance and reciprocity is the best way for us to support the country. It is for these two reasons that we must mobilize. (Author's Interview, June 2010)

She held up a small booklet that flashed the official seal of the "Plurinational State of Bolivia." The fine print beneath the seal read, "A book of Registration for Petition, Article 24 of the Constitution, in order to implement an international commission to disarticulate the networks of corruption and impunity that currently exist in Bolivia." Inside the booklet, petitioners wrote their first and last names, place and date of birth, occupation, and national ID number. There was also a small box for fingerprints. These creative performances of democracy and citizenship—collective rituals whereby people take part in claiming and reasserting their citizenship rights—ultimately propose and decree that the centralized state of Morales should be declared null and void. They skip directly over the state in order to negotiate in an international arena a platform intended to destabilize or delegitimize the current government.

Conclusion

Santa Cruz, Bolivia, and its autonomy movement offer a flare that sheds intense light on often invisible efforts to delegitimize and respatialize the centralized state through neoliberal reforms. Cruceño elites offer one of the best examples of how dominant regional economic and political interests that rarely encounter problems with the centralized state respond when confronted with a popular indigenous movement that captures parts of the state apparatus. In this case, regional elites borrowed and inverted their adversaries' tactics, strategies, and platform of justice. Just as social movements rearticulated their "popular" redistributive project as "decolonizing" the state, regionalist elites retreated to an urban-centered project tied to agro-industrial interests, and advanced a private and neoliberal-based model of autonomy in which government and authority over land, territory, space, and resources should be respatialized to the margins as a democratic project of historic justice.

This push/pull between the national-indigenous project of reclaiming a nation-state and the regionalist project of respatializing power back to the perimeter or locality to undercut the threat of the popular insurgency raises questions of how citizens come to understand, identify with, and act upon the liberatory potential of a centralized state. Both the popular indigenous call for control over the state as part of a broader project to redistribute rights to land, resources, and territory, and the elite call for autonomy and its concomitant claim that the region is the rightful locus of power, rotate around the idea that the "state" is an all-encompassing entity with an exclusive authority within a particular national territory. Clearly, however, the class and institutional interests embedded in these distinct respatializing political agendas regarding the locus of state power and its fundamental purposes are dramatically different. More concretely, Bolivia, pluricultural and Morales-led, does not fulfill the role of a state for people in the Media Luna, so these people have adopted a platform for how it might work for them. Their discourse legitimates breaking away and forming a new state by drawing on arcane, mythic, and cynically inverted historical justifications for why this is necessary and right—interestingly enough, tactics similar to those used by indigenous peoples to claim rights to a new kind of nation.

Yet, in both cases, there is no real challenge whatsoever to the conventional state form. For conservative elites, change is tethered to a singular agenda—protection from the redistributive politics of La Paz—and thus,

boundaries are readjusted or respatialized and brought to a smaller scale. More proximately, however, the corrupting influence of local moneyed interests, bureaucratic structures of decision-making, and the inability of the poor to access state power remain unchanged. For Morales's Bolivia, there are real, cultural, and epistemological shifts being offered by indigenous peoples that might alter or shift our understanding of states, yet most of what it offers is a mere culturalist gloss on a kind of state-structure that proposes to be collective, inclusive, pluricultural, and plurinational, but in reality, continues to reproduce the very same centralized, bureaucratic, and authoritarian rule of the past. Both states are re-inscribing the liberal state form. Morales's state uses indigenous values of communalism and the Camba state argues for decentralization, in which the liberal state is essentially the region.

Chapter 4

State Formation and Class Politics in Colombia

Lesley Gill

After predictions that forecast the demise of states by unfettered globalization, recent studies demonstrate that global pressures are less dismantling states than reconfiguring them (e.g., Brenner 2004; Gupta and Sharma 2006). The painful, sometimes violent, political and economic disruptions of the last three decades have prompted scholars to ask new questions about what the state is, where it is located, and how political life should be organized (Krupa and Nugent, this volume). The capacity of Andean states to claim effective control over a territory in the name of the nation and its citizens is often limited, as the kinds of social relations, understandings, and forms of political participation that become institutionalized as “the state” are themselves the outcome of contending projects of rule, which operate at different geographical scales (Nugent 1997). A number of scholars have examined how the emergence of “informal sovereignties” (Hansen and Stepputat 2006), “state proxies” (Krupa 2010), “parastates” (Gill 2009), “proto-states” (Bejarano and Pizzarro 2004), and “shadow powers” (Gledhill 1999; Nordstrom 2000) expresses decentralized claims that undermine the notion of a monolithic state that regulates social life and monopolizes violence in a given territory. They have also analyzed how imperial power operates through long-distance connections and institutions (e.g., militaries, IMF, transnational corporations) that impinge on the sovereignty of subordinate states (Ferguson 2005; Gill 2004).

State formation is a contentious, uneven process. It produces and must

contend with differently organized forms of territorial control in which groups that wield power operate alongside, with, or against state officials and institutions (Nordstrom 2000; Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Such complex geographies of power are dynamic, frequently violent, and change over time. They emerge within broader processes of class formation and capital accumulation that have transnational dimensions and uneven regional manifestations, and they are constantly transformed by the struggles of diverse groups to advance particular political projects and the beliefs, understandings, and ways of living associated with them (Smith 2004, 2010; Roseberry 1994). The research raises questions about how power-laden social geographies emerge from conflicting political and economic agendas, how rights are defined and distributed to different groups, and how distinctions such as state/nonstate, foreign/domestic, and public/private arise. How, too, do working people conceptualize the state and formulate claims at particular moments?

This chapter addresses these concerns by focusing on Colombia’s Middle Magdalena region over the last century, particularly the oil-refining center of Barrancabermeja, and considering three distinct periods in which shifting regimes of capital accumulation, the coercive capacities of different actors (a transnational oil company, guerrilla insurgencies, and right-wing paramilitaries), and the organization and claims-making of working people gave rise to changing geographies of power. The central argument is that “the state” never operated alone but in overt and covert alliances with other powerful actors to promote particular social, political, and economic projects. These political configurations have always been unstable, and they are a central feature of the perpetual crisis of hegemony in the Middle Magdalena and elsewhere in Colombia (Richani 2007; M. C. Ramírez 2011). Unlike recent scholarship on state formation that focuses on the activities of elites and middling groups, this account places the working class at the center of concern. It shows that shifting geographies of power and processes of state-making turned on the control of resources, changing forms of capital accumulation, and the making, unmaking, and remaking of a working class in which the demands, visions, and struggles of working people played a central part.

First, the chapter examines the early twentieth-century development of Barrancabermeja as an oil export enclave in which a transnational corporation concentrated power through the control of space on the otherwise wrinkle-free tapestry of national sovereignty. Yet, because the corporation controlled space and capital more easily than workers, its power foundered on the deep tensions between capital and labor that shaped the enclave from its

inception. Contests between the corporation and a militant, heterogeneous working class contributed to the demise of the enclave and the nationalization of the oil industry in the mid-twentieth century, the second period in which the geography of power, class relations, and capital accumulation was remapped in Barrancabermeja. The chapter then explores how the expansion of the public sector and the modernization of the economy pursued by a more developmentalist institutional state took place against the backdrop of growing poverty, political exclusion, and rising Cold War tensions. The juxtaposition of destitute working class, immigrant neighborhoods and a profitable, state-owned oil company laid bare the role of the institutional state in producing wealth and misery simultaneously. Diverse working people found common cause in the demand that the central government live up to its promises of development and modernization, and some made common cause with guerrilla insurgencies that sought to topple the state. In the mid-twentieth century, Barrancabermeja's popular movement reached the height of its power, but the strength of working peoples' reformist and revolutionary challenges prefigured the terror directed against them at the end of the millennium, when the emergence of violent paramilitary mafias tied to the cocaine traffic and the intensification of a counterinsurgent war fired a violent new phase of territorial struggle and state formation. The final part of the piece addresses how the counterinsurgent war, which was supposed to extend the power of the institutional state, resulted in the fragmentation of sovereignty and the violent destruction of Barrancabermeja's working class, which provided the grounding for the expansion of neoliberal capitalism.

The Domestic Politics of a Foreign Enclave, 1919–1960

In the early twentieth century, Colombia was a fragmented country of regions defined by distinct economic activities and disrupted by endemic unrest.¹ Regional elites, divided between the Liberal and Conservative parties, fought to control municipal appointments and the patronage and wealth-making possibilities that flowed from them. The victors in these partisan struggles typically acted in the name of the state, which could neither exercise direct control over the entire national territory nor monitor the population consistently. Such was the case in the Middle Magdalena region, a frontier zone where the institutions of the central state barely existed.

The central state made sporadic efforts to develop a road and rail network

to connect discontinuous regional economies to world markets, as the expansion of coffee production and mineral extraction fueled economic growth. The U.S. imperial state and its corporations also began to shape social, political, and economic life in Colombia through the creation of export enclaves. Along with the United Fruit Company's Atlantic coast banana zone, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey's oil district in the Magdalena river valley became Colombia's most important "foreign" enclave. In 1919, Standard Oil received a territorial concession from the Colombian government to extract oil through a subsidiary, the Tropical Oil Company (TROCO). The TROCO operated only nominally under the jurisdiction of the Colombian government, which arrogated virtual sovereignty to it to pump oil, mobilize a labor force, and organize social life in and around the river port of Barrancabermeja. The subsequent development of the oil enclave was integrated more tightly with world markets and the corporation's North American headquarters than Colombia (Vega, Espinel, and Fernández 2009).

The TROCO, however, never intended to replace the institutional Colombian state. With its infrastructure, technology, and capacity to concentrate and manage a huge population of migrant workers, it filled a void in a sparsely inhabited frontier region. Yet company administrators recognized the importance of working with state officials who saw the advent of foreign corporations as the harbinger of "progress" and national development.² The institutional state remained the best way for them to secure the social, juridical, and administrative order that the TROCO needed to extract oil effectively and efficiently. In 1922, for example, the provincial government strengthened the regulatory power of the corporation by carving out a new municipality around Barrancabermeja that quickly became dependent on the corporation for its budget (García 2006: 262), and the state's security forces placed a high priority on maintaining labor peace in the enclave.

The growth of the oil industry hinged on the creation of a labor force, which turned on two interrelated processes: the extermination of indigenous peoples and dispossession of peasant settlers who claimed land in the Middle Magdalena region, and the promise of relatively high wages to draw impoverished workers to Barrancabermeja from elsewhere. The concentration of a labor force in a frontier region shaped social and economic development in ways that departed from other parts of Colombia. Barrancabermeja emerged as a working class city that, by the 1920s, contained the largest agglomeration of urban proletarians in Colombia. Unlike other regions of the country, where entrenched, hereditary elites related to subalterns through ties of deference,

clientelism, and patronage (e.g., Farnsworth-Alvear 2000), the pretensions and claims of domestic power-holders were mostly absent in Barrancabermeja.

Historian Paul Kramer suggests that export enclaves constituted “strategic hamlets” of empire that concentrated extraordinary power through the control of space. They were, he argues, “spatial exceptions” in which corporations produced commodities and accumulated capital by enclosing and isolating populations, severing territory from local jurisdiction, and arrogating the right to control social life within the enclaves (Kramer 2011: 1356). Yet corporate rule was rife with contradictions. A small, transient group of white U.S. and Canadian oil company managers, technicians, and their family members comprised the local elite. They were unfamiliar with the cultural practices and social mores of the mostly mestizo and Afro-Colombian immigrants, whom they viewed as racially inferior, and they had more difficulty building cross-class relationships of respect and authority than their Colombian counterparts in other parts of the country (e.g., Farnsworth-Alvear 2000). Unlike executives of U.S.-based firms who could call upon nationalism to rally community and worker loyalty, ex-patriot TROCO administrators had few cultural tools to promote labor peace. Even though the TROCO projected itself as an ally of Colombia, the company could neither completely legitimize its operations in the eyes of Barrancabermeja’s burgeoning proletariat nor fully absorb the nascent working class political culture and the anti-imperialist nationalism that infused it.

The obvious links between an abusive foreign company and state authorities, and the stark race and class divisions between the working class and the company staff, fueled worker militancy. Social divisions were most visible in a pattern of segregated housing. U.S. and Canadian managers and technicians lived in the “barrio staff,” which contained shaded, North American-style houses surrounded by well-tended lawns. Foreign residents enjoyed an array of services, including a hospital and a golf course for their exclusive use. A fence separated this gilded ghetto from the impoverished, working-class encampments, where housing was rudimentary, basic services were nonexistent, and malaria, yellow fever, and intestinal disorders were pervasive. Patrolled by company guards from within the TROCO compound and monitored by the national police from without, the fence symbolized the hardening class and national boundaries that were dividing Barrancabermeja. During the 1920s, the installation of an army base and local, departmental, and national police forces reinforced these divisions, intensified the repressive presence of

the institutional state, and laid the basis for the militarization of the city over the twentieth century (Vega 2002: 208).

Although the divisions between “American” and “Colombian” Barrancabermeja and the militarization of the enclave were key factors in the emergence of working class anti-imperialism, communist, socialist political, and radical liberal currents nurtured a militant political culture that extended to other ports along the river and gave rise to new forms of solidarity. In 1923, the oil workers formed the Unión Sindical Obrera, which would become Colombia’s largest and most combative union and a focal point of leftist and anti-imperialist organizing. Left-Liberal Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, labor organizers, such as Raúl Eduardo Mahécha, María Cano, and the Partido Socialista Revolucionario—a precursor of the Communist Party—offered stevedores, oil and river boat workers, and peasants an alternative vision of social justice and democracy, one that focused on the intervention of the Colombian state to expand welfare, provide education, enact agrarian reform, and support workers.³ They emphasized the dignity of work and extolled the oil workers as defenders of Colombia’s national sovereignty.

To be a worker in Barrancabermeja acquired a political dimension that fused various demands and united diverse working people. Oil workers insisted that the Colombian government take back control of its oil resources. They also demanded that the oil company provide them with dignified working conditions that included wage increases, improvements in food and hygiene, an eight-hour workday, and Sunday as a day of rest. In addition, they sought to ease the control that the TROCO exercised over their lives by calling for the creation of an independent union. To advance these demands, they built bonds of solidarity to petty urban merchants and peasants, whose conflicts with the TROCO created fertile ground for alliances (Vega et al. 2009).

The emergent solidarity became manifest during two labor strikes in 1924 and 1927. While the oil workers demanded that the TROCO recognize their union, they opposed the TROCO’s exclusion of local merchants from its compound and its efforts to monopolize commerce. Merchants, for their part, depended on workers for business and gave money to support the labor strikes. The TROCO also ran roughshod over peasants. It pushed rural cultivators off recently settled lands in a bid to control access to the subsoil and create a supply of laborers for its operations. Not surprisingly, land conflicts between peasants, who lacked legal titles to their plots, and the TROCO intensified during the 1920s. Yet because many oil workers were themselves

semi-proletarianized peasants, or recently dispossessed of their lands, supporting the land claims of rural cultivators blended easily with demands for better working conditions in the oil fields. Peasants, in turn, provided food to sustain protesting workers and helped to operate soup kitchens in Barrancabermeja during the strikes (Vega 2002). Although the strikes were ultimately suppressed, and workers could not force the TROCO to negotiate with their union until well into the 1930s, the protests highlighted the new alliances and the combative political culture that were developing in the city. The effervescent brew boiled over again, in 1948, when the city experienced a ten-day period of "popular power." The uprising followed a labor strike, prompted by the TROCO's refusal to relinquish oil operations to the Colombian government after the expiration of the company's contract, and the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Bogotá.

The contests between labor and capital that gave birth to the enclave in the 1920s contributed to its demise in the mid-twentieth century, when power relations and patterns of capital accumulation were remapped. By the late 1950s, the foreign-owned enclave was in decline almost everywhere, including Barrancabermeja, where growing nationalism, intensified union activity, and a government search for more export revenue ultimately persuaded the TROCO to relinquish control of the oil industry to the Colombian government. The nationalization of oil production and the creation of the Empresa Colombiana de Petróleo (ECOPETROL) inaugurated an era of direct state control of the Colombian oil industry. A more interventionist state assumed a greater role in the stewardship of national economic development through the promotion of import-substitution policies and agro-industrial development (Safford and Palacios 2002). The expansion of the public sector between 1950 and 1980 also generated an increase in the numbers of public school teachers, civil servants, and health care and communications workers, most of whom joined the labor movement.

The Institutional State and Popular Struggles, 1960–1980

By the mid-twentieth century, working people in Barrancabermeja imagined the Colombian state as both an oppressor and a liberator, and more of them worked in the public sector than at any time in the past. Labor struggles had led to the conquest of important health, education, and pensions benefits for many working people, especially those in the oil industry. Oil workers had

achieved strong workplace bargaining power rooted in their location within a strategic state industry vulnerable to strikes and disruptions in the flow of petroleum, but Barrancabermeja was changing from an oil enclave to an urban center in which the oil industry no longer dominated social life, and the accumulation of surplus workers posed a growing problem. Neither ECOPE-TROL nor other enterprises could provide jobs to the hundreds of dispossessed peasant migrants driven from the countryside by landlord pressure and violence associated with the consolidation of large-scale commercial agriculture. The migrants invaded lands on the urban periphery, creating an expanding frontier of new, impoverished neighborhoods bereft of social services. The burgeoning warren of wood huts became known as "the other Barranca," which was connected to the Barrancabermeja of ECOPETROL and the USO via a bridge. Much like the TROCO's fence in an earlier era, the bridge symbolized the new forms of inequality in the city.

The disparity between a profitable national oil company and its well-paid workforce, on the one hand, and a municipality unable to respond to the needs of surplus laborers who resided in peripheral neighborhoods declared "illegal," on the other hand, highlighted the institutional state's role in the production of inequalities and the differential entitlements of citizenship that flowed from them. Not surprisingly, popular struggles of the 1970s turned less on strictly labor demands than on the widely experienced need for public services, such as potable water, electricity, sewerage, schools, and health centers. These struggles unfolded amid the contrapuntal forces of the Cold War, which intensified in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, and growing political polarization and militarization in Barrancabermeja.

The United States defined the Cold War as a battle between "democracy" and "communism," and it assigned Latin American security forces the task of suppressing domestic challenges to the status quo in a hemisphere considered its "backyard." To this end, the U.S. military began training its counterparts in Colombia and elsewhere in counterinsurgency warfare. The training, arming, and financing of these militaries aggravated regional conflicts and internationalized the repressive capacity of Latin American states as they became more tightly integrated into a hemispheric military apparatus under U.S. supervision (Gill 2004). The fiction of the autonomous nation-state as the locus of claims and control insulated the intrusion of U.S. imperial power from popular demands and enabled the United States to expand its repressive power by harnessing a recognized state's capacity to wield lethal violence and incorporating it into broader imperial objectives. The obfuscation of U.S. im-

perial expansion in Colombia through the assertion of “national” control posed questions about how the categories “foreign” and “domestic” emerged in struggles over space, sovereignty, and anticommunism, which became a lethal ideology in 1960s Colombia. Anticommunism provided the adhesive that united paranoid regional elites, and it bound them to sectors of the Colombian middle class, as well as North American and Latin American ruling classes elsewhere (Safford and Palacios 2002).

In Barrancabermeja, a militant, organized working class understood the Cold War as a pretext by the United States and its Colombian allies to roll back rights won through years of struggle and to suppress any efforts to expand these hard won entitlements in the present. In the 1960s and 1970s, the city was awash in new political currents that were sweeping the hemisphere. The 1959 Cuban revolution and the rise of Christian liberation theology with its blend of humanism and Marxism influenced the hopes and political practices of a generation of young people. Progressive Catholic clerics nurtured projects for social change in immigrant neighborhoods through the formation of Christian base communities, and a dense network of unions, left political parties, student groups, peasant organizations, neighborhood committees, and women’s groups expressed the political effervescence of the time through their articulation of demands for public services.

The USO played a key role in organizing the popular struggle. It downplayed the differences between the oil workers of ECOPETROL and the growing population of surplus workers; indeed, it created unity through a political program that supported peasants affected by oil exploration, contributed to the infrastructural development of poor neighborhoods, backed the civic struggles of the urban population, advocated for the extension of benefits to temporary ECOPETROL workers, and opposed efforts to privatize the company’s operations (Delgado 2006). This practice enabled the USO to forge alliances with various groups, including peasants, students, teachers, women, and marginalized urbanites, and to mobilize them. Many oil workers, in fact, lived side-by-side with recent immigrants in neighborhoods deprived of basic services.

Two major civic strikes in 1975 and 1977 focused on the issue of water in a city where the oil company had contaminated local sources for decades. Various coordinating committees dominated by the USO brought urban popular organizations together and organized a series of marches, assemblies, and roadblocks to pressure the local government to provide better services. The dense infrastructure of solidarity was rooted in the neighborhoods of the

northeast and southeast, where *comités de base* (base committees) connected residents to popular assemblies, which made decisions about strikes and other forms of collective action in large outdoor venues (van Isschot 2010).

For many working class barranqueños, the experience of solidarity through involvement with a network of grassroots organizations provided a sense of dignity, a refuge from the daily humiliations of work, and a feeling that they were making history. Progressive politics gave rise to what Grandin calls “insurgent individualism,” an individual sense of belonging to a larger social collectivity and a way of engaging the institutional state and linking personal aspirations to larger national and international movements (Grandin 2004: 180–81). Working people saw hope for change in newly forming rural insurgencies, the 1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the possibility of an FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) victory in El Salvador; indeed, a substantial number of Barrancabermeja’s working class residents wanted what Colombian guerrillas—especially the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN)—claimed to be fighting for (e.g., control of Colombia’s national resources, public services, and better working conditions), whether or not they collaborated with the insurgents.

Most of Colombia’s mid-twentieth-century leftist guerrilla groups established a presence in Barrancabermeja, where the violence and repression of state security forces fed the expansion of the insurgencies.⁴ The ELN was born in the region and put down the deepest roots. Although inspired by the Cuban revolution and influenced by Christian liberation theology, its early cadres were shaped by the regional history of left-wing populism and communism that had defined political struggles in and around Barrancabermeja for decades. After passing through an early period of vanguardism, in which it valued Barrancabermeja’s popular organizations less for their political potential than as “support networks” for the rural guerrilla vanguard, the ELN jettisoned vanguardism, as expressed in Che Guevara’s theory of the guerrilla *foco* in which a revolutionary cadre provides the leadership for a popular insurrection, and built power by working with unions and neighborhood organizations (Vargas 1992).

During the late 1980s and 1990s, the ELN and other insurgencies such as FARC developed a base in the city’s northeast and southeast sectors, where they regulated social life to a considerable degree and kept state security forces at a distance. The ties with local organizations ranged from close working relationships in which leaders were integrated into guerrilla cadres to occasional consultations between grassroots spokesmen and guerrilla command-

ers. Such clandestine relationships were not seamless: they frequently infringed on the autonomy of unions and other organizations and, more seriously, they could expose unarmed civilian leaders to the violence of state security forces, which intensified amid the pressure cooker of the Cold War. The Colombian government reverted to emergency legal measures, such as state-of-siege decrees, to grant extraordinary power to the security forces and to criminalize protest. Such measures further radicalized social life. As persecution and militarization closed off peaceful means of change, the insurgencies increasingly appeared to some people as a legitimate political alternative (Vargas 1992).

The institutional state's violent reaction to the radical thrust of Barrancabermeja's militant social organizations shifted gears in the 1980s. Government peace talks with FARC, the nation's largest insurgency, the decentralization of political power that included direct mayoral elections, and the regional successes of a new left-wing political party, the Unión Patriótica, raised expectations about the incorporation of the insurgents and their demands into the political system. These developments threatened the military and regional power-holders, who felt that the balance of power would shift to the insurgents and their sympathizers, and they unleashed a clandestine dirty war that affected less the insurgencies than unarmed civilians (Romero 2003). Paramilitary hit men, acting as adjuncts to the security forces, targeted labor and social movement leaders, as well as anyone deemed a guerrilla sympathizer, in a rising crescendo of massacres, extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, and disappearances. The military denied any knowledge of the paramilitaries, enabling them to carry out the distasteful acts of a dirty war and distracting public scrutiny of the official state security apparatus.

The counterinsurgent dirty war was supposed to strengthen and extend the power of the institutional state in regions where guerrillas operated as the *de facto* powers. Instead, it fed the increasing fragmentation of sovereignty, as regional, right-wing power blocs accumulated wealth through the creation of paramilitary armies that outgrew their role as ancillaries to the state security forces. The paramilitaries sought economic and political power for themselves, and the privatization of lethal power made possible the expansion of drug trafficking, the massive displacement of civilians, land expropriation, and, in the 1990s, the deepening of neoliberal policies in Barrancabermeja and other parts of the country.⁵ Politics fused with organized crime, as narco-paramilitary mafias began to use the institutional apparatus of the state to advance political agendas (Ávila 2010). The rise of new regional sovereignties,

or parastates, operated within and alongside local, departmental, and, eventually, national state apparatuses, posing new questions about where the state was located and who spoke in its name.

Parapolitics and Human Rights: 1980–Present

The configuration of right-wing sovereignties and their colonization of the state apparatus was the complex, contradictory, and diverse expression of the progressive consolidation of a right-wing ruling bloc in Colombia that achieved national expression, in 2002, with the election of President Álvaro Uribe and his reelection in 2006. This ruling bloc was an alliance of rural landlords, neoliberal entrepreneurs, sectors of the security forces, politicians, and a rising group of newly rich drug traffickers who had one thing in common: a dislike of the left-wing insurgencies that were extending their control across ever wider swaths of Colombian territory. Oil company administrators and the traditional elite in the Middle Magdalena region demanded protection from the insurgencies and constantly complained that the state security forces were not doing enough to protect them. Leading figures in the Medellín drug cartel, who had amassed huge estates in the region, wanted access to the political power of the elite to protect their properties and businesses, avoid extradition to the United States, and legitimize their interests. This unholy alliance backed powerful paramilitary armies that terrorized, murdered, and displaced thousands of people, took over millions of hectares of land, and pacified the region for the people they served, while taking control of the local state apparatus in towns throughout the region.

Around the country, the paramilitary capture of municipal, departmental, and national power happened in several ways. Paramilitaries got their allies elected through the signing of "pacts" with regional elites, the violent manipulation of elections, and the creation of small, nontraditional parties that received drug money and disrupted the Liberal-Conservative Party dyad that had ruled Colombia for decades. They openly or tacitly backed certain candidates for electoral office, threatened or murdered competitors, and dictated to people how to vote. Congressional candidates associated with paramilitarism captured 35 percent of the senate seats in the 2002 elections. They came overwhelmingly from the new political parties that formed Álvaro Uribe's national governing coalition, and they were mostly reelected in 2006 (Romero 2007; Lopez 2010). In Santander province, which contains Barrancabermeja, candi-

dates from the upstart party *Convergencia Ciudadana* (Citizen Convergence), with links to paramilitarism, took control of the governorship, a national senate seat, and the mayoralty of Barrancabermeja among other positions.

In and around Barrancabermeja, the growing power of narco-paramilitarism generated a campaign of terror between 1998 and 2003, when a branch of the now defunct paramilitary federation—the AUC—took de facto control of the city. The paramilitaries expelled guerrillas and fractured Barrancabermeja's working class through the assassination of labor and civic leaders, the murder or forced displacement of anyone deemed a guerrilla collaborator, and the constant intimidation of those who questioned the status quo. The events in Barrancabermeja unfolded in concert with similar processes in other parts of the country at a time when the United States' counter-insurgency and antinarcotics program, known as Plan Colombia, was funneling billions of dollars to the Colombian military, and when insurrectionary popular movements and center-left governments in South America were challenging the neoliberal economic policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department known as the Washington Consensus.⁶

The paramilitary takeover of the city stunted popular demands that the state care for its citizens through the provision of decent wages, working conditions, and social services, and that it protect natural resources from foreign control. The dismantling of the left and the social networks that residents had developed to support each other facilitated the enactment of neoliberal policies and the incorporation of urban residents into authoritarian relationships with the paramilitaries to which they had never agreed (Gill 2009). Opposing the "shadow powers" that metastasized in the city became a frightening challenge for surviving activists and popular organizations, as the private power of paramilitarism blurred with the institutional state.

Dreams of social transformation were replaced with more limited demands for "human rights." Human rights appealed to a moral vision of a global community that was not hemmed in by any political system and represented a form of internationalism that replaced older internationalist utopias, such as anticolonialism and communism, which emphasized collective self-determination and national sovereignty, rather than individual privilege, and which underscored the importance of the state, rather than the supremacy of international law (Moyn 2010). The liberal concept of human rights, with its emphasis on the individual, had not been central to leftist traditions in Barrancabermeja, and many activists once criticized it for failing to address

the main reasons of social conflict. Yet the violent dismantling of the left, beginning in the 1980s, moved persecuted local people to understand human rights as both an immediate concern and a strategy to generate international support to force the Colombian state to respect its own citizens. Rights-based opposition, however, offered less a vision of a better world than a critique of what was wrong with the present, and it had little to say about what a collective political project might look like. Indeed, human rights claims represented a defensive strategy. They emerged in Barrancabermeja at precisely the historical moment when working class solidarity and dreams of collective self-determination were being snuffed out.⁷

Paramilitaries dismantled unions, neighborhood associations, women's organizations, and left-wing political parties by murdering leaders or isolating them from their constituencies, sowing fear and mistrust among ordinary people, and seizing control of key sectors of the economy, which enabled the mercenaries to determine who worked and who went unemployed. Armed mercenaries monitored the daily life of working class neighborhoods and extorted financial "contributions" from residents for the provision of "security." Their reign of terror demonstrated the power of armed assassins to act with near total impunity in one of Colombia's most militarized cities, where the outsized presence of the state security forces attested to their silent consent and collaboration with the new lords of the city.

Terror divided working people from each other and forced poor residents to turn inward for solutions to their problems. It enforced a deep silence about what happened—and continued to happen—in the city. Renouncing progressive politics and guarding a resolute silence about the past and the continuing violence of the present were the only ways to achieve a modicum of security. Neoliberal restructuring deepened this enforced individualism, and it facilitated, and became entrenched with, the growth of paramilitarism. New, "flexible" labor laws promulgated in the 1990s facilitated the growth of subcontracting and weakened unions, and paramilitaries reinforced the power of private employers to enact them. Similarly, as the withdrawal of state protections and the privatization of public services began to affect Barrancabermeja, paramilitaries targeted any effort to protest what was happening (Gill 2009).

As the social relationships through which working people had made demands on employers and the institutional state were violently dismantled, and as people were forced to devise new solutions to their problems, it is not surprising that appeals to individual human rights found fertile ground in the

city. This process did not happen all at once. In the 1980s, human rights activism in Barrancabermeja developed in support of the right to armed rebellion and revolutionary socialism.⁸ By this time, however, the violent reconfiguration of society in the Middle Magdalena region was already underway, and, by the end of the decade, the collapse of Eastern European socialism and the end of the Cold War had cleared a path for the development of global human rights as a moral, individualistic, and apolitical alternative to the collective utopianism of socialism. The defeat of the guerrillas in Barrancabermeja and the bitterness left in their wake also discredited socialism locally. The guerrillas failed to protect their supporters from paramilitary terror, and many frightened insurgents—especially among FARC—switched sides and fingered unarmed civilians who had collaborated with them. The growing involvement of the guerrillas in drug trafficking and kidnapping further discredited their utopian political affirmations and raised doubts about the political projects that they claimed to represent.

For surviving trade unionists, members of popular organizations, and grassroots organizers in Barrancabermeja, human rights eventually took precedence over the notion of class struggle as the “language of contention,” “the framework for talking about and acting upon social orders characterized by domination” (Roseberry 1994: 361). The arrival of nongovernmental human rights organizations, tied to funding sources in Europe and North America, advanced a conceptualization of human rights as a defense of the innocent individual against dehumanizing state power. By so doing, they sought to place human rights outside of politics and to build alliances that were not connected to the political programs of left-wing groups in Colombia, but they ended up treating targeted individuals as decontextualized victims, removed from the history of social, economic, and political struggles. Rights discourse disregarded changing relationships of power and the collective motivations that drove victims and perpetrators into conflict. And even as NGOs fought impunity, struggled to keep memories of past crimes alive in the present, and constantly defended themselves against government charges that they were “guerrilla auxiliaries,” they found few values or experiences from the city’s radical past worth remembering and muddied the historical memory of a time when working people in Barrancabermeja engaged in collective social justice struggles.

As working-class *barranqueños* (residents of Barrancabermeja) struggled to find solutions to their daily problems, they discovered that they did not share the same memories about the past or the same proposals for the future.

Indeed, for many residents of the urban periphery, the notion of human rights was tied to a few surviving trade unions, key NGOs, and social leaders that they identified with discredited guerrilla organizations, a belief that was also promoted by state officials. These residents blamed the intense violence of the last two decades on the guerrillas, despite the military force and complicity that accompanied the paramilitary takeover of the city. Many believed that the paramilitaries put an end to a period of intense, unpredictable violence. They either welcomed the paramilitary takeover or accommodated to it for the rewards that collusion offered (Gill 2011) and wanted nothing to do with human rights organizations that they regarded as suspect.

The consolidation of narco-paramilitarism took place on the ashes of a splintered working class. It was not a straightforward process, as considerable tension had always shaped regional alliances between drug lords, security forces, politicians, landlords, and entrepreneurs. Although the state’s counter-insurgency project facilitated the emergence of violent, narco-paramilitary mafias, the presence of mercenary armies that massacred civilians, destroyed reformist political projects, trafficked cocaine, and amassed private fortunes after seizing control of huge extensions of land and portions of the state apparatus eventually surpassed the institutional state’s capacity to control the monster that it had created. Once the paramilitaries had marginalized the insurgents and converted vast extensions of rural Colombia—including the Middle Magdalena region—into zones of resource extraction, mega-projects, and export agriculture for themselves and those they served, they also became a liability.

Forced to contain the violence that it unleashed to defeat the insurgencies, the Colombian government announced a “peace process” with the paramilitaries in 2003. Yet because the government was never at war with armed, right-wing groups, what ensued was a negotiation between two sectors of the Colombian state: the institutional state and its illegal, regional counterparts (Hristov 2009). The result was a government-brokered amnesty program, condemned by human rights groups for institutionalizing impunity, that sought to incorporate the mercenaries into politics and society and dismantle their armies. A 2005 law—the Justice and Peace Law—offered paramilitary commanders who had committed crimes against humanity reduced prison sentences (five to eight years) in exchange for demobilizing their troops, confessing their crimes, and dismantling their criminal operations. Yet the law made no effort to expose the state’s responsibility for creating, consolidating, and expanding paramilitary entities. Nevertheless, when paramilitary com-

manders balked at the prospect of spending any time in jail, the boundary between the institutional Colombian state, which claimed legitimacy, and its violent unofficial offshoots began to erode. The commanders then threatened to withdraw from the so-called peace process and began to expose their dealings with government officials.

A perilous moment for government officials ensued. In 2006, a public scandal, known as the "parapolítica," began to unfold, when some paramilitary commanders explained their dealings and alliances with government leaders in public testimony. These revelations led to the investigation or jailing of dozens of politicians tied to paramilitary groups, and, in 2008, in an effort to prevent the scandal from reaching the presidential office, President Álvaro Uribe extradited fourteen top paramilitary commanders to the United States, where they were wanted on drug trafficking charges. Over the next two years, more details of the parastate relationship were revealed through a series of shocking scandals, but as Hristov notes, what all the scandals shared in common was the location of paramilitarism in the past (Hristov 2010). Neither the government nor the major media acknowledged the reconfiguration of paramilitarism in the present, and the illusion of a separation between the institutional state and the paramilitaries was reestablished.

The postdemobilization reconfiguration of paramilitarism happened because many midlevel paramilitary commanders had never demobilized; they rose to fill the voids left by former leaders who had become liabilities and either jailed in Colombia, extradited to the United States, or murdered amid the violent transformations that reshaped competing paramilitary blocs. The paramilitaries regrouped under new names and continued to use violence to suppress dissent, dispossess working people, and accumulate capital on behalf of a retooled right-wing alliance. Unable to deny the existence of these "new" groups, government officials referred to them by the acronym BACRIM, which referred to criminal bands. The new label placed them within the realm of youth and drug-trafficking gangs, and it severed any connection between the institutional state and a right-wing power bloc that used violence for purposes of capital accumulation. In this way, government officials reasserted the institutional state's claim to legitimacy by locating paramilitarism in the past, and they denied any connection to violent, illegal forms of capital accumulation and dispossession in the present (Hristov 2010). By so doing, they engaged in what Philip Abrams identified as the central activity of state formation: "the legitimating of the illegitimate" (Abrams 1988: 76).

Not surprisingly, reconfigured paramilitaries continued to threaten sur-

living critics of the status quo beneath the surface of an apparent calm. And once again, Barrancabermeja's municipal officials and security forces officially denied the existence of the neoparamilitaries. Despite the murder of two union leaders in 2009, a representative of the mayor asserted that trade unionists were not at risk in Barrancabermeja, insisting that ordinary criminals posed the biggest threat to public safety and attributing a rising homicide rate to the criminal behavior of delinquent groups and civilians caught in their crossfire. Such assertions were part of the continuing process of institutionalizing and legitimizing the accumulation of wealth by a violent, regionally diverse right-wing bloc and the impunity that undergirded this process.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that over the last one hundred years, processes of state formation in and around Barrancabermeja generated various territorially based forms of sovereign power that regulated social life to different degrees and operated in complex relationships to government officials and state institutions. A transnational oil company, guerrilla insurgencies, and right-wing paramilitaries, as well as labor unions, community organizations, and civic groups, have shaped the changing geography of power. "The state" has always forged alliances with other actors to regulate social life and facilitate capital accumulation. These relationships have frequently blurred the distinctions between public and private, legal and illegal, and foreign and domestic, making the limits of state power difficult to determine. Indeed, in the present moment, an alliance of paramilitaries, neoliberal elites, politicians, and drug traffickers is better positioned to siphon profits out of the regional economy, because the distinction between legal and illegal spheres has less meaning than in the past.

Since the early twentieth century, a heterogeneous, militant working class has organized in various ways to advance its own claims and visions of social life, and it has played an important part in the tumultuous history of state formation, as it was made, unmade, and remade in relation to changing projects of capital accumulation and rule. Because of their relative isolation and weakness with respect to the violent forces allied against them, working people in Barrancabermeja have been unable to transcend the region, take hold of state institutions, and advance their own vision of social justice and anti-imperialist nationalism on a broader stage. Even as popular demands for na-

tional sovereignty, democratic control of national resources, and state protections for working people have been pushed forward in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and elsewhere in South America, they have been crushed in Barrancabermeja, where the fracturing of the working class was the consequence and the basis for neoliberal capitalism.

The violent repression of Barrancabermeja's militant working class has diminished a vision of the state as responsible for the welfare—social, economic, and political—of all working people, and it has dismantled the infrastructure of popular solidarity through which working people advanced their claims. Such an understanding of the state has been overwhelmed by a more limited conception of individual human rights as the last hope for some people. Yet the struggle over universal principles and conceptions of rights has not ended. Its outcome will depend on whether and how diverse working people rebuild social, institutional, and personal ties to each other. It will also depend on their ability to develop wider coalitions and alliances to provide them with both broader societal credibility and the capacity to oppose repression and the impunity that accompanies it.

PART II

OFF-CENTERED MORPHOLOGIES OF STATE

Chapter 5

Cadastral Politics: Property Wars and State Realism in Highland Ecuador

Christopher Krupa

This chapter is concerned with understanding how particular objects and sets of bureaucratic practices are deployed as “outreach devices” for incorporating seemingly recalcitrant regions and populations into the administrative orbit of a state. It proposes a way of thinking about these vanguard technologies of statecraft as central to the pedagogical work of political legitimation—material embodiments of the state’s claim on the right to govern and of the terms by which recognition of this right is to be properly conferred. The political devices of greatest interest here are those explicitly performative technologies of rule that traffic in the mystical genre of “state realism” (*this is of state because it says so and demands to be regarded as such*).¹ Our challenge, as ethnographers and historians, is to see through the reifying magic of state transported in its instruments to map out the rich textures of political signification that unfold around them, trace the counterclaims to rule they invoke, and document the sorts of silences, subversions, and outright contestations they may provoke among the governed.

My focus in this chapter is on the use of land tax assessments, land mapping technologies, and property registries—together composing the administrative complexes known as *cadastre*—for the purposes identified above. Like systems of law and justice more generally, systems of taxation and property jurisdiction are often taken to be fundamental and defining features of the modern state. Cadastral systems, in part or in whole, have been deployed

since the sixteenth century as first-order devices in new states' attempts to colonize a population or to draw them in to the governmental reach of a new sort of state system—as their use in Roman imperial expansion, the conquest of the Americas, and the transition to capitalism throughout Western Europe suggests (Kain and Baigent 1992). They became particularly important in the last decades of the twentieth century in advancing neoliberal economic and political agendas across the Global South, for reasons attending to their link to state decentralization agendas, the liberal property fetish, the high-modern technocratic wizardry they promote, and the securitization of informal sectors. In each case, the “value of the cadastral map to the state,” argues James Scott (1998: 45), “lies in its abstraction and universality.” Cadastres bring lands and people off the grid of state into view, render them politically legible, and standardize their variations under rational calculations of value. They are key instances of what Scott calls “state simplifications” of reality for the purpose of administering it.

But they also transform land into property and turn land ownership into a taxable condition.² And it is around the deployment of new taxation, land registration, and property mapping schemas that some of the most aggressive and explicitly antistate uprisings have occurred throughout the world in the last two hundred years.³ In the 1980s, Alain de Janvry foresaw this conflict as a problem that all land reform and regulation agendas in Latin America would have to face in the decades ahead: “Subjectively,” he argued, “the state needs to legitimize its imposition on taxpayers while heeding the possibility of ‘tax revolts.’ Legitimacy and fiscal [concerns] of the state are here closely interrelated” (de Janvry 1981: 197). For if, as David Nugent (2010), Philip Abrams (1988), and Michael Taussig (1997) have argued, so much of the state's power rests on the manipulation of secrecy—the ability to convey an impression that some transcendental power and realm of knowledge lies unseeable behind its “mask”—then dramatic changes in tax structure and land titling seem particularly ripe moments for conflict precisely because, for certain populations, they throw the terms of their political regulation up for view (as a certain kind of property holder, with a fiscal value, as defined by a certain kind of state) and demand validation of that in the form of payment. Rather than solidifying the state's claim to transcendental authority, this exposure has the potential to produce a space of great vulnerability in the overall structure of political and economic domination advanced by it.

It is exactly this vulnerability surrounding state legitimacy that inspired a set of struggles to occur around a seemingly progressive cadastral renovation

experiment tried out in 2002 in the Ecuadorian *cantón* (canton, county) of Cayambe. While ostensibly advanced to update the archaic land administration system used in the canton, correct erroneous land value assessments, and modernize the municipal government's taxation structure, it became impossible for the expanding state bureaucracy to disentangle its cadastral mission from the race- and class-based systems of domination (themselves based largely on land ownership and administration) that had passed for state in the canton for centuries. It is such locally sedimented histories of political rule that most emphatically threaten to disrupt the state-extensification and “decentralized” development rubric under which cadastral projects are advanced across the hemisphere today. I review the global emergence of this rubric below before discussing its recent impact on the transformation of state systems in highland Ecuador.

Weak Cadastre as Weak State

Cayambe's cadastral renovation project was part of a global effort among international agencies in the late twentieth century to expand and “regularize” property rights among the rural poor, formalize the growing informal sector, and institute the rule of law in seemingly lawless lands. This marked a crucial transition in rural policy, signaling a shift away from previous decades' focus on *land* to that of *property*, from reforming the material bases of rural inequality to restructuring the political landscape on which it is based. A key text in this shift for Latin American societies was Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto's 1989 “bestseller,” *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in Latin America*, in which he portrays the “informals” (his word) living in shantytowns around Lima as not trying to work around the official system of state regulation but, rather, longing, in great frustration, for legal recognition by it; informality is but a consequence of an outdated and cumbersome legal system failing to adapt to the changing conditions of life under national instability. “People,” he claims, “are capable of violating a system which does not accept them, not so that they can live in anarchy but so that they can build a different system which accepts a minimum of essential rights” (De Soto 1989: 55). Property forms the cornerstone of these rights. Unable to have their homes and lands titled and recognized by the state, squatters impose their own codes of seizure and ownership on them (such as the “expectative property right” (23) and “invasion contract” (22)), and form paralegal associations to ensure

the rule of law by other means—such as the lynching of thieves. The “invisible revolution,” is thus the violation of the law in order to dramatize a yearning for it.

In this entry of property rights into development discourses, poverty and marginality come to be conceptualized as conditions of absolute lack, not relative effects of wealth and rights-hoarding; their solution, in turn, is not redistributive, as in giving the rural poor more land, but incorporative, as in giving them more formal rights to what little they have, a title for their shack or whatever. This is one key effect of the shift from land to property as the basis of contemporary rural development initiatives.⁴ Such thinking was clearly stated when, at the 1998 Summit of the Americas meetings in Santiago, Chile, the presidents of all thirty-four member states moved to add “property registration” as a new priority in their “issue basket” on “The Eradication of Poverty and Discrimination” in the hemisphere—the founding charter of neoliberal property discourses in Latin America. A summary of this charter, prepared by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), states that “the lack of formalized property rights and limited access to property are barriers for the poor to economic opportunity, governance, and sociopolitical participation” and work against the broader goals of the summit to promote “*justice, human rights, gender equality, financial market strengthening and economic integration and poverty alleviation*” in the Americas (USAID 2000b, emphasis in original).⁵

But the shift of focus from land to property implies something greater still, since while land can still be conceptualized in some ways as a thing, an object, or workable matter, property, as anthropologists have long insisted, must always be thought of as a relationship (Lowie 1928; Malinowski 1935; Gluckman 1943, 1965; Bloch 1975; Nugent 1993; Humphrey and Verdery 2004). As Jack Goody (1962: 287) famously asserted, “A man without social relationships is a man without property.” Chris Hann (1998: 5) has added to this that the “word ‘property’ is best seen as directing attention to a vast field of cultural as well as social relations, to the symbolic as well as the material contexts in which things are recognized and personal as well as collective identities are made.” To put it flatly, what the poor get, through development initiatives that make them into property owners, is not a new thing (land, for instance), but a new set of cultural and social relationships. Since the difference between land and property is nothing more than its legal recognition, the primary relationship gifted is that with the state—now mediated through the material object of land. The claim that certain groups of people “lack property rights”

in Latin America, or hold them only informally, is thus an evaluation not of the nature of bonds between people and things but of the political character of a region or a population; it is to mark people and places with the stain of living at the margins of bureaucratic governance, as located somewhere beyond the rule of law. Property, in turn, is cast as an effect, or condition, of life under a proper liberal state. We might, in this way, twist Goody’s maxim to read *a man without property is a man without a state*. The work of expanding property rights, the banner under which cadastral renovation initiatives emerged in the late twentieth century, has to be seen as primarily a mandate for state expansionism, extending the regulatory potency and administrative reach of the state into areas currently thought off its grid.

Investments in property registration systems, as a result, have been primarily directed toward enlarging the technological and bureaucratic apparatuses of rural governance. They entail developing what McLaughlin and McKenna (1998: 1) describe as a “property infrastructure,” a complex of “institutional, legal, and technical components” (Barnes 2002: 5) that generates a high degree of technical knowledge about land and its ownership and can be used to regulate all future land transactions. Modern cadastres are the hallmark of this infrastructure. They are highly technical devices based on a combination of GPS, satellite photos, surface surveys, and multiscalar mapping programs that require a sizable team of experts to manage. The majority of funds directed to “strengthening real property rights” are put toward developing these technologies. In 2000 alone, the World Bank, for instance, gave \$31 million to Guatemala, \$48 million to Panama, \$40 million to the Dominican Republic, \$47 million to Peru, and \$17 million to Ecuador for developing new cadastral systems, funds which, in most cases, were matched by similar quantities from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), CARE, and other international donors. The OAS calculates that by 2004 it had invested \$2.7 billion in such projects (OAS 2006: 2).⁶

Decentralization and Democratization Through Cadastral Renovation

The spectacular acts of the twentieth century were played out on a stage whose hidden machinery was made of parts and pieces of pre-Colombian colonial and republican corporatism, state mercantilism, privilege, wealth transfer, and political law. The way property rights

were allocated, the nature of the relationship between power and the individual, the role played by the law—all were traditions that proved resilient to change. (Vargas Llosa 2005: 34–35)

In their sweeping review of cadastral initiatives around the world, Barnes, Stanfield, and Barthel (2000: 35) note that while, in Latin America, “the legal system and registration practices have evolved from [their] colonial beginnings,” they remain blocked by a grave problem characteristic of Latin American states in general: the greatest “problem that has plagued many Latin American countries,” they claim, “is the overcentralization of government institutions, including the property registry” (35). Recent cadastral renovation projects have been designed not only to overcome this obstacle, but to serve as influential devices in advancing state decentralization initiatives throughout the hemisphere. These projects target local, municipal, or regional scales of state, not national ones, and in many ways help build them up into real, consequential entities with new governmental capacities and technologies they did not formerly possess. The “Action Plan” produced out of the Summit of the Americas meetings in 1998 made this explicit, stating that it would work with global funding agencies, “especially the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank,” to help states “streamline and decentralize” their property registration systems via “state of the art technologies for property georeferencing, computer-generated mapping and computerized records storage” (USAID 2000a). To see state decentralization as implying a *reduction* of the state is thus to adopt a highly centrist view of state; seen from the location state power is supposedly *decentralized* to reminds us that it is also a project of expansion and reterritorialization.

These state-building exercises are routinely cast in the idiom of social development and draw on classic liberal notions of property and rights as inherently egalitarian, universal, and democratic relations—if unmoored from their historical abuse under concentrated forms of government in Latin America. De Soto (1989: 248) phrases this in the idiom of governmental proximity: “if informality results from a lack of communication between government and the governed, things should improve if more decisions are made at the local level, where governments are closer to the people.” Similarly, the Inter-American Alliance for Real Property Rights (IAARPR) *Blueprint* opens with a statement entitled “Building Equity Through Property Rights,” by which it means “the rule of law applies equally to the property of all persons without regard to gender, social stature or ethnicity” (IAARPR n.d).

This democratization principle is further reinforced by the universal taxation goal that cadastral systems are meant to achieve, with taxes now able to be calculated according to scientific principles of land value—assumedly taxing owners of large and highly valued lands more than smallholders with poor land. But it is also through taxes accrued to the local state that cadastral renovations and their costly technologies are meant to support decentralization agendas and turn municipal or regional states into viable and stable units of government. Taxes accrued from previously untaxed or undertaxed landholders are meant to provide local states with the funds to undertake the other tasks offloaded to them under decentralization schemas—building roads, collecting garbage, managing health and education, and so on. Cadastres have thus come to form an integral part in the ongoing cycle of state-building in rural areas.

And yet, as my work in Ecuador suggests, the democratic principles of universal taxation and the recognition of local state legitimacy that paying them implies may be highly contentious issues in the areas where cadastral renovation projects are most likely to be advanced. As I have discussed elsewhere, the very notion of state absence only ameliorated by bureaucratic “decentralization,” or of a population or region existing at the “margins of the state,” assumes a highly centralist, rigidly orthodox, and uncritically national-territorial understanding of what the state is, something completely misrepresentative of the ways that political power has been exercised in the rural Andes and in much of the Global South (Krupa 2010). The most consequential oversight in the case of Cayambe is the racial geography overlaying the region’s political relations and the ways that land itself, its ownership and use, has served to solidify enduring state-like relations between the region’s landowning elites, on the one hand, and its indigenous campesinos on the other. The former have for centuries acted as what I have called “proxy,” or privatized, states in the lives of surrounding indigenous communities, at times acting in concert with official national-state agendas, at others competing openly with them. Once we scratch below the surface of official discourses projecting a blank political slate, or notions of state weakness, onto regions like Cayambe, we can see that the key problem any aggressive act of local state-building may face is the ability for an abstract, disinterested, universal political signifier such as state to break free of the ways such claims to political legitimacy have been historically appropriated by local power blocs seeking to advance their own agendas. Taxation, map-making, land registration, and value-calculation will all, as such, have to pass through many levels of historical reckoning—and may dredge up struggles over that reckoning—in their attempts to be passed. Such is the story of Cayambe.

Cayambe's Cadastral Complex

The decision to decentralize cadastres and property registers means that the system operates with particularly weak entities, as are most of the rural municipalities, but it facilitates taking a modern approach to the establishment and maintenance of cadastres. (IDB *Ecuador: Rural Land Regularization and Administration Program* n.d.: 2)

Cayambe's political situation in the first years of the twenty-first century seemed poised to completely overturn the structure of racial domination that had undergirded its political landscape for centuries. A government led by the pro-indigenous Pachakutik party was elected to power in 2000, bringing rural indigenous politicians and members of their communities into the halls of state to serve as the mayor's cabinet, to head key departments in the regional administration, and to serve as the bulk of the political workforce in the daily running of the municipal state. Since its cantonization in 1883, Cayambe's municipal government had served as the seat of mestizo power in the region, attending disproportionately to its urban mestizo population and to protecting large landowners' interests in the countryside.⁷ This assumption of local political power by the indigenous sector was, however, offset by the enduring structure of white control over the economy. Economic power at the start of the twenty-first century was still held by the old Spanish-descended families and a new capitalist class of export-oriented entrepreneurs, both of whom had turned most of their productive land over to flower growing in the late 1980s—employing large numbers of people from the surrounding indigenous communities since then.

This complicated bifurcation of the region's economic and political power was embodied in its mayor, Diego Bonifaz, then on the Pachakutik ticket, but descending from the largest landowning family in Cayambe's history and linked through kin and business deals to some of the most powerful rose-growing operations in the canton. In his campaign for the 2000 elections, Bonifaz promised if elected to secure international funding for a total overhaul of the canton's land mapping and taxation system. He presented this as evidence of his allegiance to the rural indigenous sector and as a way of making the rich, for the first time in history, finally pay what they owed. Updated land value assessments and appropriate taxes would allow millions of dollars to be channeled from—specifically—the flower growers, *through the municipal state*, to rural development projects in the communities. This was the

agenda with which Cayambe's cadastral renovations began under Bonifaz's leadership in 2001.

Funding for this project came from a number of international sources financing cadastral renovation across the country. The World Bank and the IDB contributed \$17 million and \$15.2 million, respectively (supplemented by local contributions of \$1.68 million), to a national project called the "Rural Land Regularization and Administration Program" (code EC-0191) that aimed to "reduce and simplify the role of the State in land administration, speed up decentralization of the cadastre to municipalities and provide a better information platform for fiscal sustainability and resource management at the local level" (IDB 2001: 6). It was to dovetail with other IDB projects, such as their Decentralization Support Program (code EC-0204, \$4.8 million) and their Municipal Development II Program (code EC-0139, \$40 million), and work through the MOSTA, or "Modernization of the State" framework—the umbrella "plan" that has encompassed the Special Law of State Decentralization and Social Participation since first written into the constitution in 1997.⁸ The municipal government of Cayambe was, on its own, awarded an additional \$1.6 million from the UNDP under the "Sustainable Development in Cayambe" project (ECU-00-017), to provide support from June 2000 to December 2005.⁹

The connection between state decentralization and land taxes was, at the time, legally binding. Article 9 (letter K) of Ecuador's 1997 State Decentralization law passed to municipal governments the administration of rural cadastral systems and the collection of tax revenues from within their cantonal boundaries, a transfer publicly authorized in 1998 by the National Directorate of Surveys and Cadastres (Dirección Nacional de Avalúos y Catastros, DINAC). At the time, this was a rather empty offering that came with no instruction on how to conduct a survey or collect taxes. In many cases, land information and data systems had not been updated since the reform period of the 1960s and 1970s. A USAID commission reporting on land tenure in 1970 said the following:

Very little cadastral information of any sort is available in Ecuador. Municipal authorities maintain lists of landowners with self-assessed valuations. In a few instances, the actual area of the land is known. These lists, somewhat erroneously called Catastros de Predios Rurales [Rural Land Cadastres], are used by the officials of each canton as a basis for collecting property taxes and are of little value for agricultural planning. (USAID 1970: 21)

A USAID-funded attempt to improve this situation was tried in 1989 under Rodrigo Borja's presidency, notably with the opposite goal of strengthening the centralization of DINAC, but its trial phase ended up "focusing almost exclusively on the legalization of land tenure, playing down the cadastral component," and was thus never completed (Moreno 1992: 129). This meant that, a decade later, explanations of the cadastral process would have to start from scratch.

Hearing the State: The Public Presentations

Cayambe's municipal government sought to generate public compliance with its cadastral renovation project through a series of outreach ventures—discursive maneuvers seeking to dispel a number of anxieties among different sectors of the population about what the new land value assessments and resulting taxation structure would mean for them. Different audiences were approached in different phases and asked to hear different things in the cadastral mission. The first phase of this targeted the urban sector and flower growers via a series of extraordinary council sessions, open to the public, to approve the technical study that would be used as a basis for calculating new land values and new land taxes. The study, prepared by Quito-based engineer Milton Jaramillo (2001), continues the common practice of calculating land taxes as a percentage of land value, but proposes a method of calculating value based on more than simply existing market price for the land (or amount paid on the previous sale). His model, becoming orthodox for municipalities across Ecuador, is drawn from both the cadastral system standardized for DINAC under the Borja administration in the late 1980s and a globally standardized format that is alternatively referred to as the "International" and "American" System of Classification. This approach calculates land value by investigating both the productive characteristics of the land itself, called land quality or "class," and the external features such as infrastructure and proximity to urban centers, called "influence," that affect the ability of producers to exploit the land effectively. Jaramillo identified seven classes of land and three domains of influence in Cayambe, each of which is described in his report with precise determinants of soil texture, drainage, fertility, amounts of rain received, temperature, frost potential, potential diseases, access to irrigation, road access, and so on, all of which are meant to allow a calculation of land's productivity and, thus, its "value."

This determination of land value was to be cross-referenced with actual land prices, which were almost impossible to obtain "from the Floricultural Business sector" (M. Jaramillo 2001: 8), likely because the entire industry runs on bank credit, based on grossly exaggerated auto-declarations of land value (as collateral) that could be dramatically reduced or cut off if proven false by such officially binding calculations as the state's cadastral study. The lack of such data and forms of regulation has become integral to the growth of export capitalism in the highlands.

Overall, Jaramillo's study was intended to fulfill two functions. As a legal document commissioned by Cayambe's municipal government, its purpose was largely performative. It had to show the new tax plan to be grounded in a properly scientific knowledge base to accord with national juridical requirements for transferring taxation to the municipality and, equally significant, to dispel anticipated accusations from local property holders that the cadastre may be guided by partisan political motives. Jaramillo's study speaks to this function in the abstract principles of measurement he employs and in the internationally approved cadastral codes he references. It provides a formula that can be used by anyone to more or less identify their tax bracket and support for the claim that this amount would be valid for land elsewhere in the country and possibly anywhere in the world. The second function was to translate these abstractions into Cayambe's reality, to map these principles on to the canton's rural formation and advance a schema for how different kinds of land would be taxed. Once compiled, the massive "scientific" report seemed, despite its multiplicity of classes and influences, simply to reify older Andean notions of vertical distinction (low lands, where flower plantations are, are good, and high lands, where Indians are, are bad) and confirm that flower growers were going to have to pay a lot of taxes, while indigenous *comuneros* (community members) were going to have to pay very little.

Flower growers took this reading of the study as a call to arms. They sent representatives from the national growers' association, EXPOFLORES, to a municipal meeting on July 30, 2001, to petition a discount, based on recognizing their "contribution to the development of the canton."¹⁰ The minutes from the meeting state that, "at 5:20 pm, the Council received as a General Commission the president of Expoflores, Engineer Jorge Peña, who manifested the need to recognize that the floriculture industry has contributed to the development of the canton. Further, he stated that they are willing to pay the cadastre and to contribute to the progress of the canton, but they are asking for a reduction in the percentage value of the tables established in the

study" (author's fieldnotes). The indigenous council responded by agreeing to discuss a discount, but took the opportunity to remind Peña that any progress the flower industry has brought to Cayambe has also been "accompanied by social consequences." The minutes indicate that "Councilwoman Juliana Ulcuango [from the indigenous community of Cochapamba] requested that the agro-industrial businessmen give security to their workers, due to the high incidence of firings; further, she stated that they have to give higher consideration to women and construct day-care centers for the children of the women who work in the plantations. She also asked for their collaboration in maintaining the roadways and that they receive all types of workers, not simply youth." Building on Ulcuango's opening, councilman Matias Imbago, from the community of Carrera "solicited that the agro-industrialists collaborate in the protection of the environment."

This meeting shows a fascinating moment of reversal in the traditional structure of political authority of highland Ecuador. Indians sit in the location of state, behind the long council table draped with flags of the municipality and country, elevated from the masses, where landowner, flower grower, and business group president Peña is forced to speak from. Indians also receive Peña as a solicitor of a *favorcito* (small favor) and offer him a token "gift" (40 percent reduction in land taxes) for his good behavior, plus reprimands for his bad behavior, much like hacendados would "gift" a sack of hacienda grains (*socorros*) every year to their *hausipungueros* (resident peons) in order to reproduce the overall surplus transfer in the opposite direction. In forging this "pact" of imbalanced reciprocity, Ulcuango's message is clear: plantation owners may now own the land and control the labor pool of former haciendas and may go on "playing" the state by building roads and so on, but the seat of local power is shifting to a legitimate "official" state that can be controlled by indios who may in fact seek retribution for injustices past and present.

What we witness in this meeting is the cadastre, the device that made this shift of state matter, and all its universalizing principles of property and rights, being slowly folded in to local structures of race and class. This folding would continue to the point that it became impossible to discuss the cadastre itself outside the terms of race and class struggle, a position that was solidified in the municipality's second public outreach venture, made during the Pachakutik cantonal assembly in February 2002.

Although the 2002 cantonal Pachakutik Assembly was intended to be a general evaluation of the party's performance during their first year in office, indigenous comuneros arrived as ambassadors of their home communities

trusted with a single task: to make sure they weren't going to be charged any more taxes by a Pachakutik government, *their* government, than they had been charged by previous administrations. The entire meeting, as a result, was devoted to discussing the cadastral project, its modes of calculating land values and taxes, and how this all fit into Pachakutik's agenda. National and regional party coordinators introduced the cadastre as an example of new modes of local power Pachakutik members should support. National economic crises, they explained, were in no small way related to the fact that the country's elites channeled their profits into non-national sources and evaded taxation since the dawn of the republic. It was the poor who built the nation not just with sweat and labor but also as the country's only taxpayers. Rural property taxes gave the opportunity to correct these imbalances.

To draw support from indigenous landowners, the municipal government would have to endorse this class-specific discourse of the national directorate as their original motive for proposing cadastral renovation in the first place. The weight of this task was borne primarily by Mayor Bonifaz, who first tried to articulate it to a politicized explanation of Jaramillo's mode of calculating differential land values. When Jaramillo's survey of the 129 flower growers' lands in the canton was completed, Bonifaz declared, they realized that 80 percent of the projected tax revenues for the canton could be derived from these businessmen alone—"in which I myself am included," he added. Flower growers were sent payment requests for their 2001 taxes, while other land owners (meaning comuneros) were simply sent a report indicating their land's determined "value" but left tax charges open for future negotiation. The technical, "International," standards for measuring land value were important, he noted, to overcome the ways the flower growers had manipulated their land values in the past:

The National Financing Corporation, by way of the Inter-American Development Bank, loaned a good quantity of money to more than 50% of the [flower] enterprises in this canton, guaranteed by reference to the value of land which on average they valued at \$25,000 [per hectare]. We are charging taxes at a rate of 14.7% of land values. And so, clearly, when they need money from the government, land is valued at one price and when they have to pay taxes it is worth another. And denouncing this, I'd like to say, has cost me the loss of some good friends.

To comuneros, however, the standards of measurable equivalence that this project relied on seemed impossible to fit on the radically distinct types of

land in the canton and thus threw the whole schema of tax calculations up for speculation. Speaker after speaker insisted on the different productive potentials of valley land and high altitude land, flat land and hilly land, irrigated land and dry soil, land devoted to pasture, and land devoted to crops. This reflection on the poor quality of their land often led comuneros to remind municipal authorities that *they*, and not just their land, were to be distinguished from flower growers because their land was put toward subsistence production as opposed to the former's goal of market profits.

Bonifaz contested these readings of the cadastre by reminding attendees that "compañeros, [loud] we constructed the cadastre [louder] in order to issue charges [shouting, emphasizing each word] TO THE FLOWER GROWERS! [slightly softer] And please raise your hand if anyone here has received a bill from me saying that you have to pay the cadastre." He assured people that all the concerns they expressed—taking account of the different kinds of land, for example—are already built into how they have designed the system, "because *our* cadastres, for the poor, are *rational*."

The dual system of taxation and class antagonism backing the cadastre had now been made public. This was the message comuneros were to take back to their communities to garner support for paying a still-undefined amount of taxes for their lands in coming years. Virgilia Hernández, of the national Pachakutik Coordination reminded those in attendance that the threats to the municipal government were real enough and for supporters to be on constant watch. "It's obvious," she insisted, "that the flower growers are going to react to this. The flower growers have a lot of power, not just economic power but more, since many of our *compañeros* work in the flower plantations, and so the reach of influence exercised by the growers is very strong." Hernández was right. A reaction from Pachakutik's opponents was imminent.

Hatred of State: The Attack

Two days after the Pachakutik meetings, a riot broke out in the city of Cayambe that destroyed the municipal government building and nearly succeeded in ousting Bonifaz and his cabinet from office. Thousands of people, mostly mestizos from the city itself, carried out the attack, but subsequent investigations revealed that it was likely designed and even financed by a coalition of flower growers and the urban families who had shared control of the

municipal state for centuries. The incident was motivated by fears surrounding the cadastre. The impending tax increases undoubtedly played a large role in provoking flower growers to back a municipal coup. But the main actors, poor and middle class urban mestizos, would not have been personally affected by the taxes, since the cadastre was explicitly a *rural* cadastre and taxes were applied exclusively to rural, productive lands, which urban mestizos in Cayambe generally do not own. For them, at issue was what the cadastre and the new taxation policies said about the changing nature of state power in the region, which, with rural Indians in control of the state and issuing tax demands from propertied classes, must have appeared as a complete inversion of Cayambe's long-established political order.

Such mestizo anxieties were made explicit well before finding expression in violence. The riot began simply as an orchestrated march outside the municipal offices where the cabinet was in its regular Monday afternoon session. Protesters carried signs and hung hand-written posters in the park and on the church doors. The messages on the signs invoked longstanding sociospatial divisions of the highlands political and economic structure, between urban municipalities claiming political legitimacy by an administrative link to the central state and a separate rural structure of political dominion ruled by ruthless, corrupt, and premodern hacendados. The main rhetorical strategy of the signs was to expose Bonifaz as a hacendado at heart, doubly insidious for its claim that he is both out of place (and time) as the state representative in a post-hacienda Cayambe and, as an elected leader of Pachakutik, exploiting his indigenous base for his own personal gain. They read:

Go back to your hacienda, *Gamonal*. There you can act badly!

Get out Bonifaz and all of your kind!

Bonifaz, avoid a confrontation with the Pueblo. Go back to your manor.

Reject the activities and weak practices of the *gamonal* mayor against Cayambeños. Where is the money coming from? From the Pockets of the Pueblo! For the salaries of *pipones* [fat cats]!

The term "gamonal" is illustrative of the accusation that urban Cayambeños were launching against Bonifaz. Peter Gose (1994: 19–20), drawing on work by Deborah Poole, describes *gamonalismo* as "a fusion of economic and political power in the person of a small resident landowner (*gamonal*), whose intimate familiarity with 'Indian' culture on the one hand, and systematic

violation of it on the other, upheld a servile agrarian social order characterized by low levels of technical innovation and productive investment. It is only through the 'mixed' identity attributed to the *gamonal* by this racist folk model," Gose stresses, "that we can understand his wildly oscillating behavior towards the 'Indian' . . . in which he switches from a sympathetic and sincere participation in agrarian ritual at one moment to an intimidating destruction of commoner livelihood in the next" (see also D. Poole 2004). While stripped ostentatiously from its historical context, the accusation of *gamonalismo* cuts to the heart of how race and politics intersect in twenty-first-century Cayambe. Bonifaz displays a kind of "mixed" racial identity that is a deviant form of *mestizaje*, a racial schizophrenia that is more opportunistic than harmonious, here put to work in local politics. Accusing Bonifaz of *gamonalismo* accuses him of a double illegitimacy. On the one hand, it claims that he has used the familiarity with indigenous culture and politics he culled violently by appropriating their labor, as a *hacendado*, to convince them of his merit in representing indigenous demands as the local head of the Pachakutik party. Here he is being exposed as not Indian enough to occupy the position he holds, a *chaupi* (half, fake)-indio, reverse *cholo* (indio trying to pass as mestizo), culling the favors of a *patrón* (patron, boss). On the other hand, as the head of state power for Cayambe, he is being racialized as Indian enough to be suspect in a position of power that is racially codified as non-Indian. He is out of place and the demands placed on him by his conflicting identity lead him to impose a platform for the entire canton that ultimately only aims to stabilize his rural, indigenous subjects, the base of his power.

These accusations each admit their own form of fear felt by urban Cayambeños. On the one hand, they expose a fear of being administered under a hacienda-like structure, the very system that generations of urban living allowed them to escape, and being absorbed into its attendant forms of political relation (patron-client systems), economic patterns (surplus transfer), political subjectivity (subjects, not citizens), and racial identity (Indian) that set hacienda enclosures apart from the public domain of statecraft for centuries. On the other hand, a government of Indians sparks the equally palpable fear of revenge. This fear is concretized at such policy junctures as the tax reforms precisely because they suggest the potential for a reversal of the historic pattern of resource transfer, from country to city, Indian to mestizo/white, that gave a material basis to racial domination in the past.

Stretching back to colonial tribute structures, taxes are what non-Indians and particularly landowning classes put into policy and Indians pay. Indeed,

handing over a surplus of any kind to the state appears throughout history as one of the central codes *defining* Indian identity (Guerrero 2003). Most of Ecuador's tax riots have, in fact, been led by urban mestizos against colonial and Republican states that attempted to generalize taxation to all citizens under liberal and preliberal systems of fiscal administration, such as occurred in the 1592–1593 "Revolution of the Alcabalas," the 1765 "Revolution of the Barrios" in Quito, the 1788 riots in Riobamba, and against founding president Flores's Bolivarian attempt to impose a *contribución ordinaria* (general contribution/ universal tax) in the 1840s (Van Aken 1981; Minchom 1994: 61, 222–34; Lavallé 1997). This latter attempt, as Galo Ramón (2009: 168) has argued, "quickly became known as a tax upon whites of the towns" (i.e., mestizos). In Cayambe, this interpretation led to the murder of Adolfo Klinger in 1843, then owner of Bonifaz's hacienda Guachalá, at the hands of a mestizo crowd who suspected him of supporting the tax and using it as a pretext for taking Cayambe under his control (see Krupa 2011). Those accused of the murder protested their sentence in court on the grounds that they were simply expressing a "public right . . . to liberate the patria from a degrading and prejudicial [that is to say, universal] tax" (court records quoted in Ramón 2009: 171).

For centuries, a critical question for mestizos has been one of finding overt ways to maintain their distinction from Indians, a division that tribute codified in the colonial period (and into the first decades of independence, owing to these very protests). Mestizos of the nineteenth century, as Guerrero notes (2003: 282), "considered that if they paid the personal contribution, as the indigenous populations had been doing, they would likewise become indigenes for the republic. Consequently, they rebelled against a paradoxical equalization of a colonial stamp that would change their identity and degrade them from citizens to the status of Indian." They developed a deep suspicion of the state's motive for what seemed to be a blatant status degradation, claiming that the government was attempting "in an underhanded way and via the pretext of a 'universal tax' (*contribución general*), to impose on them a levy that—by analogy with the colonial *tributo de indios*, or Indian tribute—they qualified in their pamphlets as a *tributo de blancos*, or white tribute" (Guerrero 2003: 280).

A similar set of anxieties, I argue, animated the Cayambe riots of 2002. Property taxes meant to cull a *contribución* from only a small elite minority were taken as a threat on urban society as a whole. Set in the symbolic economy of political exchange, the absurd act of Indians taxing whites threatened

to throw the entire canton under a bizarre inversion of hacienda society. Acting within the laws of constitution and state policy once again count little next to local conditions of legitimate power and their prescription that Indians (and their gamonales) are to be subjects of rule, not its agents.

Understanding the State: The Consultas

Shortly after the urban riots, the municipal government started sending out "commissions" composed of state officials and technocrats from the growing cadastral bureaucracy to every one of the 130 indigenous communities in the region. The stated aim of these *consultas* (consultations) was to explain the cadastral principles to comuneros and to decide with them the ways their lands would be assessed, valued, and taxed.

These meetings played out in fairly patterned ways. Communities would welcome the commission by putting forward an upper amount of taxes they would be willing to pay, something decided on in advance. The community of Cochapamba, for instance, decided to propose paying forty cents per hectare but be willing to negotiate up to one dollar—an amount comuneros deemed respectful since forty cents was calculated as double what they had paid the previous year. Municipal representatives (none of the indigenous council—smartly—ever showed up at these) and their expert consultants would then unfurl satellite photos, maps, and graphs to explain that taxes could only be determined under the new "International"/"American" system ("like every civilized country in the world") by selecting the "class" of land quality to which their properties belonged, *then* determining their market value, and *then* calculating taxes owed. Thus would begin an excruciating process of negotiation, not because comuneros couldn't understand the formulas, but because they understood too well that, in nonintensive farming, land that is productive one day may not be the next; that a simple frost or dry spell can wipe out an entire harvest; that agricultural practices aren't comparable in different communities because some areas might get a little bit more water from their irrigation systems or squeak out two harvests a year, or depend more on wages from flower plantations than agriculture and thus have more money to invest in production or pay taxes. None of these interventions ever made any impact on state representatives who remained firmly committed to their formulas.

In every case, officials were forced to retreat from the economics of the

cadastre to its politics: comuneros were reminded (again) that the real point of the project was to tax the flower growers, from whom a now-estimated 90 percent of the tax "contributions" were to come (meaning flower growers were going to pay, on average \$3,500 annually, versus an average of \$9 or \$10 for comuneros). As if trained in E. P. Thompson's (1978) "field of force" model of hegemony, municipal representatives seemed eager to pull magnets from their pockets and invite comuneros, as if iron filings, to gravitate to one of the only two positions open to them in a binary field of cadastral politics. One was either with the state or with the flower growers. However, the political point of taxes, this 10 percent, was greater still. As councilman Iván Cordoba explained to about two hundred indigenous men, women, and children in Cochapamba,

it would be very easy for us, as the municipal government, to say "look compañeros, don't pay, it's alright" . . . but here comes the other part to this, compañeros. This is the point that we can't consider those who don't pay [aren't charged] taxes to be second-class citizens, since logically, for us to be citizens, we have to comply with various requisites—one of which is to pay taxes.

Cordoba is here advancing an argument that resonates well with that made by Hernando De Soto about the imagined universal community of rights and with that advanced by later property advocates about the ability of formal juridical structures to eliminate the terms of discrimination and the barriers to political participation in modern nation-states. The response to Cordoba, from an older indigenous man in the crowd, poked quite brilliantly into the rather elitist readings of history and absurd faith in abstractions on which such statements depend, saying, essentially, "don't tell *us* about the political role of taxes—we have *always* paid taxes": "we, since the beginning, since, in this case, we bought the land from the haciendas, we came forward to pay our taxes. Sure, it was a small amount, but *we have always had to pay taxes*." Another man continued: "We have to make them [the municipality] understand that we, since we bought the land 30 or 40 years ago, have paid. The flower growers, on the other hand, have never paid up to the current era."

This addition—we have always, since owning the land, paid taxes—to the party platform—they never have paid taxes—is of great significance. It confirms a history of following state policy and a legacy of having achieved active citizenship, something that is always, up to the present, held as a question and

demanding proof for indigenous people in Ecuador (Krupa 2011). Here the relationship to landed property is the key means through which a claim on citizenship is realized. Coming to own land for the first time during the agrarian reforms acts as a kind of historical starting point for citizenship, the point when the transformation from subject (under hacienda administration) to citizen (under state administration) occurred. As the above discussion of tribute and tax riots confirmed, Indians have in fact always paid taxes, and almost exclusively so. Paying taxes specifically for land, as owners of property and not racial identity, is thus an absolutely critical renewal of citizenship, a performance that verifies that the historical transformation from subject to citizen, tribute-payer to tax-payer, indeed occurred. The never-stated though logical continuation of this point is that elites such as the flower growers are rather deviant sorts of citizens who, despite their obsessive rhetorical appeals to *haciendo patria* (or building a proper homeland, nation) through flower growing, are entirely marginal to the major conditions of membership in the patria (Krupa 2010). The weight of this point is strengthened further when we remember that flower growers consider the task of making a proper patria in rural Ecuador to be the production of new kinds of rural Ecuadorians, bringing *Indians* into normative channels of citizenship (of which labor is the key pedagogical act). The social politics of taxation flip these elite terms of propertied political citizenship on their head. What they did not do, in this case, however, was offer security to the municipal state in its efforts to establish a reliable coalition of defense from among the ranks of the region's indigenous comuneros. A final performance of support was still necessary.

The Respaldo: "Indígenas Apoyan Impuestos"

The preceding sections documented two distinct ways in which different groups of Cayambeños responded to the new cadastral project and engaged the newly decentralized state's imposition of higher rural property taxes. The first response, that of urban mestizos, the old political elite, and capital, was a violent attempt to delegitimize and destabilize the new municipal regime. The second response, by rural indigenous comuneros and their elected leaders, was a more peaceful, though not unheated, attempt to use negotiation, proposals, and consensus to impose their own conditions of tax calculation and due process on the state. Both responses drew on different historically tested political praxes that had proved effective for conflict resolution in the past.

Neither was effective in this case. Neither group in any meaningful way approved the new cadastral method, and both groups (those who own rural land, anyway) ended up paying more to the state than they had any desire to pay. Even comuneros who, as the preceding section showed, had, willingly or not, seen their own institutions, leaders, and political forms drawn increasingly closer into the very bureaucracy of the state, grumbled continuously about the taxes and questioned the broader underlying political motives behind it. And this is perhaps the most important point (and may be the reason the tax increases could be passed at all under such circumstances): once raised, the tax issue in both cases became the slowly fading center-point for much larger political concerns, both about the role of the municipal state in quotidian life and the significance of Pachakutik's run in office. But the radically different ways that these concerns were expressed—centralized public confrontation versus more dispersed private frustration—allowed the municipality to position the different camps, publicly, into absolute terms of supporters and antagonists. Its only chance for success, with the taxes and perhaps its entire term of office, depended on accentuating that divide. Land taxes were to be staged in grand terms as Cayambe's epic confrontation between indigenous and white/mestizo society.

In mid-February 2002, a massive "respaldo," or show of support, for the municipal government was orchestrated in Cayambe's central park. Hundreds or perhaps thousands of people, depending on the source, gathered in the park, or marched around the plaza or listened to speeches, or made speeches themselves, or handed out leaflets, or spoke to radio journalists in support of the mayor and his council.¹¹ This was, in many ways, a symbolic returning of the main public space of the plaza, still strewn with wreckage from the attack, to its legitimate authorities, its political purification from the violence of protest. But it was also an exercise in demographics, a populist-style headcount of supporters, and a strategy of mass intimidation directed at the opposition. Looking into the crowd, it became apparent that Mayor Bonifaz had drawn his line in the sand across Cayambe's racial frontier. The popular mass was made up almost entirely of indigenous comuneros.

In this regard, Bonifaz certainly knew which fear to play into. By summoning to the city of Cayambe as many rural comuneros as would come to his defense, he was invoking the historic threat of a mestizo town occupied by a *motín de indios*, or Indian riot, an ancient fear in small rural urban centers like Cayambe and constantly reproduced in the indigenous occupations of roads and government buildings since the Confederation of Indigenous Na-

tionalities of Ecuador's first national uprising in 1990 (Prieto 2004). And yet, the general sentiment among "supporters" in attendance was a mix of tentativeness, suspicion, and pragmatism. People generally felt that attendance was in some way important to their chances of having their irrigation canals replaced, or getting a road built, or having some other promised public works project ever completed. Others personalized the event, seeing it as a kind of favor done for Bonifaz, though not everyone felt that it was their battle to fight. Others expressed resentment at feeling obliged—*because they were indigenous*—to attend. And though this event would yield the most focused public accusation by the municipal government of "corruption" among flower growers, many "supporters" in the crowd were dressed in plantation uniforms, having come to the *respaldo* after their work day in flowers ended.

At the event, Bonifaz took the stage after a series of community leaders sheepishly spoke words of thanks to him for various public works projects performed. He cut right to a discussion of the cadastre, the taxes, the Pachakutik platform, and its international support:

Ever since the election campaign we have said that here the rich never pay taxes. And that we want a cadastral survey and an inventory. This isn't just our goal, but also that of The United Nations Development Programme, the UNDP, and with a contribution from them we have inventoried the canton. [light applause]. Then, with the Association of Municipalities, by way of a convention and a survey, we appraised the lands, in a manner with which we could cover a rural cadastre. What isn't fair is that 127 flower enterprises contribute less than the market women, who are present here today, to the development of Cayambe. [BIG APPLAUSE]. This situation can't continue. And if we did a rural cadastral survey, it was to charge the agro-industrial enterprises, and they have tried to protest this, which, as we have made clear, is trying to reach their hands into the pockets of you all. You must know that all the cadastre [charges] that the communities pay will be reinvested into public works in the same community, and that your leaders will oversee this. What we couldn't tolerate is that very large enterprises, that in other parts of the world pay taxes, here contributed nothing.

Despite this rather radical assertion of the cadastre's democratic potential, the press in attendance focused its attention instead on the audience, who seemed to present a confusing scene of Indians protesting *in favor* of a state and ad-

vocating paying more money to it. Absurd headlines surfaced, missing all the complications of the event, like that of national newspaper *El Universo* (February 16, 2002: A16), which instead told the country that "Indigenous People Support Taxes" (*Indigenas respaldan impuestos*).

The press' focus on the strangeness of an indigenous-state alliance around taxes missed something of their precedent in how indigenous people were drawn into the state-like behavior of hacienda owners in previous periods. Specifically, what this reciprocal political pact between a state that grants services and a faction of the citizen body that can be marshaled as a display of force bumps up dangerously close against, is a much older patron-client caudillo-style of politics. Clientelism of this sort was for centuries the only officially recognized mode of indigenous participation in national or local politics, and it was often put to the service of a hacendado seeking to ratify his hold on the state. In exchange for the security of their huasipungo, one of the residual duties of huasipungueros was to be on call for their lords should their presence as a mass be demanded to settle some political score or other. Under the hacienda system, indigenous people formed what might be called a reserve army of *political* labor for the hacendado; they suffered the consequences when things went badly, but rarely accrued any benefits when things went well, returning, instead, to the daily tolls on their huasipungo and on the land of the hacendado. And with this return to their plot, the reciprocal cycle was complete, the political services offered—a *respaldo* of sorts—was a performance necessary for a huasipunguero to reproduce his hold on land.

One of the more nationally known examples of this style of political practice comes in fact from Diego Bonifaz's great uncle, Neptalí. Neptalí Bonifaz was the first Bonifaz to own the hacienda Guachalá (the manor of which is now in Diego's hands, the rest having been sold off to flower growers), which he inherited from his mother Josefina Ascázubi on her death in 1924. Neptalí Bonifaz spent more of his time in Europe and other parts of South America than in Ecuador, where he developed a progressive and modernizing streak uncommon for hacienda owners of his time, but he did manage to become a cofounder and president of the state's Central Bank in 1927. More impressive still, he was elected president of the republic in 1931, in what has been called "the first free elections of our history" (Bonifaz 1995: 28). His presidential victory represented a brief and unexpected lapse in the domination of coastal liberals who, in their attempts to retake the state, made a fierce enemy of Bonifaz. As a result, immediately after Bonifaz's electoral victory, he was accused of being a Peruvian citizen and thus not eligible for the presidency in Ecuador.

He was stripped of his title by Congress before taking office, an act which provoked a bloody fight in the streets of Quito between Bonifaz's supporters and detractors, known as the Four Day War. Many of the more than two thousand deaths in those four days were suffered by indigenous people from Cayambe, particularly the *hausipungueros* of Guachalá. Yves Saint-Geours (1994: 185) provides a nicely synthetic account of Bonifaz's rise and fall from power and its significance:

Neptalí Bonifaz, shrewd financier and large landowner who lived most of his life outside the country, was elected president in 1931 . . . [But he wasn't allowed to take up his post] Thus, to put his rights to work, he called upon "his" Indians and marched to the capital. This recourse to method . . . is the work of apparently contradictory attitudes: modernization of action, opening of the market and to ideas coming from outside but using antique proven techniques of social and political mobilization. And to a certain extent, this is the panorama of the central-northern highlands at the start of the 20th century.

Clientelism, in other words, was an entrenched "last resort" option for settling the political scores of great men, even when its archaic philosophical underpinnings contradicted the modernizing principles of political economy they advocated. Given how Neptalí Bonifaz's great nephew Diego found "recourse" in a similar "method" over seventy years later, could we conclude that, in spite of the great political and economic transformations that characterize the era, the "decentralizing" states of the northern highlands entered the twenty-first century with any less of a contradiction?

Conclusions: The Spaces of Desire

In this chapter I have sought to trace the lines of influence emanating from a rather opaque orthodoxy among global development planners concerning the social and political value of "property rights" to their fusion in Latin America with dominant projects of state decentralization, and, from there, to the more grounded projects of cadastral reconstruction in the rural Andes. In approaching these projects as local state-formation initiatives, I have attempted to examine the social life of some currently powerful abstractions (property, formality, taxation, etc.) through the lens of the more historically grounded

principles they come to inhabit (such as race, clientelism, *gamonalismo*, citizenship) when put to work in a real-world scenarios like that of early twenty-first-century Cayambe. This leads me to three conclusions.

The first is to reassert that the complicated political and economic histories of places and peoples framed in dominant geo-governmental optics as sitting at the so-called "margins of the state"—those locations of interventionist desire—may, in fact, be completely overrun with power blocs long accustomed to performing the role of state in them (Aretxaga 2003). Cadastres and other technologies of state-building may not, as such, enter into a blank slate of statelessness, spaces longing for incorporation and "formalization," but rather must compete to legitimate one mode of statecraft over others and turn their outreach devices of state realism into evidence of that legitimacy—battles which, as the case of Cayambe shows, may be hard won.

The second concerns the ways we understand state centrality itself. The case examined suggests, on the one hand, the need to interrogate the ways that the magic of the state, its veneer of transcendental objectivity, rests fundamentally on its claim to centralization (at whatever scale)—to being the organic and legitimate center around which political life must be structured, and the only possible framework through which the political can be thought. Disrupting this magic takes writing from an off-centered analytic position, one committed to denaturalizing the "mystical force" of this totalizing claim. And yet this case also shows, on the other hand, the ways that subaltern populations may invoke the myth of the political center, the framework of "state" as signifying legitimate political domination, as their own in the effort to off-center the historic claims that dominant groups have made about their natural right to rule—be these framed, in Cayambe's case, in racial (white/*mestizo*), geographic (urban, territorial), lineage (familial), or class (propertied, productivist) terms. Here it is the idea of state, its claim to universality and generality, what Bourdieu (1999) termed its "unmotivated" or "disinterested" idiom, that can be marshaled in a struggle to expose previous claims to state, such as those advanced by Cayambe's flower growers or *hacendados*, as *particularistic* and interested masks covering up class, racial, or other structures of rule.

As a third concluding point, I want to return to thinking about the ways that rural subjects and their political subjectivities are being interpolated as productive sites for intervention via the sort of "development" model offered to Andean countries today—how, in De Soto's terms, informality is but a longing for formality, a "lack" expressing a latent desire for inclusion in the structures of official governance, which "development" is meant to be the bridge

toward. I want to think about this space of desire as a particular model of state subjection posited as a kind of essence lying at the core of the subject despite her knowing it. Another way of saying this is to ask about how contemporary modes of state formation find their key sites of political productivity in their most off-centered locations and subjects. I am, in this regard, haunted by the message given to the comuneros of Cochapamba, that (as quoted above) “logically, for us to be citizens, we have to comply with various requisites—one of which is to pay taxes.” This language, which equates the *practice* of citizenship with the *paying* of taxes is, I noted, resonant with the equity principles of current property discourses and explicitly built into the official rhetoric of agencies promoting cadastral renovation. The IDB (n.d.) document outlining its support for the Cayambe project, for instance, claims that the primary goal of the cadastre is to “consolidate the Municipality of Cayambe as an entity promoting sustainable local human development that contributes to social equity and the betterment of the conditions of life of the population, acting as an impulse for the responsible democratic participation of the citizens.”

I want to note especially the ethical doubling attached in both statements to taxation, presented as a primary device of democratic citizenship at the individual level and social equity at the collective one, something only possible if passed through the seemingly transcendental signifier of “state.” A series of propositions flow from this ethical duplicity: that to want social equity is to want state recognition; that equity has no bearing, cannot be thought, outside subjection to the state; that nonequity is really just an expression of marginality or distance (via De Soto’s “proximity” model) from the liberal democratic state—not a *condition of inclusion* in it, a necessary effect of being absolutely central (as wage labor) to neoliberal capitalism or its precedents (as huasipungueros).

It is precisely this sort of critique that Achille Mbembe (2001: 90) advances in his discussion of the core “political significance of taxation” since “the dawn of modern times” as that which forges a “reciprocal obligation between sovereign and subject.” What makes “taxation . . . the very mark of subjection” in postcolonial societies, he argues, is the way the “arbitrariness” of tribute relations—that is, the coordinated economic regulation of *specific* populations—may linger on within the universalism of taxation, its supposed opposite (Mbembe 2001: 92). The property wars I have documented in Cayambe show an unusual twist on these concerns, as market values, land taxes, and cadastral expansion get turned into the unlikely heroes of subaltern class struggle and racial retribution.

But at what consequence? What happens when one starts not only to “see like a state,” but to *see oneself as seen by the state*, through its categories as a certain kind of political actor, and what modes of practical engagement with local inequalities are opened and closed as a result? Throughout the Andes, struggles organized around issues of *land* (occupation, expropriation, and agrarian reforms, for instance) have declined as those based on *property* (employing idioms of rights, citizenship, and legality) have increased. Could this not, too, be an important part of the mystical allure of state centrality?

Chapter 6

New Arenas of State Action in Highland Ecuador: Public Health and State Formation, c. 1925–1950

A. Kim Clark

The quarter-century after the 1925 July Revolution (Revolución Juliana) was a key era in the Ecuadorian state's development of its capacity to administer populations. In this period, the Servicio de Sanidad (Public Health Service) was both constituting itself as a particular kind of state institution and constituting new sites of state intervention such as rural areas, indigenous populations, urban neighborhoods, domestic spaces, and intimate behaviors.

Two decades ago, Timothy Mitchell challenged scholars to find new ways of conceptualizing and analyzing state effects. He pointed out that many studies assume that the state is an autonomous, unified agent with a specifiable set of intentions, acting upon another bounded entity, society. Even studies that question the autonomy of the state assume its unified and autonomous nature as the norm from which deviations might occur; the chronic difficulties encountered by statist scholars in locating the boundaries between state and society have not led to a rethinking of these guiding assumptions. Mitchell proposed instead that the seeming autonomy of the state is a powerful state effect that should itself be subject to analysis in specific contexts. Indeed, turning this analytical lens back on statist scholars, he argued that their scholarly production "should be seen as part of the much larger social process of generating the mysterious effect of the state, as a separate, self-willed entity" (Mitchell 1991: 86). While Mitchell did not cite Philip Abrams's earlier seminal article

on the difficulties of studying the state, his approach is compatible with Abrams's insistence that we "recognize the cogency of the *idea* of the state," which must be studied along with "a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centered in government," or the state system (1988: 79, 82). Abrams emphasized the contingent features of both the state system and the state idea: the former is "*more or less* extensive, unified and dominant in any given society," while the latter is "projected, purveyed and *variously believed* in different societies at different times" (82, emphasis added). Both Mitchell and Abrams, then, turn the seeming autonomy and unity of the state into a research question, and specifically query how the state may come to seem that way. An anthropological approach—with its tolerance for the messiness of social life, attention to cultural processes, and general tendency to build up from social practices rather than down from theoretical propositions—is well positioned to contribute to an exploration of the state along these lines.

This chapter explores dynamics of state formation and the production of state effects in the Andean highlands through an analysis of two projects undertaken by the Ecuadorian Servicio de Sanidad in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The first is an eradication campaign against bubonic plague carried out in rural Guaytacama (León province, now Cotopaxi) in 1926–1927; the second is a maternal-infant health program established in Andean provincial capitals and county seats in 1935.¹ In addition to addressing health problems that were being constituted as public ones, these projects also show that the image of the state was of central concern to public health leaders, who seemed quite conscious of the impression of the state projected through their own actions and the practices of those they supervised. They recognized implicitly that the forging of an image of the state as standing above certain conflicts or outside of society was intimately linked to the ways that it came to appear as present and functional, beneficial, in the daily lives of those it governed. The spatial images of the state as above and outside society (cf. Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Painter 2006) were linked with the ways actors in this state institution saw their projects as forms of outreach, reaching out and into and acting upon arenas previously lacking (the right kind of) state attention. Both projects were also riddled with conflicts, including among differently situated state actors. To understand what constituted success for each of these projects, we need to pay attention to the specifics of the health issues being addressed, to the contexts in which state actions were being undertaken, and to what kinds of people encountered each other during public health interventions.

State projects become persuasive when they bring together at least some of the aspirations of their recipients with the goals of state actors and institutions. In that sense public health programs may be more like education, where state projects and popular aspirations may converge in complex ways, than, say, policing, although even the latter may entangle populations who seek state assistance but who also suffer some of its consequences. To further complicate this, just as seekers and recipients of state projects may be differently situated vis-à-vis specific projects, so too the realm of state action may be constituted through negotiations (even struggles) within and between state agencies. And finally, the line between state and society that is drawn through the working out of state projects in practice may be a very fragile one. Here I am interested in exploring some of the ways that social relations invaded and oriented state programs, and at the same time, how the image of the state acting on society was being actively constructed by some state actors. The two programs considered were not the only such projects pursued by the Ecuadorian Sanidad in this era, but they are illuminating examples of how these issues were worked through in rural and urban areas.

I have argued elsewhere that during the liberal period (1895–1925) the Ecuadorian state was characterized by fissures and gaps—with disjunctions among the projects and practices of state officials located at different nodal points in the state system—that allowed indigenous peasants to play some state officials off against others, generating room for maneuver to resolve pressing everyday problems (Clark 2007). Because labor issues were central to liberal discourse and policies in the early twentieth century, this dynamic was particularly marked in labor disputes. For Peru in this period, Paulo Drinot (2011) argues that there was a kind of co-production of the state by labor and state actors. In Ecuador, too, it was at least partly the actions of subordinate groups that brought the state into being in some rural areas of the Ecuadorian Andes (as David Nugent [1997] suggested in the rather different context of Chachapoyas, Peru). At the same time, the liberal state's labor policies can also be seen as part of a class project, aimed at loosening labor ties in the highlands to generate flows of labor to coastal agro-export plantations, so the freedoms this involved for Andean peasants were very specific ones. In the public health projects explored here, there is less evidence of state formation from below than there was in those livelihood struggles. Nonetheless, these projects too were shot through with conflicts and disagreements, which seem to have been quite crucial to the ways that they were implemented and gained legitimacy.

Plague in Guaytacama

Striking at the heart of the Ecuadorian export economy, bubonic plague in Ecuador began as an urban problem in the port of Guayaquil, where its arrival via infected ship rats in 1908 triggered both international quarantine measures affecting maritime traffic through the port, and the establishment that year of the Servicio de Sanidad, a nominally national institution whose radius of action was only slowly extended to other areas. Beginning in 1913–1914, eradication work in the county of Alausí in Chimborazo (the first highland province on the rail line inland from Guayaquil, located between the coastal province of Guayas and highland Tungurahua with its capital at Ambato) was oriented toward controlling disease outbreaks in the town and along the railway line, since infected rats traveled from the port on railway wagons. It did engage the rural indigenous population in a specific way, however, bringing day laborers from their peasant communities to undertake sanitary measures in town. Plague went on to infect the provincial highland city Ambato in 1916. The anti-plague campaign undertaken in Guaytacama in 1926–1927—when plague first spread past Tungurahua into León province just south of the national capital Quito—could be seen, in contrast, as one of the first sustained rural campaigns against the disease in the Ecuadorian highlands. This campaign predated by several years Universidad Central Professor of Hygiene Pablo Arturo Suárez's pioneering of new forms of empirical study of the living conditions of indigenous peasants, when he began to take his students from the Faculty of Medicine into the countryside in the early 1930s to undertake fieldwork as part of their training as future physicians.² The Guaytacama campaign thus also marks an early engagement with the native Andean population on health issues.

Bubonic plague had specific characteristics that influenced eradication campaigns: it was one of four contagious diseases tracked by international bodies that could trigger quarantine measures disrupting international trade, and its primary victims were rats rather than human beings, so anti-plague measures had to focus on controlling the spread of the prolific and wily rodents, as well as the challenge of eliminating the fleas that were the direct transmitters of plague between rats and humans. These together made the spread of plague a rather different kind of danger from other diseases with a longer history in the Ecuadorian highlands. In 1926, following a decade of cyclical outbreaks in the provincial city of Ambato, plague spread north into rural areas in León province. In some ways, the Guaytacama campaign sug-

gests some of the worst that could happen with an eradication project; it was also one of the more effective campaigns undertaken in the decades-long history of Ecuadorian anti-plague work. These contradictions make this an interesting case for considering the dynamics of state formation.

Guaytacama was the location of several modernizing agricultural estates that had benefited from the construction of the railway through the area (especially for the intensification of dairy production to provision urban markets; Arcos and Marchán 1978), and whose busy trade with both the infected port and Ambato was indeed likely the cause of the area's plague outbreak. Large landowners there responded quickly to the Sanidad's request for assistance in the anti-plague campaign. A handful of them—including Enrique Gangotena Jijón, who a decade earlier had been the first president of the modernizing Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (SNA; see Arcos 1984), and recent two-time Liberal president Leonidas Plaza Gutiérrez (1901–1905 and 1912–1916), father of future president Galo Plaza Lasso (1948–1952)—together contributed several thousand *sucres* (the Ecuadorian currency, a considerable sum of money) toward the anti-plague campaign.³ They also formally agreed that their hacienda administrators would ensure cooperation with the vaccination and disinfection teams among the indigenous peasants on their estates. The entanglement of local landowners with the state had a particular history here, since it was modernizing landowners from this area specifically who had been the designers and primary beneficiaries of a 1918 law to promote highland agricultural development, turning the disruption of food imports during World War I to their own advantage. Not only did the law's provisions benefit their productive activities, but it also mandated a tax on all large landowners to fund the SNA, further enhancing its leaders' ability to lobby legislators in pursuit of their own interests. Thus Guaytacama landowners embodied a particularly clear example of how connections to the state could be used to promote private, class-specific interests. This does not seem a likely context for developing trust in state programs and agents among the indigenous population. Other events made this even less likely, including the distribution of adulterated anti-plague vaccine with fatal consequences, an attempted rape by drunk subordinate employees of the Sanidad of two indigenous female plague patients in the lazaretto, the burning of huts that had housed plague victims, and the deaths from plague of some indigenous peasants recruited to the sanitation squads. Indeed, there was an indigenous uprising apparently provoked by the campaign.

When plague broke out in Guaytacama in May 1926, the Sanidad was just

in the process of appointing public health delegates to provincial capitals, paid staff members rather than simply local physicians appointed on an ad hoc basis during severe outbreaks of disease. This was part of the reorganization and coordination of public health efforts that followed the previous year's July Revolution, which brought to power a nationalist cohort of mid-ranking military officers and middle-class professionals who engaged in a series of administrative reforms. Indeed, this marked a shift in Ecuadorian political life from a period where the main axis of political conflict was between liberals and conservatives to one in which that axis involved the left (increasingly strengthened by alliances with peasants and workers) and conservatives, particularly notable in the 1930s (Coronel 2011). Well-respected physician Pablo Arturo Suárez—Ecuador's first tuberculosis specialist—was appointed general director of Sanidad in early 1926, and he energetically carried forward new processes of coordination, research, and extension of services. While the León delegate was appointed to his post in the provincial capital, Latacunga, the month the plague broke out in the province, he was busy setting up his services, so a special commission was sent from Quito under the supervision of Dr. Pedro Zambrano to organize the urgent anti-plague work in Guaytacama. A young physician with an interest in social medicine, Zambrano had recently completed his thesis on the medico-social implications of prostitution in Quito, and went on to have a long career running the Sanidad's venereal prophylaxis service in the capital.

In the difficult conditions of the plague outbreak, Zambrano displayed an unusual sensitivity to the situation of the indigenous population. For instance, he expressed empathy with indigenous peons who evaded sanitation work due to fear of infection—"as happened with the day worker Hualpa, who perished of plague on completing a fortnight's work; the product of his labor allowed his grandmother to buy him a coffin"⁴—and reduced recruitment for such squads. Then, when two subaltern employees at the lazaretto got drunk, locked the other employees in the bunk room, and unsuccessfully attempted to rape two female plague patients in the lazaretto, Zambrano immediately contacted the provincial public health delegate to send police troops to arrest them. When the perpetrators were released from the Latacunga provincial jail a few days later, he protested that such an abuse could not go unpunished. His reports make clear that he was partly concerned with the pragmatic problem of gaining the trust of the indigenous population, but he also characterized this incident as having sickened his soul. Around the same time, a set of vaccine used in the campaign turned out to be adulterated, so that both vacci-

nated and unvaccinated alike died of plague, leading peasants to hide from the vaccinators. Zambrano reported that "the Indians are, like never before, completely pessimistic, they believe and no one can convince them otherwise that the vaccine is a poison that they are injected with in order to kill them."⁵ Zambrano was unable to clarify how the vaccine shipment had been damaged despite his persistent inquiries. The following month an indigenous uprising occurred (apparently provoked by some aspect of the anti-plague campaign) and in its aftermath the Indians fled to distant communities. Zambrano's main concern was that the contagion might be spread, and so he provided certificates to Indians confirming their innocence in the uprising to encourage them (successfully) to return to their communities.⁶ The provincial delegate in Latacunga joined him in urging that an order of release be issued to free the jailed leaders of the uprising, to respect an offer Sanidad officials had made to them immediately after the incident.⁷

There are a number of striking elements in these accounts, such as the mention *by name* of an indigenous day laborer who died of plague and the reference to Indians as "pessimistic" rather than ignorant regarding the effects of vaccination. General Director Suárez, too, requested legal sanctions against those in positions of power, rather than against the relatively powerless, during that year's outbreak. These included a large landowner who had repeatedly tried to recruit agricultural workers from an infected zone despite the cordon sanitaire.⁸ Suárez also went straight to President Isidro Ayora (also a physician) with his request for punishment of the political administrator of Salcedo county and the political lieutenant of Saquisilí parish—who he argued were directly responsible for any increased plague contagion because they had permitted fiestas (involving gatherings of indigenous people from different communities) to occur in their jurisdictions despite the plague threat—and even of the province's governor for having neglected to prevent this.⁹ In other words, Sanidad officials showed a significantly more punitive attitude toward people in positions of relative power who undermined the anti-plague campaign by act or omission than they did toward indigenous peasants, whom they implicitly recognized as innocent victims who had a reasonable basis for their concerns. Their reports and correspondence show paternalism toward indigenous people, but could not be characterized as expressing hostility toward or pathologizing them.

In both rural areas of the central highlands and poor urban neighborhoods in Ambato, Suárez insisted in February 1927 on the importance of reforming sleeping conditions in dwellings. Based on research into plague

transmission during the 1926 Guaytacama campaign, he developed a regulation requiring that people sleep on raised platforms rather than directly on the ground, to distance themselves from the fleas harbored by domestic animals and by rats that entered huts at night in search of food. He insisted on the importance of this measure, but recognizing financial constraints, the Sanidad offered to provide one or two *sucres* per household to those who were unable to otherwise afford these *tarimas*; Suárez also circulated instructions for their simple and economical construction. For the first time, the Sanidad also developed architectural norms for peasant huts, emphasizing that they should have concrete foundations to avoid providing nesting places for burrowing rodents. These were difficult to enforce for economic reasons, but the Sanidad did finance the construction of a model hut to replace one that had been burned in the Guaytacama campaign. Compensation was also paid to peasants in the area whose dwellings had been destroyed when the Sanidad had had to burn plague-infested huts because of the impossibility of disinfecting these constructions.

Given the plague's spread via rats traveling on rail cars, Suárez also insisted that those who commercialized foodstuffs from Tungurahua and León provinces in Guayaquil modify their shipping crates. His concern was that after the produce was unpacked in Guayaquil, the empty crates, often with fragments of cheese or butter or fruit still in them, waited in the railway warehouses to be shipped back to the central highlands. They attracted and harbored rats, which then traveled to the country's interior in the empty crates. The Sanidad developed two simple models of collapsible crates that could be built using wood from the existing crates, with the addition of some hardware. The small merchants of Ambato protested bitterly about the expense and inconvenience involved, as did large landowners from the Guaytacama area engaged in commercial agriculture, including the influential Plaza-Lasso family—precisely from whom a large contribution had been solicited for the antiplague campaign a few months earlier—but this was another issue on which Suárez felt he was unable to compromise. Despite the measure's unpopularity among merchants and landowners, he insisted it was crucial to the health and welfare of the nation.¹⁰

During this antiplague campaign, a change was taking place in how the Sanidad went about its work. This occurred in the context of a new threat (as the dreaded plague crept closer to the capital city), but also very soon after the overthrow of the liberal regime and the rise to power of new social groups, offering an opportunity to demonstrate how the new government would con-

front a crisis. The recruitment into the service of members of a new generation of socially conscious physicians seems to have been essential to the success of this campaign. The ideas they brought to their work included the need for the Sanidad to stand above local conflicts and/or the narrow interests of dominant groups to carry out reforms necessary for the national good. Now, undoubtedly, plague eradication campaigns were directed toward achieving for Guayaquil the status of a "first-class clean port," in order to remove quarantine measures and restrictions on international trade, which also had a potential impact on fiscal resources. The campaigns were also informed by notions of appropriate ways of living, although those ideas were the result too of the Sanidad's observations of the specifics of plague contagion in the Ecuadorian highlands (rather than simply their own culture- and class-bound notions). Nonetheless, success in advancing these projects required establishing an image of a state that stood above the specific interests of dominant classes, and sometimes also involved confronting other state agents. Indeed, there is evidence that these new state officials perceived a need to reform certain attitudes and behaviors not only of the poor, but also of members of dominant groups.

The liberal state of the early twentieth century had struggled to situate itself as a monitor of labor relations within rural estates—particularly in some of its provisions to oversee labor contracts well before the 1918 abolition of debt peonage—often coming into conflict with landowners in the process. In this public health campaign, in contrast, modernizing landowners seemed to take some pride in demonstrating their willingness to collaborate with the state at such an urgent moment; the Sanidad in turn needed to enlist their assistance to be able to proceed with work within their estates and to engage their labor pool as both objects of the vaccination campaign, and actors in the disinfection and rat-catching teams. At the same time, however, public health officials were at pains to differentiate themselves as state actors working to advance broader national well-being from the more narrow, private, and profit-making interests of that group. The recruitment of large landowners to support the campaign did not translate into a direct alignment of this state project with landowners' interests. Indeed, landowners of this region and Sanidad officials were rather differently situated regarding plague. For large commercial landowners in Guaytacama, the challenges presented by plague were not ones that required promoting indigenous health in some vague way relating to improving labor productivity. Instead, they focused on preventing disruptions to trade for their agricultural products, which required curbing the

spread of plague on and around their estates. At the same time, the measures to prevent rat migrations through control of packing cases created extra expense and inconvenience for commercial landowners in the transport of their products to Guayaquil, one of their principal markets. It may have been especially important for the Sanidad to distance itself from landowner interests in a location such as Guaytacama, where large landowners had been so successful at using connections with state actors to their own advantage in the previous decade. As it did so, the notion that there was something that could be called a more general national interest was being actively produced.

We can measure success for this campaign both in the eradication of bubonic plague from the area, and in terms of some Sanidad officials' openness to the concerns of subordinate groups; indeed it appears that the latter facilitated the former. Ultimately, then, the campaign's success can partly be attributed to the commitment of persons of recognized integrity who oversaw its functioning, service-oriented individuals who believed in the mission of the Sanidad. At this moment of administrative energy and social change, the ability of the Sanidad to recruit this kind of people—and to pay them sufficiently so they could dedicate themselves full-time to public health endeavors—was likely crucial in advancing this image of the state. The benevolent actions of Sanidad authorities—to call for the arrest of would-be rapists, to free indigenous leaders from jail, and more—were material expressions of the power of the state to intervene in social relations, and contributed to the image of the state as an arbiter of social life and dispenser of justice that stood apart from society.

Extending Maternal-Infant Care

In 1935, partly in the context of a shifting terrain of jurisdiction among state institutions in health-related matters, maternal-infant health was redefined as a preventative health issue, rather than primarily a curative issue to be dealt with after health problems arose. That placed it firmly within the mandate of the Sanidad, rather than the Juntas de Asistencia Pública (Social Welfare Boards) that oversaw public hospitals and clinics. The Sanidad faced the challenge of staffing a new program in provincial cities, county seats, and poor neighborhoods in Quito that would be based less in medical institutions and more in people's homes. While the terrain of maternal-infant health had not been an empty one, the preventative nature of this program did mean an ex-

tension of state intervention more directly into domestic spaces and intimate activities. The project aimed to address infant mortality by providing prenatal care and delivering babies and then following up with visiting nurses' monitoring of infant health. At the time, as outlined above, it was less than a decade since physicians had been appointed as delegates of public health in provincial capitals on a permanent basis. The numbers of private physicians in provincial capitals was also small: a 1938 survey,¹¹ for instance, indicated that almost two-thirds of all Ecuadorian physicians were practicing in the country's three largest cities, and most provincial capitals had half a dozen to a dozen physicians, while outlying areas of a province might together have another one or two doctors. In this context, the Sanidad employed female paramedical professionals in this project, taking advantage of the availability of university-trained or "scientific" midwives—whose numbers had been increasing since the turn of the twentieth century—and a newer group of professional nurses (although the nursing positions were eliminated due to budgetary problems in 1940). These women, then, were the face of the state vis-à-vis urban provincial women of limited means who sought their services.

This project of monitoring infant health from the womb through the first months of life, during visits to homes that also involved offering suggestions on household hygiene, reproductive health, and child rearing, displays characteristics of a project of state formation as cultural revolution, as well as a Foucauldian project of governmentality or administration of populations (cf. Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991). The methods engaged to pursue these goals appear quite heavy-handed, if we were to believe the claims of the provincial Sanidad delegates when they advertised these new services. As the delegate in Tungurahua province pointed out in a flyer promoting this program, "with the availability of free services of a professional, there is no reason to expose yourself to the dangers of empirics, to whom we will apply the sanction established in . . . the Public Health Police Code (Código de Policía Sanitaria), if they continue to illegally exercise the profession of midwifery."¹² These warnings extended not only to empiric midwives—that is, midwives who had gained their skills through experience rather than formal training and licensing—but also to those who consulted them. As the delegate in northern Imbabura province stated in a similar flyer, after describing the need for these new employees due to the ignorance of mothers and poor hygiene of their homes, "You must not allow your children to die, without first exhausting every resource offered by medicine, thus demonstrating your love. The death of a child due to the negligence of a

mother is a crime that the Public Health Police Code quite rightly punishes very severely."¹³

These officials were engaged in constructing an image of a rather muscular state in these flyers. What is striking, however, is how little the program actually resembled their description. There were simply not enough medical professionals for state officials to be in a position to enforce their use, other than in the largest urban centers, such as Quito. Most physicians were not interested in practicing in provincial or county contexts, nor in engaging in the time-consuming work of attending laboring women. Government-employed midwives could only be in one place at a time. Those who seemed to be the most aware of the Sanidad's inability to impose this program were those closest to the ground, frontline agents who in this case were female employees of the Sanidad. Interestingly, considerably more internal documentation was generated by what was seen as the unruliness of such employees than by problems posed by the recipient population.

The hiring of female paramedical professionals in this program in 1935 fit into a larger state project to provide employment to women who were otherwise unprotected (for instance, unmarried, orphaned, or widowed). However, while such women wanted and needed the security of state employment, they were far from passive in their roles. Indeed, one scientific midwife, Consuelo Rueda Saénz, had herself proposed the establishment of a very similar program to the director of Sanidad some six years earlier.¹⁴ Like many in her profession, she was a paternal orphan.¹⁵ She had registered in the midwifery program at the Universidad Central in 1900, at the beginning of a decade that saw a significant expansion in enrollment in this field of study—at the time, the only university program open to women. She also took some basic courses in pharmacy when that second field of study was opened briefly to women in 1904. She went on to establish her midwifery practice in Quito, and again like many in her profession, she did not marry. She clearly aligned herself with state objectives to modernize birthing and displace empiric midwives when she wrote to propose the establishment of a state program in 1929, and was among the first midwives hired to the new program when it was established in 1935, moving from postings in Alausí, to Ambato, to Machachi near Quito.

The character of these first women to attend university in Ecuador seems to have been forged in difficult life circumstances, and in several ways they did not fulfill traditional notions of virtuous and sheltered womanhood: for instance, prior study at a Catholic girls school was almost entirely incompatible with a decision to study midwifery; a disproportionate number of midwifery

students lacked a male protector because they were either illegitimate daughters or, even more often, orphaned; and few professional midwives seem to have married.¹⁶ One of the main ways, however, that we can confirm that university-trained midwives like Rueda Saénz did not simply reproduce physician goals within the maternal-infant health program is from the disconcerted reactions of provincial public health delegates to their work. These women were sometimes accused by their immediate supervisors of serious moral flaws: for younger women, sexual transgressions, for older women, other failings such as alcoholism. These are reflections, to be sure, of the difficult position of new female professionals in provincial cities where they often did not have a social support network, and the archival material can certainly be mined for an analysis of gender ideologies. More interestingly for our purposes here, however, one telling complaint of a provincial Sanidad delegate revealed that a state midwife was working with the population to circumvent one of the main coercive methods used by such officials to enforce the use of medical professionals: that is, the need to have a birth certificate signed by a professional physician or midwife in order to register a birth in the civil registry. However, the state midwife in question—none other than Consuelo Rueda Saénz—responded that she had signed a birth certificate for an infant whose birth was attended by an empiric midwife merely as an interim measure until people adjusted to the idea that they must seek professional care.

What this and other evidence suggests is that front-line employees were modifying this state program in response to the everyday challenges they encountered in delivering it. Perhaps, in part, precisely because of these women's social backgrounds, portions of the population sought out state midwives for their services, and the latter's flexible approach to their mission likely enhanced their effectiveness. In some cases, they seemed to carry out their duties in spite of their supervisors, rather than with their assistance. This was recognized implicitly by more distant senior public health officials, who were supportive of these employees in contexts where their immediate supervisors were much less accepting of what they saw as their inadequacies; indeed, some state midwives ended up reporting directly to the regional director of public health in Quito, given chronic tensions with the provincial delegates under whom they nominally worked. In other words, these subordinate female employees of the Sanidad were identified as both useful and dangerous to the state, by different constellations of officials. The image of the state, and in this case who was allowed to act in its name, was central to these internal conflicts.

What can we say about the effectiveness of this program? This is difficult to judge, since the ambivalence of provincial delegates to these female employees led them to be remarkably inconsistent in how they counted births attended by state midwives in their monthly reports of vital statistics in their jurisdictions. Nonetheless, we can piece together a picture of relative success of this program: for instance, in the four and a half years Rueda Saénz worked as state midwife in Ambato she did not have a single case of puerperal infection among her patients, much less a death under her care.¹⁷ And other evidence from Ambato indicates that by 1938 over half of the births in larger Ambato county were attended by physicians or the state midwife, while in 1930 there had been at least twice as many births attended by empirics than by professionals in Ambato.¹⁸ Indicators of this kind constituted an important measure of effectiveness for state officials. Some portions of the urban population in provincial capitals and county seats apparently judged these services to be attractive, when they registered occasional complaints against government-employed midwives it was regarding, primarily, lack of access to them.

Conclusions

These two examples differ in important ways. The antiplague campaign was a rural one that took public health officials into direct contact and negotiations with both indigenous peasants and the large landowners on and around whose estates they lived and worked. Ultimately, the resistance of both groups to different elements of the antiplague campaign, as well as varying degrees of uncooperativeness by other state actors, such as political authorities, had to be navigated by Sanidad officials to move the campaign forward. The venues in which the maternal-infant health program was conducted (small cities and medium-sized towns in the highlands) and the population targeted for its services (urban women of limited economic means) were quite different, as were the state agents recruited to carry out this project. As university-educated, non-elite women, who in the main lacked male protectors, these women blurred conventional boundaries of appropriate gendered behavior, and their alignment with state physicians' projects was not stable. Some state officials' concern with the behavior of other state employees in this project suggests the centrality of images of the state in this program, when female employees were thought to act in ways their male supervisors deemed unseemly for representatives of the state.

Despite their differences, these two public health campaigns point to important dynamics of how the state rules in particular kinds of projects that were not fundamentally coercive. In 1926, sustained public health campaigns were new to rural areas, providing an opportunity in the antiplague campaign to show how the post-Juliana government would operate, working with both landowners and peasants and, where relevant, lending a particularly sympathetic ear to the concerns of subordinate groups. In doing so, Sanidad officials contributed to generating an image of the state as standing apart from powerful economic groups in their pursuit of a broader national interest, even when the latter helped fund their campaign. The multiplicity of social backgrounds embodied by those involved in delivering the maternal-infant care program seems to have been both essential to how it was implemented, and a continual source of conflict internally. Some state employees' willingness to engage in conflict with other state officials over how best to offer services to the population may have confirmed their own legitimacy and that of the projects in the eyes of some members of the public. In both cases, this openness to local concerns no doubt affected the texture of encounters with state agents and state programs, as well as helped to generate an image of this state institution as standing apart from society and placing people's needs above class projects (in the antiplague campaign) or rigid rules (in the maternal-infant health program). The two cases come together in illuminating how images of the state are constructed and made consequential through a state agency's administrative practices, although those practices do not emanate merely or even primarily from policy-making centers, but rather through ongoing negotiations internally and externally.

I began this research with an interest in exploring how the Ecuadorian Public Health Service imposed new ways of living on subordinate groups in the first half of the twentieth century—in a society marked by significant divisions of ethnicity, class, and gender—in the process participating in the social construction of notions of national culture. While the Sanidad was indeed involved in a project of that kind, the archival materials suggest that any successes depended on compromises and negotiations, allowing at least some alternative perspectives to be incorporated into projects. And this was not only vis-à-vis the recipient population: while “the state” included a constellation of different agencies that might work at cross purposes, even a single state institution, such as the Sanidad, could contain within it a multiplicity of social experiences embodied in its diverse employees. One effect of this very diversity seems to have been the construction of an arena in which “the state”

might be seen as caring and compassionate, and an entity to whom—in its manifestation as specific front-line employees—members of the population might be able to make certain kinds of appeals. This state effect was not the result of a mere performance on the part of those agents, but rather expressed their own maneuvering through difficult situations (sometimes created by their colleagues) to advance projects they believed in. As the Sanidad began to undergo a process of professionalization in the 1920s and 1930s, it became a source of employment for varied groups, who might have both a deep commitment to the mission of the service and their own ideas about how its programs should function. The conflicts they engaged in to advance their work helped to strengthen their own claims to legitimacy, to form part of a state with a caring and effective presence.

This analysis is developed through materials specific to a particular place and time, since state formation itself has multiple and contingent historical trajectories. However, this case is illuminating because for some state officials the construction of an image of the state as standing apart from and above society was at the time still a work in progress, and the matter of who could speak for, or act in the name of, “the state” was a matter of ongoing concern. Modern statecraft is built on an image of separation from society, rather than entanglement with it, and this was a moment in Ecuador when claims to state-ness were actively being constructed rather than fully established and naturalized.¹⁹ In the process, state officials indicated their commitment to a broad national interest (again using spatial terms) rather than narrow private or local ones, particularly of dominant groups: a national interest that was being discursively constructed via their actions. At the same time, employees within the Sanidad were showing that they understood local concerns and were willing to accommodate them in complex and sometimes shifting ways to establish a presence in new arenas.

Chapter 7

The State and Indigenous Women in Ecuador, 1925–1975

Mercedes Prieto

This chapter explores the relationship between the state and the so-called “free indigenous communities” of the Ecuadorian highlands, communities, that is, not formally bound to the hacienda complexes that historically dominated the countryside. My exploration focuses on the family, and within it, on women as important social “barometers” of indigenous-state relations. It is based on documents that discuss the need to subject the indigenous population to the nation-state. Such texts largely draw on and contribute to images of indigenous society constructed by the political, bureaucratic, and intellectual elites. My discussion pays particular attention to the role assigned to Quichua women in proposals to set up a public social protection net for indigenous society. From this, I argue that representatives of the Ecuadorian state came to approach the family as a strategic social setting to modify indigenous social relations and to integrate indigenous groups into national society. The period of analysis, 1925 to 1975, opens with the creation of the Ministry of Social Welfare, which, among its multiple responsibilities, was charged with the “protection” of indigenous communities. Toward the end of the period, state intervention was displaced toward “development,” a new cultural artifact for public action directed at indigenous groups. Such action culminated in an invitation to the Andean Indigenous Mission, an international program that worked in conjunction with the Ecuadorian government in projects of indigenous welfare.

A major challenge facing any historian of indigenous women in the early twentieth century is that indigenous women are largely invisible in both the texts of intellectuals and in public documents of the period. They do appear, however, in a variety of legal writings and decisions that deal with issues concerning the family.¹ This discovery is consistent with O’Connor’s (2007) hypothesis that liberalism in Ecuador, implicitly allied with indigenous males, put forth the idea of an “indigenous patriarchy.” The location of women during this period, however, is complex and often difficult to understand. Images of women speak not only of domestication and patriarchy in indigenous life, but also of power relations that “genderized” the interplay between the state and these societies, as well as justifications and demands that could, depending on the moment and context, ignore or promote the objectives of public social protection.

Little is known about the indigenous family of the early republican period spanning the first half of the twentieth century. The few available clues depict it as a social institution that blurs conventional divisions between public and private spheres and between productive and reproductive activities. The indigenous family, in other words, is depicted as an institution that eludes the binary oppositions that sustained liberalism at the time. This was a family that included both kin and non-kin members. Women shared in productive activities and played an important role in decision making in both household and community spaces (Parsons 1945). Indeed, Spanish-Quichua dictionaries of the time do not include a translation of the word “family”; the closest we find is *ayllu*, a term that also refers to extended kinship relations and to territorial networks (Guzmán 1920; Cordero 2002 [1892]).²

Relations between the state and indigenous groups exhibit a number of peculiarities. First, they were not established through the extension of an expanding bureaucratic public system, but rather emerged through a succession of what I call, “state events”—episodic encounters with public or private state representatives that conveyed a sense of belonging to the national society. Second, the objectives of the state were interpreted differently by the diverse social actors who acted as its official representatives; in other words, there was no unified agenda for integrating indigenous peoples into government relations at national or local levels (Clark and Becker 2007). The state’s relations with indigenous people, as such, show it to be fully “off-centered,” in the sense argued by the editors of this volume. On the one hand, the state appeared in many different guises inside indigenous territories, as I discuss below. On the other hand, in relation to the staging of indigenous life—the exercise of polit-

ical and economic control—Andrés Guerrero (2010) has shown how the state delegated administration of nonfree (i.e., hacienda-bound) indigenous populations to the landowners (*terratenientes*) using customary knowledge and agreements. This model guided the behavior of other private agents such as the *tinterillos*,³ and, at times, also penetrated the life of free communities. Another, less studied, model of indirect administration is the state's delegation of responsibilities to religious missions operating in frontier zones with the objective of creating "live borders"—national borders populated with self-identified state (i.e., Ecuadorian) subjects. These operations were advanced by mechanisms such as the resettlement, evangelization, and reeducation of native populations (Rubenstein 2005; Erazo 2007). Finally, among indigenous populations in urban settings, the state relied on municipalities or local administrations in ways that resemble the logic of biopower (Kingman 2006; Clark 2001)—for example, using scientific knowledge in the design and legitimation of public interventions to protect motherhood and young children.

Building on the above insights, my analysis of Ecuador's free indigenous communities argues that the presence of the state among these populations was delegated to intermediaries, both private and public, and that it was, for the most part, episodic. This type of indirect and discontinuous presence sought to establish "state subjects," rather than an institutional network or bureaucratic system of day-to-day social control. Thus, this argument diverges from approaches that trace the double existence of the state, such as that suggested by Philip Abrams (1988) in his distinction between the materiality of the state (a system of institutions) and the idea (or ideology) of the state. In my view, state functions did not expand organically with new agencies and functionaries. Furthermore, the Ecuadorian state did not seek to establish hegemony—as a conversation between equals—over indigenous populations as was the case, for example, in Mexico (Joseph and Nugent 1994). I believe that the manner in which the expanding public apparatus insinuated its presence into the lives of indigenous communities was one that allowed for the creation of *partial state subjects*; in other words, national presence was achieved by establishing civil control mechanisms in communities, yet permitted autonomous spaces for the organization of daily life and the creation of hybrid cultures.⁴ Rather than a control or disciplinary submission of communities and indigenous bodies, state officials sought to create a *modus vivendi*, mainly political in nature, which was open to continual negotiation. In this scenario, women acquired a pivotal role within the extended family organization and community power structure. This logic of community power,

however, worried civil servants at certain key junctures; this, in turn, motivated the expansion of regulatory capacities by creating a *state habitus* among indigenous communities. Following Stoler (1995), I propose that these concerns also incited public agencies to search for ways to control and discipline the bodies of indigenous women. It is during this period, the early to mid-twentieth century, that we find the emergence of new ways of ordering the reproduction of the indigenous population, under an internationally recognized and sponsored rhetoric of "development," which thereby inaugurated new methods for imprinting the requirements of state agents on indigenous culture and social organization.

Interventions into indigenous communities often originated in contexts marked by great political and civic confusion. They were objects of dispute and of shifting and strategic interest to major political actors (Baud 1996). State-community relations were always unstable and subject to constant negotiations that, in the end, contributed to strengthening the existence of the state itself. Free indigenous communities were instrumental in demonstrating to the governing elite the challenges they faced in trying to organize a national state, and even became key resources, on occasion, for political elites to draw on in critiquing the political power of the landowning class.⁵ And, in a final twist, elites, in both their political action and their administration of the state apparatus, often sought explicit support of indigenous communities for their particular political projects (as has been extensively documented in other countries of the region, cf. Mallon 1995). In sum, as Clark and Becker (2007: 5) have suggested, the Ecuadorian state of the times revealed itself to be permeable, conflictive, contradictory, and susceptible to creative responses from subordinate groups.

In order to understand these relations, this chapter discusses the elitist imaginary surrounding indigenous women and how the discourses emanating from it resonated with forms of state intervention into the social lives of indigenous men and women. My argument develops in three parts. The first part traces the images that elites constructed about indigenous women and families. The second connects this imagery and state intervention to several key concepts undergirding them and shows their imprint on the roles assigned to indigenous women. Finally, the third part of this chapter reviews the initial implementation of development actions directed at indigenous groups.

Elite Imagery of Indigenous Women

Ecuadorian intellectuals, immersed in a growing international field, elaborated three images of the indigenous family during the period between 1925 and 1975. These views were deployed over time and came to influence and reinforce one another: (1) the family as a space of "harmony and morality" in which women had no distinct importance or voice; (2) the family "in transition," a view derived from an analysis of the sexual division of labor and libido; and (3), a normalized "nuclear" and "traditional" family that subordinated women to male authority.

The Moral Family

The notion of the "moral family" appears in one of the first documents of the early twentieth century that mentions indigenous family life. The book, entitled *The Indigenous Problem: Organization and Education of the Indian*, authored by a Catholic priest who lived in the indigenous heartland of Chimborazo, speaks of the family as an orderly and harmonic social institution, that is, a moral structure: "One must speak truthfully; yes, it has its imperfections, but not the vices and refined perversions so common among civilized men" (Delgado 1925: 18). For this author, the inexistence of problems of modern life, such as the appeasement of sexual passions (e.g., prostitution and adultery), suggested a moral family, for "there is nothing in it that is exaggerated—not even love itself; nothing in it reveals exalted passions" (24).

Later writers elaborated on the notion of a normal, moral family in ways that deepened and nuanced this central thesis (cf. Sáenz 1933; Garcés 1941; Rodríguez 1949; Rubio Orbe 1946). For example, one author presumed that, being in a state of premodern evolution, Indians are "closer to nature, and therefore, closer to normality" (Monsalve 1943: 340). At the same time, however, these writers added new dimensions to the image of the indigenous family. They highlighted, first, the distinction between urban and rural indigenous families and, second, the idea that women contributed to the economic welfare of the family to the same degree as men. Along these lines, most intellectuals of the time envisioned the indigenous family as a sort of economic survival pact. A study sponsored by the International Labour Organization (ILO) described the indigenous home as "merely a transitory nocturnal refuge, because all family members leave it every day in an exodus to their places of work. It does not matter if there are lactating children or minors, for the

mother carries them along on her back with great ability, without interrupting her work" (Garcés 1941: 30).

These texts imply that, in contrast to its urban counterpart, the rural family avoided the problems of nascent modern life because of its built-in mechanisms for emotional regulation and its operation as a balanced economic unity. This view, however, did not prevent analysts from underscoring the poverty, productive limitations, high infant mortality rate, and lack of hygiene that characterized indigenous households; in fact, these were all considered problematic factors of indigenous life that called for solutions by a responsible national society. All things considered, these views point to a "peculiar"—an adjective frequently used by analysts—type of family structure.

The Family in Evolutionary Transition

Luis Monsalve (1943), in an interesting analysis, focused on the particular characteristics of a generic indigenous family. Following the themes outlined above, and inspired by the writings of Sigmund Freud and Frederick Engels, this author studied the evolution of the indigenous family. However, he concludes that available facts were difficult to accommodate into his theoretical framework and, therefore, prevented him from proposing an "exact" image of the indigenous family. In other words, in this analysis, indigenous society acquires an image of a partially indecipherable or indescribable social order.

The problem that Monsalve sought to unravel was how to understand a family organization that possessed elements of both matriarchy and patriarchy, that is, a family in transition from an evolutionary point of view. The author noted that women, as well as contributing to the economic support of the household, had authority over family decisions. At the same time, males had developed an interest in private property and had come to treat women as part of their household goods. Besides this evolutionary tension, the indigenous libido—mostly in a "natural" or normal state—did not operate in the indigenous family since sexuality was oriented exclusively toward procreation. However, for Monsalve, these tensions within the indigenous family were bound to change over time, since

The Indians reveal the triumph of the monogamous family which is conditioned by two forces: the desire, on the part of the Indian, to be the private owner of an instrument—the Indian woman—required to improve his economic situation; and the unconscious longing to, like-

wise, possess, through private property, a person—the Indian woman—through whom he can liberate all that he suffers and endures every day in his nerves and in his flesh. (Monsalve 1943: 349)

Evolutionism as a field of social explanation also allowed intellectuals like Monsalve to sidestep the issue of the need for state intervention. Change appears as inevitable, as if the result of a social “law”; it explains the eventual triumph of the monogamous family in indigenous society which, in Monsalve’s view, will also pick up modern civilized traits once exposed to life in the cities. In this analysis, women are marked by their contributions to economic production and the organization of the home, as well as their reproductive role. Specifically, maternity is seen as a “natural” event from which an indigenous woman recovers rapidly because of the vigor of her race—an important clue to explaining the prestige imputed to women in the imagery about indigenous society.

Other writers continued to reinforce the idea of multiple providers within the indigenous family, as well as the notion of sexual sobriety that seemed to characterize it. Indeed, the two aspects were seen as intertwined, as the following description makes clear:

The indigenous family is a unit where the economic aspect almost entirely obscures the emotional environment. The woman works almost as much as the man: in towns, women work as laborers making adobe bricks, mixing the mud, digging ditches; in the fields, they do the same work as men, and, in the market, they both carry and sell their goods, probably working even more than their husbands. (Sáenz 1933: 89)

In turn, the lack of sexual disorders in indigenous society was explained by observed behaviors such as the high degree of marital fidelity or the nonexistence of illegitimate or out-of-wedlock children. A study of the Otavalo region, for instance, suggested that, “Probably, the infrequency of divorce is rooted in the strong structure of the family as the foundation of social organization, maintained with rigor and energy during the time of the Inca empire and later fortified by the indissolubility of Catholic matrimony” (Rubio Orbe 1946: 196).

In sum, these authors sought to demonstrate that indigenous society was homogeneous in the diverse areas of the rural highlands as a result of both

racial and social characteristics. This society was based on a particular type of family structure characterized by a peculiar evolutionary path, the lack of sexual disorders, and the multiplicity of roles—productive and reproductive—and sources of power available to women.

The Traditional Nuclear Family

The third image of the family appears in the criteria used to design the first national population census, developed by both local and regional representatives of the *indigenista* movement, as well as by North American anthropologists.

Ecuador implemented its first modern national census at the end of the 1950s. The counting of population and homes was organized to provide information useful for state policies. As I have described elsewhere (Prieto 2004), the census sparked a series of controversies among local and national intellectuals and state functionaries who debated, among other things, the problem of identifying and classifying the indigenous population, how to locate populations in the national territory, and what information would be useful for improving the lives of indigenous groups.

In addition, an indigenous uprising in Chimborazo against the census led various government functionaries to believe that an effective state intervention demanded not only demographic data, but also anthropological data that could suggest ways of ordering rural life. An observer of the time argued, for instance, that the country did not need a census that produced “exclusively numerical statements, but one that also resulted in cultural estimations” (Garcés 1946: 26). The census showed a state that was not able to advance its objectives around a discourse focused solely on statistical images, but also required instruments that could “read” the particular narratives of indigenous groups (Asad 2004: 286). Anthropological and historical studies were needed to provide the missing histories. The government went on to establish the Ecuadorian Institute of Anthropology and Geography, a research body that produced a series of monographs on the country’s indigenous groups.⁶

Despite these realizations about the role of culture, the population census, as Kim Clark (1998) has suggested, was a strategy to normalize indigenous families as “nuclear” families, thereby erasing their peculiar and confusing traits and giving way to new accepted forms. Two criteria used in the 1950 census stand out: the abandonment of the notion of multiple providers within the indigenous family structure, and the introduction of the idea of a “head” of the household. As a result, most rural women were classified as economically “inactive” and individuals were grouped into mostly single-family units

constructed around a male or (less commonly) female head. The indigenous character of households was established using a set of traits of heads of households that included the use of shoes and beds, the type of dwelling, and spoken language (República del Ecuador 1960).

Decades later, the results of the national census were used to characterize the indigenous family as "traditional." Using preconceived ideas about socialization and authority within indigenous families, Alfredo Jaramillo (1980 [1974]) characterized the rural indigenous family as a paradigm of the traditional family, a social form opposed to the middle and upper class urban family (which was, in turn, characterized as a prime example of the "modern" Latin American family). The author used several traits to develop his definition of "traditional": close daily contact among family members, dependence on farming, lack of basic residential services, and, above all, the authority of the paterfamilias. The latter stands out as a source of cohesion and solidarity, but also as a source of limitation for the liberties accorded to women and children. According to Jaramillo, "the power structure in the rural family, especially among Indians, is based on a clearly traditional form of authority, essentially masculine" (404). Authority was entrusted to the male head, and his decisions were not subject to internal discussion. To reinforce his definition of the traditional family, Jaramillo adds one important observation to this model of familial authority: women were not allowed to participate in the labor market. This notion of male authority, however, was a subject of debate. As we will see, members of the Andean Mission, drawing on their field experience, saw indigenous women as deliberating and power-wielding subjects.

Thus, by the end of the period under analysis, the attributes of the "peculiar" indigenous family identified in the previous decades were reversed: emotional regulation gave way to male authority, and multiple roles shared by all family members gave way to gender-specific roles. As we will see, the masculinization of family authority became a pillar of the new state strategies for intervention into indigenous communities. The centrality of male power, as well as the blurring of the economic contributions of women, was used to depict a traditional family that required changes if new generations were to be integrated into national society. In addition, the opening of new territories and internal migration threatened the stability of indigenous families. This concern with family disintegration, which erased the previously held notion of social harmony, was shared by a number of intellectuals. Analysts saw evidence of such threats in the growing number of out-of-wedlock children, common-law marriages, and, in general, high birth rates. Indeed, the indige-

nous population had shown signs of positive demographic growth since the 1950s. According to a report by the ILO published in 1953, which followed studies conducted by Ángel Rosenblatt, the indigenous population of the American continent was growing even though its relative importance in the total population—mainly mestizo—was decreasing (Ministerio de Hacienda 1942: 55). Before exploring these transformations, however, it is important to review several concepts implicit in the elite imagery that informed the policy formulas proposed for the social protection of the families in free indigenous communities.

Social Protection: Concepts and Interventions

I argued at the beginning of the chapter that the state, under the banner of social protection, intervened in the life of indigenous communities through "state events" or periodic encounters between the state agents and particular communities. Such moments were based on legal decisions, health or educational campaigns, and the creation of "bases" in strategic locations for more permanent and encompassing actions.⁷ These interventions were not intended to implant or strengthen state institutions. They were part of a *modus vivendi*, a discontinuous relationship between the state and free communities, which changed over time. By the 1970s, we find that "state objectives" had shifted their focus from maintaining a connective *modus vivendi* to regulating indigenous daily life through the creation of a bureaucratic habitus. The period saw three modes of social protection, overlapping in time and location, inspired, in turn, by the changing imagery about the indigenous family.

Social Protection as Legal Order

During the early part of the twentieth century, the public bureaucracy did not directly intervene in the life and social organization of indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian highlands. Motivated by concepts of morality and a natural order, representatives of the central state, an emerging bureaucracy educated in the social and natural sciences, began to weave a legal order that, albeit in an indirect way, recognized the existence of (regulated) indigenous families. Their goal was the creation of a universal and homogenous social order. State agencies could not ignore these communities, which were often involved in land disputes yet seemed to be largely untouched by urban modern culture. With the creation of the Ministry of Social Welfare, the national bureaucracy

developed the capacity to establish legal guidelines for the organization of indigenous *comunidades* (communities). The ministry assumed, by delegation of the communities, the roles of arbiter in land matters and of administrator of the population. To exercise these roles, ministerial functionaries or delegates acted intermittently as a land court or selected community members to represent the ministry within the community. Later, as we shall see, the Andean Mission would add another dimension to this emerging relationship between the national government and the indigenous world.

Official reports of the Ministry of Social Welfare reveal that this agency worked by deploying short-term missions of bureaucrats who visited remote communities with three tasks: the arbitration of land disputes, the classification of the indigenous population, and the validation of membership in the community (and, thus, entitlement to communal lands). In 1931, for instance, a report of a mission to the community of Pilahuín, in the province of Tungurahua, identified three social groups: Indians of the *páramo* (grasslands), Indians residing in the town, and so-called “whites” or outsiders who had no legal claim to community membership or resources. The report also describes a land dispute between the indigenous and “white” parties and their legal and historical arguments. The mission concluded that true comuneros lacked the means to defend themselves since the community did not have formal instruments to regulate its affairs or to enforce the rights and duties of its members. The functionaries, as a result, promoted the enactment of community bylaws.⁸ The latter document assumes a social organization and land administration based on the family and proposed that communal lands be subdivided into individual plots according to family size.

The community bylaws in the above example stated that the heads of the community would be appointed by the Ministry of Social Welfare; their duties included submitting requests and complaints on behalf of the community, which in turn required the consent of the nearest municipal government. But while the bylaws recognized the community’s leaders as political intermediaries, the ministry’s report also explained that they were known as unscrupulous individuals who counted on the blind obedience of community members. Therefore, the report recommends that the newly designated leaders be carefully watched by local priests, the sheriff, or other external figures.

Such reports rarely mention women. They speak of a generic neutral category—indio—that, in effect, included women in their definition as subordinates to male paternal or marital authority. Despite the fact that the later Law of Communities (1937) stipulated that all adults who lived within the

community’s boundaries were members (comuneros), the membership rosters that exist only include women who are widows. There are, however, exceptional cases in which women appear as community authorities or as the suing party in land controversies.

During this initial period, patriarchal ideas implicit in state practices obscured the existence of women, who appear (or are required to appear) only as represented by male kin. At the same time, the vision of a “moral” family, subject to an obligatory evolution, had the effect of removing the sense of urgency from any potential form of direct state intervention to effect social change. Thus, the national public apparatus used a legal rhetoric to display a program that counted, classified, and ordered the social life of autonomous indigenous communities.

Social Protection as Political Integration

A second strategy to intervene in free indigenous communities—but also in the indigenous population dependent on private haciendas—was the organization of campaigns to tackle particular problems through state events.⁹ Such social problems included the lack of proper home and town hygiene, the inexistence of markets for arts and crafts, the need for bilingual literacy (Spanish and Quichua), and the acculturation of the indigenous population into the larger urbanized society—considered by many intellectuals a positive and viable undertaking. These programs—“missions” or “campaigns” in the terminology of the day—intensified after Ecuador’s 1941 war with Peru, when elites worried about the continuing estrangement of the indigenous population, potentially preventing them from participating in the defense of national territory. During this time, in a move with contradictory undertones, the Ministry of Social Welfare recognized the authority of indigenous women and legitimated them as public intermediaries in state actions (Prieto 2011). This recognition could be interpreted as a strategic move by indigenous society to protect male prerogatives and their access to productive resources. However, it can also be interpreted as a strategy by state agents to feminize and affirm the inferiority of indigenous society.

In the 1940s, two indigenous women appeared publicly as intermediaries of state initiatives, particularly those related to an adult literacy drive and the opening of new markets for local handicrafts and tourism. Dolores Cacuango (from a public hacienda near Quito) and Rosa Lema (a native of Peguche, near Otavalo) appeared in the media as both protagonists of these ventures and as negotiators of the current indigenous agenda. These two women came

to epitomize “Indianness” (*lo indio*), a generic public image that tended to obscure their gender identity. Each represented a different model of social integration. On the one hand, Cacuango promoted the right to vote through bilingual literacy; on the other, Lema headed a cultural mission to the United States with the goal of seeking new markets (Prieto 2008). Framed in this way, Lema represented “racial democracy”; her mission was portrayed as proof that Ecuador was “a truly democratic country, without racial prejudice” (Gobierno del Ecuador 1949: 25).

The state developed contact points with the indigenous world through programs with limited objectives, motivated by a growing demand for the political integration of indigenous groups into Ecuadorian society. Female authority figures, present in elite imagery of the indigenous family, helped introduce new issues and evidence in the discussion about the relationship between the state and indigenous groups. The evidence of change included the supposed acceptance, by communities and individuals, of the existence of the nation-state, the involvement of rural indigenous groups in different routes toward acculturation, and the positive signs of social and political integration achieved by intentional and focused public action (such as literacy training and the promotion of new forms of artisanal production).

Social Protection as Development

Efforts to integrate the indigenous population, as citizens, into the nation-state set the foundations for a new, more ambitious and lasting, strategy. It is here that “development” emerged as a device for the regulation of rural populations. In Ecuador, the onset of the idea of “development” is associated with a national economic plan proposed by Nelson Rockefeller at the request of the modernizing government of president Galo Plaza. This document emphasized the importance of diversifying the productive capacity of rural areas of the highlands (Prieto 2008).¹⁰ Guided by this principle, the government agreed to participate in the international Andean Indigenous Mission program, coordinated by the International Labour Office. This program deployed what it called “bases” in provincial capitals to channel interventions toward indigenous communities or areas. These bases would, in a fairly discontinuous manner, make contact with the indigenous population through household visits, school shows, training courses, and medical campaigns, among other mechanisms. Its objectives included efforts to change several dimensions of rural life, mainly education, health, diversification of production, and improved productivity.

The Andean Indigenous Mission: A Mechanism for the Extension of the State?

The Andean Indigenous Mission—known mostly by its abbreviated name Andean Mission—brought together several UN agencies in an effort to help Andean countries integrate their indigenous populations into national society. Its guiding concepts were drawn from the Mexican Revolution and from the experiences of North American and New Zealander anthropologists among the native populations in their own countries. It was conceived as a mechanism to promote economic development policies, but also as an exercise in “social engineering.”

Key Concepts

In the early 1950s, the ILO began producing reports about the conditions of the world’s indigenous peoples, who faced a host of exploitative situations¹¹ and precarious working and living conditions. As part of its effort, the ILO sent a delegation to the Andean nations to design strategies to incorporate indigenous peoples into national societies. The ILO (1953) report on the Andean countries pointed out a core paradox facing their indigenous populations: although descendants of the region’s “original” inhabitants, they were excluded from their present nations’ political processes. This was a new understanding of indigenous populations. It implied a challenge for contemporary states to raise the living and working conditions of indigenous peoples to acceptable levels and to realize their citizenship rights.

The ILO report on the Andean region underscored the problems of land ownership, work, and health. It made only scant references to women when discussing the latter two issues—women were discovered as program resources during the operation of the program. This analysis assumed the existence of a relatively monolithic and universal indigenous family—but avoided labeling it as “traditional.” It adopted an instrumental definition of indigenosity that recalls that employed before the wave of population censuses in the 1950s, one based on language use complemented by a set of indicators of cultural practices that, in turn, signaled the need for state intervention (lack of education and health services and handicraft production, among others). Finally, as mentioned earlier, the report signaled an unexpected dimension of social change: Andean indigenous populations, it noted, were showing clear signs of positive demographic growth—a fact that, unsurprisingly, local elites read only as an increment in mestizo and acculturated populations.

The published writings of the head of the ILO's opening mission to the Andean countries identify some of the new program's fundamental concepts, most of which were rooted in contemporary anthropological research (Beaglehole 1953, 1954). Anthropology, at the time, was considered the most relevant and resourceful discipline to inform and guide processes of social engineering. Drawing on this discipline, interventions were designed, for example, to consider the functional relations among different cultural components. All elements of indigenous culture were thought to be interconnected; consequently, actions in indigenous communities had to address several elements at any one time. With this conceptual base, the organizers of the mission advanced a series of programs in specific territories and populations, compiling, in other words, a holistic program of integrated interventions.

The ILO developed a second concept—"segregated life" or "apartness"—to characterize indigenous communities. This idea pointed to the relations of subordination and inferiority of the indigenous population vis-à-vis other national social groups. This cultural distance, however, did not apply to the relationship between indigenous groups and the state, the latter of which appears in the ILO documents as a multiplicity of benevolent and disinterested entities located outside the interplay of class power. The idea of "segregation" implied a fragmented political and economic integration of indigenous peoples, as well as the belief that these peoples represented a rich potential for postcolonial nations. The states of the Andean region were thereby afforded a decisive role in generating the conditions necessary to eliminate social inequalities. This role, however, was predicated on the hypothesis that the creation of a new social order required the active participation of segregated communities; and intervention required specific agreements without which social and cultural change could not take place.

The Andean Mission in Ecuador: Local Adjustment

The mission operated in Ecuador through an agreement with the Ministry of Social Welfare. It received the support of two accomplished national intellectuals: Gonzalo Rubio Orbe, an educator, and Aníbal Buitrón, an anthropologist. Its initial work was supposed to concentrate in Otavalo, an area where the indigenous population was well on its way to a successful acculturation mainly through economic diversification.¹² The mission believed success in this region would encourage other groups to participate in the program. However, its first action was an artisanal textile workshop established in the capital city of Quito. A base in Riobamba, in the central highlands, soon followed. From

these experiences, the international program expanded its presence to all the highland provinces with a high proportion of indigenous population.

The first reports about the program indicated that each base—translated locally as a "center of operations"—was different and was staffed by both Ecuadorian and foreign personnel. The base in Riobamba, for example had, during its first year of operation, a mission chief (an educational expert), an agronomist, a physician, two teachers, and service workers. Several peasants from Chimborazo were enrolled in the textile training workshop in Quito and in the agricultural school in Otavalo. In addition, the mission was sponsoring the training of a group of Ecuadorians as specialists in rural education in Mexico, while local centers were "retraining" teachers to join the program. Later, the bases expanded the number of technicians by including "a woman social worker, a nurse, and a midwife" (Rens 1961: 434), who were entrusted with reordering the daily lives of women. Indeed, women social workers defined themselves as pivots around whom other public representatives and the beneficiary population could maneuver. They were entrusted with preparing the external incursion on indigenous bodies and habitats as well as with creating a favorable communal climate for the intervention. This function was explicitly feminized as the Andean Mission took shape; women—bureaucrats and indigenes—came to represent a double-hinge system of communication with national institutions, on one side, and indigenous families, on the other.

The program required, for the first time in Ecuador, the training of development professionals such as social workers (mostly women), agricultural extension workers, and rural educators. In addition, it created positions for indigenous or community assistants in its fields of intervention. Thus, the foundations had been laid for the formation of a specialized bureaucracy in the field of community development, articulated around the notion of a true vocation and disinterested commitment to the forgotten members of the nation.¹³ The work at the provincial bases began with diagnostic studies. In Chimborazo, for instance, in each of the participating communities, the program technicians carried out a study with sections on demography, living conditions, productive activities, and road infrastructure. These studies were used to propose a set of interventions that included a vaccination plan as well as health, dental, and nutritional services, home improvements, new agricultural techniques, reforestation and the rationalization of irrigation water, new schools, and the building and improvement of roads. The proposed actions were discussed with each community, a step that often proved to be difficult:

“it was not easy to gain effective and friendly access to indigenous communities,” because of the language barrier and “the resistance the peasantry offered to the efforts of the Mission” (*Boletín Indigenista* 1957: 316).

Indeed, there is plenty of interesting evidence about the violence—resistance and strife—that ensued in the encounters between Andean Mission staffers and indigenous groups. The long and ambiguous relationship with the state—in issues like taxation or the control of land and other resources (Baud 1996)—did not guarantee indigenous communities that this time would be different. As described by Deborah Poole (2004) in the case of Peru, the state was lived by peasants, men and women alike, as both a threat and an opportunity for justice (see also Krupa, this volume).

The work of the program in each community was intermittent and ended up placing emphasis on schooling, agriculture, and household life. The main methodological consideration required that the activities be undertaken by the indigenous peasants themselves. The mission provided materials, technology, and technical assistance. Community leaders, elected by direct voting, were trained to assume the responsibility to carry out the plans. In addition, all bases implemented courses to train community members as obstetric nurses and nutritional counselors. These courses taught women to prepare diverse and varied nutritional meals (Rens 1961: 440), to improve sanitation in their homes, and to practice hygiene in their bodies.

One important effect of the mission's presence in indigenous communities was a renewed competition for leading roles in the administration of community development. The Catholic Church, for example, deployed priests to assist the bases in the process of indigenous integration. A preliminary study entrusted to the parish priest of the community of San Luis in Chimborazo argued that the Andean Mission offered the possibility of material improvement or salvation, but it risked failure if it left out the Church, which was capable of assisting the program in breaking down the resistance of indigenous communities to outside intervention.¹⁴ Similarly, a report written by a priest who was employed by the mission highlighted the fact that the program had trained several priests to support its work and had accepted the contributions of nuns and of students from the Catholic University (Mencías 1962). However, despite the mediation and support by the Church, many of the mission's initiatives were rejected, in full or in part.

A number of reports written around 1960 discuss the validity and effectiveness of the program. A report commissioned by the ILO concluded that it was “successful,” yet failed to adopt the integrated or comprehensive approach

it had intended, for two reasons: the lack of trained professionals and insufficient financial resources. Another weakness was the entrenched prejudices and racism of public bureaucrats toward Indians, which gave rise to mutual distrust and resistance between program personnel and their target population (Rens 1961: 433).

As mentioned, the first base was established in the capital city of Quito, followed by Riobamba; soon, the program had expanded to Ibarra, Ambato, Guaslán, Cañar, Cuenca, and Loja. The mission estimated that its actions had touched the lives of 100,000 residents of free communities (Rens 1961: 441). In Chimborazo, the program expanded to several indigenous areas. One of its first achievements was a textile workshop in Guano, an area traditionally known for its weaving, that trained young weavers in both technical and commercial skills. Another important result was the construction and operation of fifty-seven primary schools, with another fifty planned for the following year (437 n1).

According to the same evaluation, “The Andean program has at last enabled the Indian peoples to resume the progress which was brought to a halt at the time of the collapse of the Inca Empire” (Rens 1961: 444). In other words, the incipient development program was viewed as a turning point in the history of indigenous peoples, who were expected to mix gradually with other social groups—an outcome that closely resembled the desire of many local intellectuals to see a new phase of racial mixture or *mestizaje*. But perhaps the most important effect of the evaluation—from the point of view of this discussion—was the fact that governments of the Andean nations had accepted the program, and were incorporating it into their state practices. Indeed, the Andean Mission was able to implant procedures for public incursion into rural communities that continue to be used to this day, that is, community management and participation together with a bureaucracy specialized in local development.

In sum, the ILO program was integrated as a new state program that opened the way for the creation of a specialized bureaucracy and for a renewal of the process of delegation of civil authority in free indigenous communities. Besides the Catholic Church, actors that assumed administrative duties included indigenous leaders, community social specialists, and development aides specifically selected and trained to assume the delegation. Women—social professionals and indigenous women—also acted as intermediaries. This dual model set the foundations for a new development habitus as a political mechanism of integration and administration.

Critical Perspectives: The Strategic Role of Women

The positive evaluation of the ILO mission received several responses from Ecuadorian intellectuals. Three main criticisms were leveled at the program: first, that it had not reached the communities that were truly indigenous; second, that it had partially excluded women; and, third, that it lacked a commitment to agrarian reform.

A report by the Ecuadorian Institute of Anthropology and Geography claimed that only ten of a total of forty-one indigenous groups of communities (*parcialidades*) from the Province of Chimborazo had received assistance, a mere 6 percent of the indigenous population of the province (IEAGH 1960). This report also criticized the mission's educational program, principally on the grounds that it did not offer bilingual education, that indigenous and mestizo students were mixed together, and that its curriculum neither adequately reflected the rural world nor transmitted a love of country. Finally, the evaluation criticized the mission for not being able to design and implement a strategy for the diversification of indigenous productive activities—something most observers considered the basis for the successful integration of the people of Otavalo and that had been one of the main promises of the program. What the program lacked, in the institute's view, were anthropologists to accompany the interventions and, mainly, to ensure that the international program reflected national reality. This criticism was framed by worries about changes in local power structures as a result of the erosion of the legitimacy of traditional public intermediaries—notably, landowners, priests, and traders. Indeed, there were discussions about the demographic coverage of the Andean Mission, that is, if it should be expanded to include, together with indigenous communities, neighboring mestizo populations. In this context, it is interesting to note that these local criticisms contributed to the rhetorical displacement, within the state apparatus, of the category of “indigenous population” to the more generic and inclusive category of “peasantry.”

And, we need to ask, how did the Andean Mission relate to indigenous women? An answer to this question was formulated by two functionaries of the mission in their presentation to the V Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (V Interamerican Indigenist Congress)—an important gathering of the indigenista movement—held in Quito in 1964. Beatriz Vázquez and Gladys Villavicencio introduced in the agenda of the meeting the need to review development programs in general and, in particular, the Andean Mission. Specifically, they pointed to the tendency of such programs to misunderstand

the role of women in the family and community. For them, the problems encountered by the program originated in the lack of trust by indigenous groups. Women, in particular, were highly suspicious because they

have a strong and profound connection to the land, for it is the basic element of their economy and the symbol of the sustenance of their families. They defend it and protect it as though it were part of their own life. Hence, their feeling of doubt and fear about what “foreigners” want to do to their land. It is for this reason that the indigenous woman opposes development programs with even more vehemence than men. (Vázquez and Villavicencio 1965: 9)

And, even more emphatically, these authors see women as the main obstacle that awaits development interventions: “women constitute the real brake and social barrier that impedes these socio-cultural changes, because of the scant opportunities that they have had to confront the presence of and be persuaded by foreigners in their communities” (Vázquez and Villavicencio 1965: 9).

In other words, the problem for these authors was the failure of development programs to acknowledge and understand the power of women and the risk of their potential opposition. They proposed that women should occupy a central and vital role in the design and implementation of development actions directed at indigenous communities, particularly when these concerned health, education, and homemaking. This analysis suggests that women were seen not only as passive recipients of state actions, or as intermediaries, real or symbolic, of the state's actions, but instead were ignored as crucial players in the state's plans to reorganize and modernize indigenous Quichua communities.

The Indigenista Congress responded to this paper by passing several resolutions regarding “indigenous women.” These resolutions were premised with a view of women as the axis of family and community functioning and, therefore, of the need to involve them in development interventions—indeed, that all development dialogues depended on the collaboration of women. The resolutions concerning the Andean Mission called for, among other measures, the urgency of incorporating women into the process, the need to assign women a role as promoters of social and economic development, and the importance of education for women, including literacy and leadership training. Besides recognizing the strategic role of women in development interventions, the objective of these proposals was to ensure that women watched over

the family, increasingly menaced by population growth and male migration to the cities to search for work (Vásquez and Villavicencio 1965: 14–18). In this way, the development era opened an explicit path to the regulation of indigenous domestic life, as well as toward the domestication of women.

Indeed, later reports about the Andean Mission contain signs that these proposals were accepted and became part of the model of what became known as “rural social service”—the set of practices to change households and community organization. This service used home visits, conceived as “the spearhead for the penetration of indigenous communities . . . [and to] persuade peasants to accept the development programs” (Misión Andina del Ecuador 1964: 26). The objective was to open a space in which to negotiate actions with families—but especially with women.

This social image of community development, however centered on women and domestic life, competed with another, more economic view. An evaluation of the Andean Mission from the late 1960s concluded that the program needed to integrate the ongoing agrarian reform process. If the goal was to improve the peasant economy, greater access to land had to be considered (Dubly 1969). The idea that land distribution was the only way to integrate the peasantry was certainly common during this period. In this context, the Andean Mission gradually faded away, and its responsibilities were transferred to new agencies of a growing state apparatus.

At the same time, the program trained locals to take over the day-to-day operation of its interventions. This form of delegation allowed the reinterpretation of the mission's messages through what I have called, “partial state subjects,” that retain cultural autonomy in the midst of a “state habitus.” For instance, in the field of biomedicine, the Andean Mission trained auxiliary medical personnel who, among other responsibilities, assisted births. With the introduction of these local specialists, births ceased to be a closed family event—displacing husbands as the sole assistants—and became subjected to new hygienic norms. At the same time, however, the specialists adopted the customary vertical birth position and recognized that *mal aire*, a traditional concern with harmful spirits, was one of the risks faced by mothers and newborns. In other words, the mission created autonomous spaces in which to “re-create” traditional practices that today are recognized as part of indigenous medicine—and have been officially declared components of Ecuador's cultural heritage.

This examination of the Andean Mission prompts a final question: to what extent did its model of development, with “community” as an added adjective,

mark a change in the relations between the state and the indigenous population? I have suggested that this new discourse did open a scenario that breaks with the past in its focus on economic improvement and, above all, on the regulation of daily practices. State action required, for the first time, specialized public functionaries, although it continued to depend on the traditional delegated forms of political control and negotiation. Indigenous resistance to the new mechanism appears to indicate that, in fact, this was the case; in other words, the day-to-day re-creation of the political *modus vivendi* continued between the state and individual communities. But one innovation was on its way: the explicit intention not only to delegate the administration of the community to male leaders, but also to entrust women with the maintenance of the domestic order. The first was a known condition for political dialogue; the second signals a broader interventionist role, on a scale and intention never before seen: the normalization of the reproduction of indigenous families.

Conclusions

This chapter has traced the connections between the writings of local intellectuals and state bureaucrats and the efforts of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Social Welfare to integrate the indigenous population of free communities into its evolving forms of public and social protection. I have argued that this encounter operated through state events—legal inspections, literacy campaigns, hygiene missions, development projects—and not through the creation of institutional networks or the expansion of hegemony. In many ways, the indigenous population, among other social actors, played a key role in the formation of the Ecuadorian state—which does not mean, necessarily, forfeiting an emancipatory agenda. Episodic contacts—long present in the relations between the state and indigenous communities—were limited in scope, implemented by delegates—a variety of public and nonpublic actors—and often marked by tensions and strife. In time, these events transformed the indigenous population into “partial state subjects,” that is, subjects who recognized the existence of the state, who at times resisted their subjection, and who at times used it strategically to gain acknowledgment of indigenous issues. The resulting autonomy of partial state subjects opened, for instance, the possibility of creating hybrid cultural practices—a mixture of traditional and modern scientific elements. Such precarious openings for the exercise of autonomy, expressed in forms of resistance and cultural elaboration, required constant

political negotiations between state agents and indigenous leaders. This tension was part of the *modus vivendi* used by indigenous communities and the state for mutual recognition.

From this vantage point, during the period broadly from 1925 to 1975, the objective of the state was not total control of indigenous bodies and resources; rather, state agencies sought to delimit their functions and interventions. However, with the deployment of the Andean Mission—the program that introduced the political technology of development in Ecuador—during a time of changing power relations in rural areas, the state acquired a more permanent institutional presence. It is in this context that indigenous women caught the attention of the mission's personnel, particularly of women social workers, insofar as they appeared to transcend the domestic realm, displayed particular forms of authority, and were recognized as deliberating subjects. Women, thus, became of strategic interest to the state in its interaction with the rural population, a point missed in many analyses of this period. Women specialists and women delegates recruited in the communities shared the role of intermediaries of the national state's effort to create a patriarchal and modern domestic order and to extend public health, educational, and agricultural technology services.

At the same time, we must remember that the indigenous population was a needed source of labor for public works and private industry. Indigenous culture—which the state seemed incapable of regulating or changing—represented a threat to the reproduction of national society. The analysis of the imagery of indigenous women and families constructed by social workers suggests that the Andean Mission distrusted the deliberating and subjective capacity of indigenous women and, consequently, proposed to transform the indigenous family along patriarchal forms. In other words, the state did not recognize women by themselves, but rather as occupants of positions with a strategic value in its dialogue with indigenous communities. The Andean Mission identified the strategic function of indigenous women in the need to change and regulate the day-to-day private life of indigenous groups. By the 1970s we see a displacement of development action—framed in a transnational context and demographic pressures—from segregation to integration of indigenous groups as inferior bodies, from intermediated political contact to direct domestication of women—as a means to promote new forms of family and community organization. Despite this change, regulation of indigenous society continued to be partial; the logic of establishing separate agreements with each community persisted.

PART III

FEAR, FANTASY, AND DELUSION

Chapter 8

Haunting the Modern Andean State: Colonial Legacies of Race and Civilization

Irene Silverblatt

Contemporary Andean polities are haunted by colonial legacies. Yet colonial legacies, so critical to the modern Andes, are often disregarded in studies of modern state-making. Incorporating them into our analytical frame helps make sense of the trajectory of horrors and irrationalities—as well as idioms of political legitimacy and justice—that have profoundly marked modern Andean life. European state-making was chained to imperial endeavors and Spanish political ideologies, like those of Spain's early modern competitors, reflect modernity's beginnings in this dialectic of state-making and colonialism. My chapter explores how colonial apparatuses of statecraft, washed in the dictates of imperial control, made race-thinking—and the imperatives of "civilization"—part of the body politic. And, while this chapter can be suggestive at best, I hope it pushes us to ask why—and how—these beginnings have not been central to our perceptions of modern experience or modern states.¹

My framework owes much to Hannah Arendt's (1973) account of the origins of fascism. Arendt combed Western history for a precedent that would have eased the way for "civilized" peoples to embrace Hitler's barbarity. Arendt found that antecedent in nineteenth century imperialism, a form of governance that, like Nazism, supported the worldwide dominance of a master race. She identified two dimensions of colonial control that would have laid the groundwork for the horrors to follow: (1) bureaucratic rule and (2) racial ideologies that turned bureaucrats into members of a superior, white Euro-

pean caste with authority traversing the globe. Arendt's great fear was that intertwined, race-thinking and bureaucratic rule could unleash "extraordinary power and destruction," precisely because governance—and its inherent violence—were cloaked in an aura of "rationality" and "civilization" (Arendt 1973: ix). Arendt called this hidden dimension of Western modernity its "subterranean stream" and believed it was as intrinsic to Western modernity as vaunted morality and Enlightenment ideals (ix). Arendt thus placed colonialism at the heart of modern experience.

Arendt believed that colonialism's governing principles were launched by nineteenth-century imperialism. This chapter challenges her chronology. From the sixteenth through the mid-seventeenth century, Spain was installing cutting-edge bureaucracies and race-thinking designs throughout its widely dispersed colonies. If we take the first wave of European empire as the origin of modernity, we have a better grasp, I think, of its inherent disorder and irrationality—and of its persistent illusions. This chapter examines how states and empires have projected—and cemented—legitimacy by obscuring the political origins of exploitation. Is there a connection between our ignorance of modernity's roots and our sense of political legitimacy? In Europe, colonialism and state-making were entwined: colonialism was an integral part of early state-making, just as the emerging ideologies of nation, nationhood, and national belonging were born out of colonial endeavors. An inquiry into Europe's first wave of imperial expansion clarifies the ways that a sense of "nationhood" could be rooted in colonial processes—processes that simultaneously made "rulers" into "national" representatives and privileged, colonizing subjects. We see how nation, ethnicity, economic privilege, and political dominance could merge, splinter—and ossify—into something that we now identify as "race." We also see how ensuing confusions opened spaces for—while shaping—political contestation. Hopefully, the chapter suggests how these historical framings of legitimacy and justice—of political claims, humanness, and race—haunt us still. The viceroyalty of Peru is our focus and the seventeenth century's most centralized and global bureaucracy, the Spanish Inquisition, is our principal source.

The Peruvian Setting of Colonialism and State-Making

Our blindness to the contrary, history wedded European state-building to European colonialism. Spain is, perhaps, the prototype of this double-edged

politics: Castilian monarchs were vying to increase their authority over the Iberian Peninsula when they triumphed in the Americas; struggling to control Iberian principalities when they worked out details of colonial government; battling the English when they established Indian courts; skirmishing with the Dutch when they defended colonial borders. The Spanish experience, fashioned out of colonial efforts and European conflicts, colored all of Europe's state-building projects.

To make a Spanish colony out of what had been the Inca empire was an extended process: although begun in the 1530s when Spanish conquistadors, led by Francisco Pizarro, overwhelmed Cuzco's native forces, it was not until the century's end when royal authorities—having confronted civil wars, rebellions, and settlers' raw ambitions—could successfully root institutions of government. The Crown quickly learned that colony-building pivoted on control over immigrant colonists in equal measure to control over native peoples, and it instituted bureaucracies to curb and "administer" both. Learning from pitfalls on the peninsula, the Crown consolidated colonial state power in ways impossible in Europe. Determined to strengthen state bureaucracies, the Crown gave royal authorities (as opposed to Spanish settlers) jurisdiction over Indian commoners and turned royal bureaucrats into the brokers between Peru's colonizers and colonized natives. The Crown appointed magistrates to supervise Spanish-Indian relations, designated local headmen to represent native communities to royal authorities, and established courts, armies, and district governors to oversee the rest. It fell to the Crown's ally, the Church, however, to instruct Indians, as well as colonials, in the ways and necessities of civilization (Elliott 1987a, b; Gibson 1987; Spalding 1974).

Although Spain's imperial enterprise sought the New World's wealth and labor, it was brought to life by constructing new social relations and identities, new kinds of human being. Like all bureaucratic administrations, colonial Peru's functioned through a cultural matrix, and race-thinking was its scaffold. Royal authorities, grounded in the experiences of a developing absolutist state, imposed broad, racialized classifications on their imperial subjects. They created two unequal "republics" as the foundation for colonial rule: Native Americans and their descendants, regardless of origin or ethnicity, were classed as Indians; descendants of Iberia, regardless of origin, ethnicity, or social rank, were classed as privileged Spanish colonists. With the exception of the native nobility, all Indians owed tribute and labor to the Crown; unlike their lower-status kin in Europe, however, Spaniards in the colonies had no such tribute obligations. When Indian populations, decimated by disease and

upheaval, could no longer meet labor demands, the Crown turned to slavery, spurring the creation of a third abstract category of government: Africans brought to Peru and their descendants—regardless of origin, ethnicity, or social rank—were classed as “negros” or Blacks.

This design for imperial rule transformed the colonial enterprise into a racial play of global geopolitics. Turning imperialism into a caste structure, it also attached color to a conjunction of political privilege, place of origin, moral supremacy, and economic standing: Spaniard was glossed as “white,” European, political authority, morally superior, exempt from paying tribute in the colonies; indio was glossed as native born, “of color,” political subaltern, morally suspect, obliged to pay tribute to the Crown (except for native nobility); “negro” was glossed as African, black, politically subordinate, morally weak, slave. Colonialism transformed humanity, making race-thinking into the scaffold of humanness as well as the underlying charter for human control over other human beings. Ancestry determined the official categories of colonial order. But, as authorities were to soon realize, colonial realities could not be contained within colonial categories, and “hybrid” racial classes such as *mestizo*, *mulato* (person of mixed Spanish and African ancestry), and *sambo* (person of mixed indigenous and African ancestry) entered the Spanish political ken. This was Spanish legal theory’s flat presentation of colonial order—a caste trio of *español*, *indio*, and *negro* along with mixtures (Spalding 1974; Morner 1967); and, like many reductive categories of political rule, it concealed the historical processes—and the contradictions—at its heart.

Theoretical Interlude: Bureaucracy, the State, and Modern Life

Bureaucracy enjoys a privileged position in Western social theory as an indispensable feature of modernity, a crucial element in fashioning modern experience and sensibilities. Weber (1958) was an early proponent of this argument, believing that Western bureaucracy, as the most rationally organized governmental type, stood for modern life. Two contemporary theorists of the state and bureaucracy, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, also connected bureaucracies to modern ways, but their interest was in the advent of the modern state; for them, bureaucracies were significant because they helped fashion the “state” as an autonomous entity, with a rationale apart from the sovereignty of kings. Both turned to the seventeenth century—but not to Spain—to

amplify their arguments (see Bourdieu 1998; Foucault 1991). Foucault, exploring the evolution of what he called the “arts of government,” believed the seventeenth century marked a watershed in European state formation and in the history of the West. The seventeenth century not only witnessed the birth of large-scale administrative units that would come to challenge dynastic sovereignty; it also witnessed radical transformations in political vision (Foucault 1991). The “state” was, for the first time, something to talk about.² “State” was a meaningful concept, understood as an independent entity, born out of dynastic rule but significantly different from it. Seventeenth-century philosophers and political scientists wrote about the state, describing what a good state should do and be, the obligations subjects owed the state, the obligations the state owed subjects, and the essentials of proper state comportment. This new thing, with its own logic, its own way of being, its own conceptual expression, was “governed according to . . . principles . . . intrinsic to it,” according to “its own form of rationality” (97). State rationality, Foucault pointed out, was practiced and structured through administrative bureaucracies—the bureaucracies of the absolutist state. Schools, “manufactories,” armies—these were the institutional forms, the techniques of government, which, for Foucault, constituted the seventeenth century’s emerging “society of regulation and discipline” (104).

Like Foucault, Bourdieu centered on processes making the state into an autonomous entity, emphasizing its structures of existence, rationale of being, and its patterns of classifying the world—its imposing epistemology. Bourdieu untangled the dialectic between bureaucracy and state, arguing that while the state constructed bureaucracies to administer populations, bureaucracies constructed the state by ordaining its format, its categories of order. Bourdieu’s concerns were at once cognitive and structural: his intention was to chart the dynamic making these two facets of social experience inseparable, to focus on the emerging ideologies and institutions that, jointly, opened the political spaces known as the “state.” Bureaucracies were key to Bourdieu’s scheme, with their capacity to at once frame institutions while monopolizing information, knowledge, and even morality. Bourdieu called bureaucrats a “state nobility,” the state-era equivalent to an aristocracy. They formed a charmed circle, argued Bourdieu (1998), with monopoly over productive means, in this case knowledge, rather than land; they even acquired a cloak of divine mystery, having powers to bestow identity cards (credentials), as well as determine admission into their elite ranks. Bureaucratic claims jostled with dynastic privilege during state-making’s early stages, and Bourdieu suggested that this

conflict accounted for ideological changes both accompanying and spurring the autonomy of state institutions. The state nobility, working against the hegemony of dynastic power, developed a special vocabulary to frame its version of political morality and of political imagination. The emerging idiom was that of universalism and rationality—a new theory of special interests, but employing the language of “the public.” Public good, public will, and public order were, in Bourdieu’s (58) words, “working to autonomize the *raison of state* from dynastic reason.” Bourdieu understood the growing legitimacy of state institutions to be part of an emerging “habitus,” implicit knowledge framing a societal common sense. And, as the reach of bureaucracies grew, a growing number of human beings would share a sensibility toward the world defined by common categories produced by—and producing—state bureaucracies.

Foucault and Bourdieu help us see the emergence of “the state”; others argue that “the state” is at heart an illusion. They, in turn, help us think about how aspects of modern power disappear from public awareness. For Philip Abrams, “the state” is an ideology, a mask, and not a tangible being; it is a misrepresentation of what states are: “politically organized subjection” (Abrams 1988: 63). “The state,” he contended, is a figure in an ideology that presents political institutions as if they acted in the common interest, as if they were morally legitimate, as if the violence committed for reasons of state were inherently justified. Abrams, like Foucault and Bourdieu, focused on “the state” as it came into being, but unlike them, challenged the very concept of “the state” by exploring the “state-idea” as it emerged during the restructuring of European power relations (82). Bringing Arendt into the dialogue, we could say that the very notion of “the state” helps camouflage the West’s “subterranean stream,” the terrible underside of civilization. The records of the Spanish Inquisition in Peru are both witness to and part of the process transforming organized political subjection into “the state”: into an “entity” we have come to take for granted, a “being” whose political substance and history have been rendered invisible.

Michael Taussig also refused to ignore Arendt’s terrible realization that violence is as much a part of our Western legacy as the most uplifting of civilization’s values. He traveled to the Amazon basin to reveal the horrors carried out in the name of civilization, where, during the turn-of-the-century rubber boom, the British savagely tortured (dismembered, hung, burned) Indian laborers in the Putumayo. For Taussig (1992), modernity’s dark, infernal core, capable of unleashing enormous cruelty, was violence begotten by power, by

the ability of some Western men to command the very being of others. Like Arendt, Taussig also understood that Western rationality could perfume violence in the colonies as well as violence at home. By conceptualizing the “state” as a modern fetish, Taussig went beyond Abrams’s (1988) metaphor of state as mask: although the state’s fetishized power might be illusory, it is, Taussig discerned, preeminently and materially real. It is no less than the means through which we apprehend, grasp, and make sense of our political world. Our belief in the essential rationality of the modern state is, Taussig continues, what stops us from seeing the sectarian, all-too-human interests behind official deference to the public good. Our faith in “reasons of state,” in our “rational, legal state,” is a faith we will not admit (Taussig 1992: 116).

State fetishism—transforming an illusion, “the state,” into an entity with a life and powers of its own—casts a wide net. But state fetishism not only obscured the subjection of people, it created a remarkable historical illusion that European nations were closed off, bounded, with pasts that were independent of the larger world community. It encouraged the fiction that European countries were self-made; that successes enjoyed since the time of the Conquest were rooted in their preferred position on civilization’s highway, apart from any integral relationship with peoples outside their borders. Put another way, this version of state fetishism denies any intrinsic, relational hierarchy among nations, economies, or peoples; it denies that states and colonies were party to one another’s creation, including the re-creation of structured inequities; it denies that Western state-making, including its basic mechanics of rule, were honed in the colonizing process. State fetishism denies history. Fernando Coronil (1996) brilliantly described this Western mythology as “occidentalism.” State fetishism, in its occidentalized format, wrested Western nation-building from its roots in global politics—a fictional divorce as characteristic of the first round of fetishism as of the more commonly discussed nineteenth-century version. The modern world, from its inception, was transnational in scope and hierarchical in structure. And, these features are strikingly evident in the categories that were to order the newly globalized humanity: the categories of race-thinking—along with the bureaucratic means to bring them into being.

The Modern Inquisition

Spain brought renowned measures to investigate the beliefs and ethics of its colonial subjects, and in the late sixteenth century the Crown established an

office of the Inquisition in Lima. In spite of its religious demeanor, the Inquisition was an institution of state, under the jurisdiction of the Crown (and not the pope). Its principal charge was to defend the security of the empire and the public's well-being by eradicating traitorous, heretical beliefs and practices. As guardian of the public good, the Inquisition was also responsible for enforcing "purity of blood" statutes—measures that restricted political offices and professions to men of pure "Spanish/Christian" stock. The Inquisition was the only institution of government with jurisdiction throughout the Spanish realm and, to the surprise of most of us in the Anglophone world, the Inquisition was perhaps the most advanced, centralized bureaucracy of the day.³

I won't be able to address, in any detail, just how modern the Inquisition appears once you spend time in its archives. In principle, Inquisition officers were subject to the kind of structures and rules constraining most of today's state bureaucracies. The Inquisition was formally regulated by protocols and its activities were overseen by bureaucrats—credentialed "letrados" (learned men, university graduates). According to the job description, Lima's inquisitors were expected to be "circumspect, judicious . . . not greedy or covetous, understanding, very charitable . . . and experienced and informed about life in the Americas" as well as "pacífico," that is, tranquil and unperturbed—not a hotheaded conquistador. While not precisely a court of law (the Inquisition was established "to meet a perceived national threat"; Kamen 1998: 193), it had much in common with the ecclesiastical and secular courts of the day. In principle, its practices were guided by regulations designed to promote equity and justice as well as gradate the powers of officeholders according to an established hierarchy of command. Inquisition manuals gave specific instructions about evidence needed for arrest and conviction, methods for conducting interrogations, and criteria for determining sentences. To check for fairness, tribunal decisions were reached with the input of external consultants at every stage in the trial process. However, like most European courts, the tribunal assumed that the accused were guilty unless shown otherwise. And, although defendants were supported by a number of statutes (they were entitled to a lawyer, to name corroborating witnesses, and to provide a list of enemies who might testify out of spite), the burden of proof remained squarely on their shoulders.

Procedures notwithstanding, assumptions of guilt coupled with the (also regulated) use of torture, seemed to make the fight for innocence almost hopeless. But procedures had consequences. Many of us presume that the inquisitors always got their man or woman, that the verdict was fixed, that the

tribunals were, if anything, mere show trials. Indeed, the accused were severely handicapped. Presumptions of guilt, the character of testimony, the use of torture, and the nature of evidence all worked to the prisoner's disadvantage. Disadvantaged, however, is not the same as preordained. Inquisitors did not act as a concerted group, executing the will of their superiors; verdicts did not catapult themselves forward. Magistrates, albeit rarely, had to publicly admit to errors of judgment and publicly concede mistaken arrests. Men and women accused of heresy, and imprisoned for years while waiting for their cases to run their course, could, in the end, be "suspended" or, even exonerated.⁴

Inquisitors, the elite of modernity, might have made godlike decisions over those who came before them; yet, in spite of their divine-like bearings, they were caught by a bureaucratic paradox. They had to publicly acknowledge that they were mortal and fallible. Inquisitor-bureaucrats had to demonstrate that they responded to reason in the service of the state; that is, that they were reasonable men. Inquisitor-bureaucrats staged an elaborate rite of exoneration to publicly exhibit the innocence of slandered men and women—a public demonstration of their commitment to standards of evidence and truth. Magistrates spun an illusion of omnipotence; but their position in the modern state rested on the obligation to respect evidence and standards. That mandate could force magistrates (albeit rarely) to admit their own fallibility. The tribunal assumed a totalizing, monolithic face to the public, but their honored standing was also built on a respect for rules—on a bureaucratic ethos.

Torture and Truth

No act painted the Spanish Inquisition with greater infamy than torture. Yet, like its peer institutions throughout Europe, the Spanish Inquisition believed torture was a means to the truth, albeit, in the Spanish case, a reluctant one. Contrary to stereotype, torture was more supervised, bureaucratized, and less likely practiced in Spain than in other nations we associate with Western civilization. Spain's bureaucratic bent supplied torture with a goodly number of rules. Local magistrates were exhorted to use torture "following law, reason, and good conscience," and cautioned to "take great care that the sentence of torture is justified and follows precedent" (Kamen 1998: 188). According to government instructions, torture was never a punishment, but, rather, a last

resort to ease confession. Regulations clarified, with some precision, when torture could be employed, how long sessions could last, which instruments could be used, and what would constitute physical abuse. Moreover, torture sessions were part of the judicial and legal record, formally witnessed by delegates of church and state bureaucracies. The bishop sent a representative to Inquisition dungeons, a physician was always present, and the court secretary recorded in astonishing detail the torture process itself. It is a devastating irony that inquisitors employed torture to get to the truth, while, at the same time, doubting the truth of confessions obtained by torture.⁵

Yes, inquisitors were bureaucrats with a mission—to protect the public weal by safeguarding the empire from heresies. Magistrates must have drawn the strength, as well as the arrogance, to make extraordinary decisions over the lives of others, from what they believed was their divine mandate. Tribunal work, however, was carried out by means of bureaucratic practices and bureaucratic practices could also provide a divine-like aura to the godlike actions that inquisitors produced. These social practices, at the crux of state rationality, brought a flavor of invincibility to truth finding. For the practices themselves could promote a sense that truth was somehow immanent in the process, that the truth was emergent in the state itself—beyond the decision of mere mortals.

In the dialectic of state-making, godlike inquisitor-bureaucrats transformed human beings into “its”—fragments of humanity reworked by “state science” into statistics. Inquisitors collected all kinds of information about the men and women under their purview. Interrogations read like a modern census form: age, place of birth, education, residence, family, caste. Inquisitors were nowhere more godlike, however, than when they used violence in the name of state reason, and the most disturbing use of “state-talk” was in the documentation of torture. Never doubting the legitimacy of torture, inquisitors made records in abundance. Their very existence verifies a significant modern practice of state-making: the objectification of experience, the transformation of social relations into recordable or legible form (Scott 1998). This particular set of statistics is egregious, mutating as it does, relations of power and pain into a digestible flatness. We find accounts, but no set of words can translate the defilement of human beings’ very humanness. Human suffering was dissembled in a mountain of descriptive jottings that, like today, reduced torture and torturer to a carefully crafted and detailed government report. The bureaucratization of torture: records expose what can be unleashed in the name of public welfare; not only the physical terror, but structures of thinking

and feeling built on an abstraction of life. State abstractions seem to move horrific acts from the realm of accountability, and they do so by dismembering humanness: abuse is splintered into columns of an account ledger, torture is fragmented into events and responses, horror is objectified into smaller and smaller components. Perhaps intentionally, but most probably not—the breakdown of human existence into fragments makes a whole life easier to discard. This is the pornography of bureaucratic rendering, which deafens the perpetrators and us readers to torture’s cries, and which distracts us from the web of social relations, from the power that lies behind what the bureaucrat registers as truth.

Spain’s state horrors have entered the public record because bureaucrats met their obligation to register them. Today’s modern states are inheritors of labyrinth-like bureaucracies and godlike bureaucrats; but they have removed records from public domain, blackened out evidence, and expanded the domain of state secrets in ways that show their colonial inheritance and their all-too modern transformations.

Theoretical Interlude: Race-thinking

Tracing the modern world back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Iberia was simultaneously building a state and an empire, lets us better grasp another of the modern world’s deceits. State-fetishism—veiling our origins in a globalizing, hierarchical world—has veiled our origins in race-thinking as well; it has made us lose sight of our colonial foundations and of the antagonistic and racialized social relationships at its core.

Karl Marx, determined to root out modern abstractions, provides clues to the link between mysteries of state and mysteries of race. Marx argued that a concept like “individual,” and the social practices girding it, could only emerge in tandem with the abstraction of “state” (Marx 1983: 16–22, 77). Inquisitors, with their census-like questions and confession-like demands, produced “individual” subjects of Spanish rule: formidable examples of the ways that “individual,” as concept and practice, was constructed via bureaucratic exigencies. Abstracting an “individual” from its foundational social relations permitted the chimera of “the state” to appear as an organic creator, defining and categorizing humanity as it called “individuals” to task. Marx wrote about the normalization of slaves and citizens as examples of individual/state illusions. Slaves and citizens, Marx argued, appeared in their life-worlds as individuals,

with inherent personal qualities determining their fate. The social relations that constituted slaves and citizens seemed to disappear. In like fashion, I would argue, so did the social relations making “indio,” “negro,” and “español.” Disappearing histories meant that stripped-down individuals were primed to absorb “race”—as if race were an inborn characteristic with the extraordinary power to shape destinies.

Arendt, choosing her words carefully, did not so much talk about “racism” as about “race-thinking.” “Race-thinking” cuts a wider swath than “race” because it moves us behind and beyond racism’s narrow nineteenth-century roots. “Race-thinking” lets us place social processes that we tend to analytically separate into the same framework: that is, instead of studying “ethnicity” and “race,” or “caste” and “race,” or “nationalism” and “race” as autonomous social forms, we can, under the rubric of “race-thinking,” better grasp how they have interpenetrated and shaped one another over time. According to almost every major historical text, Latin America was a society of castes. Spain divided conquered peoples into corporate groups—Spanish, Indian, Black—each with associated rights, privileges, and obligations. Ideally, castes were endogamous, and, since caste-mates were to marry one another, membership was, in principal, determined by descent. The caste system was patently a devise of colonial political order, and, even though descent played a part and even though color named one constituent (Black or “negro”), caste is understood to be a legal or social (as opposed to biological) construct at heart.

Unlike “caste,” “race” is understood as principally a question of ancestry and phenotype, a biological phenomenon (or so goes the ideology), and, as a consequence, to be independent of social or political regimes. Race emerged as a dominant account of social differentiation in the West’s “modern,” liberal age, and the nineteenth-century revolutions in the natural and human sciences provided its explanatory frame. Race was inherited and, since human capabilities were linked to race, human capabilities, according to racist doctrine, were also inherited.⁶

“Race-thinking” does not negate the colonial caste system, nor does it deny that caste and race systems represent two different modes of organizing and explaining inequality. Race-thinking does help us see, however, what the race-caste division hides: that race and caste were not separate systems, but interpenetrating. Race-thinking helps us understand how race and caste might, chameleon-like, slip in and out of one another (Holt 2000); how a relatively innocent category (like color) could become virulent; how politically defined differences (like nationality) could so easily become inheritable traits.

“Race-thinking,” then, broadly refers to any mode of construing and engaging social hierarchies through the lens of descent. It represents a potential way of sensing, understanding, and being in the world, a cultural possibility that can become part of social identities and social practices. Its most significant property, however, is its most difficult lesson: “race-thinking” is invariably tied to other expressions of power, other forms of social antagonism, and is best interpreted in dialectic with those relations.⁷ Arendt was especially concerned with how race-thinking could become embedded in the bureaucracies of state and colonial governments. Returning to the seventeenth century, we can better understand how categories of colonial rule were tied to sentiments of national belonging.

The Modern Inquisition: Race-Thinking and National Illusions

The Inquisition held a special place in Spanish statecraft: the arbiter of religious orthodoxy in a country that defined religion as nationalism, and a bureaucracy responsible for the empire’s cultural (that is, national) security. It was an institution of state that defined what nationhood meant by fixing internal cultural boundaries in tandem with Spain’s position in an increasingly global world. The Inquisition’s mission would appear to be only an internal affair, but in fact, concerns about Catholic preeminence had everything to do with political and ideological battles that crossed state borders. Spain was fighting “infidels” and “heretics” (Moors and English respectively) when it was colonizing the Americas. The modern state, following Foucault, took “government in the name of truth” as its charge; and one of the most profound social truths for state officials to judge was the nature of human personhood. Inquisitors’ day-to-day activities included specifying various aspects of that “truth”: determining if someone constituted a threat to God and empire was one; but determining the official colonial-race category of persons appearing before the bench was another.⁸ Peru’s inquisitors (as little gods) were inscribing race-thinking into institutional practice at the same time they were producing the “State.” By the seventeenth century, magistrates (and other functionaries) were officially dividing people into Spanish-Indian-Black boxes as a matter of course, with Inquisitors holding a preeminent position in this domain as the ultimate arbiters of “blood purity.” “Indian,” “Black,” and “Spaniard” (and their percentages) were taking on the appearance of things—of

self-evident qualities of human being. Like “state,” “race” was a phantasm, and part of its mystique was to appear as if it were a category of individuals and not a social relation produced in the political and economic turmoil of modern, colonial state-making.

Seventeenth-century inquisitors inherited a world whose humanity was increasingly understood in racialized terms, and magistrates played a significant (if unwitting) role in deepening and consolidating race-thinking as a way of life. In their bureaucratic practices, inquisitors were delineating the very terms of social experience: the terms by which the world was to be judged and the terms framing any individual’s social truth.

Spain, Spanish, Spanishness

Nationalism and race-thinking, in concert, propelled the modern world’s most destructive beliefs; yet we have trouble visualizing the depth of that connection because our historical sensibilities rarely put colonialism at the core of modern life. Debates about the meaning of “Spaniard” and an incipient “Spain” and “Spanishness” suggest we do otherwise.

There was no Spain (as a government and nation) in the seventeenth century; what we now call Spain was composed of regional principalities, including the New World colonies, under the dominion of the Hapsburg dynasty of Castile. But, in spite of governmental forms, a sense of “Spanishness” was permeating Iberia. When the concept of “state” was coming into being, the Peninsula’s philosophers and policy specialists were also writing about a Spanish character and about a Spanish people (Cellorigo 1991 [1600]). And, most significantly, that sense of “Spanishness” was emerging as modern colonialism took form. In 1532, Peru’s conquistadores did not call themselves “Spaniards” but “Christians”—armed to fight the infidels. Within several decades that designation changed. By the 1550s, colonizers sent to establish the viceregal government and institutions of state referred to one another as “Spaniards” (see H. Pizarro 1968 [1533]; Mena 1968 [1534]).

Contemporary “state” theorists have not taken into consideration that Spanish philosophers were talking about a Spanish character as Castile was seizing territory and setting up colonies around the globe. Investigations into “Spanishness” in Europe were taking place at the same time that colonizers were civilizing Indians, enslaving Africans, and distinguishing themselves from the lower orders of Indians and Blacks by calling one another “Spanish.”

The historical meeting of state-making and colony (race)-making meant that the two senses of “Spanishness”—as incipient nation and as category of colonial rule—penetrated each other. Something of the nation must have been made with every use of *español* in the colonies; and, reciprocally, Madrid’s discussions of the Spanish character must have drawn on a vision of the colonial *español*. Moreover, not only was “Spanish”—as colonial category—racialized, so was its hidden partner: the potential Spanish nation. Arendt’s analysis of nineteenth-century British colonialism as fascist precedent points a finger at singular tensions within its race-framed categories of rule. Colonialism required that its superior caste of administrators and functionaries be able to find peers wherever the Union Jack flew. “English,” she argued, had to be a global phenomenon. Yet “Englishmen” were not all equal; they did not share the same possibilities in life. Race-thinking had to obscure these internal divisions; yet race-thinking, at the same time, had to leave these divisions in place. “Spaniard” filled similar shoes: it defined a unifying experience for all colonizers (*españoles* did not owe tribute or labor service in the colonies), gave that experience substance as an “unmixed race,” and portrayed the kingdom/race as God’s chosen. But as Lima’s authorities—who, like their English counterparts, harbored elite expectations and pretensions—were to discover, “unmixed race” stretched precariously over the internal hierarchies it was supposed to mute. Peruvian Spaniards, as viceroys and inquisitors bemoaned, had forgotten their place. Tensions within *español*—between metropolitan-born and creole, between nobility and commoner, and, significantly, between aristocrat and merchant—were unbearable for many Peninsulars at work civilizing Peruvians. Some of the Inquisition’s most grievous tragedies, particularly the persecutions of New Christians of Jewish ancestry, were the result. Rules of blood purity were an impossible attempt to stanch the brewing threats of the modern, colonial world.⁹

Administrators in Spain and Spain’s colonies used a particular race-thinking notion to shape and calibrate the “natural order” of political life. They argued that blood carried stains, and that stains could determine character traits, intelligence, political rights, and economic possibilities. The notion of blood purity was first elaborated on the Peninsula, where it was used to separate “Old Christians” from Spain’s “New Christians”—women and men of Jewish and Muslim origins whose ancestors had converted to Christianity. New Christians carried stained blood, and, consequently, were perceived as a potential danger to official life. By statute, if not always in practice, New Christians were prohibited from holding political positions, going to

university, or entering professions. By the seventeenth century, most (but not all) learned and popular opinion held that a Spaniard's spiritual core was, in fact, biological and that an authentic Spaniard could be defined by his purity of blood (Montenegro 1678: f. 36).

Conquistadores brought the curse of New Christians, the concept of stained blood (*mancha*), to the Americas. Inquisitors, the bureaucrats responsible for certifying blood type, were obliged to indicate the "race" and blood purity of everyone brought before them. Their records give us a ringside view of the New Christian dilemma in the New World. In Iberia, debates were spinning about the nature of blood stains (Were they indelible? Could baptism override them? Could New Christians of Jewish descent ever lose their stain?). Authorities in the Americas, however, were vexed by additional blood-related questions: Were all New Christians alike? Was the blood stain of Europe's New Christians the same as the blood stain of Indians or Blacks? Were all stains equal? When inquisitors and their colleagues responded to these issues in their daily chores of state-craft, they were helping make race into a calculable thing.

When inquisitors condemned the newly converted on both sides of the Atlantic, when they declared that not only the blood of Europe's New Christians, but the blood of Indians, Blacks, mestizos, and mulattos carried stains, they provided "Spanishness" with another common ground. Spanish blood, whether in the context of colony or "nation," was pure blood. Not only was the Spanish caste racialized, so was its contemporary partner: the potential Spanish nation. Race-thinking saturated the body-politic.

Two intermeshed paradigms, instantiated by the first wave of European state-making and colonialism—framed the new categories of humanness—the new categories of political subjection—of modern experience. Their entanglements also shadow contemporary confusions: of "race" with "nation," of "nation" with religion, of religion with ancestry, of ancestry with culture, and of culture with economic aptitude, political loyalty, and moral preeminence (Montenegro 1678: f. 403–4).

Irrationalities, Confusions, and the Languages of Legitimacy

One of the Lima Inquisition's most important functions was to clarify cultural blame: specify who, among the viceroyalty's inhabitants, held contrary beliefs

or engaged in life practices that were perceived to threaten the colonial state. In the Andes, where confusions of race-thinking merged with imperatives of religion and politics, accusations could take the form of breath-taking conspiracies with breath-taking and tragic consequences. Here we touch on three intertwined examples—the "Jewish/mercantilism" problem, the "woman/witchcraft" problem, and the "Indian" problem. Magistrates inevitably brought race-thinking to bear on their judgments just as they inevitably appealed to reasons of state to justify them. Their confusions, judgments, and justifications are of the seventeenth century; nonetheless, they are tinged with modern anxieties and modern reckonings.

In 1639 Lima witnessed a *Gran Auto de Fe*, a public ceremony of judgment. Manuel Bautista Perez, convicted of secretly practicing Judaism, was burned at the stake.¹⁰ The 1639 auto, notorious as the tableau for the punishment of the "great conspiracy" of hidden Jews, was the bloodiest in Lima's inquisitorial history. Perez was one of eleven executed for crimes associated with Judaising; another sixty-two admitted guilt and were penanced. Inquisitors justified their actions to the Suprema in Madrid by appealing to the dangers New Christians posed, not only to the ethical foundation of the colony, but to its very political security.

Most inquisitors were dubious about the commitment of New Christians to Spain or to Catholicism—loyalty, after all, was in the blood. Distrust, however, turned into alarm when Peruvian magistrates became convinced that "hidden Jews" had not only established ties with the Dutch enemy, but with "indios" and "negros." The remarkable transformations in political economy—the growth of merchant capital and the growth of colonialism—nurtured the tribunal's wildest fantasies of New Christian conspirators at the center of a great plot of oppressed, colonial malcontents (Indians and Blacks) and foreign (Dutch) usurpers. Debates over the character of New Christians were ones that fused questions regarding Spain's emerging sense of nation with the new, global colonial order. The supporters of purity of blood laws believed that religious conversion could not erase the stains of a heretical religious past, and inquisitors who arrested New Christians on the assumption they were insidious, Jewish merchants were making the case for a "racially" pure Spanish nation and for a "racially" pure definition of "Spanishness." Manuel Bautista Perez, a renowned and powerful merchant sought out by Lima's elite, surely felt that "full-Spanish" status was his due. Of course, Perez believed in and defended the legitimacy of a political structure that enslaved Blacks and coerced Indian labor; but, he also believed in the right of good Christian sub-

jects, regardless of ancestry, to be justly recognized for their contributions to nation/empire and church. It was in this regard that he challenged Castile's racial definition of religion and of Spanishness.

Magistrates pursuing the "great conspiracy" were appalled by another failing running deep in the viceregal character: the attraction to native life. Writing to the Supreme Council in Madrid, Juan de Manozca, the inquisitor who oversaw the 1639 auto, bemoaned the colony's abysmal lack of faith. He assessed Peru as a degraded country and, in his letter, blamed Peru's degradation on the ubiquity of witches, nearly always women, who were immersed in the customs and knowledge of the colony's uncivilized natives. Things Indian were becoming increasingly prominent in the repertoire of "Spanish," "Black" (free and slave), "mulata," "mestiza," and "samba" witches—to Manozca's chagrin. By the time Ana Maria de Contreras (an accused witch sharing the scaffold with Perez) was penanced, even the Inca was said to make an appearance in dreams and spells. Ana Maria de Contreras was not an *india*, but she was an "Inca-worshipper."

The fears inspired by "witches" who worshiped the Inca, and by New Christian merchants who carried on with "indios" and "negros," were elaborated at the same time that some of Peru's native peoples, calling themselves "Indian," were suspected of abandoning Catholicism for ancestral idolatries. We must keep in mind that before the Spanish conquest, Andeans did not conceive of themselves as Indian; and, except for Cuzqueñans, neither did they conceive of themselves as Inca descendants. Now some self-proclaimed "Indians," whose ancestors most likely fought against Inca dominance, were calling on the Inca to help right the wrongs of a colonial world run amok. These natives, from Peru's central sierra, deliberately rejected Spanish religion and became "Indian"—that is, their version of Indian. It appears that colonialism's cultural politics provided an idiom for protesting the status quo. This idiom appealed to Indians committed to overturning political subjection; it could even appeal to non-Indians as well.

This was the stuff of conspiracy: the "witch-woman problem," "Jewish problem," and "Indian problem" were mutually reinforcing, swelling authorities' anxieties over the brittleness of the social and political fabric—the race-thinking cultural hierarchy—of the Spanish colonial state. Colonial rule, inscribed in racialized terms and through racialized cultural hierarchies, was menaced, or so the inquisitors thought, by witchcraft ideologies and New Christian conspiracies that reached into the heart of imperial cultural politics. In turn, the imagined threats of colonial witchcraft and of New Christian

sabotage swelled as they absorbed fears surrounding native subversions, the allegiances of slaves, and the power of foreign enemies. Peru's inquisitors intertwined stereotypes of New Christians, "indios," "negros," and women as part of an etiology of fear and blame. This etiology of fear was built on a racialized (and gendered) vision that confused nationalist sentiments, religion, loyalties, and the caste categories of colonial rule. Racialized ways of being in and thinking the world penetrated the colonial Andes and, in different ways, shaped ideologies and moral visions that also challenged Spanish colonial rule and Spanish legitimacy.¹¹

The modern world, from its inception, was transnational in scope and hierarchical in structure. These features are strikingly evident in the categories that ordered our newly globalized, modern humanity: the categories of race-thinking—along with the bureaucratic means to bring them into being. Race-thinking joined to state-making produced magical properties: together, they could make the social and political relations that constituted "indio," "negro," and "español" seem to disappear. Securing European state-making to its moorings in colonial expansion helps explain the cruelties—the irrationalities—that have accompanied the development of the modern age: cruelties made all the more dangerous by their coating in the rhetoric of reason and civilization, in the rhetoric of reasons of state, and in the rhetoric of race-thinking.

Spanish colonialism still haunts the contemporary Andes: modern versions of race-thinking and appeals to reasons of state, coated now in twenty-first-century languages of civilization—remain part of the body politic. Whether legitimating the status quo or legitimating challenges to it, race-thinking is at the core of Andean political ideologies and political sensibilities—just as appeals to national security (in various guises) still justify the ugly horrors of state unreason, the horrors of torture and violence that shadow the modern Andean state.

Chapter 9

Appearances to the Contrary: Fantasy, Fear, and Displacement in Twentieth-Century Peruvian State Formation

David Nugent

Circa 1950 the military government of Peru, under the leadership of General Manuel Odría, undertook a project of truly massive proportions. Mobilizing the collective resources of the entire state apparatus—material, bureaucratic, and discursive—the regime mounted a campaign of vicious persecution against APRA, a political party regarded as a deeply subversive threat.¹ In the Chachapoyas region of northern Peru the campaign failed, precipitating a (temporary) crisis of rule. Officials came to believe that they were incapable of carrying out even the most basic of government functions, especially those concerning conscription and taxation. Furthermore, officials came to believe that their efforts to govern the region were being thwarted by APRA, the party they themselves had forced underground by means of the most brutal repression. As officials experienced a crisis of faith about their own ability to rule, they attributed to APRA a subterranean party apparatus with truly miraculous powers. Indeed, the political authorities came to view their administration as a pale imitation of a sophisticated, complex state structure located somewhere deep underground. What made it so difficult to take action against this underground state was that it remained invisible to the naked eye (Nugent 2010).

While the plague of fantasies (Zizek 1997) that swept through the Chachapoyas region during the Odría regime was certainly dramatic, the gov-

ernment's paranoia was anything but out of the ordinary. Rather, it was but a more extreme expression of official fears that had surfaced in previous decades, in the course of government efforts to modernize the region. The fantasies of the Odría era did not represent a break with the past—a momentary blip of paranoid fear in an otherwise dull, repetitive, and secular history of state formation. Despite appearances much to the contrary, these delusions were a direct outgrowth of the seemingly mundane activities of state.

Among my central concerns in the pages that follow are the mechanisms by which states produce “appearances to the contrary.” As will become clear presently, fantasy and fear, anxiety and delusion, informed virtually every aspect of the everyday production of rule. As will become equally clear, however, it is exceptionally difficult to recognize this fact. Indeed, based on the practices and procedures followed by government functionaries, one would never know that such volatile and irrational forces played any role whatsoever in the official activities of state. It is the systematic erasure of affect and imagination from the entire domain of government practice, and the crucial role this process played in state formation, which is my point of departure.

The enormous difficulties involved in seeing past the state's carefully crafted exterior of the rational and the routine—and the elaborate mechanisms of dissimulation and concealment that such difficulties suggest—speak to something important about states. I suggest that scholars have yet to understand the full extent or significance of the modern state's commitment to producing “appearances to the contrary”—to the role of illusion and misrepresentation in creating a legitimating veneer of rule (Abrams 1988). I support this claim by bringing to light what official government practice was so determined to obscure—the role of the remarkable, the delusional, in the routine activities of state. And I suggest that the ability to look beyond the state's production of a domain of the ordinary and the routine is essential to understanding what states are and do.

In pointing to the continuities between the ordinary and the extraordinary in state formation, I also seek to address a second set of questions. My point of departure for doing so is the desire to understand how the paranoia of the Odría regime could emerge out of the seemingly mundane activities that preceded it. Existing state theory, I suggest, is ill-equipped to explain developments such as these. There are most certainly conceptualizations of the state that focus on such issues as fantasy, fear, anxiety, and delusion (Aretxaga 2003; Navaro-Yashin 2007; Taussig 1997; Taylor 1997). There is also a long and distinguished tradition of more utilitarian state theory, which focuses on

mundane, pragmatic problems and dynamics of domination and control (Mann 1986, 1993; Scott 1998, 2009; Tilly 1985, 1992). To my knowledge, however, there is little that would help us understand both utility and paranoia as manifestations of the same underlying state form. Indeed, the two above-mentioned literatures are generally thought to invoke *opposed* notions of the state (Steinmetz 1999a).

The fact that existing conceptual frameworks do not allow us to understand developments such as those outlined in this chapter—in which a single state is seen to wear seemingly contradictory masks of rule—prompts a reconsideration of state theory. To foreshadow the argument to follow: while institutions were clearly involved in state formation in the Chachapoyas region, in no sense was the state an institution that monopolized the use of force (legitimate or otherwise), and that taxed and conscripted, across the regional territory (Tilly 1985). While culture was a key component of state formation, by no means was the state a cultural construction (Geertz 1980; Steinmetz 1999a).² While delusion and fantasy informed state activities in fundamental ways, it would be highly misleading to characterize the state as a magical projection (Coronil 1997; Taussig 1997).

None of these frameworks allow us to understand how the same state may appear under more than one guise. For these approaches focus on what lends consistency, order, and regularity to political domination. This makes it difficult to understand instability and disorder, except as processes that are external to the state—as processes that threaten what it is and does. The present chapter, however, moves beyond the simple opposition between order and disorder to examine how each emerges out of the other. In the process, the argument seeks to reconcile seemingly opposed understandings of state control.

In the pages that follow I explore an approach to the state that helps us understand utility and paranoia as alternative expressions of the same project of rule. I do so by providing a genealogy of rule in which the remarkable (in the form of fear and fantasy) is ever-present, but is also carefully and systematically misconstrued as the routine—as the rational plans and legitimate concerns of a modernizing polity.

I assert that the government's paranoia about APRA reflects deeper contradictions in twentieth-century Peruvian state formation. The crisis of the Odría regime, I show, had its roots in earlier state efforts to effect broad social transformation. Beginning circa 1920, the national government had undertaken a project even more massive than Odría's efforts to eliminate APRA.

Central planners had sought to mobilize the collective resources of the entire state apparatus to effect the forced modernization of the country's vast mountainous interior—which was regarded as backward and feudal.

Central planners sought to use the offices of state to accelerate a temporal process that they believed had been stalled in the highlands due to the lingering influence of the sierra's premodern attitudes and institutions. Employing the personnel of multiple branches of government, and the conscripted labor of hundreds of thousands of subalterns, government planners attempted to build a state infrastructure that would do away with these attitudes and institutions—and incorporate the highlands directly into the more forward-looking coastal region. This process of integration would produce something that progressive elites regarded as sorely lacking—a truly *national* economy, society, and culture and a modern nation-state.³

The efforts of the government to “accelerate history” by means of these grandiose modernization schemes provoked novel forms of conflict and resistance. Here I will analyze the role of these responses in disordering the state. Attending to these dynamics of disorder is essential to reconstructing the genealogy of the state crisis that culminated in the government's paranoid fears about APRA. But of equal importance is understanding the official language that state officials were compelled to employ in (mis-) representing the disorder they themselves had done so much to provoke. Just as was the case with the Odría regime's encounter with APRA circa 1950, in decades prior, government officials were compelled to generate ongoing accounts of their efforts to modernize. As one might anticipate, these explanations were filled with elisions and distortions. But there was a logic to these distortions, a logic whose origins can be traced to Peru's foundations as an independent polity in the 1820s.

As was the case with the majority of the nation-states formed during the “age of democratic revolution” (Palmer 1959–64), a transnational language of legitimacy figured prominently in the founding charter of the republic. In Peru as elsewhere, this new language of state was based on assertions of equality and the common good that systematically masked or distorted extant social relationships—making them unspeakable, unrepresentable.⁴ In other words, state discourse *invented* rather than represented the social world it purported to describe (Ferguson 1990; O'Gorman 1972).

Having imagined the countryside into being—and in ways that rendered it an obstacle to the consolidation of the nation-state—government officials encountered a whole range of difficulties when they attempted to intervene

with their modernization projects. The explanations they generated to account for their problems had much in common with state discourse more generally. Official accounts of the frustrations the government experienced in seeking to modernize the highlands ignored or misconstrued existing social ties, and conjured into being an entire series of phantom problems and imaginary concerns—concerns that could be understood as interfering with the state's nation-building mission. It was these phantoms that became the focus of government efforts at surveillance and control. In other words, the Odría regime's efforts in 1950 to displace onto APRA the responsibility for its own failures emerged out of a history of similar processes of displacement. One of my goals in this chapter is to reconstruct that history—and in the process, to show how the paranoia of the Odría regime evolved directly out of the seemingly mundane activities that preceded it.

As state planners sought to implement their modernization projects beginning in 1920, they were compelled to work within the political domains of regional powerbrokers who mediated state efforts. In the next section I examine this process of mediation in the Chachapoyas region.

Hybrid Sovereignties

Circa 1920 Peru was rent by contradictions.⁵ Although founded in the 1820s on principles of democracy, equality, and the rights of man, the government was not remotely able to make good on these arrangements. In keeping with Peru's origins as a liberal nation-state, such principles were systematically invoked in political ritual and discourse to represent the activities and intentions of the government and its agents. But in many regions everyday life was organized by principles that had little in common with the precepts of "popular" sovereignty.

Chachapoyas, in the mountains of northern Peru, was one such region. Here, society was divided into highly unequal social strata based on race, property, and ancestry. The handful of families that made up the "noble," landed elite claimed descent from aristocratic Spanish forbearers, and the right to rule the region free from the interference of indios and mestizos. Even social interaction with such people was minimized, and was structured so as to require public deference and subservience from the subaltern.

The landed class, however, was far from unified. Rather, different factions of the elite—each with an extensive clientele of mestizos and Indian peasants—

struggled to control the apparatus of state. In the early twentieth century this competition was settled by violent confrontations. The faction that prevailed went on to construct a region-wide political machine. This faction monopolized political posts, and absorbed incoming revenues from the government. It also engaged in state-sanctioned extortion of wealth from indigenous cultivators. The ruling faction also used the state apparatus to violate the constitutional protections of opposing factions. These public displays of domination were essential to the reproduction of aristocratic rule. This juxtaposition of publicly performed aristocratic practices and officially articulated popular principles defined the peculiarly hybrid conditions of sovereignty that prevailed at the time (Nugent 2001).

After 1930, however, it became increasingly difficult for a single coalition to monopolize political position for the entire region. Instead, competing elite families found themselves occupying influential posts in government at the same time. Rather than bringing intra-elite competition to an end, however, this change simply shifted the terrain on which elite families did battle. From this point onward it was the *inner workings* of government that became the ground on which elite families waged war. Elite families did not employ armed bands of followers and open street battles, as they had. Instead, they were compelled to conceal their struggles for regional advantage behind a mask of concern for the common good.

Families did so by employing the same language of liberal rights that the government used to characterize its activities writ large. But elite families used the language of state toward a different end than did the central government. Drawing on its positions in the government bureaucracy, each family sought to discredit members of adversarial families, who occupied other government posts. They would do so by accusing their adversaries of abusing their positions of public trust—by accusing them of malfeasance, misconduct, misappropriation of funds, and so on. In this way each family sought to remove its enemies from as many government offices as possible, to fill these posts themselves.

In the process, a new dynamic took shape among the various offices of government; functionaries who once would have cooperated with one another to carry out official extortion found themselves in direct competition. As these groups made war on one another, the effect was to disorder the operation of the state.

It was in the context of this intra-bureaucratic competition between different factions of the elite that the central government sought to implement

its modernization projects. The most important of these were: (1) an extensive network of roads, bridges, and airfields to facilitate movement through the national space; (2) an equally extensive network of schools, where an army of teachers would steep highland children in national cultural values; (3) new water, sewage, and sanitation facilities, improved marketplaces, and small hydroelectric plants—to introduce the highlands to improved living conditions; (4) new bureaucratic infrastructures to enumerate the population; and finally (5) uniform procedures for recruiting the rural population into that most nationalizing of institutions—the military.

The government's attempt to modernize the Chachapoyas region in the decades after 1920 was truly a mammoth undertaking. Despite their diversity, however, the majority of the government's modernization initiatives had something in common. Most relied on the conscripted labor of the rural peasantry. As the scale of modernization suggests, implicit in central plans was the assumption that there was a vast field of untapped peasant labor on hand, waiting to be mobilized for the good of the nation.

The degree to which this assumption was based on fantasy rather than fact is revealed by the following; not only did state officials never even enquire about how many people might be available to support their modernization schemes, they studiously ignored the information that existed about this topic.⁶ The "population" that government officials assumed was there waiting to be put to work was not a thing of fact, but of fiction. It was conjured into being, bit by bit, from the imaginations of individual bureaucratic planners. These individuals expressed their fantasies in that most neutral of media, numbers: "so many laborers for task A, so many additional laborers for task B," and so on. The problem was, however, that this labor supply did not exist.

Having imagined into being a vast field of peasant labor, each government office insisted that the fictive labor force they required was there—despite overwhelming evidence that their own plans and projections were flawed. Indeed, finding themselves perpetually unable to locate the (nonexistent) labor force, government planners turned to the regulatory and coercive branches of government for assistance. When they were also unable to procure this (fictive) labor supply, a crisis ensued.

I next show how this fantasy of rural labor abundance combined with the hybrid nature of sovereignty to disorder the state. I also analyze the ways state functionaries represented this disorder. The obligation to employ the categories of liberal rule to characterize profoundly illiberal activities, I suggest, led

government functionaries to produce official narratives that masked key problems. The obligation to misrepresent both the problems and the solutions to those problems, I argue, focused government efforts at surveillance on concerns that were as misdirected and illusory as was the state's fictive supply of labor.

Disorder, Displacement, and Imaginary Fields of Labor

Beginning in 1920, the offices of the central government implemented a series of projects that were intended to modernize the highlands. These initiatives introduced new forms of conflict and disorder into the regional political structure. Three processes were most important in this regard. First, the offices of the government that were involved in the modernization process imagined into being a nonexistent labor force. Second, the regulatory and coercive branches of government became obsessed with their inability to locate or manage that fictive labor force. Third, the inability of state offices to locate the necessary labor led officials to produce explanations to account for their failures. It is in the explanations they generated that one can see the role of fantasy in helping to create the routine activities of state.

The plans of the Peruvian military illustrate how fantasy informed the most mundane of everyday government activities. Nowhere were state fantasies about rural labor abundance more in evidence than within the armed forces. Nowhere was this more clearly reflected than in the military's use of numbers.

The military was clear about the number of men who would be required to join the armed forces. The army sought to conscript 2,125 men from each of the region's four provinces.⁷ Comparing the number of individuals the army assumed to be available with the number actually available is startling, for there were fewer than 2,125 in all but one of these provinces.⁸ In other words, the military made its calculations in complete disregard for the society in which it sought to intervene.

These seemingly cold, indifferent calculations were informed by what might be thought of as the "heat of military passion"—passion born of deep anxieties about what the armed forces regarded as the truly shameful state of the country's affairs. The armed forces had regarded themselves as the only truly national force in a society that was profoundly corrupt and deeply divided by partisan interest. The military saw itself as the country's salvation

because it alone could rise above petty, civilian political struggles to defend the common good.⁹ The armed forces could take on their unique nationalizing role, however, only if they were able to shape a large number of raw recruits into disciplined soldiers who would understand their obligation to serve the nation. Recruitment was the first crucial stage in this process.

The military thus made its calculations about conscription based on a fervent belief in its own unique ability to save the nation—and to do so by making present what was at the time so painfully absent—an impartial, apolitical state apparatus. The army had not the slightest interest in the actual society from which it sought to conscript the nationalized soldiers of the future. As a result, its calculations were completely out of touch with what the regional population could endure. Indeed, were they to have been implemented, these plans would have stripped the countryside of virtually its entire adult male population! Despite the impossibility of conscripting the entire agrarian workforce, from this point on the army's chief conscription officer put relentless pressure on the regulatory and coercive branches of government to do just that. As a result, the military was faced with a perpetual and unavoidable deficit of future soldiers.

It is difficult to imagine a clearer indication of the role of fantasy in informing the categories and activities of rule. But the armed forces were only one of many branches of government that looked to the countryside for the labor necessary to redeem the nation. Each additional office that did so further inflated the imaginary labor supply and deepened the real labor deficit.

A case in point is the Office of Roads, which was responsible for the construction of the Chachapoyas Highway. This highway was part of the extensive network of roads, bridges, and airfields that figured so prominently in government plans to accelerate the process of modernization in the highlands. State fantasies concerning vast fields of labor were clearly reflected in the plans of the Office of Roads. Once again it is the numbers that tell the story.

The Chachapoyas Highway was a mammoth project. It continued for over three decades, and often called for 1,000 men to be at work at a time. It is revealing to compare the number of laborers required with the number of men available. In 1940, there were a total of 1,113 households in the rural districts where the Office of Roads sought its 1,000 conscripts (MHC 1942: 5–6). This meant that each household was expected to surrender one man for twenty days, every three months.

The departmental engineer in charge of the project found he was perpetually short of “braceros.” It is not difficult to understand why. He was demand-

ing that all households sacrifice their most active members for two-thirds of a month every three months. This was asking them to do without their entire male workforce, on a repeated basis, over extended periods of time. A labor tax of this magnitude was enormously debilitating—a fact that contributed to endless labor shortages. Delusional though these demands were, however, they were only part of the problem. In addition to having to satisfy the demands of the Office of Roads, these households were also subject to the conscription demands of the army. As we have seen, the plans of the army *also* threatened to deprive rural society of its entire male workforce.

In their zeal to carry out modernization schemes that were intended to make present an absent nation-state, these officials demanded a labor force twice the size of the actual population. When one considers that these were only two of many modernization schemes, the role that fantasy played in constituting the categories (conscripts) and activities (conscription) of rule comes out with great clarity. Rather than serving as a neutral description of the scale of labor needs, conscription demands provide a rough measure of the magnitude of state delusions.

But the forces acting to create an artificial scarcity of labor were not limited to the projects of central planners. Local government was equally implicated, for local government had long relied on very large quantities of peasant labor to carry out a variety of important tasks.¹⁰ These included the maintenance of the physical infrastructure as well as the government bureaucracy. The demands of local government thus further inflated official labor needs, swelled the ranks of the imaginary workforce, and increased the labor deficit.

The total of all demands for labor was far in excess of what was actually available. When one considers the forces that generated these demands, however, the fact that they were so highly inflated is hardly surprising. Labor quotas had little to do with the actual population. Government offices were focused not on the present but on the future, not on what was present but what was absent. They reflected a most ardent desire to hasten the arrival of what was regarded as sorely missing—a truly modern, complete nation-state.

Although government planners translated their labor needs into the seemingly neutral medium of numbers, the workers they required were nonetheless invented in state offices. As a result, attempts to find them were doomed to fail. We next explore how these conditions disordered the state. We focus on the activities of rural government functionaries—the individuals who found themselves having to procure what did not exist, so as to implement projects that could not be implemented.

It was the prefect who conveyed to his subordinates demands from all government offices that needed workers. But it was rural functionaries who had to produce the laborers. In other words, functionaries had to convert a limited number of real cultivators into the ever-expanding quantity imagined into being by government planners—local and national alike. As a result, there were a great many eyes on rural functionaries. Indeed, they found themselves having to comply with conflicting demands from multiple government offices, each demanding their share of a labor supply that did not exist. As a result, governors, mayors, and justices were faced with a constant and ongoing deficit of (imaginary!) labor.

In light of the impossibility of ever meeting these demands, district functionaries found themselves having to offer explanations for their inability to carry out orders. Most of their explanations were some combination of elision, fabrication, and outright lie—because there were certain truths about government activities that could not be uttered in political discourse. These revolved around the coercive nature of the state's entire modernization effort, and the constraints on acknowledging coercion that were built into the era's transnational language of political legitimacy.

Peru had gained its independence in the 1820s. What was true of the other republics that emerged during the age of democratic revolution was also true of Peru. At the very core of the country's self-definition were the liberal rights and protections. The "rights of man" were embraced on both sides of the Atlantic as providing the only legitimate basis of national community. These rights were intended to protect individuals from the arbitrary use of state power (Nugent 2008). The rights on which Peru had been founded as a polity were thus intended to protect citizens from the very kinds of programs the government was seeking to implement.

To acknowledge that the entire modernization scheme was in violation of these principles—that it had to be imposed at the point of a gun—would be to acknowledge a contradiction at the very center of national life. It would be to declare Peru an outcast from the community of progressive, modern nation-states that had committed themselves to a form of political life in which the *people* were sovereign. As a result, there was a conspicuous silence about the systematic use of force to effect modernization.

The attempt to implement programs that could not be implemented, and the inability to acknowledge that the programs were bound to fail, played a major role in disordering the state. In addition to making it impossible to procure the labor required for modernization, these conditions also rendered

functionaries unable to explain why. They were forced to remain silent about the true causes of their difficulties, and to invoke problems that were largely fanciful in nature. Because they could only draw the attention of their superiors to these concerns, the state was forever chasing phantoms. Government functionaries invoked three such (phantom) problems: (1) corrupt state functionaries, who abused their positions for private gain; (2) the Indian peasantry, which was incapable of understanding important national causes; and (3) APRA, whose fanatics encouraged the peasantry to ignore their obligations as citizens.

These assertions did important cultural work, for they played a crucial role in constructing the state as bounded, autonomous, and legitimate. Attributing the problems of the modernization effort to phantom forces obscured the preponderant role of state activities in creating the very problems with which government functionaries had to contend. It also displaced responsibility for these problems onto external sources, which were said to threaten the completion of important state tasks.

In other words, what was represented as remarkable were the efforts of dangerous, irrational, unethical others to interfere with state projects and plans. What was implicitly represented as unremarkable were the projects and plans themselves. That this construction inverted what was remarkable and what was routine is perhaps obvious. What may be less so is that it also constructed the very idea of the routine operation of the state. It positioned the state as the entity best suited to monitor the activities of these dangerous others, to protect itself from those who threatened to undermine its normal, everyday operation. Thus did official discourse help construct the image of an autonomous and legitimate state beleaguered by its enemies.

Phantoms of State I: Government Corruption

One of the (phantom) problems that state functionaries invoked to explain their inability to procure the labor needed to modernize the Chachapoyas region was government corruption.¹¹ Unscrupulous public employees were said to be diverting labor away from its intended, legitimate public purposes, toward illicit, private ends. Furthermore, they were said to be using *coercion* to force peasant cultivators to work against their will, which was a blatant violation of the peasants' constitutional rights.

Claims such as these asserted that within the very body of the state were

individuals who were not truly of the state—who had a powerful corrupting influence on its normal, everyday operation. A large number of functionaries made such claims. Indeed, dealing with these claims became integral to the routine operation of government. In endless official correspondence, public servants sought to distance themselves from the suspicion of corruption. They did so by making the arbitrary distinction between the legitimate conscription of labor (which served public causes) and the illegitimate coercion of labor (to serve private causes). Although arbitrary, this distinction was crucial to the reproduction of the state. For it helped construct the state as a clearly bounded, legitimate entity.

As functionaries found themselves under increasing pressure to deliver large numbers of nonexistent conscripts, claims that other functionaries were interfering with their legitimate efforts to do so began to pour into government offices. As the projects of both central and local government languished, high-ranking officials felt compelled to respond to the problem (sic!) of corruption-based labor scarcity with serious countermeasures.

In light of the troubling state of affairs with which they were confronted, government officials looked to employ novel forms of legislation, surveillance, and punishment to safeguard the normal operation of the state by cleansing the state of those who threatened to corrupt it. Officials passed a series of decrees that criminalized interference with labor recruitment. These decrees threatened anyone in the bureaucracy who disrupted labor conscription with dismissal, fines, and even jail sentences. The decrees also established new procedures for policing corrupt behavior on the part of government workers. The decrees generalized the policing process by encouraging all public servants to report any and all cases of malfeasance that they observed. State representatives were thus instructed to turn their gaze inward, to impose surveillance on one another and on the state apparatus of which they were a part.

These new decrees had introduced significant disorder into the workings of the state apparatus, for the government had created a framework within which members of opposing coalitions were given license to denounce one another. But this effort to protect the integrity of the state by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms of labor recruitment (coercive and non), and between honorable and untrustworthy government functionaries was doomed to fail—for the distinctions in question were wholly imaginary. All of the government's projects were based on naked force, and so the entire distinction between coercion and conscription was delusional. This meant that it was not just corrupt public servants who were systematically violating

the rights of the subaltern but rather *all* state functionaries. And if all state functionaries were systematically violating the constitution, this called into question the very existence of a legitimate state apparatus. The difference between conscription and coercion, though arbitrary, was thus anything but trivial. It was on this very distinction—repeated endlessly in official discourse—that the existence of the “state” depended.

The distinction between honorable and corrupt public servants, however, was equally arbitrary. Everyone in the bureaucracy was continually interfering with the legal efforts of other functionaries to conscript labor, even as they went about legal efforts of their own. Because officials had imagined into being a vast field of peasant labor, there was far less labor available than the government believed. Each time any functionary complied with the labor demands of one government office he was necessarily compelled to neglect the equally legal demands of other offices.

High-ranking government officials thus responded to the disorder they themselves had provoked by displacing responsibility for that disorder onto a wholly imaginary construct—“corrupt functionaries”—whose behavior government officials then sought to police. In the process, government officials made distinctions that were imaginary but nonetheless crucial to the reproduction of the state. The reason there was a continual labor shortage, however, had nothing to do with the criminal inclinations of individual public servants. Efforts to distinguish selfless from selfish government functionaries marked the boundaries of an imagined legitimate state, and initiated a procedure for purging that state of what ailed it. But this distinction was entirely fanciful. The shortage of labor stemmed from the actions of *all* state offices and all government workers. They had collectively imagined into being a fictive labor force, and had become distraught over their inability to find it.

While the need to police the behavior of public servants appeared to reference a real problem, it actually created a false one. It converted the problem of labor scarcity—which was a function of state fantasy—into an issue of individual morality. It also masked the circumstances that made it inevitable that all functionaries would be compelled to “betray the public trust” on an ongoing basis. It was not only unscrupulous functionaries, however, to whom government officials attributed their inability to mobilize labor for modernization. The forces of order invoked two additional (phantom) problems that were said to be undermining their efforts to modernize the region. The problems in question were APRA and the Indian peasantry.

Phantoms of State II: APRA and the Indian Peasantry

In the middle decades of the twentieth century government planners sought to implement a range of projects that were intended to modernize the Peruvian highlands, which were regarded as backward and feudal. As planners sought to carry out these projects they conjured into being a labor force of fictive proportions, which the regulatory and coercive branches of government found themselves unable to procure. In addition to corruption, government officials came to believe that other forces were undermining the normal operation of the state. Unlike corruption, however, these forces were located beyond rather than within the boundaries of the state. The most important of these forces was APRA. Government officials became obsessed with the need to know, control, and do away with APRA. In order to place in context the official government's response to the party, some background is in order about the conditions out of which APRA emerged.

The disorder that characterized the middle decades of the twentieth century was not limited to that provoked by the massive program of forced labor initiated by the central government. Even more disruptive were the sweeping changes in the national social structure that accompanied the expansion of Peru's export economy beginning circa 1900. Export zones providing primary goods for the world market grew rapidly during this period, but the working classes in these zones grew more rapidly still.¹² The era was witness to a veritable explosion of laboring groups, many of whom formed themselves into parties, and became a powerful political presence. In so doing, they mounted a serious challenge to the position of the export elite (Parker 1998; Stein 1980).

Contributing further to the disorder of the era was the influx of foreign capital. Once Peru repaid its outstanding debt to British creditors in the late nineteenth century, North Atlantic capital began to pour into the country. In the process, existing patterns of production and exchange were extensively disrupted, while new possibilities for accumulation emerged. As this occurred, social groups from across the spectrum struggled with one another to control what they could of the old patterns, and to seize what they could of the new possibilities. It was a chaotic, insecure, and violent period (Nugent 1997).

It was in this context of widespread dislocation, insecurity and emiseration that APRA was formed (Klaren 1973). The Party of the People was established in Peru in 1930, in the depths of the Depression. APRA called for a form of Latin American socialism based on the nationalization of land and

industry, the formation of worker cooperatives in all branches of the economy, and the expansion of entitlements and protections for excluded social categories (especially indigenous people and women). The party also spoke out against various forms of inequality, labor exploitation, and government-sponsored extortion.

Virtually overnight, it seemed, APRA succeeded in attracting a very large following, especially among working and middle class groups.¹³ Among the most notable aspects of the party was that it formed a hierarchical organization made up of cells and committees that spanned the country. APRA's innovations in the field of organization helped create the impression that the party and its followers were everywhere.

During its early years (1930–1934) APRA was involved in a series of uprisings and coup attempts in which it allied with disaffected elements in the police and the armed forces. This led to extensive government repression, which crippled the party, and also forced it “into the catacombs” (to use an Aprista phrase). As a result, during the years that followed (1934–1945), APRA was forced to remain virtually invisible to the forces of order. Even so, the authorities in Chachapoyas would occasionally stumble on evidence suggesting that the party's invisibility was not to be confused with inactivity or impotence. To the contrary; officials ultimately came to believe that APRA had formed a vast underground party apparatus, which party members were using to undermine state efforts to govern the region.¹⁴

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1936, Sr. Miguel Collantes Rojas, an officer in the Guardia Civil, was witness to very odd behavior. At 5 a.m., when the town was quiet and the streets deserted, he saw an underage boy surreptitiously approach the home of Sr. Nicolás Muñoz—a carpenter—and knock quietly on the door. Muñoz quickly opened the door and admitted the youth. Within seconds another man—who had been hiding in a concealed spot nearby—rushed across the street to enter Muñoz's home.

The Guardia's suspicions having been aroused, he crossed the street from where he had concealed himself and appeared in the doorway. He found Muñoz reprimanding the boy, and holding a file of papers, which contained the “Manifesto of the Amazonas Action Committee, Aprista Party of Peru.” In other words, Muñoz was in possession of propaganda of the outlawed Party of the People.

The two men and the boy (who was fourteen) were detained. In the investigation that followed, the police took statements from the three, all of whom denied having ever had any contact with APRA. The testimonies of the two

men bordered on the absurd, but they did implicate other people, who the police also detained and cross-examined. These individuals came from all walks of life. They included teachers, cantina owners, public employees, merchants, itinerant peddlers, rural government functionaries, and artisans—as well as the parents of the young boy who had been detained.

At the end of the investigation the authorities had collected enough information to piece together an alarming, if partial view of APRA's activities—one that suggested to them the outlines of a vast network of underground subversion. The Apristas, it appeared, had managed to organize a region-wide network of followers that worked together, in secret, to thwart the plans of the government. In the early morning hours of July 4, the police had managed to stumble on one of the few visible signs that such a network existed.

Based on their investigation, the authorities concluded that the Apristas were extensively involved in clandestine communication with one another. To allay the suspicions of government officials, one strategy the party employed was to use underage youth, like the one who had been detained. Boys such as he could wander about the streets in an innocent manner, without drawing the attention of the police.

The Apristas were availing themselves of other methods to maintain an underground system of communication. The individuals who had been detained had used a local cantina for the same purpose. Cantinas were virtually the only place where men could gather on a regular basis without raising suspicion. The testimony of the detainees revealed that they had originally used this cantina to pass the Aprista manifesto between them—and that other men had been involved as well. These individuals were also detained.

Perhaps the most alarming evidence the police collected, however, was a notebook that belonged to Nicolás Muñoz. The authorities were especially concerned about the notebook because it was written in code. Two sets of coded entries were of special interest. The first was a long list of names—or rather pseudonyms. Opposite each was an amount of money. The police interpreted this to be a list of party members, and a record of the money each had tithed to the party.

The list was quite long, and on this basis alone was of major concern. But even more alarming was the fact that the list revealed only the codenames rather than names. As a result, the authorities could only imagine who belonged to the party. Having become convinced that they were surrounded by a large number of subversives, but being unable to determine who they were, the authorities became deeply suspicious of everyone around them.

The list was alarming for a second reason. It suggested that everyone on it was sufficiently fanatical about APRA that they were willing to make major sacrifices to support their party. This was no minor matter, for the vast majority of the townspeople were of humble origins, and had very little to give. The (apparent) fact that people who struggled to make ends meet were involved in a form of voluntary taxation was of real concern to government officials. For they had great difficulty taxing the population even at the point of a gun.

The list was also alarming for a third reason because it was written in code, which the police could not understand. This suggested that the Apristas had developed a secret language all their own that only they could understand. The fact that the party had established a sphere of communication that was beyond the forces of order made the authorities intensely curious (and anxious) about what the Apristas were so determined to conceal.

The notebook contained a second list, which classified rural villages according to their degree of support for APRA. The list thus hinted at a hidden geography of subversion—of which the authorities had previously been unaware. Because the list was written in code, however, it increased rather than decreased the anxieties of the authorities. In particular, government officials were forced to speculate about which villages were sympathetic to the party and which were not, and how APRA used this information.

The aforementioned messages from district functionaries in which they explained their inability to procure labor for modernization projects suggested one way that the Apristas were using their intelligence. It was very common for these functionaries to claim that APRA was systematically interfering with their efforts. Functionaries also linked APRA with a second phantom cause—the essential nature of the Indian peasantry. It was not at all unusual for government officials to comment on indigenous people's poor work ethic, their addiction to vices, their childlike simplicity and naivety, and their inability to understand their obligation to contribute to important national causes. These debilities, it was said, made the Indian population especially vulnerable to manipulation by unscrupulous individuals:

Sr. Interim Prefect of the Department.

I have before me your ofico #1__ of May 1th of this year in which you advise me that the Sr. Engineer . . . informs you that the braceros from this district who are called upon to work on the Chachapoyas . . . highway have yet to appear . . . I have tried, Sr. Prefect, to comply with [this] order . . . but find that the leaders of the Aprista political party

in this District interfere with my efforts. They have called the population together to declare that they should not be forced to work against their will. The innocent and simple Indians [of La Jalca] now defy my authority . . . I request that you send the . . . police to this district as soon as possible to help re-establish public order.¹⁵

In light of messages like these, government officials came to regard APRA as a dangerous evil. They also came to fear that their chance discovery of Aprista activity in the early morning hours of July 4, 1936, was but the surface manifestation of a problem that was far deeper and broader than appearances would indicate. Having discovered that some Apristas had used the labor of their underage children to deliver secret messages in the dead of night, it was difficult to avoid wondering how many other Apristas might be doing the same. Having discovered that some party members had used the cover of their neighborhood cantina to spread seditious literature, and to plan illegal activities, it was difficult for the authorities to avoid speculating how many other cantinas were being used in the same way. Having traced the party's influence (by means of the testimony the police collected) into local schools, reading clubs, musical groups, sports teams, the government bureaucracy, and so forth, it was difficult for the authorities not to be concerned about how much farther still APRA's networks extended. Having concluded (again, in the testimony collected by the police) that some Apristas were traveling to the countryside on a regular basis to organize among the peasantry, it was difficult not to suspect that there were not many more party members doing the same—especially in light of communiqués like the one quoted above.

In the aftermath of the police investigation prompted by the detention of Nicolás Muñoz, the authorities came to fear that there was a great deal going on that they could not see. In an attempt to shed light on the situation, and to control the activities of the Apristas, the prefect sought to deepen and broaden the reach of the state. He called for an entire range of new security measures to be established, in town and country alike. In a series of messages to school principals, cantina owners, the heads of government offices, district-level functionaries, the chief of police, and so on, the prefect called on everyone to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior of any kind, and to instruct their subordinates to do the same. He emphasized the importance of collaborating in a region-wide effort to control APRA, which he characterized as a grave threat to the region.

It cannot have escaped the prefect's attention, however, that the people to

whom he wrote in an effort to mobilize a broad, anti-APRA coalition were the very kinds of individuals who had been implicated in the police investigation of Nicolás Muñoz. Indeed, without the tacit support of school teachers, cantina owners, rural government functionaries, members of the police force, and so on, the Party of the People could never have operated in the many domains in which it appeared to be active. Perhaps this is why the prefect told everyone to whom he wrote to solicit support in combatting the Apristas that he would hold them accountable should he discover that they had failed to cooperate to the fullest. The investigation thus appears to have raised serious questions about the loyalty of diverse social groups, and to have put the government on notice that it had much to fear from the Party of the People.

In sum, government officials responded to the disorder of the era as a whole by displacing responsibility for it onto the shoulders of APRA. The reason that the governments of midcentury found it so difficult to procure labor for their modernization projects, and to govern more generally, however, had little to do with the party per se. Although the Apristas helped channel and organize the widespread discontent with the existing state of affairs, the origins of people's dissatisfaction lay in the very processes these governments sought to promote—the deepening influence within Peru of North Atlantic capitalism. Nonetheless, the authorities invested enormously in attempts to monitor and control APRA—to which the government attributed truly extraordinary powers of subversion—even as they continued to support policies that disadvantaged the majority of the population.

Coda

State officials in the Chachapoyas region were not seized by full-blown paranoia about APRA until the beginning of 1949. From virtually the moment the modernization process began, however, they had identified phantom forces that were said to threaten nation-building projects and plans. As long as the authorities were able to keep their internal and external foes distinct, the boundary between state and subversive was not called into question, and the autonomy of the state remained intact. By early 1949, however, this was no longer the case. By this time government officials had come to believe that large numbers of APRA "terrorists" (to use the government's term) had crossed over that boundary, and had lodged themselves deep within the state apparatus—colonizing it for the party. Because the Apristas continued to go

about their daily affairs disguised as ordinary citizens, however, it was impossible to distinguish them from people who truly were loyal and law-abiding. But the authorities were certain that the Apristas were simply biding their time, waiting for the moment to strike.

Because the state had been so deeply compromised by APRA, the authorities believed, they had to take drastic action. They decided to relinquish to APRA control of the outer domain of the government bureaucracy (i.e., low-level state posts and activities), and to reinscribe a new state topography further inward. An inner circle of state officials who were regarded as completely trustworthy took to communicating with one another about sensitive (i.e., APRA-related) matters in coded messages. When even this precaution failed to preserve the autonomy of the state—failed to prevent the Apristas from learning about the government's projects and plans—the fears and confusions that had remained just below the surface could no longer be contained. The phantoms that government functionaries had conjured into being in previous decades turned against their makers, who became truly desperate about the situation they confronted. Using code, the prefect wrote to Lima begging for reinforcements. No one could be trusted, he explained. Everyone was an Aprista (Nugent 2010).¹⁶

Conclusion

In closing, I would like to discuss some of the theoretical implications of the materials presented here. The discussion will focus on the question of coherence, for regardless of their theoretical orientation, most scholars regard the state as something that either does or should cohere—whether institutionally, culturally, or magically. Among the most interesting aspects of the material reviewed in the pages above, however, is that what would conventionally be called the state not only lacked coherence, but that it did so in the very terms that academics assert that states do cohere.

In no sense did the state-as-institution in Chachapoyas cohere. As we have seen, one of the legacies of the historical past was that powerful elite families and their clienteles found themselves doing battle over the inner workings of the state apparatus. Once ensconced within the government bureaucracy, rather than cooperate, or work together toward any collective goal, these elite factions did everything in their power to discredit, undermine, and obstruct the state activities of their adversaries. The efforts of opposing coalitions to

control the central government's modernization projects only served to exacerbate the struggles between elite factions. Furthermore, as government functionaries found it necessary to distance themselves from the suspicion of corruption, they did so by casting aspersions on the integrity of other functionaries. As a result, something of a war of all against all unfolded within the apparatus of government. In other words, rather than cohere, the state-as-institution was at war with itself. There were an entire series of forces at work that acted to disorder its operation.

If it was the case that the state lacked coherence in institutional terms, it is equally clear that it did not cohere in cultural terms. As we have seen, the language of state proposed the universalist, egalitarian principles that had emerged out of the Enlightenment as the only legitimate basis of national community. The everyday practice of rule, on the other hand, had long been based on the legitimacy of pre-Enlightenment principles stressing hierarchy, privilege, and social exclusion. As a result, two opposed and irreconcilable notions of legitimate rule were forced into uncomfortable juxtaposition with one another in the region. The fact that government functionaries were compelled to use the language of liberal rights to represent profoundly illiberal activities was one of the few regularities in everyday administration. As we have seen, however, this more-or-less uniform representational practice contributed to the disorder and incoherence of state activities.

It would be equally difficult to argue that it was the magic of the state that allowed it to cohere. In no sense did state processes succeed in disguising cultural constructions behind a mantle of objectivity, neutrality, or rationality. Nor did these processes succeed in naturalizing what were in reality arbitrary and interested cultural constructions—making them seem ordinary, or taken-for-granted. While state representatives certainly asserted that the categories and activities of rule were real, natural, and right, there is no indication that virtually anyone believed them—or even that they themselves believed these claims. Indeed, the entire question of belief is largely irrelevant in the case at hand. For government officials were compelled to represent the activities and intentions of the state in the terms of popular sovereignty *regardless* of their own views on this matter.

In sum, the analysis presented above suggests that the Peruvian state lacked coherence as a coercive institution, a cultural construction, and a magical projection. Nonetheless, there was a kind of coherence to the state. In closing, I would like to analyze the nature of that coherence, and explore what it might mean for contemporary debates about the state.

The coherence of the Peruvian state during the period in question was based on what I have called "displacement." This term refers to the process by which public officials attributed the disorder produced by modernization to phantom forces other than modernization. In so doing, they systematically misconstrued the nature of the activities in which they were involved (conscription), the problems they sought to address (corruption; APRA), as well as the solutions that they proposed to deal with these problems (surveillance and punishment). Government functionaries did not adopt the practice of displacement as the result of collective discussion or debate. Nor did they decide as a group the terms they would employ in the process of displacement. Nonetheless, displacement was an activity in which virtually all government personnel participated. Furthermore, virtually all used the same terms to misrepresent the problems they were compelled to address. Indeed, displacement was integral to virtually all the explanations that district functionaries offered to their superiors. As a result, high-ranking state officials were forever seeking to correct problems with their failed modernization schemes by addressing issues that had little to do with the actual source of their problems. For the latter could not be named as such.

In the case at hand, the state gained coherence as a result of government officials identifying a series of displaced problems or issues on which to focus official energies. This coherence was more than discursive. But it was not based on a monopoly on the use of force, or the ability to compel large numbers of people against their will. Quite to the contrary. It was a direct response to the government's belief in its inability to force or compel on a broad scale. Nor did displacement generate order, discipline, or rule-governed behavior within the bureaucracy. Rather, in a context of profound institutional disorder and competing notions of legitimacy, displacement produced a highly unstable form of coherence. This coherence was based on the creation of a series of nonexistent entities, to which the government attributed magical powers: vast fields of peasant labor, unscrupulous government functionaries, childlike Indians, and subversive Apristas. Coherence was also based on the fabrication of seemingly neutral categories and activities of governance, such as population, conscription, and enumeration—which were just as fantastic as were phantoms like corruption and APRA—despite (or rather because of) appearances to the contrary. Coherence was based, as well, on the inevitably unsuccessful attempts of government officials to manage and control the powerful imagined entities that were regarded as threatening to the ordinary [sic!] activities of government. In other words, the coherence of the state was most

certainly magical, but it did not result from success in normalizing state-sponsored activities or constructions. Rather, it stemmed from the government's failure to institutionalize these activities and creations. It was a symptom of fear and anxiety rather than a reflection of order and control.

Almost twenty years ago, the late William Roseberry (1994) made a signal contribution to the anthropology of politics with his now famous article, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention." In that article, Roseberry argued that hegemony is not about consensus but rather disagreement—that hegemonic processes "construct a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination." I will close by shifting Roseberry's focus from hegemony to state formation to suggest the following. What state formation does is establish a shared discursive (rather than meaningful) framework for systematically misrepresenting disorder as order, and then policing the divide between the two. Modern states are everywhere based on the assertion of a common good that necessarily masks or misrepresents key social relationships—especially those based on inequality. Because the state depicts itself as the guardian of a mythical general interest that is contradicted by the very social relations it is compelled to reproduce, there are always truths about the social order that must be concealed, that cannot be acknowledged in discourse. As a result, state processes inevitably conjure into being powerful phantoms that are said to provoke the disorder that state activities themselves generate (or encourage), and, in the process, threaten the common good. It is these imagined entities—brought into being through the process of displacement—that become the focus of official efforts at surveillance and control, and on which the coherence of the state depends.

PART IV

**CROSS-BORDER
PROCESSES OF STATECRAFT**

Chapter 10

Notes on the Formation of the Andean Colonial State

Karen Spalding

In 1977, Philip Abrams told the British Sociological Association that the state, the subject of impassioned defenses by politicians claiming that it was in danger of capture or destruction by usually vaguely defined enemies, was a “veil of illusion,” a mask that prevents us from seeing and understanding the political practices that preserve the power of a dominant minority (Abrams 1988). He pointed to the perhaps surprising agreement among analysts of all political persuasions that the state should be understood as a locus of power that somehow stood above and outside of the day-to-day maneuvers of parties and politicians, bureaucracies and regulations that made up the machinery of government, with a will and an identity apart from the machinations of special interests. Rather than concern ourselves with defining and studying an illusion, Abrams insisted that we must examine the state historically, as a collection of agencies and practices that function to maintain the power of a minority while at the same time constructing and deploying an ideology that purports to justify and legitimate the existing political system.

Abrams's challenge has been taken up by some—surprisingly few—of the students of politics and political ideologies who have examined the political origins of the modern state and, in particular, of the construction of the idea of the state: the collection of rules and traditions that make it possible for a powerful minority to exercise power with a minimum of open coercion by claiming that its members are acting in the defense and interest of society as

a whole (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Anderson 1974; Mitchell 1991). Such a collection of rules and regulations is generally referred to as “justice,” and a common definition of the state is that it is the agency that defends and preserves justice.

In the pages that follow, I propose to examine the origins of the colonial state in the Andes and, in particular, the ideology that justified its existence. Discussions of political systems in the Andes—or in the Americas as a whole—following the entry of Europeans into the region may mention the existence of an Andean state before the Spaniards lay claim to the area, but neither the Inca ruler nor the native elite whose members participated in the maintenance of an Andean political system are assumed to have played much of a part in the political institutions that were imported from Castile and imposed on local Andean societies. There is general agreement that the “conquest,” as events following 1532 have been baptized, was imposed on the Andean population and replaced native rule with European, and with a “colonial” system in which European ideas of justice and sovereignty swept away native tradition and practice. I argue that the process was neither so neat nor so thorough, and that throughout the sixteenth century, both Andeans and Europeans struggled with one another to define the nature of their relationship.

Cultures of Conquest

The conquest period in the Andes lasted for more than a half-century, and the power struggles that characterized the period were fought not only over the control of wealth, but over law and justice, and, in particular, the relationship between Spaniards and Indians in the Andes. Over the course of that half-century, members of both European and native societies in the Andes struggled to develop a corpus of benefits and obligations that would permit the elites of both societies to assert—or to retain—their dominance over the majority of the population and ensure their continued appropriation of the surplus generated by that majority. While the struggle to find common ground was eventually abandoned, the outcome was not predetermined, but was the product of competing political strategies and objectives. The Europeans and Andeans who took part in the construction of the institutions that made up the colonial state system came from very different traditions, although the members of each group brought to the table their identities as aristocracies intent on maintaining—and expanding—their privileged positions.

Both the Andean and the Iberian traditions were essentially hierarchical, built on an expanding warrior elite with a ruler—however defined—at the top. The Iberian Peninsula was the scene of the “reconquest,” during which the Christians and Muslims who shared the peninsula raided and fought one another along a shifting frontier that the Christians gradually pushed south, until by the thirteenth century the peninsula was divided into five Christian kingdoms (Portugal, Castile, León, Navarre, Aragon) and one Moslem principality (Granada). The Church was an active participant in the reconquest, declaring the peninsula a crusade and the men who took part in the expansion holy warriors in the service of Christianity.

The European Tradition

The revival of Roman law in the eleventh century provided an ideological foundation for royal and aristocratic domination (Abrams 1988). The classical concept of government as serving the public good, with the monarch (or emperor) as its guardian and defender, was enthusiastically received by rulers eager to legitimize their authority, and in the Christian kingdoms, rulers supported and favored the educated clerics who made Roman law the foundation of their authority. By the thirteenth century, the Roman law tradition, incorporated into the *Siete Partidas* of Alfonso X, king of Castile, had become virtually a common law for the kingdom, administered by lawyers trained in law at one of the great universities such as Salamanca (Zacour 1976: 134). These men, often drawn from the lower or middle ranks of the nobility, lacking the wealth of the great noble families whose sons were primarily trained for war, were educated in law and destined for service as both clerics and civil servants who expected to spend their lives in the bureaucracies of both Church and state. Dependent on the branch of government—civil or ecclesiastic—for which they worked, these men were salaried employees whose fortunes were dependent on their services to the institutions they served. The *letrados*, or lawyers, appeared in Castile at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and by the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella they dominated the Royal Council, the body of royal advisors, standing against the members of the great nobility who continued to feel entitled by birth to major roles in the royal service (S. Poole 2004: 3–21).¹

The Andean Tradition

There is also evidence supporting the development of hierarchical political systems in the Andes. About the sixth century, in the area of what is today Ayacucho, an urban complex, Huari, appears to have expanded over much of the highlands. Farther to the south, on the shores of Lake Titicaca, a large metropolis flourished during the eighth century. Known today as Tiwanaku, the center collapsed at the beginning of the eleventh or twelfth century. We assume that the expansion of both Huari and Tiwanaku depended on warrior elites, and archaeologists have proposed that the decline and fall of both centers was followed by approximately four centuries during which smaller political entities fought one another, ending in the fifteenth century with the rapid rise and expansion of the Incas in the Valley of Cuzco (Moseley 1992).

Despite claims made by Spaniards in the sixteenth century that the Incas had a rich oral tradition, and despite some written descriptions of Inca history by Spaniards who knew the language and were familiar with Inca culture, we still know relatively little about the nature of the political system that expanded from the Cuzco Valley to encompass an enormous area in less than a century (Julien 2000).² When the Spaniards entered what the Andeans called Tawantinsuyu, the land of the four quarters (the Quechua language designation of the area controlled by the Incas), the region had been involved in civil war for at least a decade. The members of the Cuzco Inca elite, as well as local elites throughout the region, moved rapidly to defend their interests against the warriors and the *letrados* from across the ocean. Within a few years, they had adapted to the forms of surplus appropriation familiar to the Europeans, dealing in trade and commerce and making alliances with Spaniards for purposes of their own. The Incas and the local elites were entirely unfamiliar with the culture and the values of the Europeans in 1532, but by the 1540s they had learned enough about the language of sovereignty and justice as it was deployed by Spanish *letrados* and clerics to adapt it to their own purposes.³ They may have used translators and others educated in the legal concepts current in Salamanca to prepare their petitions and their claims, but it is clear that they understood what they were doing,

Negotiating Justice: Castile

The Spaniards who dealt with the Andean elite in the 1530s were part of a political system that, despite the ruler's claims of being the locus of sover-

eignty, was in fact far from resting on a solid foundation. The great noble lineages were quite accustomed to advancing their own interests by supporting rival claimants to the throne. Textbooks that echo the image of the Catholic king and queen Ferdinand and Isabella, as responsible for the birth of a modern state, ignore the fact that the Spanish state was not really built by the Catholic kings and then extended abroad; both the monarchy in Spain and the colonial state in the Andes developed at the same time, with events on each side of the Atlantic affecting the other. Queen Isabella in Castile, as well as her successors Charles and Philip, have been described as having established a stable political system, but their tactics can also be described as a series of more-or-less desperate strategies on the part of rulers to disarm enemies, retain allies, and find the ever-increasing sums of money needed to accomplish both objectives. Isabella knew this game well. She began her reign with an open war against a powerful faction of the Castilian great nobility who sought to put her niece, Juana, on the throne. The nobles expected to increase their lands and authority in return for their services as king-makers, and Isabella fought back by seeking financial and military support from the urban elites whose members were fighting the great nobles for control of lands and people.

Without sufficient wealth or power to reduce her restive nobility to obedience, Isabella fell back on a strategy that looks much like divide-and-rule. Her reputation as a state-builder was the product of careful, and unending, negotiation. She showered with gifts and privileges those of her allies who had the greatest capacity to cause trouble. She bought off others with reforms of the tax system that put funds into the pockets of nobility and urban elites by taking it from tax collectors who took advantage of public disorder to appropriate the monies they collected. She intimidated the most recalcitrant potential noble rebels by releasing their peasants from their oaths and encouraging them to rise against those lords, thus reminding other lords that it might be worth their while to support the rule of law—or more precisely, her law. She eliminated her enemies in the Church by supporting the members of the monastic reform movement who, because of militant dedication to their cause and with backing by the Crown's authority to judge conflicts over control of monastic authority and property, gradually cut back the access of the great nobles to the wealth and power of the Church (Haliczer 1981: 30–113).

Isabella and her descendants played aristocratic rivals against one another, rewarding supporters lavishly while using their authority to make examples of a few. But this careful balancing of factions did not alter the wealth or power of the nobility as a whole, or make the state in any sense independent

of the social groups on which its existence had long depended. Isabella could—and did—alter the balance of power by using her judicial authority to support some people against others, but her success rested on her ability to use her powers of appointment and arbitration to shift, slowly and carefully, the balance of power between the factions that made up Castilian society, always presenting herself as an “honest broker” who was everyone’s best chance to gain his or her objectives. Isabella and her successors increased the ranks of the *letrados* to fill positions in new agencies that served the Crown, particularly during the Inquisition, which was given an extraordinary amount of freedom to move against political as well as religious threats to royal authority.

The monarch named royal authorities, the *corregidores*, to oversee local municipalities, and after considerable negotiation, Ferdinand persuaded the papacy to assign the right of patronage to ecclesiastical positions, known as the *patronato*, to the Crown. As a result of these changes, the Crown of Castile was able to bring its greedy nobility under the control of royal courts—as long as it continued to act as protector of the interests of the towns against the private armies of greedy aristocrats eager to appropriate additional land. The function of the state became that of keeping the balance by playing factions against one another. The role of the monarch as mediator between rival noble factions made it possible for the ruler to use that role to play those factions against one another to preserve his own interests. In this initial period of state construction, the presence of the state was the product of personal alliances among individuals—effectively, among the heads of elite families—for the benefit of those same families: a pact to maintain and expand the illusion of the elite’s disinterested administration of justice in the territory they controlled (see Abrams 1988: 80–82; Corrigan and Sayer 1985).

The struggle between aristocrats and towns increased in the decades that followed Isabella’s death in 1504, until the antagonism exploded in 1520–1521 in a revolt of the incorporated towns, or *Comunes*, against the aristocracy. The revolt threatened the Crown itself, forcing the newly crowned monarch, Charles I, to turn to the aristocracy to assure his immediate survival. In the words of a scholar who has studied the events, “the monarchy was restored with the somewhat grudging support of the great nobility” (Haliczer 1981: 205), which expected the Crown to reward their help with new land grants and expanded political power. But Charles chose to follow the example of his grandmother, refusing to reward his aristocratic supporters with new estates from the royal patrimony or even from land and revenue confiscated from the

rebels. Instead, he punished a few leaders and met many of the rebels’ demands, while quietly pardoning the most prominent and powerful among them. The ranks of the Inquisition were augmented by the addition of members of artisan and merchant families in a quiet reminder to the nobility that they were not exempt from royal supervision. Yet none of the changes introduced threatened the wealth of the aristocracy.

The discovery of rich societies across the Atlantic and the wealth that began flowing into the royal treasury of Castile in the first decades of the sixteenth century provided funds that were used by the monarch to pay the armies (and bribe the electors) and made it possible for Isabella’s grandson Charles to become Holy Roman Emperor, charged with the defense of Christianity against, first, the Turks, and, later, the Protestant princes whose support of Martin Luther initiated a conflict that ended with the permanent division of Christianity into warring factions. An important part of the wars of arms in Europe was a war of words: the justifications for the Spanish presence in the Americas that were constructed by the lawyers and theologians. The conflict over the justice of the Spanish presence in the Americas, a struggle over what might be called the conscience of the king, although primarily involving factions in Madrid, involved not only the Crown and the Spaniards in the Andes, but the natives as well. It was conducted in the idiom of Roman law as it applied to the rights of rulers defeated in war, an important aspect of international relations in a land in which members of the ruling elites could end up as the captives of rulers who did not regard themselves as subject to Christian laws or traditions.

Negotiating Justice: America

The debate among the theologians and jurists was focused on the issue of the justice of Spain’s claim to the Americas—more specifically, to the wealth of the inhabitants of the newly discovered territories. The official justification for Spain’s claim to the Americas was the pope’s assignment to the Crown of Castile of the responsibility for bringing the Christian faith to the newly discovered lands. Yet it was not battalions of missionaries (although those were sent later), but armed bands organized as conquest companies that invaded the newly discovered lands, demanding plunder and service from the people they encountered and provoking accusations from not only Spain’s enemies, but also the theorists of the *ius commune*, or body of common law that was ac-

cepted throughout Europe. Critics of the behavior of the Spaniards in America accused the king of permitting the rape and plunder of the Native Americans and ignoring the responsibility assigned him by the pope (see Simpson 1950; Brading 1991: 58–72). In response, a royal advisor and jurist drew up a formal document in 1512 that purported to cover the royal obligation. The document, called the *Requerimiento*, drew on legal theories of just war and was supposed to be read aloud to the Indians who were encountered by the Spanish conquerors prior to an attack. After summarizing the Christian version of the creation of the earth and the coming of Christ, the reader informed his audience that God's vicar, the pope, had granted the king of Spain dominion over the entire world, and the Indians must therefore surrender to their new rulers. If they refused, the Spaniards would be justified in attacking them, and the Indians would be responsible for their own defeat (Palacios Rubios 1992 [1513]).

The scholars who considered themselves obligated to remind the monarch of his responsibilities as a dispenser of justice, as opposed to a tyrant who recognized no law beyond his own whim, reacted strongly to the assumptions of the *Requerimiento*. Contemporaries in Spain as well as America openly remarked on the hypocrisy of the document as a justification for the violence of the conquest. The Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, a respected authority on canon law, wrote to another member of his order that “as regards the question of Peru . . . nothing that comes my way has caused me greater embarrassment than . . . the affairs of the Indies which freeze the very blood in my veins” (Pagden 1986: 65). Vitoria's lectures at the University of Salamanca on the right of Spain to make war on the Indians were copied and circulated by his students, becoming a key text in commentaries on the justice of the conquest.⁴

Vitoria concluded that the inhabitants of America or, as he called them, the barbarians, could not legally be dispossessed of their lands and goods on the grounds of their infidelity because “it is wrong to rob either Saracens or Jews or any other infidels of their property; to do so is theft and robbery, the same as if it were done to Christians” (Vitoria 1989: 67). Nor could the pope grant dominion to the emperor. The pope exercised authority in this world only over Christians and not over infidels or barbarians, and since the pope had neither temporal nor civil dominion, he did not have a right to cede that dominion to any other lord. Vitoria concluded, therefore, that “when the royal expedition was dispatched to the Indian lands, it carried no authority to occupy their properties” (85). Vitoria insisted conversion to Christianity was not

a justification for war and conquest; it was not legitimate to attack or plunder people who lived in ordered societies subject to rulers they accepted, unless those rulers systematically oppressed their subjects. He concluded that the only justifications for making war on another society were self-defense, protection of innocent people, or alleviation of tyranny. Vitoria was a major figure whose opinions were cited and who was invited to contribute to royal councils during his lifetime, although later generations erased his arguments while continuing to praise him (for example, see the discussion of Juan de Solórzano below).

The Justice of Conquest

In the Andes, the position ably articulated by Vitoria was shared by a faction of the clergy, in particular, the monastics sent to the Americas to convert the natives to Christianity, together with the faculties of Spanish universities dominated by his Dominican disciples (Brading 1991: 85). Against that position stood the Spaniards who had taken part in the conquest of the Incas, receiving *encomiendas*, or grants authorizing them to collect tribute from the members of Andean society in recompense for their military services to the Crown. A dispute between Francisco Pizarro, recognized by the Crown as the principle authority in the Andes, and his partner, Diego de Almagro, over the extent of the political authority of each led to factional warfare and the capture and execution of Almagro, followed by the assassination of Pizarro by Almagro's defeated partisans, leaving the Spaniards in the Andes without political authority recognized by the Crown. In 1542, in the midst of the dispute among the Spaniards over local authority, the economic and social preeminence of the *encomenderos*⁵ was challenged by royal orders that directly attacked their wealth and status. The *encomenderos* mobilized in an attempt to argue what they saw as their “rights” to local authority before the Crown, but the outcome of their show of force resulted in the death of the representative of the Crown—the viceroy Blasco Núñez Vela—followed by a showdown that left the *encomenderos*' spokesman, Gonzalo Pizarro, in charge of what was perceived in Madrid as a revolt against royal authority. The revolt was finally ended by the dispatch to Peru of Pedro de la Gasca, a priest-diplomat armed only with full authority and a set of unspecified pardons and orders carrying the royal signature. La Gasca offered the Spaniards an opportunity to back down without surrender, and most of them took his offer, deserting the rebel-

lion on the battlefield in exchange for royal confirmation of their loyalty and suspension of the royal orders.

La Gasca's actions mirrored Charles's tactic (and Isabella's before him) of refusing to reward reluctant allies while avoiding direct confrontations. He had a list of all encomiendas prepared, divided them among far too many hopefuls, and then left for Spain before making the new distribution public. Under the cover of the ensuing outrage, the *letrados* were left to confirm or adjust the tribute assessments. The royal lawyers were further reinforced by the Crown ordering the *audiencia*, or Superior Court, of Lima to amend the tribute "when it was excessive . . . because in the first tributes . . . [the Indians] were ordered to give more than they could." The native elites were encouraged to petition for the reduction of tribute, which had been set extremely high by earlier encomienda awards, and the result was a flood of appeals to the *audiencia*. Polo Ondegardo described the process, noting that "the tribute was barely set when many [people] assured [the *kurakas*, or native authorities] that if they were oppressed by the tributes, they could get them lowered; and since some of the people who said that were the ones who would do it, it didn't take much for the Indians to believe them, particularly when they saw that the first plaintiffs got the tributes lowered by simply asking and without any other formality" (Assadourian 1994: 182–83).

The events in the Andes in 1542 followed the comunero revolt by less than two decades. Given the strength of the revolt in Castile, the general pardons granted to rebel towns there and the gradual reincorporation of leading comuneros, it is likely that many among the Spaniards who initially joined Gonzalo Pizarro knew the story of the revolt, and may even have counted participants or sympathizers among their kinsmen. Although the majority of the encomenderos initially supported Gonzalo Pizarro, La Gasca could not have defeated Pizarro without their defection. As the monopolists of armed force in the new territory, the encomenderos expected to be rewarded for their alliance with the Crown's representative, and might well pick up their arms again if they thought that their rights, as they saw them, were threatened. La Gasca's only option, under the circumstances, was to act with caution and circumspection and, following the example set by his sovereigns, avoid any opportunity for the encomenderos to unite against him.

While royal authority was formally restored, La Gasca's tactics did nothing to resolve the encomendero's expectations. The encomendero faction remained strong, and La Gasca, with the aid of royal officials and clerics sympathetic to the Indians, moved to reduce the appropriation of goods and labor

from the Indians case by case, rather than taking on the faction as a whole. Such private "deals" between the representatives of royal authority and the natives left the members of the encomendero faction isolated and unlikely to unite against the reduction of their income. There was a great deal of grumbling and protests sent to Madrid, but organized protest was postponed for five years, until a frustrated encomendero led an unsuccessful revolt against the *audiencia* during an interim government.

Andeans and Justice

For a decade and a half, between 1545 and 1560, the native elites, allied with Crown officials and reform clerics, not only managed to reduce tribute assessments, they proved to be remarkably adept at deploying the arguments of theologians and jurists like Vitoria for their own ends. Vitoria had argued that the Incas, as well as the local elites, should be dealt with as natural lords, who could not legally be dispossessed of their authority by the Spaniards who had invaded their lands. The native elites, in particular, applied the legal principle of natural lords to themselves, arguing that since they had accepted the king and pope as their overlords, they could not be deprived of their legitimate authority over their native subjects (Vitoria 1989: 72–73; Chamberlain 1930). In a petition submitted by reform clerics together with members of the Andean elite, the petitioners asked the Crown to restore the rights of the native elites "following the ancient customs of the Inca rulers, for in those consists our preservation," and further asked the Crown to recognize their privileges as natural lords, "according to natural law . . . which they held and enjoyed in the time of their Inca kings . . . and that they hold and enjoy their inheritances and entailments, because they should not be deprived of their traditional authority [*generosidad*]" (Assadourian 1985: 79).

By the mid-1550s, native elites, in conjunction with Spanish lawyers, presented—and won—an increasing number of court cases seeking remuneration for plunder, as well as for excess tribute paid to Spaniards. Spanish authorities accepted information provided by Inca cord-keepers in the preparation of official documents, and the Spaniards openly recognized the contributions of the Andeans. A Spanish official in 1589 commented that while the natives had quickly learned the Spanish language, as well as its music, its instruments, and its (Arabic) numeric system, "in reality they do not use [Arabic numerals], nor do the crown authorities [*corregidores*] allow them to give or take anything

according to our counting and numerals, but rather through these *quipos*—the knotted cord devices Andeans used to record quantitative and, it is argued, narrative information (Salomon 2004: 112–13).

The standard histories of the development of Spanish rule in the Americas focus on the transfer of Iberian institutions, expectations, and practices to an exotic and distant environment, but most of them fail to note the presence of Andeans and their institutions in that transfer. Recent efforts to understand the interaction of Spaniards and Andeans argue that the members of each society struggled to make sense of one another. There were practical and opportunistic members of each society who were quite ready to make use of the others' skills and traditions, from adopting symbols of power and authority in Andean society—being carried in a litter—to adopting Andean practices of record-keeping and accounting such as the *kipu* or knotted cord records used by local native authorities (Lamana 2008; Curatola and de la Puente 2013). Members of Andean elites joined with their Iberian counterparts in expeditions of exploration and plunder, and petitioned the Spanish Crown, sometimes successfully, for coats of arms and even encomiendas of their own. In many ways, the behavior of the Spaniards toward Andean native elites in the first half-century following the Spaniards' arrival in the Andes resembled the complicated interactions between the English invaders of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland in the tenth to fourteenth centuries, with all parties negotiating for advantage and benefits (Davies 1990: 47–65).

Not only did royal authorities in the Andes incorporate the *kipucamayoc* into the judicial process, with the approval of the Crown, but the settlement of local differences among members of Andean native communities was left to the members of the native elite in an effective recognition of their claim to local jurisdiction as natural lords, even if Crown officials later denied that recognition. The Council of the Indies included in the instructions issued to Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Cañete, in 1551, a request to gather information about the administration of justice by the natives (Assadourian 1994: 219). Thirty years later, the request was repeated in a royal order asking Viceroy Martín Enríquez, successor to Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (generally regarded as the architect of the Peruvian colonial state, see below), for information about “the customs and practices followed by the natives of the land in the government and the conduct of disputes in the time of their heathendom” (Levillier 1925: 268). The order noted that the natives “have learned how to litigate [in the Spanish manner], and since disputes are decided according to the use and customs followed during the time of their heathendom,” infor-

mation was needed to correctly adjudicate disputes involving members of Andean society. The information was collected from both Spaniards and Inca elders in Cuzco, remitted to Madrid, and apparently forgotten, although native elites continued to settle community disputes according to Andean traditional practice (268). The information provided by Spanish witnesses, several with long experience in dealing with local Andean society, strongly suggests that de facto practice in the Andes deferred to local custom, which from the European perspective recognized the members of the native Andean elite as holding judicial authority over their people. Looking back on the first half-century of Spanish presence in the Andes, it is important to remember that while the Crown in Madrid issued orders (in response to the flood of letters and petitions from Andeans, clergy, encomenderos, and even Spanish immigrants without official status), the sheer extent of its claims ensured that Andean practices and customs would continue in the territories arrogantly christened “New Castile.”

The Struggle to Define Justice

The Spaniards affected by the events of the decades of 1540–1560 fought what they saw as an attack on the “rights” granted them by the award of their encomiendas with protests and letters to the Crown, and even a last desperate revolt by an encomendero who explained his rebellion by insisting that he “took action because he saw the liberties [taken by] the Indians and saw that there was no consideration for [the encomenderos], although they were the conquerors of all Peru. And the reason for this was the friars and the lawyers, and their desire to squeeze the land dry” (Assadourian 1994: 184). Despite apparent successes, however, the native elites were squeezed between the encomenderos, on one hand, and their own subjects on the other. Alliance with the Spaniards offered native elites opportunities to maintain the authority they had exercised under Inca rule, and perhaps even extend it, but they could be replaced by rivals. If they failed to meet the needs of their people, their subjects might withdraw their support, shift their allegiance to another lord, or even kill them (S. E. Ramírez 1996: 33–38; Spalding 1974: 61–87). Furthermore, the rise of Protestantism in Europe put increased pressure on the Church to “purify” the doctrine it professed, which undermined the relationships between the missionaries, who hoped that the native elites could be induced to convince their people to adopt the new beliefs.

The encomenderos, seeking to transform their access to tribute and labor services into the permanent legal jurisdiction that would make them nobility in the lands they had invaded, took advantage of the financial needs of the Crown to offer *servicios*, or financial donations, in exchange for the jurisdiction they sought. When a legal representative of the encomenderos offered Philip II five million gold ducats in exchange for granting his clients their *encomiendas* “in perpetuity” (forever), with full civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Indians, he responded by submitting a draft of the proposed award to the Council of the Indies, deeding the *encomiendas* to those who offered a substantial payment “in view of the uprisings and wars that have taken place in those provinces, to their great harm . . . and in order to preserve the kingdom and gratify the conquerors, settlers, and others who have served there.” But the royal advisors flatly refused to approve the project. They insisted that, first, the *kurakas*, as natural lords, had ordinary civil and criminal jurisdiction over their subjects and the Crown could not give away what it did not possess; and second, that while the Crown had supreme jurisdiction, it was against the interest of God and the Crown itself for the ruler to abandon his responsibilities to his new subjects (*Consulta del Consejo* 1953 [1556]: 342).⁶ The *kuraka*-cleric alliance also joined the struggle, offering the Crown 100,000 ducats more than the encomenderos’ best offer if it would take the *encomiendas* under direct royal authority. In their petition, the *kurakas* made it clear that they had an agenda of their own, for they asked the Crown to “return and restore to us all the lands, fields, and other inheritances and possessions that were taken and usurped by the Spaniards against our will and against justice . . . and we further ask that we retain the good customs and laws that we have had and have, and that are right for our government and justice, together with the other things that we were accustomed to as infidels” (*Assadourian* 1985: 82). Philip II and his advisors finally agreed on a compromise, sending a commission to Peru with the new viceroy in 1561 to investigate the matter further.

The presence of the commissioners sparked chaos in the Andes. Debate was not restricted to the halls of justice and the anteroom of the viceroy. People at all levels knew about and debated the issues, for as royal authorities complained from the 1540s on, members of the Spanish Court and the Council of the Indies kept friends, family, and associates in Peru informed of what was going on, so that every ship brought the same word to the public that was contained in the Crown’s ostensibly secret instructions. In 1561, a petition against perpetuity circulated in Cuzco by plebeian residents and mestizos led

to disturbances described by the authorities as a rebellion. Two years later, the *kuraka* of Huarochiri, an active member of the *kuraka*-cleric alliance and a signatory to the petition presented to the Crown in 1560, publicly refused to take part in the routine ceremony of possession with the heir of his encomendero, insisting that he had accepted the authority of the holder of the grant during the two “lives” for which the *encomienda* was granted, and had paid for incorporation into the Crown.

The viceroy’s report to the Crown provides a graphic example of authority under siege. He complained that “the matter . . . has inspired passion in some, and the majority of those who argued were the religious . . . they have attempted everywhere to attract people to their opinion and belief, and it has gone so far that the Religious have taken more liberties than they should in the pulpit and outside of it . . . insisting that they could not absolve us because we were in a state of sin, and they have refused to absolve some of us if we spoke further about the matter, and their interference is so extreme that they have tried to appropriate the right to govern the natives” (*Levillier* 1921a [1562]: 396–97). The clerics responded by insisting that while the laws decreed by the Crown were just, the authorities “seem[ed] to have been instructed to govern in a manner exactly opposite to what the laws command” (*Assadourian* 1985: 77). Finally, in 1568, the Crown and a specially chosen group of advisors debated the turmoil in the Andes and concluded officially that “under the guise of protecting the Indians and favoring and defending them, [the Religious] have interfered with matters affecting Justice, government, and the State, seeking to interfere with [the state’s] right and dominion over the Indies” (*Ramos* 1986: 20). Further debate was forbidden and the clerics were told by the Crown and its advisors to shut up and return to their monasteries. In the words of Domingo de Santo Tomás, “there is [was] no remedy now but heaven” (*Assadourian* 1985: 77).

Because we have come to take for granted not only the centralized claim to authority of a state, whether that authority is embodied by a monarch or a government, it may appear strange that a group of clerics would appeal to an authority that they regarded as above that of the state, but the theologians who debated the rights of the Crown to intervene in the affairs of other societies in the sixteenth century, claiming to speak in the name of a spiritual authority whose fiat overrode not only the pronouncements of the monarch but, ultimately, even those of the pope, were confident that their arguments were valid. In effect, these clerics were engaged in the construction of a set of laws that extended the authority of the *ius commune* to all persons recognized as

human and capable of intelligent thought, laying the grounds for a law of societies that could have become a basis for giving all people the rights assumed to belong to Catholics. That process, however, was sidetracked and ultimately appropriated by a group of jurists and officials who supported the expanding claims to authority of the state, embodied by the monarch.

The tumult in the Andes sparked a great deal of concern in Madrid. The encomendero faction had been seriously undermined by both the sharp decline of the native population and the scandal that followed the campaign for making the *encomienda* perpetual. The open conflict between the royal authorities and the clergy offered an opportunity to the pope to regain some control over the Spanish Crown, a threat to which Philip II was quick to respond, while still taking the, perhaps odd, stance that the Crown's justification of its presence in the Andes rested on its claim to represent the justice of monarchical authority.

Toledo: The Paradigm Shift

The hard fact, however, was that the Crown was desperately in need of funds to finance its armies, and the political machinery that supported it rested ultimately on the precious metals shipped to Castile. In this situation, the Crown finally opted to come down on the side of order and control, sending a representative of the aristocracy with experience in imposing authority to the Andes. The man chosen to implement the shift in royal policy was Francisco de Toledo, the fifth viceroy of Peru, who was born to one of the great noble families of Castile, and trained for royal service. He was part of the imperial court of Charles I, accompanying the emperor to Germany, Flanders, Africa, Italy, and France. By age twenty-one, he was an experienced courtier with both military and diplomatic experience. A member of the military order of Alcántara, he administered its properties and took part in the order's reorganization, all of which gave him firsthand experience in the mechanics of government and administration (Gómez Rivas 1994). The transfer of authority from Charles I to his son Philip II has been characterized as a change in the nature of authority from the conciliar style, in which the nobility took an active part in government, to the more personal, centralized style favored by Philip, and Toledo carried that style to the Andes, arriving there in 1569 convinced of the need to eliminate any and all challenges to the rights of the Crown (Gómez Rivas 1994: 61–62).

The political tactics of negotiation and divide-and-rule applied by previous authorities were spurned by Toledo, who insisted on the importance of a centralized monopoly of authority in a region little accustomed to it. Barely a year after arriving in Peru, Toledo embarked on his famous inspection of the viceroyalty, during which he collected testimony from native witnesses intended to demonstrate that the Incas were tyrants whose rule was therefore illegitimate. In 1571, he wrote a letter to the Crown, arguing that the information he had gathered proved that the definition of the Incas as natural lords was "one of the detrimental ideas that have impeded the proper governance of this land," adding that he had become aware of this while still in Spain and regarded it as an "important truth" that the king should apply to the kingdom (Levillier 1921b [1571]: 443).

Toledo reinforced his argument with other documents, in particular, a history of the Incas that he commissioned Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa to prepare, and a legal opinion, or *parecer*, attacking Bartolomé de Las Casas as having perpetrated a false idea of the nature of the Incas and the native elites that had been part of the Inca state. Las Casas, a Dominican friar, was a figure of major importance in the sixteenth century as the public face of the movement that sought the abolition of the *encomienda*. While he never went to the Andes, he was in communication with the influential clerical activists there, among them the Dominican missionary, linguist, and bishop, fray Domingo de Santo Tomás, and the Spaniards who defended the legality of the *encomiendas* regarded him as their worst enemy.

The author of the *parecer* insisted that "the cause of this lie [attacking the legitimacy of the Crown's right to Peru] was Bartolomé de Las Casas, for having maintained and taught that the Incas were legitimate lords, and the *caciques* [native elites] were natural lords" (Anónimo 1995 [1571]: 114). Neither Toledo nor the author of the *parecer* attacked the respected jurists, among them Francisco de Vitoria, who had challenged the right of the Crown to rule the Andes; they reserved their vitriol for Las Casas, who was roundly condemned for (1) having written without ever having been in Peru (true), or (2) failing to inform himself about conditions there (false). The document praised Toledo for having revealed the truth to the Crown, which was that the Inca had been one of the greatest tyrants on earth, together with the native elites, both of whom had been foisted on the natives shortly before the arrival of the Spaniards who freed them from tyranny. This war of words was intended to confirm the claims of the Crown in Madrid, where the documents were sent, and, while the local defenders of the *encomienda* would

undoubtedly have subscribed to Toledo's position, he did not trouble to include them.

Toledo, a man of action, also moved to eliminate any threat from the Incas in the future. He sent a small army to Vilcabamba, which destroyed the place, and brought the Inca, Tupa Amaru, and the natives with him back to Cuzco. The Inca was subjected to a quick trial and beheaded in the main square. The others captured in Vilcabamba were condemned to punishments that ranged from whippings to execution, and other Incas in Cuzco, who had no proven contact with the people who had not recognized the sovereignty of the king in Spain, were accused and sentenced to exile and the confiscation of their properties, although their punishment was eventually partly overturned. Finally, Toledo attempted to eliminate the descendants of Huayna Capac, the last Inca prior to the invasion from Spain, by marrying Beatriz, the only remaining recognized descendant, to Martín García de Loyola, leader of the expedition sent to eliminate Tupa Amaru, to whom she would have been married according to the terms of the capitulations agreed to in 1565. Toledo explained his action to the Crown in a letter in which he noted that García de Loyola had agreed to the union because "he wanted to serve Your Majesty by marrying this Indian to ensure that there would be no further pretensions nor uncertainty [in Peru] since he, as well as I myself intend that they move to Spain" (Levillier 1924: 483).

Justice Redefined

Toledo's elimination of the Incas is a tale of the rejection of existing concepts of law and justice and the rewriting of existing political agreements, together with military action and forced marriage—all justified by the interests of the Crown. The newly arrived Inquisition in Lima, used by Isabella to assure the loyalty of her subjects in Castile, served a similar function in Lima. The function of the Inquisition in Peru, as in Castile itself, was the ideological support of the Crown, rather than of the established Church or the Vatican. If, as Abrams insists, the state is essentially an ideological power, then the Inquisition—as well as the organized campaigns against native religious beliefs directed by the bishops of various regions of the Andes—reinforced the authority of the Crown (see Silverblatt, this volume). As a state-in-formation, it was the Crown that appointed and stood behind those institutions. In fact, it would not be excessive to describe Toledo as one of the early architects of

the principle of the absolute state who set what he regarded as the interests of the Crown—predecessor to the modern state—above the principles of law and justice argued and fought over during the first half century following the invasion of the Andes from Spain.

In many ways, Francisco de Toledo's actions in the Andes mark a shift in what we might call the prehistory of the state in the Andes. His efforts to rewrite the arguments over the justice of Spain's claim to rule were ultimately successful, not because of superior arguments advanced by judicial theorists, but because he seemed perfectly willing to falsify the arguments of theorists he claimed to respect and credit them with opinions they had rejected. While he would probably have been horrified by the suggestion, Toledo's vision of the state was very similar to the model offered by his contemporary, Niccolò Machiavelli, of a ruler who acted purely in the interest of central power, manipulating or ignoring the obligations and values inherited from a medieval tradition in decline in order to replace them with a centralized authority.

Toledo's actions, as well as his reports and letters, indicate that he was determined to eliminate the factions that attempted to justify their claims by appeal to an authority above and prior to that of the Crown. The legal tradition of the *ius commune* that had been in construction since the twelfth century was rejected in favor of a position that put the Crown above all others. That position was still new and tentative in the sixteenth century, and was undermined in favor of the principle of royal authority that rejected all authority other than its own. By the seventeenth century, the principle of royal absolutism held that the Crown was the final authority, God's designated representative on earth, despite the real limits of royal authority in practice, with royal claims to authority severely limited by the Crown's financial difficulties.

The upheavals that marked the administration of Toledo were largely over by the end of the sixteenth century, giving way to a period during which administrative practice gradually became legal principle. Seventy years after Toledo left Peru, vilified by many of his contemporaries for what they regarded as his high-handed behavior, a respected jurist presented a full-blown justification of the colonial state as a legal truth that ignored all alternatives. In the *Política Indiana*, the major commentary on colonial law, Juan de Solórzano Pereira devotes the first four chapters of his work to the topic of the legal right of the Crown to rule the Americas. While he includes Francisco de Vitoria among the authorities he cites, he completely fails to mention Vitoria's insistence on the natural rights of all people, Christian or heretic, to the lands

they inhabited. Instead, Solórzano insists that the Spaniards were called by God to conquer the Americas, adding that He had granted the riches of the overseas territories to Spain in recompense for Spain's services to Him in the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims. He describes the conquest as a just war, in which the Spaniards freed the barbarians of the Americas, particularly the inhabitants of the Andes, from a tyranny "in which the invaders turned themselves into kinglets, oppressed them and subjected them to untold impieties and cruelties, without their having anyone to come to their aid" (Solórzano 1930 [1647]: Lib. I, cáp. ix, párrafo 35). Toledo's argument was given new life by Solórzano.

Solórzano concluded that the end justified the means, and that a war that may appear unjust is justified if its purpose is the introduction of Christianity. He comments further that the natives were so backward they needed the presence of the Spaniards "by virtue of their being so barbaric, uncivilized and rustic that they barely merit the name of men, and require those who, by taking control of their government, protection, and instruction, reduce them to a life that is human, civil, social, and organized, so that they become able to receive the Faith, and the Christian religion" (Solórzano 1930 [1647]: Lib. I, cáp. ix, párrafo 19). Solórzano even credits Vitoria with these arguments by including his name among the authorities he cites in support of such statements.

The chaotic events of the 1560s were a prelude, or perhaps more exactly a "prehistory," of the Andean colonial state, which did not fully emerge until the seventeenth century. From the 1540s to the end of the century, several very different political traditions, each representing very different factions, struggled to impose their particular ideas of justice, or perhaps more exactly, their ideas of the proper distribution of authority in society. The organization and the justification of the distribution of power was not simply transferred from Madrid to Lima. Rather, the struggle over what kind of political system would emerge in the Andes began with the first efforts of Spaniards and Andeans to deal with one another. In the struggle among all of the factions in the Andes in the four decades that followed that encounter, unheroic events were adjusted and inconvenient truths corrected to make the Crown—and the ideology constructed to support it—the sole source of authority and justice. The process took a century, and culminated in the centralization of state authority in the designated representative of the Crown: the viceroy and the local representatives of Spanish "justice" in the Americas. The phantom nature of the state was nowhere more evident than in the way in which the local represen-

tatives of the colonial state ensured the presence of the Crown in official functions and ceremonies. They displayed a painting of the current monarch propped on a chair, from which it overlooked the proceedings. The illusory nature of the royal authority claimed by the Crown could hardly be more obvious.

Chapter 11

The Aspirational State: State Effects in Putumayo

Winifred Tate

At the turn of the millennium, conditions in the Putumayo region of Colombia challenged virtually every aspect of the standard narrative of the relations between state, society, territory, citizenship, and rights.¹ The normative ideal of modern state-society relations assumes territorial control via a state apparatus capable of guaranteeing citizens' rights and the rule of law when threatened by illegal activities, armed actors undermining the state's monopoly of force, or interference from other nation-states. In Putumayo, however, it was not the national state apparatus that attempted to safeguard the rights of citizens but rather a criminalized population of smallholding *cocaleros* (coca growers), who sought to establish the liberal freedoms and the rule of law, and who strove to develop the economy. In so doing, they sought support for their cause from a complex and evolving network of regional, national, and transnational NGOs, elements of regional, national, and foreign governments (including the United States), religious organizations, and, at times, illegal armed actors. At the same time, Putumayo was the scene of multiple, conflicting claims about who was to govern, according to what legitimating principles, and toward what ends.

During the period from the late 1990s until the mid-2000s, there was a surfeit of groups in Putumayo seeking to be "the state." During this period, coca cultivation in the region reached the zenith of what became known as the *bonanza cocalero*, when Putumayo became the world's major production

center of the raw material for cocaine. Beginning in the early 1980s, FARC established itself in Putumayo, and became the *de facto* governing force until the end of the 1990s, when the Colombian military and paramilitary groups began to struggle with the guerrillas for control of the region. Backed by extensive support from the United States, and in conjunction with a broad network of paramilitary groups (who receive the tacit support of the armed forces), the Colombian military unleashed a campaign of brutality and terror upon much of the population. The armed forces did so with the avowed goal of eradicating coca production and the groups that support it, and establishing what the military characterizes as a strong and stable state presence in the region. As a result, the very state apparatus that is understood in conventional state-society narratives as upholding the rule of law was systematically involved in its violation. But the Colombian military and its allies continued to dispute power with FARC; all these armed groups claimed the exclusive right to govern in Putumayo. The situation in Putumayo thus inverted much of the standard narrative concerning state-society relations. "Criminals" sought to establish the rule of law, while the state subverted it. Instead of viewing non-state armed actors as a threat to sovereignty, state offices actively encouraged and supported Colombia's paramilitary groups. The latter, however, did not work with the offices of government to protect and safeguard the rights of citizens, but instead to brutalize the population. Indeed, rather than establish broad conditions of social peace across the national territory, the military and its coercion-wielding allies waged war on the civilian population, who were seen as an internal enemy rather than a national citizenry. At the same time, a foreign government (the United States) operated as a governing power in the region via contracting agencies conducting state functions, including development and counternarcotics operations, with minimal oversight.

In the pages that follow I seek to draw out the implications of these seemingly aberrant conditions for theories of the state. What forms of boundaries and jurisdiction—the spatialization effect (Trouillot 2001)—emerge in contexts such as this one, in which contending projects of rule simultaneously seek to order space in different ways? How do local inhabitants, confronted with these competing projects, stake their political claims in terms of the state? These are especially interesting questions because in regions such as this one the term "state" has no agreed upon institutional, bureaucratic, or territorial correlate. I am especially interested in the kinds of state effects (Mitchell 1999) that emerge in contexts in which much of the standard narrative of state-society relations is inverted.

Residents were forced to navigate extreme violence and competing claims for state authority. At the same time, they articulated visions of political alternatives through demands for what I call an aspirational state. This aspirational critique of the politics of the present focused on the qualities of the state, its affective ties to its citizens, and the state as an ideal form: caring, responsive, generous, and abundant, rather than distant, repressive, and extortive. These fantasies channeled oppositional imaginaries during the height of the violence. In these extreme circumstances, the magic of the state was revealed less through ongoing encounters, but more so conjured through these possible futures. The aspirational state described by these officials and activists drew on the conceptual categories of modern liberal democratic citizen-state relations, while at the same time resonating with historic ties of authoritarian paternalistic clientelism. This analysis explores the limitations and possibilities of local actions and how claims to jurisdiction and territorial control shift over time, particularly at the “fuzzy boundaries” (Gupta 1995) of state action, where state agents and local inhabitants become entangled in competing claims.

Stigmatized as violent criminals intent on personal enrichment through the drug trade, *Putumayenses* are considered throughout Colombia as a growing population excluded from citizenship and rights claims because of their assumed criminality (for comparative cases see Caldeira 2001 for Brazil, Coutin 2007 for El Salvador, and Goldstein 2004 for Bolivia). As in other cases of increasing fragmentation of citizenship and political belonging (Ong 2006), these residents attempted to fully inhabit citizenship rights, if only through their claims on the state. They articulated demands for citizenship organized around peasant identities, but at the same time did not negate their criminal practices except through their critique of the state, charging the state with responsibility for failing to provide security, services, and market infrastructure. Anthropologists working in other marginal and criminalized regions in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia have documented similar dynamics, as local populations articulate their “longing for the state” (Bocarejo 2012), feel the presence of the “phantom state” (Goldstein 2012), and experience state violence as constituting law even while violating it (Kernaghan 2009). I explain these developments by locating them in a subterranean history of the region, one that focuses on the weak and incipient efforts of popular organizations to define new forms of citizen-state relations. In other words, I attend to the alternative visions of just rule that have been generated by everyday encounters between the general populace and the violent efforts of those who claim the

right to govern them. This approach tracks the dispersed institutional and social networks through which claims to legitimacy are described and consolidated, and the roles that state and nonstate institutions alike play in mundane processes of governance (cf. Ferguson 1990; Gupta 1995; Krupa 2010; Nugent 1997; Scott 1998).

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC

For many years Colombia's largest and oldest guerrilla group, FARC, dominated in the region. The presence of FARC in the southern jungles dates to The Violence, when Liberal peasants organized to defend themselves from Conservative police brutality. These “self-defense forces” adopted a revolutionary Marxist platform with aspirations to national power in 1964. The FARC 32nd Front settled in Putumayo in the early 1980s, when FARC remained a marginal group with minimal national presence. The remote region was logistically important because of the shared border with Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. FARC encountered minimal state resistance, and found a ready base of social support in the growing population of *colonos*, many of whom had experienced guerrilla leadership in other rural areas. FARC leaders came to control much of the social and economic life of the region, maintaining a strong militia presence in hamlets and town centers and regularly patrolling rural areas.

FARC efforts to regulate local life were clearly evident during my first trip to the region in 1999. The local activists who helped me organize my trip requested permission from the regional commander for our travel by boat down the Putumayo River from Puerto Asís to Puerto Leguizamo; we only proceeded after given clearance. We did not stop in particular hamlets where local commanders were known to be mercurial. On my travels by road from Puerto Asís to Mocoa, we passed a large, slightly tattered poster attached to the wall of a concrete community building, painted in patriotic red, blue, and yellow, titled “Sanctions and Fines: Norms for living in a dignified and honest community.” Signed by the 32nd Front of the Southern Bloc, the poster listed 19 regulations, and the corresponding fines and punishments, ranging from 200,000 to 2 million pesos (approximately US\$100–1,000). The crimes included being a gossip (\$100), to the more serious, \$1,000 for bringing in unknown people, selling a farm without consulting with the FARC, or traveling in a vehicle after 6 p.m., which also could result in confiscation of the car.

During interviews in the region, I frequently heard the FARC identified as “the law”; commanders regulated social life, organized forced communal work brigades, and required local officials to report their operations.

FARC was one of many groups to benefit from the staggering profits of the drug trade. The leadership made a strategic decision during their 1982 Seventh Conference to use profits from the drug trade to expand their military operations. While during the late 1980s FARC had “negotiated on behalf of the harvest workers as an organization analogous to a labor union” (Jansson 2008: 54), by the 1990s the group was involved in taxing coca crops, protecting drug processing labs and intermediate trafficking, and even placing militia members as intermediate traffickers, funding significant military expansion (Chernick 2005). The Southern Bloc became one of the most powerful in the country, operating with seven fronts and ability to mobilize 2,400 combatants. The southern command played a central role in a series of dramatic military operations against Colombian armed forces battalions, beginning with the attack on Las Delicias military base in Putumayo, in which army casualties totaled 54 dead, 17 wounded, and 60 captured (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). In a series of subsequent operations, the FARC conducted itself more like a standing army than a guerrilla force, taking and holding garrisons and capturing more than 500 soldiers and police they claimed as hostages.

The Local State in Putumayo

Beginning in the 1990s, coca paste became the region’s major export, the latest in a historic cycle of transnational boom-bust economies, which included Franciscan missionary efforts and quinine, fur, rubber, and oil exploitation for the international market (Stanfield 1998; Taussig 1987). Even while engaged in illegal activity, local residents pushed for greater recognition from the state and the creation of administrative structures that would allow them to participate in political life. Paradoxically, the coca boom, which brought new people and resources to the region, facilitated this process. During the 1980s, Putumayo had one of the country’s highest rates of internal colonization. From 1973 to 2005, the coca-growing region of Lower Putumayo experienced a 725 percent growth in population, while the Middle grew 89 percent, and the Upper region grew 137 percent (M. C. Ramírez 2010: 13). The resulting new communities were largely self-built and financed. Collective work brigades built roads and schools; relatively flush coca farmers paid construction costs

and even supplemented teacher salaries in some remote regions. Unions and civic committees in Puerto Asís (still the area’s largest town) organized strikes and protests to demand state services. In the early 1980s, the teachers’ union, Asociación de Educadores del Putumayo (ASEP), together with other sectors, led strikes for water, electricity, and sewer systems.

Residents in newly constituted communities also took advantage of the administrative restructuring efforts during the late 1980s and early 1990s that were intended to increase local political participation. These committees were legally recognized and frequently required participation of both civil society and local officials, providing a critical political space for state-resident encounters. One of the most important examples was Law 11 of 1986, which provided for the direct election of mayors and created mechanisms for community participation in local decisions (among them local administrative boards) (Hoyos and Ceballos 2004: 4). Throughout the country, President Vergilio Barco’s (1986–1990) national development strategy, known as the National Rehabilitation Plan, mandated that rehabilitation councils be established in all municipalities to facilitate communication between government officials and community representatives. Through their participation on these local councils, leaders learned to negotiate with officials and gained access to government services and training courses. In 1991, a new constitution allowed the election of governors, as well as enshrining a number of new rights. Putumayo was declared a department, rather than an *independencia*, or nationally administered colony, with the capacity to elect regional assemblies, a governor, and congressional representatives.

New administrative avenues to national recognition included the opportunity for communities to claim status as municipalities, allowing them to gain access to resources from the central state, as well as to establish local political offices such as mayors and assemblies. Many of the new communities in Putumayo organized pro-municipal committees to lobby for recognition, negotiating with government representatives as well as local FARC commanders (Torres 2011). This complex and ambiguous process involved moving through stages of increasing state recognition, beginning with the designation *inspección de policía*, until reaching the goal of being designated a municipality.

The local state provided a significant source of employment and resources. “Here, we all live from the state and from coca,” a doctor native to the department told me over *tinto*, the ubiquitous small cups of sweetened black coffee, laughing at the contradictions inherent in her assessment of the primary sur-

vival strategies in Putumayo. Her words capture the ways the local state coexisted with the local illicit economy; more important, she highlighted the multiple ways the state was a central presence, an important economic motor in the region, at a time when the department was routinely described as "abandoned" by the state, or without state presence. For many local inhabitants, work with the state was the primary means of achieving minimal financial security, as an official, teacher, secretary, or contractor.

Yet state officials themselves frequently described the state as absent, drawing a distinct boundary between the central state and the local state as separate, often competing entities. In part this reflected the larger stigmatization by Colombian officials (as well as their U.S. counterparts) of the population as criminals and guerrilla supporters, existing outside the law, to whom the rights and protections of citizenship did not apply. Anthropologist María Clemencia Ramírez summarized the general view of Putumayenses and their elected officials as "migrants in search of easy money, without identity, without roots in Amazonia, and concerned with their own interests above all" (M. C. Ramírez 2011: 58). Military officials characterized them as a "scourge," "the Mafia's masses, sponsored by the FARC cartel," "like herds of animals" (General Bedoya, quoted in M. C. Ramírez 2011: 58).

Local officials were caught between guerrilla claims to jurisdiction and the security forces' efforts to maintain their territorial control. FARC commanders frequently required local state officials to meet with them, consult over infrastructure projects, and explain budgeting decisions. Local officials would also meet with local commanders to negotiate the guerrilla justice system, when specific community members were punished or threatened with death because of presumed misdeeds. I heard the story of one local official's experience with FARC governance from his wife, who explained that as deputy mayor, he had to "go into the mountains" to meet with local commanders, to investigate guerrilla punishments after infractions (including death sentences). Such diplomatic missions frequently included local priests as well, and were not "to fight with them, he went in peace."

While most accounts of Putumayo stress political violence, illegal armed actors, and the illicit economy, the region was home to several generations of efforts to organize political participation. During my interviews with priests and other community leaders, they recalled the importance of the Putumayo Grassroots Civic Movement, created in the late 1980s in order to participate in the newly organized local elections. Working with priests influenced by Liberation Theology and attempting to chart a political middle ground, the

movement was deeply affected by paramilitary violence. In part as a result, the first municipal human rights committee was formed, with a paid staff advisor funded by the Bogotá-based Jesuit progressive think tank Center for Grassroots Education and Research (CINEP). In 1991, large-scale community protests expelled the most brutal paramilitary commanders in what local residents remembered as heroic and empowering actions (M. C. Ramírez 2011). After the committee was forced to disband because of paramilitary persecution in the mid-1990s, the advisor remained working with the state health service and became a critical link between Bogotá and international NGOs and local communities.

Local accounts of political participation highlight 1996 peasant protest marches that paralyzed the region for months, demanding an end to U.S.-sponsored aerial fumigation, as well as an increase in services. Many U.S. and Colombia policymakers claimed the marches were simply motivated by pressure from FARC. María Clemencia Ramírez has argued, however, that the peasant leadership was attempting to claim citizenship rights while negotiating space for relatively autonomous community organizing when faced with extreme pressures from the guerrillas and state security forces (M. C. Ramírez 2011). She emphasizes that the cocalero marchers were not attempting to withdraw from the Colombian national polity, but were demanding full citizenship rights: they wanted more state presence in their region, along with the full range of state services, benefits, and opportunities for participation in the political process. The marches ended with the government and peasant leaders signing an agreement known as the Orito Pacts, in which representatives from the central government pledged to provide resources for infrastructure projects (such as paving major roads), education funding for teacher salaries and increasing school coverage in rural areas, and technical assistance for peasant farmers. These pacts were left entirely unfulfilled. Escalating paramilitary violence forced the marches' leaders to leave the region; several were killed, including one assassinated in Bogotá; some joined the ranks of FARC.

The Catholic Church has played a central role in regional organizing efforts, in particular a charismatic Catholic priest, Father Alcides Jimenez, who worked for more than eighteen years in the Puerto Caicedo parish. He introduced training in Liberation Theology with an emphasis on gender equality and sustainable development. Father Jimenez promoted a number of sustainable development projects, women's groups, peasant organizations, and peace networks, creating the Peace Promoters Network (Red de Formadores de

Paz), bringing in community leaders from around the country to help local leaders strategize and present their proposals for development and other community initiatives. While they were unsuccessful in gaining central government support for these programs, pressure from the community forums resulted in the creation of the office of the regional *personero*, a human rights ombudsman linked to the National Ombudsman's Office.²

The Paramilitary Project Comes to Putumayo

The paramilitary forces that moved into the region in 1999 were intimately linked to local military commanders' counterinsurgency efforts, but also targeted FARC's control of coca cultivation areas and taxation of coca paste production.³ Their groups were connected to AUC, a national umbrella organization, and operated in close coordination with local military commanders. Rather than having a hierarchical structure, AUC was a loose confederation of regional commanders, most of whom worked with Medellín and Cali cartels and were heirs to the trafficking business following the cartels' demise. Their efforts to buy their way into the regional ranching and business elite served as a method to launder money and as a concerted strategy to gain political legitimacy (Reyes 2009). Scholars of this period have characterized the paramilitary ideological project as pro-state and pro-capitalist, with significant support among political elites, and "more successful in taking over the state" than the guerrillas. Efforts to gain political legitimacy, including a sophisticated public relations campaign, were dedicated toward generating negotiations with the central government that would allow the leadership to legalize their assets and gain entry into the political system (Tate 2009). No longer simply concerned with using military force and brutality to consolidate military control, paramilitary forces claimed jurisdiction over multiple dimensions of daily life in the village centers.

FARC reacted to increased paramilitary presence in the region with growing violence, including selective assassinations and massacres. They also organized against what they called Yankee imperialism in the region. Beginning in September 2000, FARC leadership declared the first of several "armed strikes," rejecting U.S. intervention and the growing presence of the AUC, paralyzing the economy and all transportation. During the armed strike, deputy mayor "David" (a pseudonym for his security) found himself once again confronting guerrilla claims to governance. While inspecting

some of the mayor's construction projects in local schools, he encountered guerrillas already mobilizing people to protest during the strike. After learning that he advised people to remember the hardships suffered during previous strikes, guerrillas confiscated his motorcycle; the next day, he found that the guerrillas had taken and burned a municipal dump truck full of food and supplies. After speaking with him, the commander allowed him to complete the inspection. He reported his concerns about the guerrilla actions to his superiors during the Monday morning public order report; news of his report traveled swiftly through the region and he was soon under threat from guerrilla commanders.

Paramilitary commanders managed inhabitants' movements to solidify their territorial control. Rural people were presumed sympathetic to the guerrillas, and residents of the urban centers were identified with paramilitary forces, with the respective groups killing people who moved from rural to urban areas. Paramilitary forces also developed what came to be labeled "confinement" by human rights groups: preventing people from leaving their homes, or traveling from hamlets to towns or the reverse. As a result, rural people were no longer able to travel to urban markets for their livelihood and for supplies, while residents of urban areas were no longer able to travel to their land in rural areas. In another example, women from urban centers who worked as part of church and other community outreach programs told me they could no longer travel to meet with their rural counterparts. Any travel required consultation with paramilitary commanders. "There was a time here when you even had to get permission," one lay Catholic agriculture extension agent told me. "I mean, if the neighborhood committees (*juntas de acción comunal*) were going to go out, they had to get permission to go because the [paramilitaries] became like the state."

Categorizing people as allies or enemies was achieved through an analysis of clothing styles, footwear, hairstyles, and ascribed racial identity. Individual bodies became a central site for distinguishing allegiance to particular groups, for civilians attempting to negotiate these competing claims, and for the groups to determine who deserved punishment or reward. "Here, men can't walk with their shirt untucked because that was the paramilitary uniform, they kept their shirts out so you couldn't see their weapons," one school teacher told me.⁴ Paramilitary gunmen were marked by a closely shaved head with a longer ring of hair along the edge. Racial profiling also impacted local Afro-Colombians. Many paramilitaries came from the Atlantic Coast, known for its high Afro-Colombian population. "I have a brother, they said he was

one of them because he looks like them, because the ones that arrived were tall, fat, Costeños” one Afro-Colombian woman told me.

Paramilitary commanders also regulated public space. They ordered communities to clean their streets and display certain Christmas decorations, calling residents and business owners to public meetings to inform them of the new rules. One resident of a hamlet explained, “The commander in the beginning, he organized a minga [a collective work brigade] every month to clean up the whole town . . . They were doing work for the town.” One neighbor continued the story, “They arrived in September 1999, they took all the people out of the town to the park, and had a big meeting. They told everyone that they were the ones who were going to be in charge now.” Commanders also intervened in local disputes, regulating domestic violence, as well as punishing thieves. “The people who solve the problems are the people who have the guns. When the police go, people say, it becomes a scandal, but when a group goes, things are calmed at once (*calla de una vez*) and the problem is silenced,” one local school teacher told me. I heard stories from many local residents how the commanders charged all local businesses “taxes,” as well as percentages of all government contracts.

In his work as deputy mayor, David was one of many local officials who became ensnared in the growing paramilitary presence. He witnessed their arrival with a civic-military brigade organized by a senior military commander. During a meeting, one of the same senior military officers asked David to report in his official capacity “what strange movements had been occurring in the pueblo.” In response, David reported that “people were worried, they were afraid because there were some strange guys that were going around armed, in cars and were driving all over, and were already living in one of the hotels.” David was responding to local demands for responsive governance; by assuming the state would act against paramilitary forces he endangered himself and his family. As paramilitary commanders began to claim jurisdiction over the exercise of local governance, David was further exposed to retaliatory violence as they demanded he submit municipal budgets to their oversight. After they called him and delivered a deadline—November 20, 2000—to confess “anything pending” he fled the region.

Putumayo and Plan Colombia

During this period, the region also factored heavily in Washington debates over the appropriate role of U.S. assistance for Colombia. The same month

that David was called to accountability by paramilitary commanders working with the local military, Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Brian Sheridan told the *St. Petersburg Times*, “Putumayo is a poster child for why you need Plan Colombia. The FARC and the paramilitaries are running roughshod all over the Putumayo right now, killing each other, blockading roads, holding villages hostage . . . and the military and the police are nowhere to be found.” His formulation of Putumayo, erasing military and police presence and complicity with paramilitary forces by portraying the region as in chaos, became the standard narrative for understanding Colombia (Tate 2010). Colombia began to be discussed as a possible failing state, in danger, in the words of one senior defense department official, of “sliding off the table.” In 2000, U.S. president Bill Clinton announced what became known as Plan Colombia, a \$1.7 billion dollar aid package. The majority of the assistance was military aid; the package made Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid after Israel and Egypt. The largest single program—\$600 million—was military training and supplies destined for the “Push into Southern Colombia,” for new counternarcotics army battalions that would be based in Putumayo.⁵ While U.S. support was limited to counternarcotics operations, staffing and training military battalions operating in historic FARC strongholds made the operations largely indistinguishable from counterinsurgency.

U.S. jurisdiction in the region was justified by U.S. official “zero tolerance” for all drug production, trafficking, and consumption, organized around the premise that America’s youth must remain innocent of any exposure to drugs. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan formally issued National Security Directive 221, declaring drugs a national security threat, setting the stage for the legislative changes that were to follow. The 1989 omnibus anticrime bill dramatically expanded domestic drug enforcement bureaucracy, and made the Department of Defense the lead federal agency for interdiction efforts in support of law enforcement agencies. In August 1989, President George H. W. Bush issued National Security Directive 18, which “specifically directed the military to assist law enforcement agencies to halt the flow of drugs as part of the national counterdrug effort” (Bertram et al. 1996: 114). Fighting drugs became the primary post-Cold War mission of the U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. military command with jurisdiction over Latin America; widely described as “narco-guerrillas,” the U.S. focus on FARC fused lingering anticommunism with the new counternarcotics concerns. U.S.-sponsored operations in the region frequently bypassed the Colombian government completely.

They were developed, executed, and evaluated by U.S. contractors reporting to U.S. government agencies. For example, military contractor DynCorp ran all aerial fumigation efforts (the spraying of chemical herbicides), reporting to the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), while development contractors Chemonics, Inc., and Associates in Rural Development Inc. ran crop substitution programs for the Agency for International Development (AID).

U.S. officials and their contractors were also deeply invested in population management. U.S. military commanders were required by law to ensure that soldiers with a history of credible allegations of abuse were not allowed to participate in military training; when no existing units free of such accusations could be found, the United States insisted on the creation of new units staffed by recent volunteers (Tate 2010). In Washington, INL and AID officials debated on whether or not any inhabitants of Putumayo could be considered a legitimate resident. One AID official explained the conflict as between those who wanted to force everyone out of the region—"they needed to go back where they came from"—and those who supported development projects that would allow farmers to make a legal living in the region.

Excluding the military programs, from 2000–2004 Plan Colombia funding in Putumayo was more than five times the state's budget.⁶ USAID argued that existing Colombian governmental agencies were weak, highly corrupt, and frequently delayed in their execution of program funds, resulting in U.S. funds being channeled through NGOs rather than any Colombian government institutions. The view of these contractors toward the local population was summarized in a Chemonics report evaluating a \$200 million alternative development grant, the majority of which was spent in Putumayo, and which described the region until 2000 as a characterized by "perverse social capital." In their view, all social practices and networks in the region were condemned as contributing to violence and instability.

As a result of the U.S. programs and escalating violence in the region, a number of international agencies, as well as Colombian human rights groups, established programs in Putumayo. The International Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other transnational humanitarian organizations established offices in Putumayo during this period, providing important political and material resources for community activists. Colombian national organizations Minga (an indigenous concept of collective work) CINEP, the Women's Path to Peace (Ruta Pacifica de Mujeres), and the Quaker Andean Service Committee (Comité Andino de Servicios) all began working

with local community initiatives. They organized several community forums addressing local concerns about the impact of counternarcotics policies, as well as about political violence. In 2003, the Ruta Pacifica organized a march of approximately 3,000 women in support of peace and against violence and fumigation operations.

Local Officials Stake Their Claim

While David was simply attempting to fulfill his mandate as a state official to communicate public concerns to his superiors, other local officials used the political space opened up by the presence of international NGOs to critique alliances between paramilitary forces and state agents, in the process participating in the articulation of what I am calling the aspirational state.

Elected officials in Putumayo and other regions of the country where Plan Colombia programs were carried out protested the lack of opportunity for participating in the policymaking process. According to then Putumayo governor Jorge Devia Murcia, he was never consulted about the project, and learned of the proposal from the media. Beginning in late 2000, the governors of Putumayo, Nariño, Huila, Cauca, Caquetá, and Tolima formed the "Southern Alliance" to press for more opportunities to participate in centralized planning and offer alternative programs. In February 2001, they presented the "Southern Project," proposing an end to fumigation and increased social investment, and offering a model of alternative development based on sustained investment in participatory planning as the basis of peacebuilding in the region. The governors explicitly rejected Plan Colombia because of its development without the participation of local authorities and communities (M. C. Ramírez 2011). Invited by U.S. NGOs, they traveled to Washington and met with civil society and government officials to express their concerns.

"Carlos" was another local official who expressed his objections, as a personero (municipal ombudsman) to the central tenets of Plan Colombia. A flamboyant lawyer in cowboy boots and with a flair for dramatic tales, most of which featured him confronting some powerful person in defense of local peasants and small time traders—such as negotiating with guerrilla and paramilitary commanders for the release of captured young men or standing up to what he called "high officials" from the federal government who would arrive in campaign season and depart with empty promises. He argued that the central government's vision of the region as criminal was "very erroneous,"

contributing to political divisions that “strangled all forms of regional autonomy and cultural expression,” and that in fact local residents were deeply committed to social transformation. He channeled his opposition to military-paramilitary collusion through national and international NGOs, including testifying to Human Rights Watch for their reporting, and participating in a closed forum with the U.S. ambassador, two U.S. congressional representatives, and other U.S. officials organized by national human rights NGO Minga and Washington advocacy group the Washington Office on Latin America.⁷

Carlos described the central state as being reluctant, unwilling (*reacia*) to recognize local political priorities and participation. In his case, it was his connections with well-established NGOs that allowed him, as a local civilian state official, greater political space. These NGOs working in the region served as intermediaries; the ability for local officials to intercede with the central state was made possible by the support of these NGOs. He went on to emphasize that local people “want to see a distinct form of political leadership, they want to truly believe in a transparent administration that works for the public good, that will truly provide public services.”

Officials like Carlos have been able to mobilize the symbolic resources of the state in order to develop state activism on particular human rights cases, and to serve as a critical link between civil society groups and other state institutions. Many local state officials viewed Bogotá-based NGO representatives as more powerful, not less—NGO activists often enjoyed higher class standing, more education, and better international connections and opportunities—than many local state officials. In some instances, local officials relied on NGO activists to support their efforts to promote human rights, provide education training opportunities, pursue investigations of specific cases, and connect them with international groups (and support political asylum claims and other protective strategies); their colleagues within state institutions were often un-supportive of their efforts or even undermined them. State agencies applied to international funding sources—including the U.S. and European governments as well as the UN and private foundations—to support their projects, further blurring the lines between state agencies and NGOs. Many of the same staff circulated between these institutions.

These state officials demonstrate the importance of distinguishing the different alliances and linkages among state agencies, which can be marshaled to support or challenge official state positioning and interests. Gupta makes important observations about the difference between national bureaucracies and

local structures, challenging “Western notions of the boundary between state and society” in the more fluid relationships between public servant and private citizen in small rural communities (Gupta 1995: 384). The roles of Colombian local civilian state officials, including personeros, their relationships to national bureaucratic structures, other government agencies, and NGOs, illuminate the possibilities and the limitations of such efforts. In Carlos’s case, the limitations became apparent the year following his encounter with U.S. Congressional representatives, when threats from the local paramilitary commanders escalated and his NGO connections—primarily Human Rights Watch—would facilitate his political asylum claim abroad.

Understanding the role of these local civilian state officials requires an alternative history of Putumayo, locating the rejection of armed actors’—including the Colombian military—claims of jurisdiction over the population, and the articulation of a vision of a responsive, democratic state in generations of local organizing. Armed actors, as well as the Colombian state officials, almost always categorically rejected these demands, as the result of manipulation or criminality. These efforts were fragile, often met with brutal repression, but this history is fundamental for understanding the multiple ways in which local residents and officials understand and make claims on the state. In many cases, porous boundaries between civilian officials and local residents make classifying such efforts as part of “civil society” or “the state” extremely difficult. In many instances, these claims were facilitated by national and international NGOs, who created the forums for the articulation of these claims; NGO representatives and training provided the language of rights claims that were employed before national state officials.

Civil society groups also organized to protest Plan Colombia programs implemented in the region, as well as the escalating political violence during this period. One of the first examples was a large gathering called “The South Evaluates Plan Colombia,” organized by Colombian national NGOs Minga and CINEP on December 10–11, 2001, in an educational center on the outskirts of Puerto Asís. The primary goal was to present Putumayo residents as legitimate citizens with credible proposals worthy of respect from national and international state actors. Local officials and community leaders were given space to speak; in small group sessions distinct local concerns including political violence, fumigation, and alternative development programs were discussed. The mayor of Puerto Asís, the governor of Putumayo, and the national coordinator of Plan Colombia for the Colombian government, Gonzalo de Francisco, were present, as well as representatives from the Canadian,

Swedish, and British Embassies and the UN human rights and development programs.

In the opening welcome, organizers referenced the history of local demands on the state, locating the state, not citizens, as the source of betrayal and being unresponsive, reminding listeners that “this is not the first time that Putumayan peasants tried to provide a means to end coca cultivation with social support” by invoking the failed Orito Pacts from the 1996 cocalero marches as “when the national government wasted the opportunity to make the pacts a real proposal for social economic development for the entire department.” They went on to issue a call to “state agencies, to the human rights NGOs of the world, to the human rights NGOs of the country, to the departmental and municipal institutions, to the countries that intervene” to replace funding for war with money for development and humanitarian programs. During the two days, the majority of the public discussion centered on the issues of fumigation and concerns about money for development projects: who were designated as recipients, the requirements for it, and the issues in implantation of these projects. Ongoing fumigation was widely criticized as undermining local participation by destroying alternative and food crops, as well as serving as one of many examples of the betrayal of peasant trust and expectations raised by state promises. During the forum, statistics from government and Colombian NGO human rights groups were quoted to demonstrate the severity of the situation, but there was little discussion of specific cases in the region, probably due to fear. There were subsequent similar forums held in Putumayo, and activists traveled to Washington with the support of DC-based NGOs to meet with U.S. officials about the impact of U.S.-sponsored military and development programs (Tate 2010).

Putumayo community leaders, working with NGOs, created additional channels for expressing their demands to an aspirational state. The Putumayo Women’s Alliance (La Alianza de Mujeres del Putumayo, herein Alliance) emerged in the early 2000s as a loose network of women community leaders, many of them teachers or involved in rural community organizations, such as the regional chapter of the Ruta Pacifica. Being recognized as a politically powerful force, and being able to participate in local political debates, is widely recognized by Alliance members as an important objective. An explicit part of their feminist political agenda is to play a more active role in designing local policies, particularly those that impact women such as ensuring the enforcement of Colombian legislation safeguarding women’s rights. They also hope to gain material benefits from the state, including a building, with a lot,

to serve as their permanent office. In their view, broad participation of women in formulating local public policies, efforts to safeguard collective memory and symbolic recognition of loss, and demands for legal redress in individual cases all constitute the embodiment of citizenship.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have analyzed recent struggles over the right to rule in Putumayo. In so doing, I have had several goals in mind. First, I have attempted to complicate official claims that the problems of the region stem from a deficit of state activity. U.S. and Colombian officials have repeatedly declared Putumayo to be a chaotic region characterized by an absent state and a criminal population. I have argued, however, that Putumayo is a region characterized by the hyper-presence of state-like actors. Indeed, it is this surfeit rather than the deficit of state-like actors and organizations that is responsible for many of the problems faced by Putumayenses.

Despite official claims to the contrary, Putumayo is oversaturated with state-making activity. Indeed, the region is the scene of competing and contradictory projects of rule—a fact that introduces the second question I have explored in this chapter. How, I have asked, do states come to be imagined when people are confronted with conflicting political projects, none of which is able to prevail over its competitors? As we have seen, these are precisely the conditions that have developed in Putumayo. The presence of multiple actors and organizations with pretensions to govern the region has meant that the population of Putumayo has been confronted with opposing visions about how political life is to be organized, conflicting expectations and demands about appropriate behavior. It has meant that the region’s inhabitants have been compelled to consider competing normative claims about how space is to be organized (cf. Trouillot 2001), and have had to make sense of conflicting experiences of verticality and encompassment (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). The presence of multiple projects of rule that vie openly with one another has also meant that Putumayenses finds themselves confronted with an array of institutional orders, each of which presents itself as the locus of authority. Much the same applies to the cultural principles associated with the various projects of rule, each of which claims to be the exclusive basis of legitimacy.

I have placed equal emphasis on the peculiar nature of state effects (Abrams 1988) in Putumayo—on the ways that conditions in this region tend

to create confusion about what the state is, where it is located, and who acts in its name. Military officers, for example, have come to exert considerable control in the region, but much of this is through (paramilitary) proxies (López 2010). This practice has the important effect of blurring the boundary between state and nonstate (Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1999; Nugent 2010). But it does more. It also raises questions about what the true locus of state power is, where it is to be found, and which principles and practices are involved in the legitimation of rule. Similarly, foreign governments (especially the United States) have intervened extensively in the organization of everyday life, especially through projects that focus on the management of public infrastructure and local governance. Like their counterparts in the Colombian military, however, the U.S. government has generally acted through proxy forces like civilian contractors—creating further confusion about which institutional orders represent the state, about who might be the power behind these institutional orders, and what the locus and source of that power might be (cf. Krupa 2010). The vision of Putumayo that circulates in official policy circles as an outlaw zone, a region of state absence dominated by a criminal population, which is being reformed through U.S. intervention, has served to justify the self-congratulatory assessments of U.S. intervention and formulate these efforts as a model for other regions (de Shazo et al. 2007; Pickering 2009).

The general populace has thus been confronted with conflicting claims about the right to rule, as well as confusing and inconsistent messages about where the state is located and which institutions and individuals act in its name. These conditions have produced a destabilizing and fragmentary experience of the relations between state, society, territory, citizenship, and rights. In these circumstances, local state officials have organized to express alternative visions of citizen-state relations. They have done so by means of what I have called an aspirational state. Civilian government officials have at times played a crucial role in helping civilian groups that seek to craft their own political futures. But state officials have been only one element in a complex network of actors and organizations that have sought to promote an aspirational state—a network that defies any neat division between state and society, and that undermines claims that the territorial state and its bureaucracy is the locus of governance.

Putumayo is only one of many regions throughout Colombia and other countries in Latin America that have hidden histories that involve illicit drug production, the presence of illegal armed actors and struggles for control between an array of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. As

noted above, cases such as these invert conventional understandings of state-society relations, and in the process show the highly interested nature of normative claims about the national state. The Colombian case dealt with here also sheds light on the multiplicity of forms in which states may be imagined—such as that in Putumayo, in a deterritorialized form, in which the national state is not regarded as the sole source of authority or legitimacy.

PART V

THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

Chapter 12

Off-Centered States: An Appreciation

Cyanendra Pandey

There is *perhaps* a new consensus among scholars investigating the concept of the state.

The state is a secret that appears in at least two guises. The first is as an idea that legitimates political and economic power, masking the advance and in-temperate consequences of capitalism (and, one might add, what was called “socialism”) under the rubric of the interests of the people. It serves this particular function well since “democracy,” the obvious alternative conception, is too open, too obviously imperfect, and too continuously negotiated, to allow similar cover. It appears second—as the reference to “the people” in the preceding sentences will already have indicated—as the nation-state, concerned with the development and welfare of the world’s people divided as they are, historically, into nations—although these tend to be presented as natural, rather more than historical.

The latter guise is empirically verifiable. Whether we like it or not, regimes that claim statehood issue passports, enact laws, impose taxes and punishments, organize economies, and provide a variety of infrastructural facilities and the conditions that enable some kind of work and security and “ordinary” life for their citizens. This remains true to a large extent even today, when the idea and sanctity of the nation-state has been seriously called into question. New supra-nation states have come into being (although one might argue that outside what is recognized as “Europe,” these already existed in India, the USSR, and the United States, to take only three examples), and powerful “non-state” organizations (the IMF, the World Bank, international finance

more generally, NATO, the UN and its various agencies, perhaps even a number of international human rights groups) have emerged to challenge the sovereignty of nation-states, and to organize important aspects of state surveillance, rewards, and punishment, as well as many national economies.

The former—the idea of the state as providing legitimating cover—is more elusive, yet no less compelling: an insight that helps make sense of a great deal that we recognize as having long gone on, and still going on, around us. In pursuing this insight, and seeking to interrogate the “pretensions of regimes to being states,” as Abrams has it, and claiming a unity of political power which is in fact always dis-united, several recent writers have called for theoretical work that builds on a careful documenting and contextualizing of the emergence of the state and the state-idea (Abrams 1988: 77–79; Mitchell 1999: 84, 89). The scholarship presented in this volume follows from the consensus I have outlined above, which I hope is not entirely imaginary, and from this call to take seriously the history of the process and the making of the modern state, or states.

Three important lines of inquiry run through the chapters. Perhaps the common underlying thrust is an investigation of how the idea of the state, by its pretenses, claims, inheritance, and aura, serves to cover up unpalatable facts of political power and inequality in society. State formation, as the editors suggest, is “usefully understood as a cultural process, rooted in violence, that seeks to normalize and legitimize the organized political subjection of large-scale societies.” Elaborating the proposition through an exploration of the colonial legacies of the modern Andean state, Irene Silverblatt points out how the new bureaucracies of the colonial era structured systems of rule and political discourse that shrouded “special interests [in a] language of . . . universalism and rationality . . . [in an] idiom [of the] public good and the public will.”

The new language of state, David Nugent writes, “was based on assertions of equality and the common good that systematically masked or distorted extant social relationships.” Or, again, to take a contribution that focuses more sharply on one kind of state practice, Christopher Krupa, while recognizing the value for those in power of the abstraction and universality that inhere in cadastral mapping, finds nevertheless that, in an attempted and seemingly progressive cadastral reform in Cayambe (Ecuador) in 2002, “it became impossible for the expanding state bureaucracy to disentangle its cadastral mission from the race- and class-based systems of domination (themselves based largely on land ownership and administration) that had passed for state in the canton for centuries.”

The starting point of this collective reflection, then, is a close analysis of arguments about the “public good,” or the good of all, and of the political struggles that inevitably accompany all such claims. A second major aspect of the inquiry concerns the concrete, real-life consequences of these political struggles, and the exercise of privilege or punishment organized around the idea of the state (although this is perhaps more implicit than explicit in some of the contributions to this volume). Related to these inquiries is the perceived need to examine what constitutes the power of the state *idea*, and its capacity to reproduce itself and, with it, the power to persuade (or punish).

In pursuing their task, the writers and editors of these chapters do a double-take on the history and practice of the state. They begin by invalidating the idea of the state as an entity: that is to say, as a unified, or focused, powerful and overwhelming force. What is the referent when people talk of “the state”? the editors ask. Where and what is the state? How do people apprehend it, and experience it? Is there an “it”? The answer to all of these questions, if one may be ungrammatical for a moment, is “No.” There *is* no clear or obvious referent; there is no clear-cut location or identity of the state; people apprehend and experience state-effects, the fear of something called the state, the aura or magic of this intangible power, the consequences of state actions, in all sorts of ways. For all that, the contributors suggest, when you get down to it, when you *really* look and try to pin it down, there is no “it” there.

Having begun the task of undoing the idea of the cohesive state, however, which different contributors do in remarkably sophisticated ways, with a wealth of empirical detail and careful demonstration to illustrate their arguments, the authors pause, look again, and ask: what then is the mystery of the state, the state-effect that persists, frightens, and often spells a certain awe—even in our own time, when the critique and the dismantling of the state and statist politics have proceeded so far? They call attention, thereby, to a more complicated question, flowing from the contention between what might be called two theories of power, the Hegelian/Marxian and the Foucauldian/Deleuzian, the concentrated and the capillary. Power in the former mode is unified and indivisible, centralized, hierarchical, and marked by generalized—or generalizable—conditions of dominance and subordination. In the latter, it is, of course, rather more unpredictable, distributed much more widely, along multiple grids, diffused, flowing, spreading, intensifying, assembling, and reassembling in unexpected ways. The first conceives of the state as an integrated object, sovereign, supposedly above the fray of day-to-day political

squabbles, and hence able to protect the shared interests of a unified ruling class or coalition of dominant classes. The second, perhaps more in line with the thinking of most of the contributors to this volume, is more layered, flexible, and variable, and hence more capable of explaining or illuminating the multiple kinds of state operations and practice, and the various modes of state appropriation (bottom up, top down, and in other directions), that we encounter in these pages—and beyond. Nevertheless, there is a tension between these two theories of power that needs to be addressed more directly.

I stress the point because it seems to me that the state as an idea still remains caught between these two modes of power. For the notion of the state returns time and again, by the back door or by default, to the state as that centralized, unified power that somehow has legitimacy and can grant it. It seems to me an important task, therefore, to work out the theoretical relation between a history of the modern state and a rhizomatic understanding of power. What is the place of the state idea in the scenario that talks about the uncountable locations of power, its extensive diffusion, through multiple and malleable grids, and its expansion and contraction, dilution and intensification, at many different points and in many different ways?

What remains of the power of the idea of a “state,” of generalized dominance and subordination, in the present state of the academic debate? One might ask, in this context, not only what is the republican state, which is somehow able to grant legitimacy, but, also, what is the authoritarian state in the rhizomatic scenario? How would we analyze an authoritarian state: Nazi Germany, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, South Africa under apartheid, China today? What is the “state” that political society, deprived of “civil society” rights and the status of citizens—undocumented workers, slum dwellers, rural migrants to the cities, illegal immigrants to North America and Western Europe (and Australia, and India, and Singapore)—still call on? (Chatterjee 2004). And what remains of the power of abstraction, enumeration, standardization, universality—the homogenizing tendencies that are the hallmark of both capitalism and the modern state? For there is clearly some tension between the notion of diffused, decentralized, ephemeral power and the disciplinary state that Foucault writes about—not to mention the image of a powerful (now, perhaps even more powerful than ever before), secret, super-state, run by secret bureaucracies and financial interests and political factions responsible to no one.

A cynical response to what has been said above might be to suggest that the secret of the idea of state appears to be rather like the secret of the idea of

God in the Judaic tradition: a force that is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere, unreachable and unquantifiable, yet (somehow) providing legitimacy to earthly arrangements, threatening punishment and promising reward—though not always in the here and now. Where does that leave us students of the state, believers or nonbelievers—historians, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, concerned citizens? Fortunately, the contents of this volume offer several points of subtle and valuable guidance. Let me note three of these that we could very usefully follow up.

The first is the strong affirmation that the state is but a claim—the claim to order, rule, even “civilization” (which, the argument goes, is not possible without the state, order, rule)—a claim, in other words, to legitimacy.

Second, following from the first proposition, the authors urge us to view the state, not as an entity or thing, or even a bundle of established institutions, but as a process, as a project, as a claim to authority that is never fully realized. This project or claim is commonly marked by decentralization, by a necessary adaptability and flexibility, multiple and varied modes of incorporation: indeed, multiple and varied nodes of state practice, and therefore of the production of the state or state-effect—often from the bottom up, rather than the top down. It is marked, thus, by a multiplicity of state presences, variations in the daily practice of state power and constitutionality, with diverse initiatives and constant negotiations helping to bring the state into being.

This is a critical and enlightening suggestion, as several of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, but it is perhaps not nearly enough. For, in one reading, the proposition of state-as-process does no more than to defer the question of the referent, shifting its identity or location or it-ness to another (future, ongoing, albeit negotiated) time and place. Hence, the final proposal made by the authors and editors of this volume—and one of its signal contributions.

This final proposition is that the state is, fundamentally, from beginning to end as it were, off-center. The articulation is novel, and powerful. The point is not that the Andean states, which are the subject of investigation in this volume, are not quite like the long-dominant, “mainstream” states of Western Europe and North America; or that the states along the Andes range are exceptional, even in terms of some supposed dominant pattern in Central and South America. The proposition is that the state—as state—is always, everywhere, off-centered. That is to say, the claim, project, power (however one may wish to conceive of this force) is necessarily out-of-sync, off-kilter, disjointed, disarticulated, displaced, not quite there. It is certainly not what it pretends to

be, or what people dealing with the state, or talking of the state, imagine it to be. The need is to examine the Andean states, and all states, as the editors put it, "as off-centered political fields and *from* off-centered locations of analysis." This is an insight that is both productive and far-reaching in its implications.

"Precisely because they cannot be seen," Krupa and Nugent write in Chapter 1, "states must be imagined . . . [or] constructed out of everyday encounters with objects, rituals, persons and activities that have no inherent relation to one another or to the totality that we call the state. While some of these bear the mark of the state, others do not. In each of these encounters, we suggest, people seize on what is immediately available to them and on the basis of what this encounter suggests, they make several kinds of imaginative leaps and magical connection." The contributors proceed to examine, among other things, the role of affect and imagination—the remarkable, the delusional, the fantastical, and the routine—in the everyday history of the state: to powerful effect, as readers will see.

Yet, propositions regarding the disarticulation and disjointedness of existing power arrangements lead one back to the question of ongoing struggles for alternative political arrangements, for social and cultural power to be distributed in other ways. The question is, who is able to act under the impress or the imprimatur of the state, when the state becomes a powerful resource in these larger, longer-lasting political battles, aimed at restructuring, rescuing, revitalizing, perpetuating, or transforming particular patterns of social, cultural privilege and dominance—everyday and extraordinary. At stake here, as part of the battle for political and social advantage, is the articulation of the *idea* of the state, or claims to being a state with the legitimacy attaching to that status. One question we might still ask is: what is it that produces this effect, the secret or magic of the state, the ethos that gives value to its presence? What is it that still allows the disjointed state, the weak, dispersed, and incoherent state, to be a force, to remain, in spite of all its weakness, something that one needs to claim? There is the aura of an inheritance, but, I would suggest, there is also something more that goes into the making of the mystique and the force.

The mystique of a remote, central authority derives, it seems to me, not only from an inheritance and a presence—because it is there, and apparently very powerful—but also from the fact that that remote authority comes, in curious ways, to embody ideas and promises that go well beyond the interests of the ruling groups or classes. Thus, the early modern state is apprehended, far and wide, not only as powerful and arbitrary, and not only as divinely

sanctioned, but as being ultimately on the side of justice: hence the peasant rebels who rose up in the name of the tsar in Tsarist Russia, and tenants who did so in the name of Queen Victoria in nineteenth-century India, believing the monarch could not have sanctioned the kinds of oppressions being meted out to them by local authorities (Field 1976; Kumar 2006).

Or take the case of the European conquests and colonial adventures of recent centuries, legitimated most commonly in self-satisfied arguments about a civilizing mission. Colonizers had other, more urgent, pursuits—the extraction of minerals, the capture and sale of slaves and indentured laborers, the establishment of captive markets and manufactures and trade routes—but they also had the albatross and contradictions of the civilizing mission around their necks. For, while the narrative sanctioned conquest, and arbitrary rule and punishment, it also opened up questions about the rights of the colonized—even if these rights were pushed into the far future, or into oblivion, in the majority of cases.

Similarly, one might note how the developmental state, which is the preferred self-description of most postcolonial nation-states, has in one instance after another articulated its claims in terms of some of the most advanced ideas of the age—the universal right to freedom and democracy, self-determination, education, and welfare for all—guaranteed by institutions of social, economic, and political democracy, and a benevolent state. It is such rhetoric that has played a large part in giving these regimes their right to exist.

Anticolonial struggles, and modern revolutionary struggles more generally, however decentralized, disaggregated, and even contradictory they may have been, have time and again arrived at political positions and platforms far in advance of the thinking of any of the individual constituents, very much greater in other words than the sum of their individual parts. Thus the preamble to the U.S. Constitution, which says nothing, of course, about the existence of slavery, or the conquest and annihilation of Native American nations:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Or that of the Republic of India, similarly persuaded that problems such as

that of Untouchability, domestic servitude, or discrimination against religious minorities are an aberration:

We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, economic and political; Liberty, of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation; in our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitution.

As early as 1925, indeed, a leading political organization of a minority religious community in northern India, the Sikh Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, accepted for itself and for its largely rural constituency a platform of universal, adult franchise, irrespective of education, property holding, income, gender, class, or other qualifications. The Indian constitution of 1950 unanimously adopted an equally undiluted, universal franchise for all adults, men as well as women—some time before the United States and many countries in Europe had accepted such an extensive electorate. In the Indian case the constitution, and the attendant political movement, has written into it a political agenda and a promise, the implications of which many among the leaders of the anticolonial movement surely would not fully comprehend, let alone support. With the adoption of the republican constitution, secularism was declared to be the goal of Indian society, Untouchability was abolished, and penal legislation followed to back up these ideals. It is the creation of such a position, I suggest, well in advance of its constituent parts, that gives to the idea, or phantom, of the state a quite unusual ideological and political legitimacy.

The power of the state idea is, in some senses, parallel to that of the law. For all the corruption surrounding it, law has a stature that derives from something that goes beyond its institutions and practitioners. In India, as in the United States of America, I am repeatedly struck by the fact that oppressed groups, minorities, Muslims, Hispanics, blacks, Dalits, people who have suffered in a variety of ways under existing political arrangements, and have battled against them powerfully and effectively over a very long period, continue to speak up for their constitution as a fundamental guarantor of justice—a statement in which they are readily joined by the dominant majorities

and mainstreams of the two countries. The cynic would say, “What constitution? The constitution means nothing, given the entrenched power of vested interests, and the virulence of caste and communal discrimination, racism, and long-standing prejudice.” And yet the minorities and many new opposition groups invoke the constitution for the limits it marks and the goals it sets: “We, the people . . .,” “irrespective of caste, color, creed, sex or place of birth,” “give to ourselves . . .” this Constitution and these promises. We will be a free people, a tolerant, democratic, secular, and, in the Indian case, even “socialist” society, working for the welfare of all, caring for the poorest and most helpless in the land.

Let us be clear that the state in these instances rarely delivers on all, or many, of its wealth of promises. The colonial state “civilizes” the colonies only to the extent of creating the best possible market for its goods and services, providing a transport network, armies to secure the territory, and a minimal bureaucracy to keep notes. Nor do most developmental states do a great deal to “develop” the societies and populations inhabiting the territories they control, or pretend or seek to control. Nevertheless, the point to stress is the powerful impact of a position that is in advance of what one might describe as the reigning political consensus. To a large extent, that position draws its power precisely from the fact of being *in advance*, whether it is in the “divine” right of kings, or the “civilizing” mission, or a constitution speaking in the name of all the people.

What we have here is an articulation that brings us back to the proposition of the off-centered state, and calls for investigation into the distorted nature, the manifest lack of fit, between the articulated constitutional position and any existing political practice, bureaucratic institutions, and ideological battles. While none of the latter quite lives up to the underlying proposition and promises, there is a certain power in the claim. That claim is seen as a guarantor by people who know that it is not only unrealized, but in many respects fake. It is an ideal to fight for, and a platform to fight on. In other words, the articulation of the most advanced anticolonial, or revolutionary, or democratic political position ends up by providing very different possibilities for different people to speak under the impress of the state—a state that never exists, but one that has accumulated a certain power and mystique. We need to take this into account as we seek to analyze the question of legitimacy and value that somehow accrues even to the disarticulated and weak state, and the less-than-coherent arrangements of national power today.

If in the current state of our knowledge, the idea of the state appears a bit

like the idea of God—cohering (if at all) only in the minds of believers, in ways that cannot be described, ineffable but ever-present, intangible yet threatening—the differences between the two domains should not go unrecognized. In the modern conception of the state (and we would do well to remind ourselves that there is no other), the “state” is not omnipresent and omnipotent, except by agreement of, and ideally through negotiation with, “the people.” It is less in a statist threat of punishment, than in the statist promise of “normalcy” and opportunity, that its power to legitimate lies.

In seeking that legitimacy, and the power to legitimize, modern states or their representatives (perhaps like earlier gods and their chosen prophets?), the laws and the constitutions, often overstate their promise—and thereby provide the grounds for unanticipated and frequently unmanageable (oppositional) political action. Here perhaps lies the strength of the idea of the state: here, and in the sheer weight of historical inertia. And here too lies its fragility.

Chapter 13

Viewing States from the Global South

Akhil Gupta

This fascinating and complex collection sets out to offer an “off-centered” view of the state. As seen from Latin America, the state—the bureaucratic nation-state idealized and normalized in the self-representations of European theorists and leaders—appears as a strange object. Seen from somewhere else, the normative model of the state appears off-kilter, its seams showing, its unnatural nature evident. Provincializing Europe is not just about deconstructing European self-representations from within, but also seeing the normative model of the state from elsewhere, from somewhere where it appears off-center.

My task in the midst of these brilliant reappraisals of the state in Latin America is to take an off-centered view of that which is already off-centered. My view, therefore, is not so much doubly displaced from the northern center, as one that queers the already off-centered view from the south, a view *of* the Global South *from* the Global South. Although the Latin American perspective and a view from South Asia are equally estranged from dominant models of the state, the state on which I do my research—India—also differs dramatically from the states mentioned in these chapters. This leads me to reflect on how much our theories of “the state” are actually embedded in the structures and histories of particular states. Perhaps, as this volume suggests, what we need is not so much theories of “the state,” assuming that our object is the same, but instead theories of states, whose similarities and differences are to be discovered rather than assumed.

The Indian state is historically very different from the Latin American

states that are analyzed in this volume. While both India and Latin America share a peripheral location with respect to the capitalist core, their peripherality does not make them similar, but they are, instead, shaped by their different histories before colonialism as well as by their different functional relationships to the capitalist core. For instance, unlike Latin American states that achieved independence relatively early in the formation of nation-states, the Indian state was a late bloomer. In the great wave of decolonization that swept the world in the twentieth century, India was one of the earliest and largest to attain freedom when it became a nation-state in 1947. It is important to remember, however, that by the time India became an independent country, the "peripheral" Latin American states of this volume were already more than one hundred years old.

Another significant and paradoxical difference between the Indian and the Latin American cases is in the history of race and racism. This is paradoxical because, unlike the experience of Latin American countries, British rule in India was marked by separation of colonizers from colonized, the lack of widespread admixture and intermarriage, and the relatively small numbers that made up the mestizo and creole populations. Unlike in Mexico, something akin to mestizaje could never be a national ideology in India, both because the absolute numbers of British were so small, and because there was a strong colonial taboo against intermarriage with the natives. This was one way in which Spanish and Portuguese colonialism differed from English colonialism. Could it be a legacy of the fact that Iberian colonialism preceded British colonialism and, therefore, was "inexperienced" in the colonizing project? Or was it because Iberian racial ideology was different from its Northern European counterpart? Dutch colonialism, which stands temporally between these early and late colonial powers, was in-between on the mestizo question, leaving small but politically important mestizo classes in the areas it colonized, particularly in the example of the burghers of Ceylon.¹ This is one of the significant differences between forms of settler colonialism, such as that practiced by Iberian powers in Latin America, and colonial rule from afar, as practiced by the British in India. One of the consequences of the British style of colonialism has been that the legacy of racial issues in India is not as politically fraught as it is in Latin America. For instance, South Asia does not have the elaborate typologies of race (one-fourth of this, or one-eighth of that) that are common in Latin America, and British colonialism, unlike the Spanish and Portuguese, did not leave a tiny minority of creoles and mestizos on top of a majority of Indians and blacks.

Ironically, we now (mis)use the term "caste" from the Portuguese "castas" to talk about Indian *jatis* (and the dominant image of India is that of a "caste society"), whereas, as Silverblatt shows, the castes that Iberian colonialism were to create and embed in Latin America are seen primarily as "racial" divisions. Another irony is that such racialized divisions have been much more consequential in the case of the Latin American countries where there was intermarriage between colonizers and colonized, than in the case of South Asia where interracial marriage was uncommon. Race-thinking did serve as a scaffold of colonial administration in India, but its legacy has not been as deep and wide in India as it has been in Latin America, nor has it been as politically consequential. The state in contemporary India has had to struggle with the question of caste, but not as much with colonial racial categories as the states in Latin America.

European colonization started with trade, and then moved on to other enterprises. In Spanish Latin America, that enterprise was often mineral extraction, but once colonialism metamorphosed into "settler colonialism," and the various nation-states became formally independent of the Iberian fatherlands, the question of funneling surplus to the metropolitan centers became less urgent. State structures were shaped to a large extent by a comprador bourgeoisie, export economies, extractive industries, and a peripheral location as supplier of raw materials to the capitalist core. By contrast, British colonialism in India moved from trade to agriculture and land revenue, because enormous and regular surpluses were available in that sector. Extractive industries never played a very important role in India, although selling cash crops on the global market was certainly very significant: opium, indigo, tea, and cotton were perhaps the most important commercially. After the rebellion of 1857, British rule was threatened, and had formal independence been achieved at that stage, it is possible that India too would have moved in the direction of comprador capitalism and the selling of raw materials on the global market. But that shift never really happened, and when the British Crown officially took control from the East India Company, it moved very much to being a land-owning state whose surplus extraction was chiefly in the form of land revenue. Why is this fact so important?

It is important for at least two reasons, one of them having to do with its imbrication in existing, precolonial state structures, and the other with its articulation with existing forms of local power. What is striking to me about Silverblatt's chapter on the forms of state created by the Spanish in implementing projects such as the Inquisition is not so much the admittedly fascinating

point that modern bureaucratic procedure (what we might call *bureaucratismo*) is institutionalized by the Inquisition, or that the Inquisition re-created and stabilized racial categories, and that these forms of categorical thinking were reinforced in other arenas where bureaucratic procedure was employed. Rather, what I find intriguing is the ease with which the Spanish appear to have replaced existing state structures and procedures in their state-making endeavors.² This “absence” of the resistance or friction posed by preexisting state structures may be merely the result of the fact that Silverblatt’s focus is elsewhere, but preexisting state structures do not have much of a role to play in any of the chapters, including the ones by Nugent and Krupa that deal with later time periods.

In the Indian case, the involvement of the state in land revenue meant that colonial state structures were overlaid on long-existing bureaucracies. From the beginning, colonialism was enacted by incorporating difference. In its hybrid character, the colonial state was always already “postcolonial,” and never functioned entirely in the model of a European state. If the British can be seen as founding a “modern state” in India, then that modernity was never simply Western because it was a palimpsestic unity of different kinds of state formations. Indeed, many of the offices of the colonial state were taken directly, in function and form, from the precolonial Mughal bureaucracy and, even today, retain the same names and functions as they did perhaps seven centuries ago. Colonial rule did not so much replace existing state structures as overlay new structures on the old ones, and incorporated some of the processes, offices, and personnel from extant structures of surplus extraction in the subcontinent. A similar process might have been at work in some parts of Latin America, where, as Karen Spalding argues, existing state bureaucracies may have exerted their own friction in the establishment of a “modern” colonial bureaucracy. However, the extent to which a new bureaucratic order builds upon an older one depends to some significant degree on whether it serves similar functions and draws upon familiar symbols of rule.

In a very general way, one may distinguish between two forms of rule. In one, colonial rulers (the Spanish or the English) replace an older ruling elite but retain the apparatus of rule. What one gets here is a change in the head of the king, but the body of the state remains intact. Another ideal type is diametrically opposed to this and often results from “modern” revolutionary movements. In this transition, not only do a new set of rulers come in with very different ideologies, methods, and purposes, but forms of rule are drastically altered.

The first type of change results in palimpsestic structures; the second in new structures that seek to erase the past, and replace the *ancien régime* with a “modern” state. The Indian state resembles the first outcome, but it is not clear to me from reading these essays whether the Latin American cases are closer to the second ideal type. If so, it certainly complicates reading both of these as examples of “postcolonial” states. While there is much that would allow us to connect postcolonial states to each other, it is always important to keep differences in mind so that we may better appreciate what makes a state “postcolonial.”

Both types of postcolonial state structures sketched above are haunted by the image of the centrifugality of the modern state. This is the familiar image of a state where power emanates from a center to the peripheries of the national territory and to the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. The modern state is a state with a powerful center, and power emanates from this center both geographically and symbolically because the state is a crucible of territoriality and nationalism. As opposed to a previous era, our cartographic and administrative imaginations of the state have diminished with the hegemony of territorially based nation-states. The “postcolonial” aspect of such a modernist imaginary is exposed by the inability of states in places like India and Latin America to ever become “modern”: their aspirations to an ideal-typical nation-state are futile from the start, and have become even more so in a transnational world. In Nugent and Krupa’s contributions, we see most clearly the “incompleteness” of the project of the modern state. In their accounts, the state at the local level is not simply weak because it is further from administrative and symbolic centers, but because it is effectively captured by personalistic forms of power. Instead of the Weberian image of a well-ordered and hierarchical structure, it blends into local forms of power so much that it is indistinguishable from rule by powerful castas, or traditional forms of patronage and clientism practiced by a dominant aristocratic class. As Nugent’s essay argues with particular clarity, “the state” itself becomes a resource over which local elites wage a no-holds-barred struggle for dominance. Here the modern state metamorphoses into something else, and the “dissipation” of the state into local forms of power is inevitably seen as a failure of the centrifugal, modern state to take root in hostile conditions.

Such a failure is especially evident when the modern state is supposed to have replaced older forms of rule (as in the second model of the postcolonial state mentioned above). In the palimpsestic interpretation of the colonial and postcolonial state, it is expected that new state structures will build upon ex-

isting ones, and that any new administrative and surplus-extracting machinery will depend on existing structures. Elite capture and localization of the state are here not seen as a problem, but as a fact of social life that any new regime or state has to contend. Thus, the "Cambridge school" of historians contended that British rule in India was "light" because it relied on a very small number of Englishmen who captured the highest positions in the bureaucracy, but who relied on locally powerful people to do their work. In this rendering, the colonial state shared the surplus with existing elites and did not seek to displace them from their positions of dominance as long as they did not challenge the legitimacy of British rule. In its extreme form, this style of analysis makes colonial rule yet another variant of existing forms of hierarchy and surplus extraction and denies that there was anything about colonialism that made it different from native rule. Although the Cambridge School of Indian history was severely criticized by nationalist and subaltern historians for its race-blindedness, its model of the palimpsestic state and its view of the centripetality of power was, ironically, perhaps closer to a subaltern geography of power.

Krupa's chapter in this volume points to contradictory aspects of transnational state imaginaries. He points to the support being given for the construction of accurate cadasters by a whole range of transnational actors, from the World Bank to USAID. Whereas cadasters were first employed to draw people "in to the governmental reach of a new sort of state system," they have now become part of a transnational project to "localize" and "decentralize" the state. This follows from an analysis of the failure of development to reach the poor as being the result of centralized and centrifugal states that were out of touch with local needs and conditions. Decentralization and the empowerment of local government have become the mantras of a new wave of "reform," and as a way of by-passing centrifugal nation-states with powerful central bureaucracies. These state structures have become so efficient at extracting rent and appropriating surplus, it is argued, that they prevent meaningful development by siphoning aid to the poor, or by taking resources away from the poor for the benefit of bureaucrats.

Krupa demonstrates that the new forms of aid do not seek to distribute goods and services that directly benefit the poor but change techniques of governmentality by which citizens are governed. In the case of cadaster reform, the idea is to make all citizens pay roughly comparable land taxes. The idea was that making land tax transparent and equitable would result in new revenues so that local municipalities could obtain enough funds to do the

kinds of things that they had not been expected to do so far but that "decentralization" has thrust on their shoulders: provide infrastructure in the form of roads, electricity, and water, municipal services such as garbage collection, and services in the fields of health, education, public safety, and so on. Historically, ladino groups who controlled agriculture in the countryside paid very little tax, and poor Indians bore the brunt of the tax load. Krupa shows that, despite the expectations of transnational actors, "fair" and "transparent" cadasters run into significant problems with local elites. Giving legal rights to land, or overhauling the taxation system, articulates with local power structures because existing structures already allocate those rights in particular ways. Thus, any change, while seemingly a neutral, technocratic, administrative change, is always also a political change that shifts relations of power and the distribution of surplus. Krupa thus suggests that such changes may end up being "successful" precisely in those areas where they shore up existing power relations. On the other hand, he suggests, they might not end up working in places where the powerful can successfully block changes that work against their interests. As Nugent demonstrates, however, not all policies impact the powerful in the same way, and intra-elite competition may well make it possible for some redistributive and republican measures to be successful.

The chapters in this volume also agree on a central contradiction of Latin American states: the conflict between the principles of equality on which these states were founded and the inequality of the society in which they operate. Inequality based on race, property, and ancestry, these papers argue, continues to structure the everyday workings of these states despite the principles of equality enshrined in their constitutions. The gap between what *is* and what *ought to be* is the structuring contradiction that defines postcolonial states in Latin America. This contradiction is accepted because it is part of people's lived reality, but when there arises a situation, as in Krupa's description of the canton of Cayambe in Ecuador, where political power depends upon the indigenous majority, but economic power remains in the hands of a ladino minority, the contradiction becomes visible and leads to open conflict.

Like the Andean states, the Indian state was founded on republican principles, and like the Andean states, it has struggled to reconcile the principles of equality enshrined in the constitution with the *de facto* inequalities of caste, class, and gender that have shaped social life. However, as a late entrant to the world of nation-states, and an early entrant to the world of democratic politics (India became a full democracy only eighteen years after Britain gave all its

citizens the right to vote with the granting of the franchise to women in 1929), this gap between formal equality and *de facto* inequality has been contested by the pressures of popular democracy. The architect of the Indian constitution, B. R. Ambedkar, a lower-caste lawyer, feared that if this gap between promise and reality was not bridged, it would lead to the disintegration of Indian society. It took almost four decades for lower-caste majorities to find political expression as majority parties in regional states, but the fact that they did so has been significant. It has consolidated the long-held idea in India that constitutional equality was not just about formal equality, equality before the law, but was also about substantive equality, about enfranchisement and empowerment of all subaltern groups. Globalization is leading to new forms of inequality, and has widened the gap between those who already have some cultural and educational capital and the poor majority who do not have such capital. However, this gap between promise and achievement remains front and center in India's political and judicial systems. Popular democracy does not necessarily close the gap, but it makes it hard to escape the dilemma and to prevent it from occupying the public sphere. When indigenous majorities start controlling the levers of politics in the Andean nation-states, as has already happened in Bolivia, we can expect to see what has happened in India being replicated there.³

The anger of the masses who are denied access to the equalities promised to them by the law is a potent image. Such an image reminds us that one of the most underexplored issues in the study of the state is the question of emotion, of the feelings that connect or alienate people from the state. There is little doubt about the centrality of emotion and feelings to the study of the state and one must ask why there is so little scholarship on this very important question. One possibility might be that social science has had little to say about feelings, and although alienation is a central trope in both Marxist and Weberian sociology, it remains remarkably underdeveloped. Another reason is that political science and sociology have dominated the study of the state, and neither discipline has had much to say about emotion, partly because institutional analysis and political economy approaches dominate these fields, and those approaches are the least likely to do justice to the study of feeling.⁴ Anthropology, meanwhile, often trades in emotion: the strength of ethnographic writing so often lies in its ability to evoke emotion and sentiment, but interest in the state in anthropology has historically been low.

Whether one thinks of nationalist feeling, or whether one thinks of emo-

tions such as fear, frustration, disappointment, or hope, part of being a subject and a citizen is to be emotionally invested in the state. Without understanding the emotional ties between citizens and the state, we cannot understand how people respond to state initiatives and actions. Krupa records the opposing sentiments of flower-growing mestizos and poor Indians to a purportedly politically neutral "technical" intervention: the cadastral survey. Mestizos are incensed that they have to pay taxes and beg for tax relief from elected Indians; Indians, on the other hand, are happy to be taxed because the cadastral survey promises to fix taxes in a manner that is fair for all concerned. Mestizos stage a riot, burn the municipal building, and attack the mayor for his Indian sympathies: their primary relation to the state is organized around the emotion of anger. The mayor arranges a counter-rally in which Indians appear to thank him for development programs, and express support for the new cadastral tax, which would have left their own payments intact but extracted much more from the rich mestizo landowners. Sentiments of gratitude and fair play seem to dominate the Indians' relation to the state.

On the other hand, as Nugent's essay brilliantly demonstrates, without understanding the emotions that rule state officials' interactions with the population, we cannot make sense of the actions of state officials. The officials in Chachapoyas are driven by fantasy and fear, and anxiety and delusion, and seem incapable of completing simple tasks because they imagine the presence of a secret party that is thwarting their every move. In this manner, Nugent suggests, paranoia and fear are woven into the everyday actions of the state and constitute the routine functioning of state institutions. If the Weberian state is haunted by the fear of disorder, then the state in Chachapoyas could not be Weberian because fear and disorder were at its core. And yet, the state in Chachapoyas officially and publicly was based on the principles of efficiency, disinterested perusal of the public good, and establishment of regular procedures for citizens' access to goods and services. Its secret, which everyone knew yet no one could name, was that it was institutionally and culturally incoherent, and it was the recognition and denial of this incoherence that paradoxically gave the state its coherence.

Silverblatt's description of the Inquisition makes it clear that emotion has had a large role to play in the operation of the Peruvian state through history. The effort to get at the truth through torture and then not trusting the information obtained by that method throws state officials into the position of not trusting what they know and not knowing what they trust. Suspicion becomes

the reigning emotion by which state officials encounter citizens, and the arbitrariness of suspicion is countered by the meticulous procedures that are followed in torturing people and extracting confessions, and the recording of these procedures in exact detail.

Perhaps no writer has captured citizens' emotional investment in the state as powerfully as Kafka. In *The Castle* (1998), most of the "action" involves speculation about the motives and actions of bureaucrats. Long passages attempt to discern the "meaning" of every act for what it may signify. In fact, nonaction, too, becomes the source of an endless loop of signification. The primary emotion is uncertainty and hope, and it is in fact hope that the bureaucrat will intervene in a benevolent manner that structures K's time, which is otherwise filled with waiting. Waiting for a decision, not knowing what that might be, speculating on the motives of the bureaucrat and the meanings of each action or non-action, and hoping for a favorable outcome—these are the emotions that dominate *The Castle* and have made its portrayal of the state resonate for so many people. Kafka's work not only underlines the importance of emotions in citizens' relations to the state, but also how much individuals are at the mercy of actions that appear arbitrary although they are generated by the "rational" apparatus of the state. Reading Kafka alongside Weber reminds us about that which is missing in Weber's description of the state apparatus—the sentiments that it mobilizes and discards, emotions like fear, trust, loathing, speculation, uncertainty, longing, joy, hope, and despair. Kafka's work suggests that no description of the state can afford to ignore this dimension of the state, and this is what gives *The Castle* its enduring value.

The unsettling quality of Kafka's representation of the state is also due to its subtle undermining of realism. Representations of the state in social science often take the form that Krupa and Nugent call "state realism." By this term, they mean that representations of the state end up replicating and naturalizing certain conventions by which states represent themselves. Realism thus partakes of, and participates in, the naturalization of certain conventions, optics, and forms of power by which states represent themselves as standing for the general interest, in a realm "above" society, as a rational, efficient, centrifugal, and meritocratic apparatus. As Nugent's chapter shows clearly, state realism cannot allow that fantasy and fear have a role to play in its everyday functioning, and thus relies on "displacement" and delusion to achieve coherence in its self-representation. Because Nugent rejects Taussig's idea of the state as a magical projection, he does not necessarily accept that the only forms of representation that might be adequate to such an object are them-

selves surrealist or experimentally nonrealist. His chapter though does raise the question of whether we need to stretch the boundaries of realist social science to understand the delusional quality of state officials' own understandings of the state. If so, it might be worth thinking about what forms and styles of writing are adequate to the task, and the ways one might evoke the emotions that states evince in their subjects and officials.

Notes

Chapter 1. Off-Centered States: Rethinking State Theory Through an Andean Lens

1. In the pages that follow we make no attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on the state. The reason is quite simple. A number of insightful works and reviews have already been published. We have found the following to be particularly useful: Abrams (1988); Aretxaga (2003); Coronil (1997); Corrigan (1981); Corrigan and Sayer (1985); Ferguson and Gupta (2002); Foucault (1991); Gupta (1995); Hansen and Stepputat (2001, 2005); Herzfeld (1992); Joseph and Nugent (1994); Mitchell (1991, 1999); Navaro-Yashin (2002, 2007); Poulantzas (1975); Roseberry (1994); Sayer (1994); Scott (1990, 1998); Sharma and Gupta (2006); Steinmetz (1999b); Taussig (1997, 1999); Taylor (1997); Trouillot (2001); Weber (1958, 1968).

2. For important scholarship on the problem of citizenship, see Dagnino (2006); Hale (2006); Holston (2008); and Postero (2007).

3. See Ong (1999) for a fascinating discussion of the concept of fragmented sovereignty.

4. Projection, of course, is a key term in Freudian psychology. We would like to emphasize that our use of this concept has an entirely different meaning, as we outline below.

Chapter 2. The Idea of the State in Colombia: An Analysis from the Periphery

I am grateful to the Colombian Institute for the Advancement of Development, Science, and Technology-COLCIENCIAS; the Colombian Institute of Anthropology and History-ICANH, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for funding the research in Putumayo between July 2007 and July 2010 on which this chapter is based. I also want to thank David Nugent and Christopher Krupa for their insightful comments, which contributed to the expansion of the chapter's scope and the sharpening of my analysis. Thanks to Andy Klatt for his translation.

1. I understand “politics” as actions taken by politicians as representatives of political parties. Focusing on local political elites, I am seeking to unveil how political elites in Putumayo conceive political action and to understand “the distinct cultural frameworks [that orient] their actions and make them meaningful” (Gledhill 1994: 9).

2. Tate’s chapter in this volume provides a detailed account of the ways FARC commanders regulated social life in Putumayo, including their requirement for local officials to report their operations.

3. Likewise, in the peace negotiations begun in October 2012 in Havana, Cuba, President Juan Manuel Santos and other state representatives expressed their wish for FARC to collaborate in the eradication of coca.

4. Five municipalities make up lower Putumayo: Puerto Asís, Orito, Puerto Caicedo, La Hormiga (Valle del Guamués), and La Dorada (San Miguel).

5. See Tate’s chapter in this volume.

6. In this vein, Gill’s chapter in this volume sustains that the Colombian state has historically established “overt and covert alliances” with nonstate actors in the region where she worked, in order “to promote particular social, political and economic projects.”

7. This section is based on fieldwork conducted in Putumayo between 2007 and 2010. I made two one- to two-month trips to Putumayo each year, during which I held workshops with local politicians, conducted interviews, and observed the October 2007 elections. In addition I had access to the archives of the departmental assembly in Mocoa and the municipal council of Puerto Asís.

Chapter 3. Respatializing the State from the Margins: Reflections on the Camba Autonomy Movement in Santa Cruz, Bolivia

1. Neil Brenner (2004) argues that there has been a kind of restructuring of rural and urban regional power, a sort of reterritorialization of state power under contemporary globalizing capital. This is similar to Saskia Sassen’s (2001) model, whereby places like New York and Los Angeles become nodes of specialized financial and marketing firms with global links—critical nodes of commerce, culture, and ideas.

2. Central to the process of decolonizing the state has been rewriting the national imaginary, challenging the narrative of the nation-state written so long ago by the white criollos who founded the first Bolivian republic.

3. Distinct groups have come together to promote this regional project of autonomy, such as Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente (CAO, the Eastern Agricultural Chamber), the Federación de Ganaderos (Cattle Ranchers’ Federation), Cámara de Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbon Chamber), and CAINCO. Together, these institutions control the primary political tool in the autonomist struggle, which is the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee or Civic Committee (CPSC), a self-elected governing body dominated by business and agro-industrial elites that has a long history of resisting control of, and demanding subsidization by, the central government (Gustafson 2006).

4. As urban planner Benjamin Kohl (2003) notes with regard to land reforms, although

neoliberal land legislation promised to give indigenous communities titles to their lands, those responsible for carrying out the law materially failed to follow through on many of the promises. Exact figures are hard to come by, but even the most generous statistics document that between 1996 and 2003, 79 million acres were distributed to 40,000 people in large parcels, while only 10 million acres were awarded to 550,000 campesinos.

5. Rosanna Barragán (2008) states that centralism has been described as an oppressive power, an expression of internal colonialism by Santa Cruz elites.

6. The CAO supports large-scale agrarian development and resource extractivism.

7. Cruceño was a term used to describe a person of pure Spanish blood, while Camba was a Guaraní word to describe a dark-skinned indigenous peasant, a peon tied to the *finca*, or plantation, by debt (Stearman 1985). More recently, elites have appropriated the term Camba for themselves: de-Indianizing it, whitening it, and making it an acceptable designation for elites despite their identity as Europeans (Pruden 2003).

8. It is important to note that despite Morales’s initial intent to undermine and marginalize the powerful latifundios in the East, he has more recently made many concessions with agribusiness elites (including the CAO) in order to sustain many of his social programs. Elites initially feared a radical redistribution of lands. However, fears have lessened over time as the new constitution did not take away their lands but rather redistributed government lands to poor campesinos.

9. While I do not have the space to develop this idea in this chapter, I have discussed in other contexts the ways autonomists mobilize transnational discourses of democracy and freedom to promote a capitalist model of development (see Fabricant 2011) and stand against what they view as indigenous communist invasions.

10. Equipetrol, situated in the northwestern section of the city of Santa Cruz, is an active and famous neighborhood found between the second and third *anillo* (beltway). In the mornings after cleaning, it could be any neighborhood, but in the afternoons from 4 p.m. through evening, Barrio Equipetrol is charged with life. This is especially the case when schools and universities are on vacation, on public holidays, and, without fail, every Friday and Saturday night. Equipetrol is the place elected by young people to *pirañear* (to “pick up” or “check out” the opposite sex). It is usually filled with elite Cambas who are part of *comparzas* (social clubs or fraternities). Yet, it is also a racialized space, as poor indigenous vendors weave into and out of such social networking spaces selling bubble gum, mints, and cigarettes.

11. Antelo also spoke often about changing the image of Bolivia from one that focuses on the Andes, or what he calls *Andinocéntrico*, to one that focuses on the beauty and richness of Santa Cruz and the Media Luna. He also emphasized the fact that Bolivia is majority mestizo: “We are a population of mestizos, people who are mixed, and in the East, we are a population of White-Mestiza, and we don’t have anything to do with the Aymara.” As Gustafson and Fabricant (2011) have noted, for the right-wing elites of the East, the rejection of all things Andean helps fuel the reaction against MAS, which is seen as neither Bolivian nor national, but *Andean*. This reaction against Andean Indians and

the appropriation of local indigeneity serves the interest of regional business elites and their ultimately anti-indigenous political projects in eastern Bolivia.

12. “Si for autonomy” refers to the campaign slogan, “Yes, for autonomy,” which was successful in rallying votes for departmental autonomy and for pushing for a national referendum on autonomy in May 2008.

13. Elites have masterfully seized on mythic tales and appropriated the Guaraní warrior as a central character in their performances of autonomy. They have reshaped historical narratives to present the warrior as a powerful and unstoppable force against the Incan empire (Pruden 2003; Lowrey 2006).

14. See Stearman (1985) and Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler (1969).

15. For more on this, see Ferguson and Gupta (2002), in which they argue that more work needs to be done to excavate the imagination of the state and the ways in which the state is spatialized. They ask us to think about the images, metaphors, and representational practices the state comes to represent.

16. These tactics were quite successful, as the Constituent Assembly was paralyzed for months. Finally, in February 2007, MAS and the right-wing political parties reached a settlement in which each article of the constitution would be approved by two-thirds of the commission in charge of it, and then the entire body, concluding with a public referendum for final recognition of the full text. With this compromise, the assembly ended its seven-month break and began its work on the content of the constitution.

Chapter 4. State Formation and Class Politics in Colombia

1. Colombian regionalism was not exceptional among Andean states of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, for example, Nugent (1997) and Larson (2004).

2. Beliefs about national development emerged from a vision of economic liberalism in which free trade, individual sovereignty, propertied citizenship, and “whitening” through *mestizaje* would produce national prosperity. Although Colombia’s Liberal and Conservative parties were divided during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, male elites in both parties embraced the liberal vision to a considerable degree. See Saford and Palacios (2002). See, also, Tinker Salas on Venezuela, where oil and national development were closely intertwined (2009).

3. John Green makes the point that, despite the factional squabbles that divided the Colombian left, there were few clear distinctions between communists, socialists, and the left wing of the Liberal Party represented by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (Green 2000).

4. These groups included the peasant-based and communist FARC, the Trotskyist Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the socialist M-19, and the Cuban-influenced ELN.

5. See Hylton (2010) for a discussion of the relationship between U.S.-backed counterinsurgency programs, especially Plan Colombia, and paramilitarism.

6. See Hylton (2007) for an analysis of the paramilitary takeover of Medellín at approximately the same time. See also the chapters by Tate and Ramírez in this volume for a discussion of the Putumayo region.

7. See Markarian (2005) for a discussion of a similar process among Uruguayan exiles.

8. See Tate (2007: 72–106) for an insightful discussion of early human rights activism and its subsequent professionalization in Colombia.

Chapter 5. Cadastral Politics: Property Wars and State Realism in Highland Ecuador

1. On the notion of the mystical in relation to state formation, see Derrida’s “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” a phrase he borrows from Montaigne’s statement that “laws keep up their good standing, not because they are just, but because they are laws: that is the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other” (Derrida 1992: 12) see also Agamben (2005: 38). The concept of state realism is discussed further in Chapter 1.

2. Cadastral maps are distinguished from other state-produced maps by their taxation-function, their chief purpose. Kain and Baigent (1992: 336) claim that “in the Old World, more land was surveyed and mapped by the state for setting and recording land taxes than for any other single purpose.”

3. See, for instance, the 1898 Hut Tax Rebellion in Sierra Leone (Crooks 1903; Denzer 1971) and the anti-*alcabala* protests in colonial Ecuador (discussed here) as prime examples of the breaking down of this basic political relationship of rural life.

4. This is in many ways reminiscent of the problems Roseberry (1993) identified with land reform initiatives during the Cold War. The agrarian question was, he suggests, “a political question that was given a primarily economic answer” (336); in other words, the problem of subduing a potentially revolutionary peasantry was addressed by projects of land redistribution and enabled by studies of rather adaptive rural class processes. Today, however, the problem has in many ways been reversed—economic questions (of poverty, informal livelihoods, the effects of flexible accumulation strategies, and so on) are given primarily political answers (via rights, titles, state recognition, etc.). See the conclusion of this chapter for a return to this theme.

5. “This topic,” we are told, “incorporates more than public administration of land titles. Improving systems of property registration is a means of recognizing rights formally, resolving conflicts, increasing transparency, increasing participation in governance and property markets, improving the security of investments, improving contracts enforcement and motivating investment in environmental conservation” (USAID 2000b, emphasis added).

6. Property’s entry into the generic lexicon of development also expanded the global expertization of knowledge and skill. Following the 1998 summit meetings, all multilateral organizations formed separate bodies and sideline organizations devoted specifically to the administration of property projects. USAID, for instance, formed the Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative in 1998, and in 2004 the IAARPR developed the “Landnet Americas” system to coordinate its actions with other bodies (such as the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Lincoln Institute of Land

Policy in Cambridge), and disseminated the Blueprint for Strengthening Real Property Rights to guide individual states and donor organizations through the analysis and reconstruction of property systems.

7. As I have elsewhere written, it is necessary to understand the location of “mestizo” as indexing not simply a racial identity (of mixture, ideally indigenous and Spanish) but also a political location equivalent to that of the *ur*-citizen, by which I mean “the “unmarked” or “natural” citizen of a nation, the unquestioned subjects of rights and recognition that defines the interior of the national-political community and, with that, the naturalization of exclusions suffered by those deemed outside it” (Krupa 2011: 149).

8. Ley Especial de Descentralización del Estado y de Participación Social (Special Law of State Decentralization and Social Participation): Ley 27, Registro Oficial 169, 8-XX-97. Suplemento del Registro Oficial 265 27-XX-98 (Reforma a la Constitución, Título XI). Ley 2000-1, Suplemento del Registro Oficial 20, 18-II-2000, Decreto Oficial 1616, Registro Oficial 365, July 2001.

9. The five-year period of this project is significant since, under Ecuadorian law, cadastres must be updated every five years. This implicitly fused “sustainable [municipal] development” with property regulation and marked the year 2000 as foundational for the regenerative cycles of both.

10. This parallels the appeals to the king by Creoles against generalized taxation in colonial Quito. Their argument, as Hurtado (1980: 35) has outlined, was that “the king could not enact taxes from his American subjects without taking into account the services rendered by their forefathers in conquering these lands at their own expense.”

11. Different sources published radically different calculations of “supporters” in attendance. These get bigger the farther our sources move from Cayambe. Local radio station Radio Mensaje reported five hundred people. The regional newspaper *Diario del Norte*, February 23, 2002, 10, claimed 1,500. Of the two national papers that covered the event, *El Universo*, February 16, 2002, A16, said there were 2,000, and *La Hora*, February 17, 2002, A18, estimated 4,000.

Chapter 6. New Arenas of State Action in Highland Ecuador: Public Health and State Formation, c. 1925–1950

This analysis draws on research projects funded by Associated Medical Services, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, and the University of Western Ontario, to whom I am grateful. I also appreciate the assistance of the directors and staff at the archives in Quito where the research was conducted, especially at the Archivo del Servicio de Sanidad at the Museo Nacional de Medicina (ASS/MNMM) and the Archivo General de la Universidad Central (AGUC).

1. I have discussed the second project at greater length elsewhere; see Clark (2012a, b). Those publications provide additional bibliographic and archival references relevant to the maternal-infant health project outlined here.

2. Prieto (2004, chap. 4) provides a useful contextualization of that work within the larger history of dominant images of and policies toward Andean Indians. For an analysis of related projects in Quito, see Kingman Garcés (2006).

3. Various documents from May–July 1926, LCR (Libro de Comunicaciones Recibidas)–BAG (La Bubónica en Ambato y Guaytacama) 1926–1927, ASS/MNMM.

4. P. Zambrano to General Director of Sanidad, Guaytacama, May 31, 1926, LCR–BAG 1926–1927, ASS/MNMM.

5. P. Zambrano to General Director of Sanidad, Guaytacama, June 4, 1926, LCR–BAG 1926–1927.

6. P. Zambrano to General Director of Sanidad, Guaytacama, July 6, 1926, LCR–BAG 1926–1927.

7. León provincial delegate to General Director of Sanidad, Latacunga, July 6, 1926, LCR–BAG 1926–1927.

8. General Director of Sanidad to the Comisario Municipal de Calles, Quito, July 19, 1926, LCE (Libro de Comunicaciones Enviadas)–1926, ASS/MNMM.

9. General Director of Sanidad to President Ayora, Quito, June 15, 1926, LCE–1926, ASS/MNMM.

10. See various documents and petitions from April, May, June, October, and November 1927, in ASS/MNMM.

11. “Nómina del Cuerpo Médico Ecuatoriano en el año 1938,” *Anales de la Sociedad Médico-Quirúrgica del Guayaquil* Año XXVIX 18, 1 (January 1938): 27–42.

12. “Al Público,” Ambato, June 1935, LCR–Delegaciones Provinciales (DP) 1935, ASS/MNMM.

13. “Protección Infantil,” Ibarra, February 1936, LCR–DP 1936, ASS/MNMM.

14. Consuelo Rueda Saénz to the Director General de Sanidad, Quito, September 27, 1929, LCR 1929, ASS/MNMM.

15. Information about the social position of Rueda Saénz and other midwifery students is drawn from enrollment records of the Faculty of Medicine at the Universidad Central in Quito, Archivo General de la Universidad Central (AGUC).

16. The first two points are gleaned from the enrollment records at the AGUC; the third is based on the professional registries maintained by the Public Health Service, held in ASS/MNMM.

17. Consuelo Rueda Saénz to the Tungurahua provincial delegate, Ambato, September 5, 1940, LCR–DP–II 1940, ASS/MNMM.

18. For the 1930 figures, Tungurahua provincial delegate to the General Director of Sanidad (trimestral report), Ambato, May 1930, LCR–Informes Anuales Delegaciones 1928–1930, ASS/MNMM. For 1938, monthly vital statistics report for Ambato county for September, ASS/MNMM.

19. On the state as a claim see Krupa (2010).

Chapter 7. The State and Indigenous Women in Ecuador, 1925–1975

1. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, in the context of a debate about women's suffrage, a discussion emerged among intellectuals about the use of gender in language that asked, for instance, about whether the word "citizen" had a gender (Prieto and Goetschel 2008). We have not found a similar debate concerning the indigenous population; in other words, when these intellectuals speak of the indigenous population, it is not clear if they are speaking of males only or of a group undifferentiated by gender.

2. Luiz Alberto Toaza, a colleague from the province of Chimborazo in central Ecuador, explained to me that today the notion of the family continues to be translated as *ayllu*, but that this word now has a range of meanings. The terms *wasiukuayllu* or *ñukaayllu* are used to refer to the family made up of a couple and their children. The term *ñukanchikayllu* includes grandparents, uncles, and in-laws; *jatunayllu* refers to the whole community. In the indigenous community everyone is considered part of an extended family; persons who are married are called "uncle" or "aunt" and persons to whom one owes respect are called *taita* (father) or mother.

3. *Tinterillos* (derived from *tinta*, Spanish for ink) were rural clerks with some legal training, often self-taught, who drafted legal documents and served as intermediaries between the indigenous and legal worlds.

4. See Chatterjee (2004) and Stepputat (2001) for related arguments about India and Guatemala respectively.

5. Valeria Coronel considers that the free indigenous communities were fundamental to the establishment of the postcolonial state, especially during the period of state liberalism (personal communication, 2010).

6. These monographs were published in the journal *Llacta* and were later used in the design of the Andean Mission programs (see below).

7. Indigenous men and women have been a part of a long trajectory of state interventions in land and marriage disputes. Until the twentieth century, these issues were not seen as part of the state's responsibilities of social protection.

8. Ministry of Social Welfare, Intermediate Archive, Quito, "Pilahuin Report," 1931. Since at the time there was no national legislation for the regulation of free communities, the ministry required communities to enact their own individual bylaws to define community membership and to regulate the use of resources.

9. At the end of the 1960s, a population census in the province of Pichincha established that 35 percent of the population was indigenous; 64 percent lived in free *comunas*, and the remaining 36 percent in haciendas (Peñaherrera and Costales 1970).

10. It is interesting to note that the concept of diversification of production was developed by Beate R. Salz (1955), an anthropologist who proposed the creation of rural industries as a way of disciplining the indigenous labor force and improving their living conditions.

11. This issue took a long time to come into focus. First, the nations had to prepare information about the conditions of their native peoples for a worldwide report. The

technical mission to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador then laid the foundations for a regional program. It is interesting to note that the idea of a region-wide program was initially conceived by a group of evangelical churches. The document produced by this group considered that indigenous women were the principal contact for a program that combined evangelization and development (Rycroft 1946).

12. Before the installation of the Andean Mission, Victor Gabriel Garcés (1941, 1946), a noted *indigenista*, had published, locally and abroad, several studies of the living conditions of the indigenous people. These documents served as the basis for a baseline study of the indigenous populations in the Andean postcolonial nations.

13. An address given by the director of the Andean Mission refers to a "revolution of the forgotten people." In addition, interviews with ex members of the mission showed that technicians, particularly women social workers, had constructed a legitimating mystique about the program, which served as the articulating logic of their professional work, reinforcing their role as intermediaries between state agencies and indigenous communities.

14. Ministry of Social Welfare, Intermediate Archive, Andean Mission, Survey of indigenous communities, 1959.

Chapter 8. Haunting the Modern Andean State: Colonial Legacies of Race and Civilization

Many thanks to Chris and David for graciously and generously inviting me into this extraordinary discussion. I learned much and am truly honored to be a part of this effort. This chapter draws from and builds on my *Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Civilized World* (Silverblatt 2004).

1. Several chapters in this volume elaborate and complement the arguments about the machineries of state-making and race-thinking developed here. Please see Chapter 1, along with the chapters by Krupa, Prieto, and Spalding. I also want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

2. Some historians would not use the term "state" to characterize the polities of early modern Europe, see Feros (2000).

3. Kamen (1998) is the principal source for the descriptions that follow.

4. Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) (Madrid), Inq. Leg 1647, no. 5; Jose Toribio Medina, *Historia del Tribunal de la Inquisición de Lima, 1569–1820*. 1956.

5. Magistrates believed "voluntary" confessions were more reliable than coerced ones.

6. The literature on "race" and colonial Latin America is vast, cf. Cahill (1994).

7. For "race-thinking" see Arendt (1973). Also see Holt (2000), and Hall (1983) for theoretical insight.

8. See chapter, "States and Stains," in Silverblatt (2004) for greater detail.

9. AHN, Inq, Leg 1647, no. 10; AHN, Inq, Leg 1647, no. 13; AHN, Inq, Lib 1031, f. 31; Juan de Solorzano Pereira (1972 [1647]).

10. See Medina (1956 [1887]), and AHN, Inq. Leg 1647, no. 13, which contains the trial against Manuel Bautista Perez.

11. For detailed components of these “conspiracies,” see “New World Christians and New World Fears,” “Becoming Indian,” and “Inca’s Witches” in Silverblatt (2004).

Chapter 9. Appearances to the Contrary: Fantasy, Fear, and Displacement in Twentieth-Century Peruvian State Formation

1. APRA is the acronym for the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Popular American Revolutionary Alliance). Members also referred to APRA as the Party of the People.

2. See Sharma and Gupta (2006) for an insightful discussion of the distinction between functional and cultural approaches to the state.

3. See Larson (2004) for a fascinating analysis of the rise of the “Indian question” in the Andean republics in the late nineteenth century in relation to elite efforts to modernize the region.

4. For a discussion of Roman law as a new language of legitimacy in early modern European state formation, see Abrams (1988).

5. See Nugent (1997, chap. 2) for a more detailed discussion of the relationships outlined in this section.

6. Information about the characteristics of the regional population was available in the form of municipal records and census materials.

7. The figure of 2,125 men per province assumes that men pressed into military service were gone for an average of five years, a figure based on extensive discussion with informants. In fact, five years is a conservative figure, for two reasons. First, a large number of men recruited into the army never returned. There are no figures available concerning how many conscripts actually returned home after completing their military service. As a result, it is impossible to calculate the possible long-term impact of this aspect of military conscription on rural social reproduction. Second, it was very unusual for those who did return home to be drafted a second time. In other words, the loss of 2,125 men per five-year period from each of the provinces of the highlands of Amazonas was a permanent one. In order to understand the impact of government policy on the rural population, it would be necessary to subtract this number every five years from the total available to serve conscription needs (something the government neglected to do). While it is true that small numbers of adolescents became eligible for the draft during any five-year period, the numbers were tiny compared to the 2,125 men taken by the armed forces (see MHC 1942).

8. There were 2,021 men in the province of Chachapoyas (a deficit of 104), 1,441 in Bongará (a deficit of 684), 1,415 in Mendoza (a deficit of 710), and 4,080 in Luya (a surplus of 1955) (MHC 1942). The figures refer to the five-year period from 1940 to 1945. I have subtracted men in the nineteen to fifty age category who lived in the city of Chachapoyas, and also those in the larger towns who were listed in census materials or

municipal records as white or mestizo, or who were registered to vote. In general, they were able to avoid the draft. Even so, I have erred on the side of caution; these figures overestimate the number of men available to fill the conscription quotas.

9. See Cobas (1982) and Nunn (1979, 1983) for a more in-depth discussion of the nationalizing, professionalizing tendencies in the Peruvian military.

10. I use “local government” to refer to refer to municipalities (at the level of both province and district). This is because municipal government tended to be dominated by regionally focused landed elites, rather than nationally oriented elite groups.

11. For an unusually insightful analysis of a culture of corruption in a different context, see Gupta (1995).

12. For scholarship on the export zones that formed beginning in the late nineteenth century, see Dore (1988), Gonzales (1985), Klaren (1973), Mallon (1983), and Peluso (1999).

13. According to Stein (1980), APRA appealed in particular to the organized working class, as distinct from the urban day laboring population that was not integrated into union structures.

14. Documentos de Correspondencia de la Prefectura del Departamento de Amazonas, 1936, Archivo General de la Nación. See Nugent (n.d., chap. 5) for a more detailed discussion of this police investigation.

15. Gobernación del Distrito de La Jalca al Sr. Prefecto Interino del Departamento, 15 de Junio de 1932, Oficios de los Gobernadores (1932).

16. The background to these developments is beyond the scope of the present chapter. See Nugent (2010).

Chapter 10. Notes on the Formation of the Andean Colonial State

1. The Royal Council came into being at the end of the War of Succession that confirmed Isabella as Queen of Castile in 1480. The council, dominated by letrados, advised the Crown on high-level appointments, as well as supervised royal administration in general. See Haliczzer (1981, chap. 3); S. Poole (2004: 4–21).

2. Among those who claimed the Inca held a rich oral tradition were Pedro de Cieza de León, whose written chronicles were widely circulated among Spaniards in the sixteenth century (see de Cieza de León 1984). Of the written descriptions of Inca history appearing at this time, one of the most important is that of Juan Diez de Betanzos, commissioned by viceroy Antonio de Mendoza in 1551 (see Diez de Betanzos 1987).

3. For an example of the legal tactics of the native Andean elites in the sixteenth century, see Assadourian (1994: 156–70). For more on the letrados, see Silverblatt, this volume.

4. Vitoria studied and taught at Paris between 1509 and 1523, and his ideas were disseminated by his students who recorded and published his lectures. He became involved in the dispute over the legitimacy of Spain’s conquest of the Americas in the 1530s. As one of the most influential political theorists of sixteenth-century Catholic Europe, his ideas were widely disseminated (Vitoria 1989: xiii–xxviii).

5. An *encomendero* was the recipient of an *encomienda*, a royal grant that authorized the holder to claim goods and labor from a group of natives under the authority of a designated leader, or *cacique*.

6. Medieval Iberian law held that a monarch could not abandon his responsibilities to his subjects; assigning permanent juridical authority of such subjects for money was regarded as equivalent to selling those subjects into slavery.

Chapter 11. The Aspirational State: State Effects in Putumayo

1. It is important to note that there are thirteen officially recognized indigenous groups in the region with distinct forms of indigenous sovereignty exercised within their territories and among community members; this will not be addressed here.

2. Father Jimenez's organizing efforts also resulted in growing resistance to abusive practices by the guerrillas. When the local guerrilla commanders attempted to pressure communities to come out for another large-scale protest march in 1997, the peasants refused, arguing that the previous marches had led to increased violence and poverty without any gain for the communities involved. Father Jimenez was killed while saying mass on September 11, 1998; responsibility for the attack has never been definitely established but it is widely believed he was killed by FARC in retaliation for encouraging autonomous community organizing. After his death, the local peace network dissolved; other local priests who had been involved in his community development projects were transferred to other parts of the country because of threats.

3. A prior generation of death squads known as Los Masetos, linked to powerful drug lord Jose Rodriguez Gacha (and regional landowner), operated in Putumayo. Masetos derives from "MAS"—muerte a los secuestradores, death to kidnappers, the name given to a death squad established by members of the Medellín Cartel after the daughter of a high-profile drug trafficker was kidnapped by members of the guerrilla group M-19. The name spread to be used by any of the regionally based, drug-trafficker-linked death squads that targeted both business enemies and perceived leftists during this time. Between 1989 and 1991 they targeted leftist politicians and anyone accused of sympathizing with the guerrillas, but were weakened after Gacha's killing in a shootout with Colombian police in 1989, public outcry against their brutality, and a FARC attack of their camp.

4. Conversely, wearing knee-high rubber boots, a staple of muddy rural life, was widely warned against, as such apparel signaled rural origin, and a presumed sympathy for the guerrillas, making anyone wearing such boots in town a paramilitary target.

5. The United States has also played a central role in the history of the counter-narcotics efforts in the region, as well as being the primary market for the Colombian cocaine originating there. Beginning in 1989 with the "Andean Strategy," U.S. money, equipment, logistical support, and personnel from the DEA, CIA, and other agencies have played a leading role in counternarcotics operations in Colombia.

6. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit*

Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles (Washington GAO-02-291, February 2002).

7. In February 2000 U.S. Representatives James P. McGovern and Jan Schakowsky traveled to Colombia, together with six congressional staff. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) sponsored the delegation, which meant covering the costs through special fundraising, organizing the itinerary, and leading the actual trip; as the WOLA Colombia analyst, I organized much of the trip and acted as the group's leader while in Colombia. In Puerto Asís, the U.S. ambassador joined the delegation for a day with a large entourage.

Chapter 13. Viewing States from the Global South

1. Although not many people are aware of the burghers of Sri Lanka, many of them are well known, including Sri Lankan-Canadian poet Michael Ondaatje (1993).

2. Karen Spalding's chapter provides an important account of the historical processes by which Spanish colonial rule consolidated circa 1570, after a hybrid period that drew on principles derived from the Spanish and the Inca.

3. It would be interesting to compare the public grammars of equality between countries like India, and Latin American nation-states with indigenous majorities, such as Bolivia and Peru.

4. Although I am aware that there is excellent work on the sociology of emotions, that subfield has not intersected very much with the sociology of the state.

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